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Introduction 
 
 
The aim of the present dissertation is the examination of an important author of Arabic 
Christian literature, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, from a terminological perspective. ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ (d. 840) is an understudied yet interesting Christian author; he was among those early 
Arab Christian authors who wrote the most sophisticated theological works of their era. The 
little information we possess about him has been collected by M. Hayek.
1
 We do not know 
anything certain of his life, except that he was a native of BaÒra, an important Nestorian 
centre of the age. He was a Nestorian theologian who had vast religious and philosophical 
education. Only a vague reference forms the basis of our hypothesis that he might have been a 
bishop or a monk. Two of his works survived: The Book of the Proof (KitÁb al-BurhÁn) and 
The Book of Questions and Answers (KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba). These are considered 
to be among the most sophisticated texts in early Arab Christian theology. The former 
concentrates on controversial issues that Christians living under Muslim rule had to deal with, 
such as the authenticity of the Bible, the question of the Trinity, Incarnation, sacraments, etc. 
It is written in dialogue form, as a reference work for Christians who might eventually be 
interrogated by Muslim opponents.
2
 The latter piece introduces reasoning on the existence and 
unity of God, and then discusses the Trinity and the Incarnation.  
Other contemporary authors include the Jacobite ÍabÐb ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa al-
TakrÐtÐ (d. probably soon after 830) and the Melkite Theodore AbÙ Qurra (d. c. 820-25). 
Theodore AbÙ Qurra was a Melkite scholar and polemicist. Born probably in Edessa, later on 
he is likely to have been a monk in the monastery of Mar Sabas in the Judean desert, and 
finally he was bishop of ÍarrÁn. He is the first known Christian author who wrote theological 
works in Arabic. He was not only known in his own community, but by Christians of other 
denominations and Muslims, as well. He must have held a high status in the society of his 
day, and he is thought to have disputed even in the court of the caliph.
3
 Some of his opuscula 
                                                          
1
 HAYEK, M., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux 
apologies du christianisme, In: Islamochristiana 2 (1976) pp. 70-132. And HAYEK, M., Introduction générale 
In: Ed. HAYEK, M., Apologie et controverses, Beyrouth, Dar el-Machreq, 1986. pp. 13-84. 
2
 C.f. BEAUMONT, M., Christology in Dialogue with Muslims: a Critical Analysis of Christian Presentations 
of Christ for Muslims from the Ninth and Twentieth Centuries, Oxford, Regnum Books, 2005. p. 68. And 
GRIFFITH, S., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-BurhÁn: Christian KalÁm in the First Abbasid Century. In: Le 
Muséon 96 (1983), pp. 145-181. 
3
 GRIFFITH, S. H., Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True 
Religion. In: Eds. SAMIR, Kh. - NIELSEN, J., Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period, 750-
1258. pp. 6-8. 
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survived in Greek,
4
 but his main works are in Arabic and include the Treatise on the Existence 
of the Creator and the True Religion
5
 and the Treatise on the Veneration of Icons.
6
 As for the 
third author, not much is known of ÍabÐb ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ’s life, except 
for his being the Jacobite bishop of TakrÐt or Nisibis in the beginning of the ninth century, 
and that his native language was Syriac.
7
 His surviving works are edited by G. Graf,
8
 and 
include pieces written against Muslim and Melkite opponents. 
 By this period, namely the first half of the ninth century, Hellenism had entered 
Arabic culture, with the translation, dissemination and development of sciences, including 
that of kalÁm. D. Gutas demonstrates that the translation of non-literary and non-historical 
secular Greek books that were available in the Eastern Byzantine Empire and the Near East 
into Arabic had already started, but it was a long process, lasting for more than two centuries 
(8-10
th
 c.s).
9
 The effect of Hellenistic theology and philosophy can particularly be seen in the 
Arabic language which underwent a terminological revolution in the theological, philological, 
linguistic and literary fields. For this reason, the study of terminology is of great interest. As a 
first step, this dissertation aims at demonstrating how the effect of Hellenistic ideas and 
Patristic influence can be discerned in a ninth-century Arab Christian author’s work; and then, 
as a second step whether and how these ideas recur in contemporary or later works of Muslim 
authors. 
By the third/ninth century the translation of philosophical works from Greek to Arabic 
had started,
10
 but exact understanding and accurate use of concepts and terms is thought to 
have been in its inchoative stage. It is due to the fact that when the Arabs began translating 
Greek texts, they lacked a complexity of pre-existing technical vocabulary in Arabic to 
express philosophical concepts. Early translators and falÁsifa had to develop a vocabulary, 
since they needed terms in specific meanings not previously set up in their ordinary language. 
                                                          
4
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Opuscula ascetica, In: MIGNE, J. P., Patrologia Graeca, Vol. 97., Paris, 1865. cc. 
1461-1598. 
5
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuºÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm, Ed. DICK, I., ¹Ùniyya, al-
Maktaba al-BÙlusiyya, 1982. 
6
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ ikrÁm al-ÐqÙnÁt, Ed. DICK, I., ¹Ùniyya, al-Maktaba al-BÙlusiyya, 
1986. 
7
 GRIFFITH, S. H., ÍabÐb ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, a Christian Mutakallim of the First Abbasid Century, In: 
Oriens Christianus, 64 (1980), pp. 164-165. 
8
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma, Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, Ed. GRAF, 
Georg, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium, vol. 130.; Scriptores Arabici, tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 
1951. 
9
 GUTAS, D., Greek Thought, Arabic Culture., New York, Routledge, 2005.  p. 1. (Later on: GUTAS, D., Greek 
Thought, Arabic Culture). 
10
As indicated by GUTAS, D., Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, p. 1. But Kiki Kennedy-Day establishes the 
beginning of the translation movement in the third/tenth century. See: KENNEDY – DAY, K., Books of 
Definition in Islamic Philosophy. The Limits of Words, London – New York, Routledge, 2004. p. 19. (Later on: 
KENNEDY – DAY, K., Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy). 
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They did it in a variety of ways: by transliterating Greek words (e.g. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s barsÙb, 
which stands for πρόσωπον); by adopting foreign words (e.g. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s uqnÙm, 
which stands for the Syriac ܐܡܘܢܩ), and by dedicating ordinary language words to a technical 
philosophical use or concept (c.f. Ýaql, present in all above-mentioned authors’ works).11 
The standard scholarly view on the early development of kalÁm had it that Muslim 
theologians owe their terminology to the translation movement of philosophical works in the 
ÝAbbÁsid era. In this respect, scholarly consensus relies on the interplay of terminologies 
between kalÁm and philosophy. The two fields were still in their formative stages, as well as 
their scientific methodologies. Philosophy and kalÁm themselves were not clearly separated, 
either; since philosophy dealt with the question of God’s existence and cognition in the early 
period, that is, it concentrated on questions that would make up the subject matter of kalÁm 
later on. Though ÝAbd al-AmÐr al-AÝsam argues that ÉÁbir Ibn ÍayyÁn (d. c. 815) is 
considered to have made a distinction between the two sciences already in the first half of the 
third (i.e. the eighth) century,
12
 defining philosophy as the science dealing with the essences 
of caused existents (al-Ýilm bi-ÎaqÁ’iq al-mawºÙdÁt al-maÝlÙla), thus separating it from 
metaphysika (al-Ýilm al-ilÁhÐ), ÝAbd al-AmÐr al-AÝsam admits that this distinction 
becomes widely spread only later, especially after al-KindÐ (d. c. 873).13  
In addition, scholars who adhere to this view highlight the tensions between theology 
and philosophy in the early works. As Kennedy-Day claims it, this tension is evident while 
both sciences aimed at delineating their terminology.
14
 It is generally accepted that al-KindÐ 
incarnates a transition momentum where philosophy and kalÁm were still closely related, 
although apparently philosophy was on its way to a complete de-theologizing. In this 
approach, philosophy is considered as a separated, self-sufficient field free from theological 
terms and impact from the tenth century, beginning with the works of al-FÁrÁbÐ (d. 950/51). 
This view has recently been challenged by Miklós Maróth. In his The Correspondence 
between Aristotle and Alexander the Great (an anonymous novel of letters translated from 
Greek to Arabic), he examines the earliest case of transmitting Greek wisdom. M. Maróth 
demonstrates that Arabic prose literature started by this translation in Damascus, in the first 
third of the eighth century; he also proves that Arabic prose literature developed under a 
strong Greek influence. Thus he modifies the scholarly consensus, according to which Arabic 
                                                          
11
 KENNEDY – DAY, Kiki, Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy, p. 19. 
12
 al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, al-MuÒÔalaÎ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab, Cairo, al-Hay’a al-MiÒriyya al-
ÝÀmma li-’l-KitÁb, 1989, p. 21. (Later on: al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, al-MuÒÔalaÎ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-
Ýarab). 
13
 al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, al-MuÒÔalaÎ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab,  p. 21. 
14
 KENNEDY – DAY, Kiki, Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy, p. 19. 
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prose literature started around the middle of the eighth century, in Baghdad, under Persian 
influence. An important aspect in M. Maróth’s examination uses a terminological method, 
demonstrating that many technical Arabic terms had already been present by this time: he 
introduces some specifically philosophical terms that had already appeared.
15
 Scholarly 
consensus concentrates on the 9
th
 or 10
th
 centuries as the period of the formation of Arabic 
philosophical and theological terminology, but on the basis of these results, we need to be 
aware that it had already started earlier. 
In this dissertation I consider ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ an author who plays an important 
role in this early Greek influence on Arabic prose. A terminological examination of his KitÁb 
al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba can help us get to know the formation of terminologies of kalÁm 
and falsafa even more. The main issue would be whether Christian authors played any role in 
the delineation of the vocabularies of philosophy and kalÁm by influencing Muslim authors 
while interacting with them. Scholarly consese asserts it that Arab Christian theologians 
played a prominent role in the process of the Hellenization of the Islamic theology, which 
ultimately led to the systematic and logical development of kalÁm. Apart from carrying out 
most of the translations of Greek works into Arabic, they provided Muslim theologians with 
chief themes of theological inquiry such as predestination and the attributes problems.
16
 It is 
expected then, that Arab Christian theologians had their impact on the formation of Arabic 
language and especially on the philosophical-theological terminology, as well. 
Christian terminology can be examined from many points of view; according to a 
given field, either philosophical or theological terms can be concentrated on. Christian 
polemical and apologetic writings mainly belong to the field of theology, since they deal with 
theological issues, but due to their nature, they are less descriptive than argumentative, and 
argumentation needs clear, accurate concepts and terms, so philosophical terms may also 
appear in these texts. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba is an apology (as 
such, it is polemical in nature), so its terminology may offer interesting examples of 
interaction between philosophy and kalÁm. Through the study of its terms I also aim at 
answering the question: to what extent did Arab Christian authors affect Arabic prose? To 
what extent did Arab Christian theology in general, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, interact 
                                                          
15
 As Miklós Maróth indicates it in: MARÓTH, M., The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the 
Great. An Anonymous Greek Novel in Letters in Arabic Translation, Piliscsaba, Avicenna Institute of Middle 
Eastern Studies, 2006. In particular, see the following terms: al-mÁhiyya: pp. 77., 91.; iÎdÁ×: pp. 77-78., 91; 
ayniyya: p. 78.; kayfiyya: p. 78.; mÁ’iyya p. 78.; ÒÙra: p.78.; Êawhar: p. 91.; mÁdda: p. 91. 
16
 WOLFSON, H. A., The Philosophy of the Kalam, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, Harvard University 
Press, 1976., pp. 58-63, 80-82. As for dialectics, see COOK, M. A., The Origins of KalÁm, In: Bulletin of the 
School of Oriental and African Studies, 43 (1980) 1, pp. 32-43. 
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with Muslim theology and philosophy in the field of terminology? This investigation will be 
carried out on the basis of comparative methodology: representative terms ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ used are classified and compared to corresponding Hellenistic and Patristic terms, and 
then to their contemporary use by Muslim and other Christian authors. Interaction should be 
examined in the framework of polemics, where both Christians and Muslims used the Arabic 
language, interacted, and discussed specific problems. Terms will be classified according to 
their nature – that is, whether they are theological or philosophical ones. There are terms of 
foreign origin; ones which are in current usage and stereotyped formulae; adaptations from 
Qur’Ánic and Islamic expressions; and combinations of Biblical and Islamic expressions.17  
As far as philosophical and theological terms are concerned: when comparing the way 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used them to how Muslim philosophers and theologians did, in order to 
find them in their clearest form, I examine their usage in books of definitions (kutub al-
ÎudÙd). I take the latter as references of comparison, since my approach deals with technical 
terms in both Islamic theology and philosophy. What interests me primarily is to compare 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s terminology to what became standard terminologies of kalÁm and 
falsafa. For this reason I rely on the following books of definitions: AbÙ YÙsuf b. IsÎÁq al-
KindÐ’s (d. c. 873) RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, the first Arabic book of 
philosophical definitions,
18
 by an author contemporary to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Where 
necessary, my research will go on to check whether the terms can be found in the following 
works (progressing in chronological order): AbÙ ÝAbdallÁh MuÎammad ibn AÎmad ibn 
YÙsuf al-KÁtib al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s (d. 997) MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm; AbÙ Bakr MuÎammad b. al-
Íasan Ibn FÙrak al-AnÒÁrÐ al-IÒbahÁnÐ’s (d. 1015) KitÁb al-ÍudÙd; Ibn SÐnÁ’s (d. 1037) 
KitÁb al-ÍudÙd; Sayf al-DÐn al-ÀmidÐ’s (d. 1233), al-MubÐn; and finally, ÝAlÐ ibn 
MuÎammad  al-ÉurºÁnÐ’s (d. 1414) al-TaÝrÐfÁt. My research will try to define whether the 
given term is earlier used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ than the Muslim authors: that would mean 
that Christian authors might have been active in inventing and outlining terms. If terms are to 
be found in contemporary works, too, we may think of a common heritage, or the use of 
everyday words in a new sense, mutually accepted by both parties. Given that ÝAmmÁr al-
                                                          
17
 In setting up the classification, I benefited from the work of FARAG, F. Rofail, The Usage of the Early 
Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: 
Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ. Journal of the American Oriental Society 99.1 (1979), p. 51. (Later on: FARAG, F. R., 
The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of a Tenth-Century 
Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ). 
18
 al-AÝSAM, ÝAbd al-AmÐr, al-MuÒÔalaÎ al-falsafÐ Ýinda al-ÝArab, pp. 34., 36. 
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BaÒrÐ was contemporary to the translation movement,19 if no earlier appearance can be 
traced in a term’s case, we can think of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s own invention. Such a term 
may have come from a tradition of the rhetorical schools in which Christians were educated.  
We should not, ignore the Syriac, Greek and Coptic Christian terms introduced into 
Arabic either, which represent another phase of the revolution which the language underwent. 
These terms were mostly theological; they came into usage after the translation of the Old and 
New Testaments into Arabic. Before Islam, Syriac, Greek, Coptic and Ethiopic were the 
languages used by the Christians. With the spread of Islam, the Arabic language took firm 
root, whereas the other languages suffered a setback and were gradually replaced by Arabic; 
many only survived in the Christian rites.
20
 As an example, let us refer to the Melkite church, 
which, as Gutas indicates it, faced the decline of the Greek language in the population in 
Syro-Palestine and eventually was compelled to switch to Arabic even for liturgical purposes 
after the ÝAbbÁsid revolution.21 We can accept this claim, though probably instead of an 
inner decline of the Greek language we may think of a native Arabic-speaking majority as the 
motivation for assimilation. As we are looking at the question from the viewpoint of 
polemical and apologetic literature, an intention to use a common language (i.e. Arabic) with 
the majority and the opponent as a motivation may also be accepted. Farag argues that though 
Arabic became the vernacular among Christians, it was inadequate for the expression of all 
their theological terminology. This accounts for the numerous Biblical terms which they 
maintained in Arabic after translating the Gospels into that language.
22
  
The encroachment of Arabic Islam into the religions in the Near East was felt on many 
fronts, and in unexpected ways of which non-Muslims had no experience from Umayyad 
times. Hence the palpable need to explain themselves and to maintain, enlarge, and at times 
even re-establish their rights and positions. As a result, the first ÝAbbÁsid century saw an 
unprecedented rise in Arabic Christian apologetic writings directed against Islam.
23
 
                                                          
19
 If we take what GUTAS claims into consideration, we have to make it clear that the translation movement had 
already started by the time ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ lived and worked. 
20
 FARAG, F. R., The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary Form of 
a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ, p. 50.  
21
 GUTAS, D., Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, p. 66; and GRIFFITH, S.H., Eutychius of Alexandria on the 
Emperor Theophilus and Iconoclasm in Byzantium: A Tenth Century Moment in Christian Apologetics in Arabic, 
Byzantion, 1982. vol 52, pp. 154-90, p. 161.  
22
 FARAG, F. Rofail, The Usage of the Early Islamic Terminology as a Constituent Element of the Literary 
Form of a Tenth-Century Christian Arab Writer: Severus Ibn al-MuqaffaÝ., p. 50. E.g.: Many of the Christian 
terms were introduced into Arabic in the so-called literature of ÊÁhiliyya, such as InºÐl – TawrÁt – dayr – 
qissÐs. 
23
 GUTAS, D., Greek Thought, Arabic Culture, pp. 66-67. 
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Christians were no strangers to polemical literature. Disputation was the main form of 
communication in the seventh century, particularly in the conflict among Chalcedonians, 
Monophysites, and Nestorians which was intensified after the Fifth Ecumenical Council of 
553. Public debates on matters of religion became regular events. These debates were 
recorded, as a result of which the dialogue form of disputation became one of the most widely 
used genres of Christian (Greek and Syriac) literature in the seventh century. When the 
Christian – Muslim dialogues began in the ÝAbbÁsid period, they owed a lot to the long 
tradition of using the dialogue form for Christian apologetic and polemic purposes. As a 
matter of fact, the very first Arabic Christian polemic against Islam that we possess dates 
from the middle of the eighth century and is in dialogue form.
24
 As it is attested by Griffith, 
Islamic Ýilm al-kalÁm grew out of the participation of Muslims in the styles of scholarly 
discussion Christian intellectuals employed in the Greco-Syrian milieu of the Christian 
centres of learning in the oriental patriarchates. Griffith emphasizes that Christian kalÁm 
already existed in the formative period of Arabic thought in the Islamic world. They used the 
Arabic language according to the Islamic frame of reference: so Christian teachings needed to 
be investigated and interpreted in a new framework. Griffith also draws attention to the 
bipolar character of the terminology and argumentation of these writings: according to this 
view, Christian authors were not only translating Greek and Syriac statements of faith into 
Arabic, but also employed terms that suggest an Islamic or Qur’Ánic view of the matter.25 
As for the importance of this topic, let us refer to the anonymous novel of letters 
examined by Maróth Miklós, on the basis of which it can be demonstrated that Arabic prose 
literature started in the first third of the eighth century in the frame of the tradition of Greek 
rhetorical schools. Christian authors – including ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ – were the 
representatives of the same tradition. After the Islamic conquests, Greek rhetorical schools 
became the educational centers of Christians, who could learn classical Greek knowledge 
there for centuries. It means then that rhetorical schools, i.e. schools of Christian communities 
were the transmitters of classical Hellenistic culture for the world of Islam. Christian authors 
who are going to be mentioned – in particular, the author whose work is the core of this 
dissertation, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ – were educated in such schools. In general, on the basis of 
the works of the Christian authors living in the ninth century, one can demonstrate the main 
                                                          
24
 GUTAS, D., Greek Thought, Arabic Culture., pp. 66-67. See also: CAMERON, A. New Themes and Styles in 
Greek Literature, in Ed. Averil Cameron and Lawrence I. Conrad, The Byzantine and Early Islamic Near East I, 
Problems in the Literary Source Material, Princeton, 1992.  pp. 97-100. 
25
 GRIFFITH, S. H., Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True 
Religion. In: Eds. SAMIR, Kh. - NIELSEN, J., Christian Arabic Apologetics during the Abbasid Period, 750-
1258. pp. 1-6. 
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topics, themes and imagery shared by them. What is remarkable is that these topics and 
images, as well as analogical demonstrations can be found in later Muslim writings, and 
especially in scientific prose. In order to complete this examination, this dissertation aims at 
the examination of terminology, so that it can be seen how Greek concepts could make their 
way into Muslim authors’ writings through the mediation of Christian authors. 
 I will carry out my terminological analysis in five chapters. In every chapter, I will 
start with the introduction of corresponding Greek terms with particular concern for their 
appearance in Patristic schools. This is due to what was said above: Christian authors were 
educated in the traditions of Greek rhetorical schools, so Greek ideas, terms, and at the same 
time, Christian traditions (including the ideas of Patristic literature) must have been known to 
them. Then, I am going to examine how these terms are used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, and 
check whether he is a continuer of Patristic ideas. As a third step, I am going to examine the 
same term as it is defined by Muslim books of definition, and check whether ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s usage in particular (or Christian ideas in general) precedes the appearance of the 
term or the idea on the Muslim counterparts’ behalf. I aim at demonstrating that Arab 
Christian literature has a mediating role between Greek and Islamic cultures. 
In the first chapter, I will start my terminological analysis with the term Ýaql 
(intellect). I decided to start with this one for several reasons. First, its place corresponds to 
the one it occupies in kalÁm manuals. Muslim theologians start their books with a chapter on 
knowledge where they examine the intellect as a provider of acquired knowledge. Further, it 
is an important term for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, who uses it extensively and refers to it as the 
method of demonstration. Another reason for placing this chapter at the head of the study is 
that it covers, in a general manner, several subsequent terms. 
I will keep the same kalÁm order in the following chapters. In every chapter, a group 
of terms which deal with the same theological question is going to be examined. Thus, in the 
second chapter, I will examine the terminology of body and incarnation (ta’annus – 
humanisation vs. taÊassud – incarnation; and badan vs. Êirm vs. Êasad vs. ºism vs. haykal – 
body, bodily form). In the third one, I will examine the terminology of eternity (i.e. azalÐ, 
azaliyya – pre-eternal vs. sarmad – perpetuity vs. qidam, qadÐm – eternal vs. baqÁ’, bÁqin – 
permanent). In the fourth chapter, I will inspect the terminology of Creation (i.e. ibdÁ’ and 
ibtidÁ’ - beginning, commencement vs. ibdÁÝ – direct creation vs. ibtidÁÝ – instauration vs. 
iÌtirÁÝ – creation ex nihilo vs. Ìalq – creation vs. iÎdÁ× - creation ex nihilo vs. ÒinÁÝa, 
making vs. takwÐn – generation vs. inšÁ’ – bringing into being). In the fifth chapter, the 
terminology of Fatherhood-Sonship (Ubuwwa – fatherhood vs. Bunuwwa – sonship) will be 
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considered. The last chapter concentrates on terms that refer to divine Trinity and Unity (i.e. 
ta×lÐ× - trinity, „making three” vs.  waÎdÁniyya, tawÎÐd, ittiÎÁd – unity, “making one,” 
union) in addition to the question of duality. 
Chapter I. 
The Terminology of intellect 
 
 
In this chapter, I will inspect how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses a term of crucial 
importance, i.e. the term Ýaql (intellect), taking into consideration the way his Christian 
contemporaries used it. I will explore the potential sources of Ýaql, then its uses and 
implications in the KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba. I will also inquire into ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s possible impact on the use of Ýaql among Muslim theologians and philosophers, on 
the basis of Muslim books of definitions (kutub al-ÎudÙd). 
The term Ýaql26 is a translation of the Greek terms διάνοια, ἡ φρόνησις, and ὁ νοῦς.27 
These terms may be found in Greek Patristic literature, as well, as Lampe indicates it, with the 
exception of the first one, i.e. διάνοια. The second term, i.e. ἡ φρόνησις may be found in 
various meanings; according to Lampe’s classification, they are the following: intellect, 
understanding; wisdom, prudence in moral philosophy and Christian teaching; opinion, 
faith.
28
 (It is obvious that the source of the use of intellect as practical reason is Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle used the division as follows: “Let us begin again, then, and 
discuss these states of soul. Let us assume that there are fivee ways in which the soul arrives 
at truth by affirmation or denial, namely, skill, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, 
wisdom, and intellect; for supposition and belief can be mistaken.”29 Art is the translation of 
τέχνη, science stands for ἐπιστήμη, practical wisdom is φρόνησις, theoretical wisdom stands 
for σοφία, and intelligence is νοῦς.) As for ὁ νοῦς, its connotations are numerous. It can be 
found as a description of mind and its functions with reference to man’s distinctive nature; in 
relation to other faculties; particularly in relation to sense perception. It is referred to as 
mind’s various processes in general or owing to its power of discernment. Lampe then 
classifies its appearances with reference to spiritual life: e.g. God as object of the mind, 
                                                          
26
 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘intelligence.’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 85. 
27
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, Beirut, Dar El-Mashreq, 1968. pp. 178-179. 
(Later on: AFNAN, A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic.) 
28
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, Clarendon, Oxford, 1961. (Later on: LAMPE, A Patristic Greek 
Lexicon. ) pp. 1490-91. 
29
 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.3.1., Tr. and ed. CRISP, R., Cambridge University Press, 2004, 105. 
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mind’s capacity for knowing God; mind and body, e.g. mind enslaved by senses, or mind 
controlling senses. Mind and sin also appear, further classified into connotations referring to 
mind’s responsibility for sin, mind obscured by sin, and mind between good and evil. 
Lampe’s last major category is “mind’s way to perfection,” but I would only mention divine 
assistance as a common point with Arab Christian theologians among its subdivisions. (The 
term ὁ νοῦς also plays an important part in philosophy: as it can be seen in the Nicomachean 
Ethics, it refers to one of the intellectual parts of the soul, as mind/intelligence/intellect.
30
) 
Now that we have gained a general understanding of this concept according to Church 
Fathers, let us see how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Arab Christian contemporaries (Theodore AbÙ 
Qurra and AbÙ RÁ’iÔa) used it, then we can examine ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples, and 
finally, we will proceed to the investigation of Muslim terminologies.  
As for Theodore AbÙ Qurra, he aims at demonstrating in his tract Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd 
al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm (On Existence of the Creator and the True Religion)31 that the 
only true religion (al-dÐn al-qawÐm) is that of the Christians. He proves it on the objective 
basis of the intellect. Taking the role of a neutral observer, he enumerates and examines the 
main religious groups and denominations of his epoch, puts scriptures aside, and turns to the 
cognitive and analyzing abilities of human reason. Human nature and human intellect are the 
bases of human recognition, so the “narrator” in this tract turns to them in his pursuit of 
objective truth and introduces the intellect and its role by an allegory.  
The narrator is a “natural man” who has never previously belonged to any 
denominations. Now he meets religious groups and wants to find the right one among them. 
At this point, he introduces an allegorical story about an unknown king, his son, who gets ill, 
and a doctor, as follows. The king has a son, and for the sake of his protection and health, he 
summons a doctor by his side. The son ignores the doctor, and falls ill. By the way of a 
messenger, the king sends him medicine and a book that describes him (i.e. the king) as well 
as it prescribes the use of the medicine, what the son should do in order to get and stay 
healthy and what he should not do, and what the result of committing forbidden things would 
be. The enemies of the king, who cannot harm him in any way, try to benefit from the illness 
of his son, and they send poison instead of remedy and forged books with false descriptions of 
the king, the free and forbidden things and the results of these actions. The books differ, but 
each messenger claims to be the true one. At this point, the doctor tells the son to dismiss 
them all, since he is going to make the case of each of them clear saying: “I am the doctor and 
                                                          
30
 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.3.1., Tr. and ed. CRISP, R., Cambridge University Press, 2004, 105. 
31
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm. 
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I know these things because this is my profession”32 He also tells the son the way he is going 
to examine the question: being a doctor he knows what makes man ill or healthy, and he is 
sure to recognize the real attributes of the king from the resemblance of the son.
33
 Remedies 
have to be examined, the things prescribed or forbidden in the different books should be 
studied, and the king’s attributes (ÒifÁt) ought to be looked at. The real attributes of the king 
can be established by the resemblance of the son by way of comparison, qiyÁs. Having 
completed his task, the doctor sees that with one exception, all the books exhort the son to do 
things that would do him wrong, and they discourage him from doing things that would 
benefit him. The remedy belonging to that only book is the only truly healing one. As for the 
description (waÒf) of the king: the doctor compares the different descriptions to the features 
of the son,
34
 and he finds similarity between them in only one book – the one that described 
the illness correctly and with which the right remedy came. So the way of cognition includes 
two steps: the first one is intellectual reasoning, in the course of which one may arrive at 
specific results; but intellect has limits, the things that are beyond them can be clarified by 
revelation. The second step is the comparison of the intellectual results with the revealed 
books; agreement shows which one to choose. Things going beyond the limits of intellectual 
cognition can be known from the revealed books. 
All the characters and events of this allegory are meant to promote a theological view: 
the hidden king is God, while the son is Adam and his offspring (i. e. mankind). The doctor is 
the intellect that was given to Adam in order to recognize what is right and act in accordance 
with it, and in order to recognize what is wrong and avoid committing it. The son’s ignoring 
the doctor and getting ill stands for Adam’s or humankind’s leaving the intellect out of 
consideration and going astray. The king’s sending remedy and a book stands for God’s 
sending messengers and scriptures that contain his description and determine the good and 
forbidden deeds with their results that is reward or punishment. Enemies that want to do the 
king wrong by harming his son are the evil ones or demons.   
According to the message of this allegory, man should not depend on revelation only, 
but he should put books aside, rely on the intellect and ask it how to recognize the 
unperceivable and incomprehensible God on the sole basis of his resemblance with our human 
nature. We have to ask the intellect how to make out what is right and wrong, evil or good 
                                                          
32
 Ibid., p. 214.  
ينلأ بيبط فرعأو هذه ءايشلأا اهنلأ يتعانص  
33
ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm, p. 215.  
انأو ىلع ام تركذ كل ،بيبط فرعأو   اضيأ تاهاع ضارملأا يتلا قستم تلااحلاو يتلا حصت .فرعأو تافص كيبا نم كهبش كنلأ هنبا 
34
 Ibid., pp. 215-16.  
ساقف تافصلا اهلك ىلإ تافص ملاغلا 
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(qabÐÎ - ºamÐl),35 and what to think about eternal reward and punishment. In Theodore AbÙ 
Qurra’s view, the intellect is a “doctor”, God’s “agent” that originally belongs to and comes 
from him.
36
 The task of the intellect is to protect man from illness, this is why God made him 
man’s guide.37 But if man ignores the intellect and falls ill, it is the intellect that can help him 
find the way to health and prosperity again, and this is what can lead him back to God. So 
according to Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s opinion, the intellect is God’s gift for mankind: the 
faculty of thought. In Griffith’s interpretation, Theodore AbÙ Qurra introduces a rational 
strategy here,
38
 which comes from a Neo-Platonic intellectual framework of human cognition 
of God with a methodology earlier Byzantines had called kataphasis/apophasis. This 
approach relates all perceivable natural perfection to God, and negates all imperfection from 
Him.
39
 He further asserts that Theodore AbÙ Qurra applies an epistemology which depends 
on the results of his spiritual predecessors, e.g. Nemesius of Emesa (d. c. 390), Dionysius the 
Pseudo-Aeropagite (fl. c. 500) and John of Damascus (d. c. 749). In Griffith’s view all of 
them were representatives of a Neo-Platonism which might as well be called Christianism, i.e. 
a philosophical system based on the teaching of Christianity. While theology explains 
Christian teaching, Christianism takes it as a basis for a rational account of the universe.
40
  
Let us mention the significance of the medical allegory in the Islamo-Christian 
interaction. First of all, the idea of religion as healing, šifÁ’ is highlighted in the Qur’Án and 
sunna.
41
 The image of Jesus himself in the Qur’Án and in the Islamic literature is that of a 
great spiritual physician. Second, it is well known that Muslim ÑÙfÐs used extensively the 
allegory of the ÑÙfÐ master as a physician of the heart. This allegory was also consolidated 
with the highly appreciated position of the physicians in the Muslim popular religion. It can 
be said that AbÙ Qurra was aware of the effect of such an allegory while he attempts at 
rebutting his Muslim adversaries. Nothing could be more persuasive than a familiar 
terminology and imagery to them. Naturally, in order to understand the significance of this 
allegory on spirituality and medicine one has to go back to Greek roots, i.e. the Greek 
rhetorical tradition, which had its effects on Christian theology before it entered Islamic 
                                                          
35
 This pair of terms corresponds to the Greek κακόν - αἰσχρον, or the Latin turpe – pulchrum.  
36
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm, p. 212.  
ثعبف هنبا ...، وهو ،ثدح هعمو   ابيبط ناك هل 
37 Ibid., p. 212 
هظفحيل نم تاهاعلا ،ةضراعلا ريصو هل   اضيأ   اريزو  
38
 GRIFFITH, S. H., Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True 
Religion, p. 8. 
39
 Ibid. p. 26. 
40
 Ibid. pp. 27-28. 
41 With regard to the Qur’Án, see 16,69. As for the sunna, there is an entire literature on the subject to be found 
in al-Óibb al-nabawÐ books. 
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culture. Further, this allegory has been widely used in the Neo-Platonic thought,
42
 one may 
find medical analogies in Aristotle’s works,43 as well. AbÙ Qurra testifies to the reliance of 
Arab Christians on Greek philosophy. Thogh in a different context, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ also 
uses medical allegory, or rather parabole to express his view on the necessity of the Son’s 
death and resurrection.
44
 
With regard to the problem of good and evil according to Theodore AbÙ Qurra, he 
later on addresses the possibility of its recognition on the basis of the intellect. He says: “just 
like the way our intellect was able to find out the invisible attributes of God on the basis of 
our nature, it can, on the same basis, find out about licit (ÎalÁl) and illicit (ÎarÁm), beautiful 
and detestable, good and evil, what is beneficial for us, and what makes us strong, as well.”45 
He goes on by listing various offenses, saying, if someone hurts us acting so, by our intellect 
we know that it brings corruption for us, it is detestable, evil and illicit. He then concludes 
that evil is to treat another in a way that we would dislike if that were committed against us. 
He goes on the same way to demonstrate how we recognize that which is good, right and 
licit.
46
 Thus both right and wrong may be distinguished on the basis of human nature and the 
intellect. We have already seen on the basis of the allegory that intellect is a divine grace that 
can differentiate between good and bad, and AbÙ Qurra elaborates on this point in the rest of 
his treatise. Only in the end does he say that the good man wants the benefit of others, in 
which he resembles God, and thus links the ethical quality of good to the divine. We need to 
emphasize that good and bad are not classified this way in Islam: since good and bad are what 
God created as such.  
We have seen that intellect and choice appear together when it is not the cognition of 
God which is in the centre but an ethical approach. Based on Patristic sources, this idea was 
further developed by Christian authors such as AbÙ Qurra, and later on this idea reappears in 
                                                          
42
 Vid. GRUDZEN, Gerald, Spirituality and Science: Greek, Judeo-Christian and Islamic Perspectives. 
Bloomington, AuthorHouse, 2007. 
43
 E.g. “Διόπερ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι σκέψιν καὶ διανέμειν τε καὶ ἀνιέναι κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ἕκαστα, καὶ τροφὴν καὶ ἐσθῆτα καὶ 
ἀργίαν καὶ κολάσεις, λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ μιμουμένους τὴν τῶν ἰατρῶν δύναμιν ἐν φαρμάκου λόγῳ, προσθεωροῦντας 
ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ οὐ φάρμακον διὰ τὸ συνεχές.”) ARISTOTLE, Economy, 1.1344b. In: Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 
18. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., London. 1935. Or: “Ἒτι οὐδὲ δείκνυσιν οὐθεὶς ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡ 
ὑγίεια, ἂν μὴ σοφιστὴς ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἰατρός (οὗτοι γὰρ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις λόγοις σοφίζονται), ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ἄλλην ἀρχὴν 
οὐδεμίαν.” ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, 1.1218b. Ed. F. Susemihl. Leipzig: Teubner. 1884.  
44
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, In: Ed. HAYEK, M., Apologie et controverses, Beirut, 
Dar el-Machreq, 1977. p. 229,8-13. 
45 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, al-DÐn al-qawÐm, p. 229. 
امك تعاطتسا انلوقع نأ جرختست انل تافص الله يتلا لا ،رصبت نم هبش ،انتعيبط كلذك نم انتعيبط جرختست انل ملع للاحلا ،مارحلاو ليمجلاو 
،حيبقلاو ريخلاو رشلاو يذلا انحلصي ،انديفيو رملأاو يذلا ىوقن ىلع هلعف هب 
46
Ibid., p. 230.  
لكو دحاو ،انم نم هسفن بحي فرعيو رملأا نسحلا حلاصلا ريخلا للاحلا… رملأا نسحلا ،حلاصلا ،للاحلا نأ عنصت كبحاصب رملأا ديجلا ليمجلا 
يذلا بحت نأ هعنصي كب 
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Muslim authors’ works, too. As an example let me refer to how Tritton defines effects of 
nature and intellect: “Effects produced by man’s nature are mean; those due to intellect come 
from choice and are honourable; man can incline to either side of his being.”47 In this, he 
relies on AbÙ ÍayyÁn al-TawÎÐdÐ’s KitÁb al-MuqÁbasÁt, in which intellect is referred to 
together with the capacity of choice so that it gains an ethical faculty.
48
 The idea of the 
Church Fathers is used by Arabic Christian authors who were educated in the rhetorical 
schools, and it was probably them who influenced Muslim adversaries – as this example may 
suggest it. 
Another Christian theologian, the Jacobite AbÙ RÁ’iÔa made an interesting 
contribution to the Arabic Christian use of Ýaql, which is worth exploring. According to 
Griffith, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa refuses to prove the verity of Christianity on the mere basis of 
rationality, because he considered this attempt successful among the learned only.
49
 We find 
that he rarely mentions intellect explicitly, as far as it can be judged on the basis of the 
collection of his writings, Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa.50 
However, on the basis of his few examples, his approach is still cognizable. In his major 
treatise, RisÁla fÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i×bÁt al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas51 he is in the 
pursuit of the only true religion, but this work lacks propedeutical introduction or any other 
theoretical basis. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa does not enumerate religious groups, but finds something else 
to contrast Christianity with: the list of various motivations or intentions that can make people 
follow a religion. There are six driving forces that are far from God’s intention52 and there is 
only one in agreement with His will. The groups that follow the first six false motivations 
deviate from the true divine religion in AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s view, because they do not endeavour 
                                                          
47
 TRITTON, A. S., Man, nafs, rÙÎ, Ýaql. In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London, 3 (1971) 34, pp. 491-495. 
48
 al-TAWÍÏDÏ, AbÙ ÍayyÁn, al-MuqÁbasÁt, Cairo, 1929., p. 243. 
 هب فاطأ دق لقعلاب يذلاو ،ةرورضلا هب تطاحأ دق ةعيبطلاب وه يذلارايتخلاا 
49
 GRIFFITH, Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True Religion, p. 
37. 
50
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, Ed. Georg GRAF, Corpus 
Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; Scriptores Arabici tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951. 
51
 ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, RisÁla li-AbÐ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ fÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i×bÁt 
al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas. In: Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, Ed. Georg GRAF, 
Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; Scriptores Arabici tom. 14., Louvain, 1951. pp. 129-
158. (Later on: FÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i×bÁt al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas) 
52
 Ibid., pp. 131-32. For the sake of brevity, these reasons are only introduced in the footnotes: 
- the first: desire for some immediate benefits or later ones 
- the second: aspiration for reaching the hereafter 
- the third: a coercive fear that forces one to accept a religion 
- the fourth: a religion that permits forbidden things 
- the fifth: if one likes the ornament of a religion 
- the sixth: “clanism”, i.e. belonging to a certain group that follows this religion, in order to gain power 
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to obey God. The author does not elaborate on this point, saying only that these approaches 
bear corruption (fasÁd) and contrariety (tanÁquÃ). For him “the seventh type is the right one, 
the one for which there is proof and upon which faith relies – by the support of the Lord of 
Majesty – in what is inaccessible for intellect to understand and it is impossible for the 
creation to do so, except for people of the truth, the rightly guided ones.
53
 
If AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s approach to the intellect is compared to that of AbÙ Qurra, we may 
find that the former, right at the beginning, enumerates motivations for choosing a religion 
and talks about them briefly. He then returns to each and every one of them, and presents a 
more detailed contrast between them and Christianity. As he has already claimed that these 
approaches are not godly intentions now he only has to prove that Christianity is not 
dependant on any of them. He does not need the intellect as a basis for demonstration. While 
AbÙ Qurra relies on intellect as a premise for his argument, and only as a second step does he 
turn to scriptures for a comparison, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa underlines that the characteristic of faith is 
that it goes beyond reason, and cannot be comprehended by the intellect alone. With the aid of 
God, it is possible to believe what one cannot comprehend with the intellect, hence, for AbÙ 
RÁ’iÔa, it is not only the intellect which is important, but the divine help (ta’yÐd AllÁh) as 
well. If one wants to gain knowledge about God (taÎÒÐl maÝrifat AllÁh), it is only possible 
with divine help and the intellect together. In this, he reflects an important topic in Patristic 
literature, as we have seen it above (on the authority of Lampe). Both authors consider the 
intellect the gift of God, and the function of the intellect the cognition of God, right and 
wrong; and also establishing and defending the religion. 
According to Griffith, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ did not believe in the role of intellect and 
argumentation as much as Theodore AbÙ Qurra did, since he considered it a characteristic of 
a polemist personality, and such conduct would exclude reference to miracles. Griffith asserts 
that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s apology is based on miracles, since the Nestorian author considers 
them as the most important proofs for the true religion.
54
 However, looking at the KitÁb al-
MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, we can see that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ turns to the intellect in various 
issues and uses the term Ýaql in different meanings. This does not imply any inconsistency on 
his part, since the meaning of the intellect varies in both kalÁm and philosophy. Variance is 
the result of the diversity of contexts, vocabularies and influences. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
understanding of Ýaql can be classified into five categories:  
                                                          
53
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA., RisÁla li-AbÐ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ fÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i×bÁt al-×ÁlÙ× al-
muqaddas,  p. 132. 
54
 GRIFFITH, S., Faith and Reason in Christian KalÁm: Theodore AbÙ Qurrah on Discerning the True 
Religion, p. 37. 
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1. As for the first meaning: there is a locus where the author gives something like a 
definition of it. When he speaks about qudra, quwwa and istiÔÁÝa (potency and 
faculty or potentiality), there he mentions their two causes (ÝillatÁni). One of the 
causes is bodily, corporeal (ÊismÁniyya, ÊasadÁniyya), but it is now left out of 
consideration. The other is spiritual, and it belongs to the soul. It is defined as follows: 
“[the other cause] is psychical, spiritual, namely the intellect, which is the faculty of 
the soul that creates these subtle things, which we can see in the making of the bodies, 
the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, and similar making 
actions that can be carried out by the wisdom of the soul and the reflexion of the 
intellect.”55 Thus, intellect is a cause; and it can be understood from the context that it 
is the universal intellect, al-Ýaql al-kullÐ, which is defined here. The passage also 
defines it as a faculty.  
2. Intellect as a faculty can be considered the second connotation and is further 
elaborated in other examples and contexts. Intellect is a means of distinction and 
choice: “the property of goodness or immorality can be attributed only to man among 
all the creatures, since he is created to be able to choose his actions by his intellect 
and distinction; so he can choose for himself whatever he pleases.”56 It reflects the 
Patristic idea according to which intellect appears as a reference to man’s distinctive 
nature. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s approach is in accordance with that: since if man is the 
only creature that can have the property of goodness or immorality due to his intellect, 
then it is the feature that distinguishes man among all creatures. The author uses 
intellect in this meaning when he refers to it as a means of understanding or 
distinction, since it is something that God created in humankind, alongside with 
understanding; at the same time, it recognizes good and bad: “He left them with [the 
guidance] of the intellect and understanding, which He had created in their nature and 
[to the guidance of] what He had made for them as a path to good and bad.”57 As we 
could see above, ‘mind between good and evil’ is a theme that had already appeared in 
Patristic literature. In this, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, as well as his Christian 
contemporaries, can be considered continuers of that tradition. 
                                                          
55 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 157,16-19 
ىرخلأا ةيناسفن ةيناحور ينعأ لقعلا يذلا وه ةوق سفنلا عرتخملا هذه فئاطللا يتلا ىرن نم ةعنص مارجلاا ريوصتو لاكشلأا فيلأتو ناينبلا 
وحنو كلذ نم تاعانصلا رودقملا اهيلع ةمكحب سفنلا ةيورو لقعلا 
56
 Ibid., p. 125,14-15 
بسن سانلا   ةصاخ ىلإ ربلا روجفلاو نم نيب عيمج خلا،قئلا ذإ اوقلخ نيعيطتسم رايتخلا لامعلأا لقعب زييمتو اوراتخاف مهسفنلأ ام اوراتخا 
57 Ibid., p. 117,11-12 
مهلمهأف كلذل ىلع ام مهعبط هيلع نم لقعلا مهفلاو امو لعج مهل هب ليبسلا ىلإ لعف ريخلا رشلاو 
 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
22 
 
3. The previous example offers another opportunity for interpretation. In the following 
part of the cited phrase:  „intellect and understanding, which He had created in their 
nature” (i. e. ÝalÁ mÁ ÔabaÝahum Ýalayhi min al-Ýaql wa-’l-fahm), understanding 
and intellect are referred to as human disposition, as ÔabaÝahum indicates it. 
4. The fourth meaning of intellect is that of an attribute (Òifa). It appears with the ability 
of speech, when the author defines the One, Who is characterized by mercy and 
compassion: “As for mercy, compassion, justice, gentleness, generosity, grace, and 
what resembles them; all of them are effects that appear as attributes on the behalf of a 
deliberate, rational substance, not on the behalf of substances that lack the capacity of 
speech and intellect.”58 It can be considered an attribute, too, when mentioned with 
iÌtiyÁr and istiÔÁÝa, or when it is a gift of God, together with life, speech, 
understanding, ability, and free will: “what grace might be better or generosity greater 
than his generating them in this noble disposition [including] life, intellect, speech, 
understanding, capacity, and free will, after that they had been nothing/they had not 
existed.”59 So intellectuality may be either a divine attribute or that of a created being 
as well. 
5. Intellect plays an important role in ethics, too, and when appearing in this context, it is 
used as a quality, equal to capacity and free will in importance. From an ethical point 
of view, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ establishes that the intellect, as well as free will and 
ability can make one good or bad. He says: “no one deserves the name ‘good’ or ‘bad’ 
without having all the three following qualities: ability, intellect, and free will. And if 
one follows the path of obedience to his Creator in his intellect, by his choice and 
ability, …”60 it will be considered as goodness from him. We could see it in the case 
of the second meaning, too, that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ follows Patristic tradition insofar 
he gives intellect an important role between right and wrong. This idea is further 
accentuated here.  
                                                          
58
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 158,6-8 
أوام ةمحرلا ةفأرلاو لدعلاو ملحلاو دوجلاو ةمعنلاو امو ،اههبشأ اهنإف تلاولعم ودبت نع رهاوجلا ةقطانلا ةيورملا   ةصاخ لا نع يش نم رهاوجلا 
ةميدعلا لقعلا قطنلاو 
59
 Ibid., p. 105,7-8 
ةيأف ةمعن لضفأ دوجو مظعأ نم هنيوكت مهايا ةصاخ ىلع هذه ةئيهلا ةفيرشلا نم ةايحلا قعلاول قطنلاو مهفلاو لااوةعاطتس لااورايتخ دعب نأ مل 
اونوكي   ائيش. 
60 Ibid., p. 125,12-14 
لا قحتسي امس حلاصلا حلاطلاو لاإ نم تلمك هيف لاصخلا ةثلاثلا :ةعاطتسلاا لقعلاو رايتخلااو   اعيمج .نمو يرجي ةعاط هقلاخ   لقعب   رايتخاو 
ةعاطتساو 
Here we could see the intellect among qualities, as equal to capacity and free will in importance. The way it 
appears may make us think of what MuÝtazilite ethics say of human acts as being created by humans 
themselves. And therefore, they are responsible for their acts. 
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As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s definition of the intellect as a cause, this usage can be 
considered mainly philosophical. In the rest of the cases, where intellect is used in the 
meaning of a means, faculty, quality and attribute, both philosophical and theological 
influences are clearly discernible. Since the meaning of Ýaql depends on the context, it may 
seem at first glance that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is using this term inconsistently. In fact, upon 
further investigation, it appears that this author is quite thorough in his discussion of its 
various senses. 
After examining ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of Ýaql as a term, let us consider now its 
role in his theological reasoning. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ affirms that understanding divine grace 
in creation is only possible for a person using his intellect to grasp the signs or the outcome of 
divine generosity: “As soon as it became firm in our intellect that by creating His creatures 
He did good to others only, and out of generosity and grace, He did good and intended the 
benefit of his creatures; our intellect was convinced that the favours of generosity may only 
appear on the behalf of someone who has intellect and wisdom.”61 In other instances he 
depends on both intellect and scriptural evidence, that is: on Ýaql and naql together. “We do 
not negate what intellect is unable to comprehend without the Scripture, but we admit that 
intellect has not become aware by its own accord that these meanings are Father, Son, Holy 
Spirit, without the Scripture.
62
 In this respect ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ appears as a proponent of 
complementarity between intellect and Scriptures in teological reasoning. Although he gives 
credit to the intellect, he still thinks that scriptures matter in understanding Christian mysteries 
and the Trinity. He cannot be considered a philosopher only, since the aÌbÁr of Scriptures – 
from a rationalistic point of view – always carry the possibility of being either true or false.  
Sometimes complementarity between intellect and senses as a way of cognition is 
defended by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. He says:  
“In the first investigation, witnessing the forms of creatures forced the intellect to affirm that 
there is a substance that created them in time and brought them into being. In the second 
investigation, the fact that in the eternity of His pre-eternity He had abstained from creating 
[his creatures], but later on He carried out their making as a donation, [forced the intellect] to 
render pre-eternal life necessary for Him. And the third investigation, on the basis of His 
perfect government, and of what had previously shown of His care, guided [the intellect to 
                                                          
61
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 151,19-152,1 
املف رقتسا يف انلوقع ،هنأ امنإ يرجي هقلخب قئلاخلا ناسحلإا ىلإ ،هريغ لضفت ىخوتو هب حلاص ضعب هقئلاخ   ادوج ، اماعنإو تنقيأ انلوقع هنأب نل 
ودبت لئاضف دوجلا ةمعنلاو لاإ نم يذ لقع وأ ةمكح. 
62
 Ibid., p. 169,7-9 
ام تزجع لوقعلا نع هكرد نم نود باتكلا لاف ،هركنن لب دق رقن نأب لوقعلا مل هبنتت نم اهئاقلت ىلع هذه يناعملا   ابأ   انبإو حورو ،سدق نود لوق 
باتكلا 
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accept] that He carries this out in order to be generous to others. It witnesses to the 
substantiality of His Word and the pre-eternity of His wisdom, necessarily.”
63
  
So the first step of the investigation was based on the physical evidence of bodily forms, and 
the second and third steps were more “intellectual” or rational. This methodology can also be 
considered a continuation of Patristic traditions, since ὁ νοῦς is also found in relation to other 
faculties or particularly in relation to sense perception in Church Fathers’ texts. Here is 
another example: “And the traces of their actions (burning, ashes, smoke and steam) are signs 
for the intellect of the existence of their sources.”64 Although ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ displays 
here common methodological elements with Muslim philosophers, mainly experience and 
sense perception, he does not elaborate his proof as a philosopher. First, he does not endorse 
emanation or necessity to explain the creation of things. Second, he mixes proofs from 
experience or sense perception with others based on signs or analogy (qiyÁs). Signs or 
analogies, which do not produce certain knowledge, are typically used by Muslim 
theologians, not philosophers.  ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not use in this case the Aristotelian 
syllogistic in a strict philosophical, but rather in a rhetorical sense. M. Maróth asserts that in 
general the assessment of rhetoric proofs was not clear in Greek and Latin rhetoric traditions 
either. It is sure that they were not admitted as valid and applicable in theoretical sciences, 
while the results of practical sciences were introduced by rhetorical proofs, since there the aim 
was conviction instead of exact knowledge. Aristotle permitted invalid and incorrect proofs in 
rhetoric.
65
 Similarly, in Arabic prose, an analogy on the basis of senses – even if combined 
with the intellect – is not a burhÁn falsafÐ; it is rather kalÁmÐ, ºadalÐ. According to what 
M. Maróth writes in his The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great, 
Christian communities were educated in the (once Greek) rhetorical schools. It is not 
surprising then that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses such argumentation, i.e. sign-inference. On the 
other hand, it is not just his argumentation which can be characterized by such a feature, but 
he even asks for the same kind of demonstration, when addressing the (probably Muslim) 
opponent: “Make us find the truth of this by a clear burhÁn, like the way we made you see the 
essence of the four elements, their createdness in time and the evolution of creatures out of 
                                                          
63 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 152,5-9 
هنإف امك نع دهاوشلا نم لاكشأ قئلاخلا ترطضا لوقعلا يف صحفلا لولأا ىلإ دوجو تابثإ   رهوج اهثدحأ ،اهأشنأو لاوصحف يناثلا نم هعربت 
اهتعنصب دعب هكاسمإ   اميدق نع اهقلخ ىلإ باجيإ ةايحلا هل ، ايلزأ كلذك ام لد صحفلا ثلاثلا نم ماكحإ هتسايس اهل امو مدقت نم قباس هتمه نأب 
دوجي ىلع ريغ ،اهب دهشي ىلع ةيرهوج هتملك ةيلزأو هتمكح   ارارطضإ 
64
 Ibid., p. 132,7-8 
… تناكو راثآاهلامعأ نم قارتحلاا دامرلاو ناخدلاو راخبلاو لئلاد لوقعلل ىلع دوجو اهنيع  
65
 MARÓTH, M., Methods of Conviction in Rhetoric Part I, In: Acta Antiqua 49 (2009), p. 339. 
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them, by way of witnesses of the intellect and senses together.”66 His use of the term burhÁn 
is typical of a theologian whose background is philosophical. For if he considers burhÁn an 
apodictic proof, then it would be certain knowledge. In this case, he would not as his 
adversaries to prove the contrary by way of another apodictic proof. The latter is self-evident 
and a philosopher would not make such a mistake. Since he is a theologian, ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ uses some philosophical methods and terms (burhÁn, Ýaql, ÎawÁss) in a polemic 
against an opponent. An analogy on the basis of senses – even if combined with the intellect – 
is not a philosophical proof; it may only be dialectical argumentation. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples refer to the cognitive faculties of the intellect, its role 
in perception and understanding, its role in ethics, and its being a gift of God. He may be 
compared to both previous authors, since all the three authors establish the intellect as being a 
gift of God, in which intellect is used in a theological way. Theodore AbÙ Qurra and 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ emphasize the cognitive faculties of the intellect as a means of 
understanding, recognizing; as something that can set up analogies and get to the knowledge 
of things. In this respect, the use of the concept can be considered philosophical in approach. 
Both authors consider the intellect a means for distinguishing between good and evil, so there 
is an ethical approach, too. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ and AbÙ RÁ’iÔa both refer to the limits of 
the intellect, but while AbÙ RÁ’iÔa sees the help of God as a solution in such cases, 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ turns to analogy or to scripture. In this, their approach is not 
philosophical, since it is the characteristic of the theological approach to mention the help of 
God and Scripture in the course of the cognition of God. 
The question that raises here is whether ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ had any impact on later 
Muslim authors. In answering this, no direct textual evidence is quoted, instead, (Christian) 
ideas presented by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ will be compared to descriptions of books of 
definitions, as the representatives of standard Muslim theological and philosophical 
terminology. 
Let us first examine the philosopher, AbÙ YÙsuf b. IsÎÁq al-KindÐ, who defines the 
term in his RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ67 as follows: intellect is a simple 
substance that comprehends the true nature of things.”68 Since Ýaql is defined as a substance, 
                                                          
66 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 99,15-16 
انودجوأف قح كلذ ناهربب حضاو امك كاندجوأم تاوذ عئابطلا عبرلأا ثودحو اهنوك ءوشنو قئلاخلا اهنم تاداهشب لقعلا ساوحلاو   اعيمج 
67
 al-KINDÏ, AbÙ YÙsuf b. IsÎÁq, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ In.: RasÁ’il al-KindÐ al-falsafiyya, 
Ed. ABØ RÏDA, MuÎammad ÝAbd al-HÁdÐ, RasÁ’il al-KindÐ al-falsafiyya, Frankfurt, MaÝhad TÁrÐÌ al-
ÝUlÙm al-ÝArabiyya wa-’l-IslÁmiyya, 1999. pp. 165-180. (Later on: al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-
RusÙmihÁ) 
68
 Ibid., p. 165.: 
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we may say that here we see a philosophical approach that underlines the cognitive faculty of 
the intellect and defines the term by it. The simple and concise definition indicates that al-
KindÐ shares – at least with regard to the function of the intellect - ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
concept. Indeed, the latter highlights Ýaql as a faculty of comprehension and perception of 
and distinction between things. Al-KindÐ’s definition concentrates on intellect as a substance: 
it is simple, and it is the means of the perception of the true nature of things. Contemporary 
Christian apologetic writings deal with the concept and the term in a wider range, from 
multiple approaches. However, the reference to the intellect as a substance in al-KindÐ’s 
definition – to the best of my knowledge – cannot be seen in the Christian apologetic writings. 
There is a possible parallel, though: Christian theologians often use the analogy of the 
intellect and the word and spirit as three aspects of one substance, when they defend the unity 
of the three divine hypostases. Each constituent is regarded as a substance on its own, forming 
one general substance altogether. If the parallel is too far-fetched, we can still think of al-
KindÐ’s philosophical interpretation as one coming from a different tradition: probably the 
one that developed from the translation movement.  
Though not a book of definitions, let us mention al-FÁrÁbÐ’s (d. 950) treatise on Ýaql 
here.
69
 He introduces six meanings of Ýaql, the first of which is a ‘general’ interpretation of 
intellect, as it is understood by the ÊumhÙr [al-ÎukamÁ’], i.e. the majority [of philosophers]. 
It is what makes man intelligent, ÝÁqil.70 According to this interpretation, it is a distinctive 
characteristic of humankind; it is discernment or prudence, taÝaqqul, a faculty that 
characterizes the man who acts in order to perform what is good.
71
 This kind of interpretation 
may be paralleled with the writings of Christian authors, which indicates that the tradition the 
latter authors relied on was known to the philosopher, as well. The second interpretation is 
that of the mutakallims, who use Ýaql to say it makes a thing necessary or impossible.72 It is 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
. لقعلا - رهوج طيسب كردم ءايشلأل اهقئاقحب  
The term is defined by al-KindÐ in the second place, right after the First Cause (al-Ýilla al-ÙlÁ), which indicates 
its importance in the philosopher’s view. This fact can be further emphasized if we take into consideration that 
al-KindÐ mostly followed the order of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, translated for him by UstÁ×, and this term 
seems to be inserted among those important for Aristotle, as Kennedy-Day demonstrates it. C.f. KENNEDY – 
DAY, K., Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy, pp. 21-22. 
69
 al-FÀRÀBÏ, AbÙ NaÒr MuÎammad, RisÁla fÐ al-Ýaql. In: al-FÀRÀBÏ, AbÙ NaÒr MuÎammad, Texts and 
Studies III., Ed. SEZGIN, F., Frankfurt am Main, Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1999., pp. 47-94. 
70
 Ibid. p. 49. 
لقاع هنإ ناسنلإا يف روهمجلا لوقي هب يذلا ءيشلا. 
71
 Ibid. pp. 50-53. 
72
 Ibid. p. 49. 
لقعلا هيفني وأ لقعلا هبجوي امم اذه نولوقيف مهتنسلأ ىلع نوملكتملا هددري يذلا لقعلا 
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identified with common sense, bÁdi’ al-ra’y.73 This interpretation may also be paralleled with 
the writings of Christian authors, since all of them use phrases like “yÙÊibuhu al-Ýaql” or 
“yanfÐhi al-Ýaql.” This correspondence shows that the tradition Christian authors rely on and 
the one al-FÁrÁbÐ defines on the basis of mutakallims’ usage may go back to a common 
(philosophical) tradition that transcends denominational and religious differences. Al-
FÁrÁbÐ then goes on with four meanings defined on the basis of Aristotle, the first of which 
relies on the Posterior Analytics.
74
 The second one is based on the Nicomachean Ethics;
75
 the 
third one depends on the Psychology;
76
 and the last one is defined according to the 
Metaphysica.
77
 As for the first one, it is a faculty of the soul, quwwat al-nafs, by which man 
can gain certitude from true, universal and obliging premises. It is also termed as natural 
perception, fiÔra and disposition, ÔabÝ.78 The fourth of the six meanings, is a part of the 
soul, Êuz’ al-nafs, in which, by perseverance and experience some certitude formulates, by 
which good and evil might be distinguished.
79
 There’s partial agreement between this 
statement and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage. The latter does not refer to Aristotle as his source, 
but he considers intellect a part, or more precisely a faculty of the soul and a means of 
distinction. The fifth subsection of the intellect is described on the basis of Aristotle’s 
Psychology, and is considered to be of four types: potential intellect, Ýaql bi-’l-quwwa; actual 
intellect, Ýaql bi-’l-fiÝl; acquired intellect, Ýaql mustafÁd; and agent intellect, or active 
intellect, Ýaql faÝÝÁl.80 Potential intellect, Ýaql bi-’l-quwwa is a part or a faculty of the soul, 
which – as M. Fakhry puts it – abstracts the forms of existing entities with which it is 
ultimately identified.
81
 By way of the coming into being of these forms in the soul, the 
potential intellect becomes actual intellect.
82
 The acquired intellect is what can conceive of, 
imagine or actualize the rational entities.
83
 The last one is the agent or the active intellect, 
                                                          
73
 Ibid. pp. 53-54. 
74
 al-FÀRÀBÏ, AbÙ NaÒr MuÎammad, RisÁla fÐ al-Ýaql, p. 49. 
 هركذي يذلا لقعلا ذاتسلأاناهربلا باتك يف سيلاطسرأ 
75
 Ibid. p. 50. 
قلاخلأا باتك نم ةسداسلا ةلاقملا يف هركذي يذلا لقعلا 
76
 Ibid. p. 50. 
سفنلا باتك يف هركذي يذلا لقعلا 
77
 Ibid. p. 50. 
لقعلا يذلا هركذي يف باتك ام دعب ةعيبطلا 
78
 Ibid. pp. 54-55. 
79
 Ibid. pp. 55-57. 
80
 Ibid. p. 58. 
81
 FAKHRY, M., A History of Islamic Philosophy, London, Longman - New York, Columbia University Press, 
1983., p. 121. C.f. al-FÀRÀBÏ, AbÙ NaÒr MuÎammad, RisÁla fÐ al-Ýaql, pp. 58-61. 
82
 al-FÀRÀBÏ, AbÙ NaÒr MuÎammad, RisÁla fÐ al-Ýaql, pp. 61-66. 
83
 Ibid. pp. 66-70. 
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which conceives of the more perfect existents.
84
 These subsections are not paralleled with 
Christian author’s writings. The sixth meaning of the intellect – as defined in accordance with 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics – is divine intellect, the source of all movements.85 God as a rational 
being is present in Christian understanding, but this kind of philosophical expression cannot 
be found in the works of the authors examined here. It can be seen that al-FÁrÁbÐ’s 
interpretation is based on a different tradition from the one ÝAmmÁr al- BaÒrÐ relies on. His 
heavy reliance on what Aristotle said concerning the issue cannot be paralleled with the 
Christian authors. 
In AbÙ ÝAbdallÁh MuÎammad ibn AÎmad ibn YÙsuf al-KÁtib al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s 
MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm,86 there is a reference made to Ýaql among the terms of falsafa, in its 
second part, in the framework of the science that treats the divine as its subject matter – that 
is, it belongs to the field of metaphysika, although it appears in kalÁm books as well. The term 
is defined in a classified form, and no definition of the intellect as such may be found in itself. 
We can first read about the active intellect as follows: 
“The agent intellect is the divine faculty that is followed by everything in the upper and the 
lower worlds, namely the stars and planets, objects and animals that are not rational beings, 
and humankind, since everything searches for their benefit, and for what keeps them alive and 
subsistent. [They do it] according to the possibility that is given to them. And this faculty that 
is present in things of the natural world is called nature.”
87
  
Next in line is the material intellect, which is defined as follows: “The material intellect is the 
faculty in humankind. Its position in the anima is like that of seeing in the eye, whereas the 
agent intellect has the position of the light of the sun for the sight. And when this faculty that 
is the material intellect emanates and becomes an act, it is called acquired intellect.”88 Later 
on reference is made to the universal intellect, without further definition. We may see that a 
century after ÝAmmÁr al- BaÒrÐ’s time, according to Muslim writers’ definition, Ýaql is 
primarily the agent intellect. However, we can also observe that Ýaql has the meaning of a 
faculty given to humankind (i.e. it does not appear as a substance), as we have noticed it in 
ÝAmmÁr al- BaÒrÐ’s and his Christian contemporaries’ texts. I do not assert that Muslim 
                                                          
84
 Ibid. pp. 70-80. 
85
 al-FÀRÀBÏ, AbÙ NaÒr MuÎammad, RisÁla fÐ al-Ýaql, pp. 80-82. 
86 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, AbÙ ÝAbdallÁh MuÎammad ibn AÎmad ibn YÙsuf al-KÁtib, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, Beirut, 
DÁr al-Fikr al-LubnÁnÐ, 1993. (Later on: al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm) 
87 Ibid., p. 163. 
لقعلا لاعفلا وه ةوقلا ةيهللإا يتلا يدتهي اهب لك ءيش يف ملاعلا يولعلا يلفسلاو نم كلافلأا بكاوكلاو دامجلاو ناويحلاو ريغ قطانلا ناسنلإاو 
بلاتجلا هتحلصم امو هب هماوق هؤاقبو ىلع ردق ام أيهت هل ىلع بسح ناكملإا .هذهو ةوقلا يف ءايشلأا يتلا يف ملاعلا يعيبطلا ىمست اةعيبطل. 
88
 Ibid., p. 163. 
لقعلا ينلاويهلا وه ةوقلا يف ناسنلإا يهو (يف )سفنلا ةلزنمب ةوقلا رظانلا يف نيعلا .لقعلاو لاعفلا (اهل )ةلزنمب ءوض سمشلا رصبلل .اذإ تجرخ 
. هذه ةوقلا يتلا يه لقعلا ينلاويهلا ىلإ لعفلا ىمست لقعلا دافتسملا  
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philosophical tradition roots in the works of Christian authors, as it is a continuation of 
Aristotelian philosophy, but it is important to emphasize that similarities in interpretation are 
discernible. 
Al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s contemporary, the theologian Ibn FÙrak gives a brief definition of 
the term in his KitÁb al-ÍudÙd:89 “the definition of the intellect: it is the evident knowledge 
which the rational beings do not share with the animals and the sleeping.”90 Intellect is seen as 
a means in cognition, in which Ibn FÙrak’s approach is close to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
and Theodore AbÙ Qurra. It can be of interest to note that this approach is closer to the 
Christian theologians’ interpretation than to the Muslim philosophers’ one. If intellect is a 
basis for distinction between human beings and animals, wakeful and sleeping, then it implies 
that intellect is a distinctive feature. If this is the difference between humans and animals, 
wakeful and sleeping, it may than even stand for rationality. Even if the tradition they are 
depending on may be different, in this, we may see a resemblance to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
and Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s interpretations, who are continuers of the Patristic tradition. 
Even in the eleventh century, as it can be seen in Ibn SÐnÁ’s Book of Definitions,91 
Ýaql is still used as a faculty in addition to several other meanings. On the one hand, Ibn 
SÐnÁ claims that the common usage of Ýaql includes the meaning of faculty in addition to 
knowledge and disposition.
92
 On the other, he mentions eight meanings of Ýaql. An 
examination of his definitions shows his fidelity to the Aristotelian syllogistic and 
psychology. It can be assumed that Ibn SÐnÁ was aware that some confusion was taking 
                                                          
89
 Ibn FØRAK, AbÙ Bakr MuÎammad b. al-Íasan, al-AnÒÁrÐ al-IÒbahÁnÐ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl In: 
Abdel-Haleem, Muhammad, Early Islamic Theological and Juristic Terminology: "KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl" 
by Ibn FÙrak.' Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 54 (1991) (1). pp. 5-41. (Later on: Ibn 
FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl) 
90
 Ibid., p. 19. 
.( دح لقعلا :وه هئادبلا نم مولعلا يتلا لا كرشي يف اهملع نوقطانلا ،مئاهبلا نوظقيتملاو (مونلا  
91 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd (Livre des Définitions), Ed. and Trans. GOICHON, A.-M., Cairo, Publications de 
l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale du Caire, 1963. (Later on: Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd) 
92
 Ibid. pp. 11-13. 
دح لقعلا لقعلا مسا كرتشم ناعمل ةدع لاقيف لقع ةحصل ةرطفلا ىلولأا يف سانلا نوكيف هدح هنأ ةوق اهب دوجي زييمتلا نيب روملأا ةحيبقلا 
ةنسحلاو :لاقيو لقع امل هبسكي ناسنلإا براجتلاب نم ماكحلأا ةيلكلا نوكيف هدح هنأ ناعم ةعمتجم يف نهذلا نوكت تامدقم طبنتسي اهب حلاصملا 
ضارغلأاو لاقيو لقع ىنعمل رخآ هدحو هنأ ةئيه ةدومحم ناسنلإل يف هتاكرح هتانكسو هملاكو هرايتخاو هذهف يناعملا ةثلاثلا يه يتلا قلطي اهيلع 
مساروهمجلا لقعلا. 
امأو يذلا لدي هيلع مسا لقعلا دنع ءامكحلا يهف ينامثة ناعم اهدحأ لقعلا يذلا هركذ فوسليفلا يف باتك ناهربلا قرفو هنيب نيبو ملعلا لاقف ام 
هانعم اذه لقعلا وه تاروصتلا تاقيدصتلاو ةلصاحلا سفنلل ةرطفلاب ملعلاو ام لصح باستكلااب اهنمو لوقعلا ةروكذملا يف باتك سفنلا .نمف كلذ 
لقعلا يرظنلا لقعلاو يلمعلا لقعلاف يرظنلا وقة سفنلل لبقت تايهام روملأا ةيلكلا نم ةهج ام يه ةيلك لقعلاو يلمعلا ةوق سفنلل يه أدبم كيرحتلا  
ةوقلل ةيقوشلا ىلإ ام راتخي نم تايئزجلا نم لجأ ةياغ ةنونظم وأ ةمولعم. 
مث لاقي [ىوقل ةريثك نم لقعلا يرظنلا لقع نمف كلذ ]لقعلا [ينلاويهلا وهو ةوق سفنلل ةدعتسم لوبقل متايها ءايشلأا ةدرجم نع داوملا نمو كلذ 
لقعلا ةكلملاب وهو لامكتسا هذه ةوقلا ىتح ريصت ةوق ةبيرق نم لعفلا لوصحب يذلا هامس يف باتك ناهربلا   لاقع نمو كلذ لقعلا لعفلاب وهو 
لامكتسا سفنلا يف ةروص ام وأ ةروص ةلوقعم ىتح ىتم ءاش اهلقع اهرضحأو لعفلاب نمو كلذ لقعلا سملادافت وهو ةيهام ةدرجم نع ةداملا  
[ةمسترم يف سفنلا ىلع ليبس لوصحلا نم جراخ. 
نمو كلذ لوقعلا يتلا لاقي اهل لوقعلا ةلاعفلا يهو لك ةيهام ةدرجم نع ةداملا ]لاصأ .دحف لقعلا لاعفلا امإ نم ةهج ام وه لقع وهف هنأ رهوج 
يروص هتاذ ةيهام ةدرجم يف اهتاذ لا ديرجتب اهريغ نع اةدامل نعو قئلاع ةداملا يه ةيهام لك دوجوم امإو نم ةهج ام وه لقع لاعف وهف هنأ 
.رهوج ةفصلاب ةروكذملا نم هنأش نأ جرخي لقعلا ينلاويهلا نم ةوقلا ىلإ لعفلا هقارشاب هيلع. 
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place in the use of Ýaql, and wanted, accordingly, to separate the use of the term in a 
philosophical sense from that of the theologians. As a result, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s uses of 
Ýaql as a faculty, a means or an attribute are, in light of Ibn SÐnÁ’s strict philosophical 
vocabulary, common usage. However, when ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ uses Ýaql as quwwat al-nafs, 
faculty of the soul, it is evident that Aristotelian psychology was known to him. 
Two centuries later, al-ÀmidÐ’s work, entitled al-MubÐn, defines intellect in the 
following way: “as for ‘intellect,’ this term refers to eleven things; one of them is substantial, 
the rest are accidental. …”93 In his classification we may see a similar principle to that of Ibn 
SÐnÁ. He also uses a strict philosophical vocabulary and an exact classification, a kind that is 
unparalleled on the behalf of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ and his Christian counterparts in the ninth 
century. This difference can be explained by the fact that in the 9
th
 century the fields of kalÁm 
and philosophy were on their ways to separate, and this is reflected in the formation of distinct 
terminologies. These late authors define the term in a detailed philosophical sense, while 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage testifies to its early formation. 
The last example I am going to examine is al-ÉurÊÁnÐ’s definition in his al-
TaÝrÐfÁt: “Intellect, according to theorists, is a substance free from matter in its essence, but 
it can be compared to that in its action. It is the anima capable of rational thinking that is 
referred to, when one says “me”. Intellect is said to be a spiritual substance that is created by 
                                                          
93 al-ÀMIDÏ, S., al-MubÐn fÐ šarÎ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ÎukamÁ’ wa-’l-mutakallimÐn, Cairo, Maktabat Wahba, 
1993. pp. 106-108. (Later on: al-ÀMIDÏ, al-MubÐn) 
The citation goes on in the following way: 
“… As for the substantial intellect: this expresses a quiddity free from matter or any relation to matter. As for the 
accidental ones, they are the following:  
Practical and theoretical intellects are what have been referred to at the properties of the human anima. 
Material intellect is an expression of the theoretical faculty in the case of the lack of a device, by which 
it would be possible to reach comprehension. It is like the faculty of a child in connection to the knowledge of 
geometrical forms. This faculty is called the absolute faculty. Another kind is the intellect of talent, and this is an 
expression of a theoretical faculty in the case of the presence of a means for acquiring comprehension by thought 
and reflection. It can be compared to the situation of a young man who knows the elements of letters, the ink, the 
pen, and who, while writing, needs the state of thought and reflection. This intellect is called the faculty of 
enablement. 
There is the intellect in actu, too, and this expression refers to the theoretical faculty that covers the 
occurrence of comprehension that does not need any thought or reflection. It is like the case of one who is 
perfect in writing. 
There is the holy intellect that refers to a theoretical faculty that does not need teaching or being taught 
for acquiring comprehension, like the case of the Prophet. 
There is the learned/derived intellect. It is an expression referring to a theoretical faculty, when it is 
knowing and comprehending, like man while writing. 
Intellect can refer to what man acquires through his experiences, and then it is called experimental 
intellect. 
The term may refer to the soundness of the first disposition. 
And it may refer to an attitude of a man, which is beautiful in his acts and states.” 
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God together with the human body…”94 As we can see, it first appears as a substance, and 
later on it is defined in a detailed way as faculty, agent, and means. In the latter meanings, i.e. 
intellect as faculty, agent, means, we can see a common point in his usage and that of the 
Christian authors in the ninth century. Similarities may be due to the philosophical origins of 
these terms that influenced Muslim authors through different sources, including the Christian 
transmission. Christian authors were the contemporaries of Muslim theologians and 
philosophers and in that sense they seem to have shared a common terminology that 
transcended to some extent communal and religious divisions. As for the difference: al-
ÉurÊÁnÐ’s definition is more detailed, but by his time the philosophical terminology had 
been more refined. 
Conclusion 
 
I demonstrated that all Christian authors are continuers of Patristic notions, as far as 
intellect is concerned, inasmuch they considered intellect a distinctive feature of man and a 
tool for distinction between right and wrong. The contexts in which intellect appears are also 
similar: Church Fathers refer to intellect as a means of cognition, the object of which is God, 
and many of them refer to divine assistance as another means in this process. I showed that it 
is a recurrent topic in Arabic Christian literature, too, especially in the case of AbÙ RÁ’iÔa. 
Theodore AbÙ Qurra mostly relied on intellectual argumentation, while AbÙ RÁ’iÔa had a 
                                                          
94
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, Ed. ÍIFNÏ, ÝAbd al-MunÝim, Cairo, DÁr al-RašÁd, 1991, pp. 
173-174 (Later on: al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt) 
His definition is very long, so for the sake of brevity, the rest of it is cited only int he footnotes:  
“ … The intellect is said to be the light in the heart, which knows truth and the false. And intellect is said to be a 
substance free of matter that sticks to body through direction and regulation. 
Intellect is said to be a faculty of the anima capable of speech/rational thinking, and it is evident that the 
intellectual faculty is exchangeable with the anima capable of speech/rational thinking. It is also said that the 
agent of the realization is the anima, ant the intellect is its means, like the knife is [the means] of one who cuts. 
Intellect and anima and mind are said to be one, but as a comprehending thing it is called intellect, as a 
regulative thing it is called anima, and as something that is ready for comprehension it is called mind. 
Intellect is by what it is possible to understand the true nature of things. Its place is said to be the head and the 
heart. 
The material intellect is merely the readiness to comprehension of understandable things. It is a mere faculty free 
from action like for children (?). It is related to matter only because the anima at this stage resembles the first 
matter that – in itself – is free from all the forms. 
The intellect is – according to the linguists – taken from the cord of the camel. It prevents those who have 
intellect from the abandonment of the right path. It is true that it is only a substance, that can comprehend the 
hidden things indirectly, and the perceptible things by way of witnessing. 
The intellect in natural disposition is the knowledge of necessary things and the preparedness of the anima for 
acquiring the theoretical things. 
The intellect in actu means that the theoretical things become stored up in the rational faculty by way of 
repetition of the acquisition, thus it becomes possible for it to produce it, whenever it wants, without undergoing 
a new acquisition, even if it does not see it in actu. 
The derived/learned intellect means that the comprehended theoretical things are present at it in a way that these 
do not disappear from it.” 
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theological approach, placing divine assistance in the centre. As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, he 
used Ýaql in both philosophical and theological meanings. The term had a wide range of 
references in the ninth century in Christian authors’ writings, and we have seen ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ as the one who used the term in the greatest variety of contexts.  
 Their contemporary Muslim author gave a definition for the term with a narrower 
sense, but introduced intellect as a substance, which is an interpretation that cannot be found 
in their works. Later Muslim authors gave definitions including meanings discernible in 
Christian authors’ works and that of the substance. Great elaboration can first be seen in al-
FÁrÁbÐ’s treatise, and the first to give a lengthy and detailed definition in a book of 
definitions is Ibn SÐnÁ. However, he represents a later stage of development in the field of 
terminology, while Christian authors witness to the early formation. The variety of meanings 
that appear in Christians’ usage is unprecedented on the Muslim side, which may refer to 
Christian contribution to later Muslim elaboration. 
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Chapter II 
The Terminology of body and incarnation 
(Ta’annus – humanisation vs. taÊassud – incarnation; and badan vs. Êirm vs. Êasad vs. 
ºism vs. haykal – body, bodily form) 
 
In this chapter, I aim at examining the formation of a specifically Christian concept 
and the terms that refer to it in Arabic. My presupposition is that the connotation of terms that 
refer to body, bodily form, corpse, “frame”/temple, and accordingly, their possible use and 
appearance may originate in Greek Patristic and/or philosophical literature. I wish to examine 
terms for body, bodily form in themselves first, and then I wish to see how the concept is 
adapted to refer to its relation to the divine (whether the divine/God may be/have a body or 
not). I will examine whether ‘body, bodily form’ i.e. badan vs. Êirm vs. Êasad vs. ºism have 
any specific connotations in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, and then contrast them with Muslim 
usage. I intend to investigate them – where possible – in their “clear” form, where they appear 
in themselves. As a second step, I will cite examples where more than one term is mentioned, 
and try to demonstrate if and to what extent they might be considered synonyms. Then, the 
most important issue in this chapter will be the incarnation or humanisation of Jesus Christ, 
i. e. ta’annus – ‘humanisation,’ taÊassud – ‘incarnation,’ and ittiÌÁÆ (governing one of the 
following terms: bašarÐ, hay’a bašariyya, etc.)  – ‘assuming, taking (the form) of a human.’  
At the same time, I am interested in the way these terms may be contrasted to Islamic 
use, and in how interaction or influence may be observed in this very field. I also aim at 
examining the question if Christian understanding of the relation of the divine and a bodily 
form, or more specifically, God’s assuming a human body/form, i.e. His incarnation, may be 
paralleled to Islamic anthropomorphic ideas, ascribing human attributes to God.
95
 Prior to 
Arabic Christianity, John of Damascus already wrote in his De Fide Orthodoxa on the human 
need to conceive of God metaphorically in human terms. It can be found in the 11
th
 chapter, 
                                                          
95
 According to van Ess, the Qur’Án is transcendentalist, but uses anthropological language as a reference to 
God’s actions and qualities. It caused tension later on, when Islam expanded, and both transcendentalist and 
anthropomorphist tendencies were sharpened by the religious ideas prevailing in the new environment. C.f. VAN 
ESS, J., TashbÐÎ wa-tanzÐÎ, In: EI, Second edition, vol. X., 2000. Leiden, E. J. Brill, pp. 341-44., p. 342. (Later 
on: VAN ESS, J., TashbÐÎ wa-tanzÐÎ.) Martin claims that likening God to humans was already well-known in 
the Middle East prior to the rise of Islam in Christianity. The formation of Muslim discourse on 
anthropomorphism and corporealism in the first three Islamic centuries resembles earlier discussions among 
Christians, Jews, and pagan Greeks. C.f. MARTIN, R.C., Anthropomorphism, In: The Ecyclopaedia of the 
Qur’Án, Brill, Leiden – Boston – Köln, 2001., Vol. I.,  pp. 103- 107., pp. 103-104. (Later on: MARTIN, R.C., 
Anthropomorphism.) 
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i.e. Τῶν σωματικῶς ἐπὶ Θεοῦ λεγομένων (De his quae modo corporeo de Deo dicuntur). He 
says that in Holy Scriptures we may read symbolical references to God’s body or figure; but 
we need to know that we are corporeal human beings who could not understand divine things 
and the actions of an immaterial divinity, or could not comprehend His sayings without 
images and figural language. That is why whatever is told of God’s corporeality, it is 
figuratively expressed, and it is to be understood in a “higher” meaning. Eyes, vision should 
be meant as a figural expression for God’s potency to inspect and thus know everything. Ears 
refer to His “listening” to humankind’s appeal and His forgiveness, etc.96  
According to Martin, such Christian and some Neoplatonic influence on Muslim 
thinking in this field is possible, but the problem in Islam is basically linked to disputes about 
how to interpret passages in the Qur’Án that ascribe human attributes to God.97 Van Ess, 
however, underlines that what influenced most Islamic thinking was Neoplatonic philosophy 
in the form it had assumed in Christian theology.
98
 By an examination of sources, I try to find 
evidence for Christian influence. E.g. Binyamin Abrahamov studied a Muslim author, al-
QÁsim ibn IbrÁhÐm al-RassÐ, whose refutation of tašbÐh follows MuÝtazilites, who were 
influenced by Christian theology and Greek philosophy in this field.
99
 
If we turn to terms of bodily connotations, we may know on the authority of T. de 
Boer,
100
 that in the understanding of Neo-Platonizing philosophers and theologians, there was 
a distinction between heavenly and earthly bodies. The latter were composed of the four 
relatively simple bodies (elements, in Aristotle ἁπλᾶ σώματα: Arab, al-basÁ’iÔ). Heavenly 
bodies were simple; to describe them the term ºirm (plur. aºrÁm) was often used, which 
otherwise is synonymous with ºism. ¹irm, badan and Êasad are used as synonyms of Êism, the 
two latter ones are usually applied to the human body, badan often only to the torso. While 
badan is also used for the bodies of animals, ºasad is rather reserved for the bodies of higher 
beings (angels etc.), but aºsÁd is used particularly for minerals. It may also be mentioned that 
haykal (plur. hayÁkil) means with the Gnostics and mystics the physical word as whole as 
well as the planets, because the world-soul and the spirits of the stars dwell in them like the 
soul of man in its body. I am going to examine whether ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s terms can be 
placed in the same framework. 
                                                          
96
 DAMASCENUS, Johannes, De Fide Orthodoxa, In: Migne, PG. XCIV., 1860. cc. 841-44. 
97
 MARTIN, R.C., Anthropomorphism, p. 104. 
98
 van ESS, J., TashbÐÎ wa-tanzÐÎ, p. 342. 
99
ABRAHAMOV, B., Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qur’Án in the Theology of al-QÁsim ibn 
IbrÁhÐm, Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1996. pp. 8-9. 
100
 de BOER, T., Djism, In EI, Second edition, Vol. II., Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1965.  pp.  553-555. (Later on: de 
BOER, T., Djism) 
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1. ¹irm101 
 
According to Afnan,
102
 Êirm was used in the translations to express Greek 
philosophical terms such as τό στερεόν and σῶμα; but this does not mean that there is a total 
agreement in their meanings. If we look at the same terms in Greek Patristic usage, we will 
find that the first one appears with the following meanings: firm, solid, substantial 
[firmament, divine nature, which is not liable to change].
103
 For σω μα, Lampe brings a lot of 
meanings in Patristic literature, the most typical among them referring to man, earthly body, 
the body of Christ.
104
 However, though scarcely, but meanings such as ‘figure of three 
dimensions,’ ‘corporate body,’ ‘body, unit,’ ‘reality,’ and ‘bodily aspect or form,’ can also be 
found.
105
 
As far as we can judge it from the scarce appearance of the term in the KitÁb al-
MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, ºirm is used in a philosophical sense. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses it in 
the following meanings: ‘the body of an atom,’ or ‘the subject/substratum, carrying something 
that cannot subsist in itself.’ As for the first meaning, let us examine the context in which it 
appears: “You may find many kinds of mortal creatures that are praised for various things. 
E.g. the Sun is praised for the beauty of its light, the radiance of its glow and its sublime 
disposition. The fire is likewise praised for the subtlety of the body of its atom, the power of 
its heat and its beneficial effects. Thus, it is called a glowing, lucid, glorious, burning, 
ripening body…”106 It was said above that the simple heavenly bodies were described by the 
term ºirm (plur. aºrÁm) in Neo-Platonizing philosophy, and though the atom of the fire is not 
a heavenly body we may find some similarity here taking the simplicity and subtlety of this 
unique atom into consideration. The term is sometimes synonymous with ºism in Neo-
Platonizing philosophy, and it can be observed in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage, as well, as in 
the following examples:  
“These four things comprise everything that can be imagined or perceived. There is nothing 
that could be perceived by imagination or  sensory perception except for these four categories, 
necessarily. Two of them subsist in themselves: the substance and the individual hypostasis. 
                                                          
101
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term. 
102
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic,  pp. 48-49. 
103
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 1257. 
104
 Ibid., pp. 1362-66. 
105
 Ibid., p. 1366. 
106
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 155,12-15 
دقو نودجت   اريثك نم عاونأ قئلاخلا تاوملا حدمت ءايشأب ىتش سمشلاك ةحودمملا لامجب اهئوض ءاهبو اهرون فرشو ،اهتئيه رانلاكو ةفاطلب مرج 
… اهرهوج ناطلسو اهرح دماحمو اهراثآ .هومسف كلذل ً امرج   ائيضم   ارين   ايهب   اقرحم   اجضنم  
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The other two cannot subsist in themselves, and they can only exist in something else. These 
two are: the simple faculties and the accidents that befall bodies and entities.”
107
  
Here, body refers to the earthly, sublunar body, which carries accidents. It expresses body in a 
philosophical sense, as a substrate, parallel to an entity, which appears as the subject which 
can carry accidents. As for the synonymity of Êirm and ºism, it will show in another similar 
example, in which body, as the entity, the carrier of accidents (i.e. with the same meaning as 
we could see in this last example) is expressed by ºism: “as the simple faculties and necessary 
accidents that cannot subsist in themselves without different bodies.”108  
These meanings that appear at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ are not closely related to the ones 
we could see in Patristic use, as far as τό στερεόν was concerned. The other meaning, i.e. 
σῶμα, as a synonym of physical body, ºism is more likely to have influenced his 
interpretation. Looking at the connotations of σῶμα we can see that these have a similar 
meaning to those used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. 
As for his Christian contemporaries, to the best of my knowledge, they don’t use the 
same term. With regard to Muslim uses, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s contemporary, al-KindÐ 
defines only the term Êirm of the ones listed above. It is described from the viewpoint of 
extent, saying: “Body is what has three dimensions.”109 In this sense, Êirm proves to be a 
synonym of Êism, which is also a part of al-KindÐ’s vocabulary,110 but no definition is given 
for it. This definition is exactly the same Aristotle gives for body (cf. De Coelo, i, I, 268a, 7 f., 
and Metaph., v, 13, 1020a, 7): a body is what has three dimensions (dimension: διάστασις, 
διάστημα, Arabic buÝd, imtidÁd) and is a continuous, therefore always divisible, quantity 
(ποσὸν συνεχές, kamm muttaÒil).111 This meaning can also be found in Patristic literature, 
though its appearance in al-KindÐ’s definition might have originated in the philosophical 
tradition. Al-KindÐ mentions Êirm another time, right before its definition, in the definition 
of anima, nafs, where the author considers it to be the completion of a body.
112
 In the same 
                                                          
107
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 162,12-15 
هذهف ةعبرلأا ءايشأ ةطيحم لكب ام وه موهوم سوسحمو .سيلو ءيش كردي مهوب سحو لاإ وهو لخاد يف هذه ةعبرلأا يناعملا لا ةلاحم .نانثإف 
اهنم ناموقي ،امهسفنأب امهو رهوجلا ماعلا مونقلاو ،صاخلا نانثإو لا ناموقي امهتاذب لاو نادجوي لاإ يف امهريغ امهو ىوقلا ةطيسبلا ضارعلأاو 
ةضرتعملا يف مارجلأا نايعلأاو. 
108
 Ibid., p. 163,14-15 
 ...اهل ةفلتخملا ماسجلأا نع اهسفنأب ينغتست لا يتلا ةرطضملا ضارعلأاو ةطيسبلا ىوقلاك … 
109
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 165. 
. مرجلا ام هل ةثلاث داعبأ  
110
 e.g. when defining nafs, ‘anima’. MuÎammad ÝAbd al-HÁdÐ AbÙ RÐdÁ, the editor, adds in a footnote, that 
al-KindÐ mostly uses Êirm, not Êism. According to the editor’s view, Êism became more widely used later. He 
also draws attention to the former term’s disappearance, and as a proof, he mentions that al-ÉurÊÁnÐ does not 
define it. C.f. p. 165. 
111
 de BOER, T., Djism, p. 554. 
112
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p.165. 
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description, it is used as a synonym of Êasad: since soul is defined as the completion of the 
body (ºirm), and then as the integrity of the body (ºism). This synonymity can also be found at 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, but the understanding of Êirm as having dimensions is not present in the 
Christian author’s text. 
Éism is the only term Ibn SÐnÁ defines among the ones under investigation in this 
chapter, but at the same time, Êirm also appears in his use, as it is the case in the definition of 
fire,
113
 with the meaning of one of the elements, the Aristotelian ἁπλᾶ σώματα, as ºirm 
basÐÔ.  It means then that he also relies on the Aristotelian tradition. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
used it in the context of the Sun as a burning, glowing “body,” and Ibn SÐnÁ’s usage in the 
description of fire is really similar to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s first example. On this 
basis we may say that the Aristotelian classification was not only known to Ibn SÐnÁ, but 
already to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, a Christian in the first half of the ninth century, which cannot 
be interpreted as a proof for the existence of direct influence, but indicates that a common 
tradition was shared by Muslims and Christians. To the best of my knowledge, there is no 
definition of this term in the other authors’ texts. 
 
2. ¹ism114 
 
In philosophical language the body (σῶμα) is distinguished from the incorporeal 
(ἀσώματον), God, spirit, soul, etc. In Neo-Platonic influence on Muslim thought two features 
were emphasized: the incorporeal is simple and indivisible in nature, while the body is 
composite and divisible; the incorporeal is in spite of its negative character the original, the 
causing principle, while the body is a product of the incorporeal.
115
 
On the authority of Afnan, the term Êism is considered to be the translation of the 
following Greek philosophical concepts: σῶμα and τό στερεόν.116 Given that these two terms 
are exactly the same that were translated as Êirm, it is not unexpected to find them in similar 
contexts, as synonyms in Arabic texts, too.  In Patristic literature (as seen above) τό στερεόν 
may refer to a solid, firm body, while σῶμα has a plurality of meanings in Patristic literature, 
as well. Now suffice us to mention that σῶμα may mean a solid figure of three dimensions as 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
سفنلا ةيمامت مرج يعيبط يذ ةلآ لبق ؛ةايحلل لاقيو :يه لامكتسا لوأ مسجل يعيبط يذ ةايح ؛ةوقلاب لاقيو :يه رهوج لقع كرحتم نم هتاذ ددعب 
فلؤم 
113
 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, p. 27. 
رانلا يه مرج طيسب هعابط نإ نوكي   اراح   اسباي   اكرحتم عبتلاب نع طسولا رقتسيل تحت ةرك قلارم  
114
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term. 
115 de BOER, T., Djism, p. 553. 
116
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 51. 
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understood by Church Fathers (and it is also used in this sense by Johannes Damascenus, as 
indicated by Lampe).
117
 
Éism appears more frequently in a variety of contexts, implying a variety of 
connotations. Early in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s book, ºism means a(n inanimate,) physical body 
(as such it must be created and thus stands in opposition with the simple, uncreated, and 
incorporeal). The following quote deals with a body’s coming into being out of hyle: 
“In what way is your statement similar to the first one? What similarity is there between your 
claim: that hyle resulted bodies out of no body, spirits from no spirit, and life out of the lack 
of life; and between the clay of the ceramist? It will remain clay forever, if the ceramist leaves 
the clay of the forms – out of which he forms his pot – in its original state. And if he burns it 
in fire and causes the humidity in it to cease, by this, he will bring it away from the 
substantiality of the clay which then becomes ceramics.”
118
  
On this basis, body is material in nature, and it consists of hyle and form. This approach is 
close to the approach of Muslim philosophers, because they, as de Boer attests it, say with 
Aristotle that the body is composed of matter and form (hayÙlÁ or mÁdda and ÒÙra).119 
As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, the creation of bodies, aÊsÁm, is a sign of omnipotence 
(i.e. as contrary to the lack of potency) in his interpretation: “this is the attribute of a failing, 
contemptible [being] that persists in his action by the domination of someone else, and he 
does not deserve to be described by the power to create bodies if he is impotent to enforce his 
will in what he wants.”120 This quotation does not clarify what kind of body is referred to, but 
as the object of creation, ‘body’ may simply refer to a physical unit. The significance of the 
example lies in the idea that ‘body’ as a result of a creative action proves divine omnipotence. 
Body, ºism has the attributes of partition, and can only be created in time. Its being a 
body excludes the possibility of pre-eternity: “As for parts and divisions, they are not 
attributes of something which is not a body and has always existed in His pre-eternity. 
Instead, it is the attributes of bodies that are created in time, and which are composed and 
combined.”121 Neo-Platonic ideas are clearly reflected here, as well as they are in Muslim 
                                                          
117
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 1366. 
118
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 98,20-99,3 
ام هبشت يرمعل مكتيضق هذه ؟ىلولأاب يأو سايق نيب مكمعز اهنأ تجتنأ نم لا مسج ً اماسجأ نمو لا حور   احاورأ نمو لا ةايح ، ةايح نيبو ةنيط 
بحاص راخفلا ،يتلا نأ وه لمهأ ةنيط لاكشلأا يتلا اهنم روص هتينآ ىلع ،اهلاح تبث رهدلل ، انيط نإو اهقرح رانلاب لازأف ةبوطرلا ةضرتعملا 
اهيف اهنع اهلقنو كلذب نع ةيرهوج نيطلا تراصو   اراخف. 
119
 de BOER, T., Djism, p. 554. 
120
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 103,12-13 
 قلخ ىلع ةردقلاب فصوي نأ قحتسي لاو هرومأ يف هريغ ةزعب لوصي نيهم بئاخ ةفص هذهفماسجلأا عم دارأ اميف هرمأ ذافنإ نع هزجع  
121
 Ibid., p. 152,17-18 
. امأ ءازجلأا ضاعبلأاو سيلف نم تافص ام سيل مسجب لب ام مل لزي   ادوجوم هتيلزأب .لب كلذ نم تافص ماسجلأا ةثدحملا ةفلؤملا ةبكرملا  
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thought; in this, the two parties rely on shared sources. The same is true the other way round, 
if something is not a body, it cannot be partitioned: 
“As their Creator is seen never to have ceased existing, it is right for us to establish life and 
rationality for Him necessarily. I do not know why some refute – though they ascertain a pre-
eternal Artificer – that He should have pre-eternal life and pre-eternal wisdom. Do they 
consider this as something that would introduce parts and divisions in His substance? If so, 
they should annul their fear, and they should know that what is not a body, cannot be 
partitioned and divided.”
122
  
The example introduces the concept of body through a declaration that division and partition 
are physical actions or states that can only be traits of physical, combined and composed 
entities. In this context ºism is to be understood as an inanimate, physical entity; its being 
animate or inanimate is irrelevant. However, we need to be aware that this evidence, 
establishing that physical entities can be divided, while division is meaningless outside the 
connotation of the body, is accepted by Muslims, too. This mutually accepted basis serves 
here to defend the Trinity. The establishment of God (the Father), His Son, i.e. the pre-eternal 
Life, and the Spirit, i.e. the pre-eternal wisdom
123
 is rebutted by Muslims as introducing 
division in the Godhead, but Christian polemics, on the basis of mutually accepted Neo-
Platonic teaching, according to which the incorporeal is in its nature simple and indivisible, 
try to demonstrate that this cannot be considered division, otherwise, if insisting upon it, 
Muslims would be accused of turning the incorporeal into a corporeal entity. 
If a body can be divided, it can even intermingle with another,
124
  but a body may 
never reach the pre-eternal, and the bodi(ly) can never mix with the divine. This preliminary 
gains special importance in the Nestorian teaching on the two hypostases of the Messiah: “the 
substance of the Pre-eternal transcends the tangibility by bodies, [stands above] intermixing, 
intermingling with them, being limited by them, and receiving accidents and contingence 
through them.”125  On the other hand, it can be paralleled to the teaching of the Muslim 
                                                          
122
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba,, p. 153,13-17 
اخ يفلأ ذإ كلذل ًةايح يلزلأا عناصلل ًاتابثإ ،نوركنملا ءلاؤه ركنأ مل يردأ تسلو ًارارطضا قطنلاو ةايحلا هل بجون نأ انل قح ،ًايح لازي مل اهقل
 نكي مل ام نأ اوملعيو مهنظ اولطبيلف كلذ اونظ نإف ًاضاعبأو ًءازجأ هرهوج يف بجوي كلذ نأ نوبسحيأ ةيرهوج ةمكحو ةيلزأً امسج  ناكمإ لاف
يزجتلل ًلاصأ هيف ضيعبتلاو ء 
123
 According to M. Hayek, in referring to the Word by the term wisdom and the Spirit by the term life, 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ shares the Catholicos Timothy’s practice. C.f. HAYEK, M., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La 
première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux apologies du Christianisme. In: 
Islamochristiana, (1976) 2, p. 81. 
124
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 189,13-15. “If a body intermingles with another, 
the result is more probable to be heavy and to [be ready to] mix than the two [original] bodies out of which it 
resulted.” 
.  جزام اذإ لبمسج ةجيتنلا تناك امهنع نيذلا نيمسجلا نم طلغلاو ةفاثكلل ولحأ اهنم ةنئاكلا ةجيتنلا تناك ًاميسج  
125
 Ibid., p. 215,1-3 
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counterpart (MuÝtazilites and other theologians), who claimed that a God limited by a body 
could not be omnipresent, consequently God’s being a body, or God’s inhabiting a body is 
impossible. Let us examine another example, which highlights the same idea and plays an 
important role in disputes. God’s (or the Word’s) dwelling in a physical entity, being 
surrounded (as just referred to in the previous paragraph) by a body appeared both in disputes 
among Muslims, and between Christians and Muslims. If the Son is considered to be divine, 
the same problem arises as far as his inhabitation is concerned. In this example we may find 
the same teaching: God is not restricted by the body. The problem is resolved by introducing 
the idea that the divine may appear through the body. Interestingly enough, in the last case in 
this example, body is referred to by ºasad instead of ºism, which will indicate differences in 
their connotations: 
“There is no modality of the Pre-eternal and His actions, and there is nothing similar to Him or 
to His deeds. Just as in the case of light: He created it as clear light in the beginning of creation 
(as He said in the book of Genesis), then, this light dwelt in a small, thick, dense body. He 
linked and combined them; and made this body a dwelling place and source for the light. Out 
of this body the light can pour out for the benefit of the earth and its magnitude, without the 
body’s limiting or restricting the light, or any place surrounding it. Instead, it is the light that 
limits, restricts and contains the body. The Pre-eternal substance can also do the same, and 
even more. He is not surrounded or limited by any body, nor is He contained in any place. He 
could assume a human [being] for Himself by way of His incarnation, or a temple in which He 
can dwell, or a dwelling place out of which he can address people. The body he took as a 
garment for Himself did not contain Him, His dwelling place did not restrict or guide Him, His 
temple, out of which He addressed people, did not limit Him. Instead, He surrounded and 
restricted this body, and He appeared through it.”
126
 
The first sentence shows that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ aims at disputing on a mutually accepted 
basis. The bi-lÁ kayf idea of Muslims is expressed in a similar way: i.e. lÁ kayfiyyata li-’l-
AzalÐ; and he also emphasizes that nothing can be similar to God or His actions. However, he 
introduces the issue through an analogy. The first part of the analogy introduces the light to 
which the divine is compared to, as being created and existing without a body. This body 
comes into being later, and instead of containing the light, it is contained by the light. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
يلزلأارهوج ...  لاعتم نع  ةسامم ماسجلأا اهتطلاخمو جازتملااو اهب بيكرتلاو اهعم ديدحتلاو اهيف لوبقو ثادحلأا ضارعلأاو نم اهلبق. 
126
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 194,8-16 
نإو ناك لا ةيفيك يلزلأل هتافصو لاو هبش هل لاو ،هلاعفب هنإف امك يف رونلا يذلا هقلخ   ارون   انيبم يف ىدتبم ،قلخلا امك لاق يف رفس ،ةقيلخلا مث 
هلولح يف عبارلا ً امسج   اريغص   اظيلغ   افيثك هطبرف هفلأو هلعجو له   لاحم   اندعمو وشني هنم ىلإ فرش ضرلأا اهتزعو نم ريغ نأ هدحي مسجلا وأ 
هرصحي وأ ،هيوحي لب وه طيحملا رصاحلا هل يواحلا ؛هيلع كلذك لضفأو نم كلذ نكمأ رهوجلا ،يلزلأا يذلأ لا طيحي هب مسج هرصحي لاو ناكم 
،هيوحي نأ هذختي هسفنل   ارشب هدسجتب   لاكيهو لحي هيف   لاحمو اخيبط سانلا هنم .ملو هوحي دسجلا يذلا هعردت لاو هرصح هنكسم لاو همكح لاو 
هدح هلكيه يذلا بطاخ سانلا ،هنم لب وه طيحملا هب يواحلا هل رهاظلا هيلع 
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phrase lÁ kayfiyyata li-’l-AzalÐ was necessary, since the divine cannot be fully compared to 
it, because the divine is not created; but it has always been existent, even before the creation 
of the Messiah’s body, in which He later dwelt, as the light did in its body. Though it will be a 
second step to compare terms that appear together, we may see that ºasad and ºism are used as 
synonyms, however, the human body, more specifically the one that was taken by the divine, 
is not referred to by ºism, but by ºasad instead. ¹ism is still used as an inanimate, physical 
entity, whereas ºasad appears as the human body, or more specifically, the Messiah’s body or 
flesh. The analogy of the light and Sun frequently appears in Patristic literature, so the 
imagery ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ (and as we will soon see: AbÙ RÁ’iÔa) uses here relies on 
Greek roots. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ makes the term ºism the basis of distinction between person and 
hypostasis, as we can see it in the demonstration of divine hypostases for the opponents: “We 
have not named them three persons, and nobody should imagine out of what we said that we 
named them persons, since person means body for us, which is limited by its diameters and 
limbs, which distinguish them in contrast to other bodies. Instead, we have called them three 
hypostases in Syriac: (ܐܡܘܢܩ).”127 In this case, body is a physical entity with dimensions and 
parts. If šaÌÒ is translated as person, this body can also be imagined as an animate one, but it 
is more probable that this occurrence refers to a living, biological-physical entity or a unit 
which has parts and dimensions. It is also noteworthy that ºism is used in a definition where 
divine hypostases are introduced, since it offers a parallel with Muslim anthropomorphism, 
ºism being the term used by Muslim authors to refer to God as (having) a body.128 ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ, as well as Muslim orthodoxy rejects this view. (‘Person’ as šaÌÒ is rather used by 
Jacobite theologians, when they refer to the three hypostases; as an example, let us mention 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, 162,1-3 
مل اهيمسن ةثلث ،صاخشأ لاو نمهوت دحأ انيلع نأ اهانيمس   اصاخشأ، نلأ صخشلا اندنع لك  ًمسج دودحم هراطقأب حراوجو لصفت هنيب نيبو ام 
. هاوس نم ماسجلأا .لب اهانيمس ناسلب ينايرس ةثلث ميناقأ  
On the question of ousia-hypostasis see VANYÓ, László, Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe, 
Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2009. p. 415. 
128
 Martin asserts that anthropomorphism appeared first in the claims of some Muslims declaring that God has a 
physical body (Êism). “Corporealism … was not based on any occurrence of the term with that sense in the 
Qur’Án, but on literal understandings of Qur’Ánic descriptions of God as having a physical body, … on the 
ground that God exists and only that which has physical extension can exist.” C.f. MARTIN, R. C., 
Anthropomorphism, p. 103.  
As for the verses: “Often cited were such passages as the Throne Verse (2:255; cf. 20:5) which suggests that God 
is seated on a throne in heaven and the passages that suggest God has hands (e.g. 3:73; 5:64; 48:10) and eyes 
(e.g. 20:39; 52:48; 54:14).” C.f. Ibid. p. 103. 
The explanation of the term can be found at van ESS, J., TashbÐÎ wa-tanzÐÎ, pp. 341-44; p. 342., too, in a 
similar sense. 
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AbÙ RÁ’iÔa.129 This term, if used in relation to the divine, however, is rejected by Muslim 
theologians, too.
130
) 
Concluding we may say that ºism in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use is a corporeal entity, a 
physical being, which is created (in time), and cannot be pre-eternal. It is inanimate, 
composite and compound, is subject to partition and division. A body is capable of mixing 
and mingling, but cannot affect or limit the divine principle. Its creation is a sign of divine 
omnipotence. In the majority of the cases no special reference is made to its being a body of 
an animal or a human, so a physical corporeal entity is the best circumscription we can give 
for it. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Êism is close to the τό στερεόν of Patristic literature in 
connotation with the meaning of a solid, firm body, and we have seen various collisions with 
the plurality of meanings of σῶμα, as well.  
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa uses the term frequently 
in his treatise on Incarnation, in a way that offers ground for comparison. But while the body 
of the Messiah is mainly referred to by the term Êasad, other bodies and their embodying are 
expressed by Êism and taÊassum. In one of his analogies, he talks about the fire that cannot 
be perceived due to its subtility, unless it embodies in any body (referred to as Êism). But the 
fire does not change away from its essentiality in the embodiment, neither does the body in 
which it embodies.
131
 The bodies that are referred to in the action of embodiment are wood, 
candle, gold, or silver, so ‘body’ is used as a reference to a physical entity, just as in the case 
of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Another example needs to be mentioned since it is really similar to an 
example by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, thus its Patristic origin may be confirmed by its collective 
usage in Christian circles. The example is that of the light and the Sun. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa refers to 
the creation of the Sun’s light three days before that the body as dwelling place would have 
been created, establishing that neither the body nor the light of the Sun changed away from 
their essentiality.
132
 A difference is to be remarked, though: while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses 
                                                          
129
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, Ed. GRAF, Georg, Corpus 
Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 130.; Scriptores Arabici tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951., pp. 11, 
107, 109, 110, 11, 163-65. 
130
 C.f. HAYEK, M., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux 
apologies du Christianisme. p. 83. 
131
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, al-RisÁla al-×Ániyya li-AbÐ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ fÐ al-taÊassud. In: Die Schriften des 
Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, Ed. Georg GRAF, Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium vol. 
130.; Scriptores Arabici tom. 14., Louvain, Peeters, 1951. pp. 27-64., (Later on: ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-
taÊassud.)  p. 31. 
ام نولوقت يف رانلا يتلا نم اهرهوج لا رصبت لاو سحت لاو عقت تحت ءيش نم ساوحلا ةطبلا اهفطلل نود نأ مسجتت ضعبب ماسجلأا امإ بطح امإو 
عمش امإو بهذ امإو ةضف ريغو كلذ نم ماسجلأا .نورتفأ رانلا يه اهمسجتب دعبب هذه ماسجلأا ةفوصوملا ةريغتم مأ ةلدبتم نع اهتيران وأ لأاماسج 
ةمسجتملا اهيف ىلإ ريغ اهلاح ىلولأا .امناو رانلا ران  ًادبأ نإو تمسجت دعبب موسجلا .مسجلاو مسج  ًادبأ نإو هتمسجت رانلا. 
132
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 31. 
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this example to elucidate dwelling, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa applies it as an analogy for incarnation, and 
to demonstrate that this occurrence does not infer change upon the “participants.” AbÙ 
RÁ’iÔa also refers to the Torah, to give the example a greater emphasis. 
The Melkite counterpart, Theodore AbÙ Qurra uses the term rarely, with the meaning 
of a physical entiy. He divides corporeal entities to animate ones, aÊsÁm nafsÁniyya and 
inanimate ones, aÊsÁm Èayr nafsÁniyya. He then places human bodies parallel to them 
(referred to by the word Êasad), and then establishes that all these are made up of the four 
elements: fire, air, water and earth.
133
 In this, he resembles ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ: a common 
heritage must have been known to Christian authors, without respect to the denomination they 
belonged to. 
As for the Muslim counterparts, it was already mentioned above that al-KindÐ uses 
the term Êism, but no definition is given for it. However, when al-KindÐ defines the soul, 
nafs, he mentions Êism and Êirm as synonyms.134 The same term is to be noticed in the 
definition of place, makÁn.135 On the basis of the context, Êism is a physical (probably 
inanimate) body which has dimensions. When describing elements, the author refers to them 
as the smallest constituents of bodies: here, Êism is to be understood again as an inanimate, 
physical, and composite body that is made up from parts.
136
 The same could be our conclusion 
on the basis of the definition of contingence,
137
 odour,
138
 and cleaving.
139
 In the definition of 
nature, body appears as governed by a faculty.
140
 In a definition for philosophy,
141
 it can be an 
inanimate physical entity or a human body, as well. Man consists of body, Êism; soul, nafs, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
امو مكلوق يف رون سمشلا يذلا ثكم دعب ام قلخ ةثلث مايأ ريغ مسجتم نيعلاب. فرعي كلذ نم أرق ةيروتلا .فمسجت نيعلاب نم ريغ رييغت نع 
هرهوج لولأا وهو رون نم لبق نأ مسجتي نمو دعب همسجت. 
133
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al- ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm, p. 178. 
134
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p.165. 
سفنلا ةيمامت مرج يعيبط يذ ةلآ لباق ؛ةايحلل لاقيو :يه لامكتسا لوأ مسجل يعيبط يذ ةايح ؛ةوقلاب لاقيو :يه رهوج لقع كرحتم نم هتاذ ددعب 
فلؤم 
135
 Ibid., p. 127. 
ناكملا تاياهن مسجلا؛ لاقيو :وه ءاقتلا يقفأ طيحملا طاحملاو هب  
136
 Ibid., p. 128. 
.  سقطسلأا- يأو ؛ةوقلاب نئاكلا هيفو ،ًلاحنم هيلإ عجريو ،ءيشلا نوكي هنم رصنع وه :ًاضمسجلا،  ةلمج نم ءايشلأا رغصأ وهومسجلا  
137
 Ibid., p. 170. 
ةسامملا - ىلاوت نيمسج سيل امهنيب [نم ]امهتعيبط لاو نم ةعيبط امهريغ لاإ ام لا هكردي ؛سحلا   اضيأو وه ىهانت تاياهن نيمسجلا ىلإ طخ 
كرتشم امهنيب  
138
 Ibid., p. 172. 
ةحئارلا - جورخ ءاوه نقتحم يف سجم ضراع ،هيف ةطلاخم هل ةوق كلذ مسجلا   
139
 Ibid., p. 176. 
ةقزلاملا - كاسمإ تاياهن نيمسجلا ً امسج امهنيب  
140
 Ibid., p. 179. 
لوق ةفسلافلا يف ةعيبطلا :يمست ةفسلافلا ىلويهلا ،  ةعيبط ىمستو ةروصلا ةعيبط ، ىمستو تاذ لك ءيش نم ءايشلأا ،ةعيبط ىمستو قيرطلا ىلإ 
نوكسلا ةعيبط، ىمستو ةوقلا ةربدملا ماسجلأل ةعيبط  
141
 Ibid., p.173. 
اهدحو   اضيأ اولاقف :ةفسلفلا ةفرعم ناسنلإا ؛هسفن اذهو   لوق فيرش ةياهنلا ديعب روغلا :  لاثم لوقأ :نإ ءايشلأا اذإ تناك   اماسجأ لاو ،ماسجأ امو لا 
ماسجأ امإ رهوج امإو ،ضارعأ ناكو ناسنلإا وه مسجلا سفنلاو ارعلأاو،ض تناكو سفنلا   ارهوج لا ، امسج هنإف اذإ فرع هتاذ فرع مسجلا 
.هضارعأب ضرعلاو لولأا رهوجلاو يذلا وه لا ؛مسج نذإف اذإ ملع كلذ ، اعيمج دقف ملع ؛لكلا هذهلو ةلعلا ىمس ءامكحلا ناسنلإا ملاعلا رغصلأا 
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and accidents.  According to MuÎammad ÝAbd al-HÁdÐ AbÙ RÐda, the editor of RasÁ’il al-
KindÐ, the broad use of Êism as a term is a later development.142 This then means that 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ attests to the term’s early formation, preceding Muslim authors in its use. 
His exact, consistent use of the term with the meaning of a physical, biological entity seems to 
correspond to al-KindÐ’s interpretation (even if the latter author does not consider this term 
of primary importance). However, al-KindÐ’s usage of the term when referring to an animate 
body is not paralleled by Christian examples. 
In al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, Êism is defined according to different fields: 
we can see it in kalÁm first: “According to the theologians, bodies are composed of parts that 
cannot be [further] divided, and these are the atoms. … According to them, body is a 
collection of atoms, which has length, breadth, and depth.”143 In philosophy, he gives a 
definition for the natural body and another for the mathematical body.
144
 Body may belong to 
human beings, too, but it is rather the physical body itself that is concentrated on. The ‘body’ 
referred to in the field of handasa is also a physical one that has three dimensions.
145
 In the 
light of al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s definitions, it is the field of theology in which some interaction might 
have taken place. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage of Êism as a composite and compound 
physical entity may be paralleled with al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s definition for the term’s theological 
use. 
Ibn FÙrak’s KitÁb al-ÍudÙd highlights only one aspect of the physical body: its being 
composite.
146
 In this respect, he reflects Neo-Platonic classification, and might be paralleled 
to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. We have seen though that the latter’s understanding of the concept is 
much richer and appears in a variety of contexts: in this, he seems to precede Muslim authors. 
In his KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, Ibn SÐnÁ gives three definitions for Êism.147 Just like in the 
case of the intellect, Ibn SÐnÁ is aware of the confusion concerning the various 
understandings of Êism. He says that people call continuous and limited quantities that have 
                                                          
142
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 165. 
143
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 83. 
دنعو نيملكتملا نأ ماسجلأا ةفلؤم نم ءازجأ لا أزجتت يهو رهوجلا درفلا... .  مسجلاو مهدنع عمتجملا نم رهاوجلا   لاوط   اضرعو   اقمعو. 
144
 Ibid., p. 165. 
مسجلا يعيبطلا وه نكمتملا عنامملا مواقملا مئاقلاو لعفلاب يف هتقو كلذ اذهك طئاحلا اذهو لبجلا كلذو ناسنلإا .مسجلا يميلعتلا وه مهوتملا يذلا 
ماقي يف ،مهولا روصتيو   اروصت طقف 
145
 Ibid. p. 218. 
146
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl, p. 21. 
فلؤملا وه :مسجلا دح 
147
 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, pp. 22-23. 
اقيف ٍناعم ىلع لاقي كرتشم مسا مسجلا .مسجلا دح ضرفي نأ نكمي ام ةروصل مسج لاقيو ةوقلاب ةثلاث داعبأ هيف حوسمم دودحم لصتم مك لكل مسج ل
.ةفصلا هذهب ةروصو ىلويه نم فلؤم رهوجل مسج لاقيو ةنيعتم دودح تاذ ًاقمعو ًاضرعو ًلاوط تئش فيك داعبأ هيف 
ش تلدب ةملك عمشلا وأ ءاملا نم ةعطق نأ ةروصلا هذه نيبو مكلا نيب قرفلاو هنيعب اهنم دحاو قبي ملو ةحوسمملا ةدودحملا داعبلأا هيف تلدبت هلك
ت مل تلخلختو تفئاكت اذإ كلذلو ريغت لاو لدبت ريغ نم ددعلاب ةدحاو ةيمسج يهو لاوحلأا هذهل ةلباقلا ةروصلا تيقبو ددعلاب هيف ًادحاو ةروص لحتس
 يتلا ةيمسجلا ةروصلا نيب قرف نذإف هداعبا تلاحتساو ةيمسجلابو مكلا باب نم يهرهوجلا باب نم يه يتلا ةروصلا ني 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
45 
 
three dimensions bodies. Another understanding defined by him comprises limited forms in 
which dimensions may be imposed in length, breadth, and depth. And a third meaning of 
Êism in Ibn SÐnÁ’s description refers to composite substances that are made up from matter 
and form. In the light of this classification, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation belongs to the 
third group. Ibn SÐnÁ goes on to explain that different meanings are due to a difference in 
approach: the core of the interpretation may either be the quantity or the substance. But this is 
more elucidated than ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s concept, given that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is 
representative for the early formation of the concept and term, while Ibn SÐnÁ for a later, 
more developed stage.  
Al-ÀmidÐ, in his al-MubÐn, defines body as a compound (physical) entity that 
consists of at least two atoms.
148
 (By this time, this interpretation must have become widely 
accepted, since even his contemporary, MÙsÁ ibn MaymÙn (d. 603 AH/AD 1205) also refers 
to it in the Guide for the Perplexed.
149
) He then goes on to define the mathematical body on 
the basis of dimensions and the possibility of division.
150
 All these examples show that the 
differentiated definition of ‘body’ as expressed by the term Êism is a later development in 
Muslim thought.  
And finally, let us see how al-ÉurºÁnÐ defines this term in his al-TaÝrÐfÁt. He puts 
down that a body is a substance, which can receive three dimensions (i.e., as accidents), and it 
is a composite, compound substance. He also defines the mathematical body saying that it can 
be divided in all three dimensions. According to this description, the end of the surface is the 
end of the natural body, but it can be used as a demonstrative subject for sciences.
151
 These 
two descriptions show that Êism is an inanimate, physical body here, as well. As for its being 
a composite and compound substance, this idea had already been present in 9
th
-century 
authors’ works. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation and usage is recurrent in all these later works, so 
an early Muslim – Christian interaction is likely to have happened in this field. Later Muslim 
                                                          
148
 al-ÀMIDÏ, S., al-MubÐn fÐ šarÎ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ÎukamÁ’ wa-’l-mutakallimÐn,  p. 110. 
امأو مسجلا :ةرابعف نع فلتؤملا نع نيرهوج نيدرف ادعاصف  
149
 IBN MAYMØN, M., DalÁlat al-ÎÁ’irÐn, Maktabat al-ÕaqÁfa al-DÐniyya, Cairo, 1974. pp.  196-197.  
زجلل لاو اهتقدل ةئزجتلا لبقت لا ًادج ةريغص ءازجأ نم فلؤم وه هيف مسج لك ينعأ هتلمجب ملاعلا نأ اومعز مهنأ اهانعم ىلولأا ةمدقملا اهنم دحاولا ء
 وهو ،مك اذ عمتجملا ناك ضعب ىلع اهضعب عمتجا اذإف .هجوب مكمسج نائزج اهنم عمتجا ولو ذئنيح 
150
 al-ÀMIDÏ, S., al-MubÐn fÐ šarÎ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ÎukamÁ’ wa-’l-mutakallimÐn,  p. 111. 
امأو مسجلا يميلعتلا :ةرابعف نع دعب لباق ةئزجتلل يف ثلاث تاهج ةعطاقتم ىلع دح دحاو اعطاقت امئاق  
151
al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, pp. 86-87. 
مسجلا : ةثلاثلا داعبلأل لباق رهوج.رهوجلا نم فلؤملا بكرملا وه مسجلا :ليقو ، 
يميلعتلا مسجلا : يف هنع ثحبي ذإ ،ًايميلعت ًامسج :ىمسيو ،يعيبطلا مسجلا ةياهن وهو ،حطسلا هتياهنو ،ًاقمعو ًاضرعو ًلاوط ماسقنلاا لبقي يذلا وه
لإ ةبوسنم ،لصفنملاو لصتملا مكلا لاوحأ نع ةثحابلا ةضايرلا يأ :ةيميلعتلا مولعلا مهميلاعت يف اهب نوؤدتبي اوناك مهنإف ،ةضايرلاو ميلعتلا ى
.ًاكاردإ لهسأ اهنلأ ،نايبصلا سوفنل مهتضايرو 
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works are more detailed, but it is due to an elaboration that is a result of a long-term 
development of kalÁm and philosophy. 
 
3. ¹asad152 
 
According to de Boer, Êasad is usually used as a synonym of Êism, applied to the 
human body, or even for the bodies of higher beings (angels etc.). In its plural form, as aºsÁd, 
it is used for minerals, too.
153
 On the basis of Afnan’s lexicon, we also know that it is the 
equivalent of the Greek term σῶμα.154 If we turn to Lampe’s σῶμα, we will see that some of 
its meanings (neglected so far) will offer parallels to this term. Lampe brings man’s body at 
the first place, subdivided into the earthly body, (related to soul and their connexion), then its 
relation to Christ (His human body, similar to all men’s bodies, not converted into divine 
nature, indwelt by Logos, united with Logos, in relation to deity; Logos not sullied by contact 
with body).
155
  
Furthermore, it is the Greek term, σὰρξ, which allows us to understand better the 
meaning of Êasad. The Greek text of the Gospel of John (1,14): “Καὶ ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο 
καὶ ἐσκήνωσεν ἐν ἡμῖν” is particularly illustrative. According to Lampe, this word can mean 
‘flesh,’ ‘body, as an integral part of man.’ It appears many times in relation with ‘its 
resurrection.’ It can also mean ‘man,’ and as for Christological texts, they use this term to 
refer to the ‘action of Incarnation,’ or the ‘human nature of Christ,’ and ‘Christ’s body.’ 
In ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, when appearing alone (i.e. without being accompanied 
by other terms referring to corporeal connotations), Êasad is mostly used to raise the question 
whether the body assumed by the divine may be considered the body of God. It also refers to 
human body, as an entity that will resurrect. As for the first field: the analogy of the relation 
of the body of light and the appearance of light through it was introduced above to describe 
the body of the Messiah and the divine appearance through it. We could see in that analogy 
that the body of the light was referred to by the term Êism, but when the body of the Messiah 
was mentioned, the author switched from the usage of Êism to the term Êasad. In the 
following example we can observe the same thing: when the body the Messiah took for 
Himself is referred to, it is again the term Êasad which is used:  
                                                          
152
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term. 
153
 de BOER, T., Djism, p. 555. 
154
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 50. 
155
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon,  p. 1366. 
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 “It is astonishing that some people may claim that what made them call him one substance, 
one hypostasis, is the will to make the verity of unification between the divine and the human 
necessary. [By this, they also wanted to make] the rules of duality [necessary] in every respect 
concerning the unity of the one Messiah, who consists of these two. Then they called the body 
of the Messiah the body of God, and thus, though they wanted to escape from establishing two 
hypostases, and setting up two substances and denying the unity of the Messiah, they fell into 
something even more severe. It is because in their calling the body the body of God, there is 
an establishment of the duality of the two substances in the one Messiah, necessarily: i.e. God, 
and His body. And this would mean the establishing of their duality together with the negation 
of the unity of the Messiah who consists of them, and to whom the substance of both is 
attached.”
156
   
Interpreting the body of the Messiah as the body of God would imply a dualistic approach. 
This argumentation might not only be addressed to Muslims, but fellow Christians, namely 
the Orthodox. Nestorius had taught that in the incarnation two distinct hypostases were 
conjoined in Jesus Christ. The teaching of Chalcedon, according to which there was one 
hypostasis in Christ, was denounced by Nestorians. The example aims at demonstrating that 
that such a unity would actually imply a dualistic interpretation. 
Right after this part, as an explanation for this idea, another analogy is introduced in 
the text,
157
 relating that a human being consists of his body and soul, and if his body were 
considered as the body of the soul, and his soul as the soul of the body, it would be dualistic 
as well. Interestingly enough, when talking of the human, both Êasad and badan are used to 
refer to his body, though badan prevails, as the word mostly used for human beings, or their 
torsos. In the end, a conclusion is drawn, as follows:  
“If not, then where is the unity of the human being, who has a soul and a body, if the body of 
the Messiah is called the body of the pre-eternal God, and the Pre-eternal is called the divinity 
of the body? By this, the unity of the Messiah, whom both His divinity and humanity is 
attached to, would get invalidated, and by this, the duality of the divine and the human would 
become necessary, because this would necessarily exclude their unity and composition.”
158
  
                                                          
156
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, pp. 197,15-198,2: 
قلاو ،توسانلاو توهلالا نيب داحتلاا ةقيقح باجيإ ةدارإ ًادحاو ًامونقو ًادحاو ًارهوج هتيمست ىلإ مهاعد هنأ اومعز موق لوقعل بجعلاوينثلاا دعاو ةين
 اومس مث .امهنم مئاقلا دحاولا حيسملا ةينادحو ىلع اهلك هوجولا يفدسج  حيسملادسج  لاطبإو نيرهوجلا ةماقإو نيمونقلا تابثإ نم اوعقوف ،الله
 مهتيمست يف نلأ كلذو .هنم اوبره امم مظعأ يف حيسملا ةينادحودسجلا دسج الله يأ ،ًارارطضا حيسملا يف نيرهوجلا ةينينثا تابثإ الله هدسجو .
امهيلك نم رهوجلا هيلإ فاضملا امهنم مئاقلا حيسملا ةينادحو لاطبإو امهتيئانث باجيإ عم كلذو 
157
 Ibid. p. 198,2-10 
158
 Ibid. p. 198,7-10 
 سفنلا هل يذلا دحاولا ناسنلاا ةينادحو دجوت نيأف لاإوندبلاو ليق اذإ ،دسجل  حيسملادسج  توهلا يلزلألو ،يلزلأا اللهدسجلا.  ةينادحو كلذب تلطب
ةلاحم لا ،فلاتئلااو داحتلاا نع امهليطعت باجيإب ناسنلإاو هللإا ةينينثا هب تبجوأو ،هتوسانو هتوهلا هيلإ فاضملا حيسملا 
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We can see that this conclusion of the above-mentioned analogy uses the term badan, when 
referring to the body of the human, and Êasad, when the body of the Messiah and the so-
supposed “body of the pre-eternal God” is described. There seems to be a differentiation 
between the two terms’ denotations, as well as it can be considered a hierarchy of meanings. 
  The question may be investigated from another approach: the body as the body of 
“God” may only be referred to if the Son is specified among the three hypostases. “The 
Messiah – eulogy – is God, but God is not the Messiah, since the name ‘God’ refers to the 
Messiah, and to others: the Father and the Spirit. This is why it is impossible to say. “the 
body of God” or that “Mary born God” without first pointing at the Messiah and saying that 
the body is the body of the Messiah who is God in all.”159 In every instance in this quotation, 
the “body of God” or the body of the Messiah is described by the term Êasad. (At this point, it 
is important to refer to the specifically Nestorian nature of the argumentation, as far as Mary 
as God-bearer is concerned. Nestorians taught that the Virgin was a woman and gave birth to 
a human being in the nature of his humanity, so she cannot be called Theotokos.
160
 This 
example is probably not articulated against Muslims, but Orthodox Christians instead.) 
The body as the body of God is examined through scriptural evidence, too. Examples 
are cited from the Gospel of Matthew,
161
 Luke,
162
 etc.
163
 Finally, let us remember, that it is the 
term Êasad, which appears when it comes to the body of the human being that will resurrect:  
“the Messiah is who vivifies the two worlds by His power, and the cause of His appearance on 
the world was that He wanted to save humankind from their error, and to drive them from the 
obedience of Satan to the obedience of their Lord, and to fill their mind with certainty 
concerning what He had told them: that their bodies would resurrect and go to the [eternal] 
happiness, which He had prepared for those who are the first among them regarding 
godliness.”
164
  
This is the first instance that we have seen the term Êasad as referring to human bodies, but 
apparently what justifies it is the fact that a resurrected body is beyond the earthly sphere; it is 
                                                          
159
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, p. 199,7-10 
كلذو   اضيأ هنلأ نإ ناك حيسملا لج هؤانث ، اهلإ سيلف الله وه ،حيسملا نلأ مسا  الله عقاو ىلع حيسملا ىلعو ريغ حيسملا يأ بلأا حورلاو .كلذلف 
لاحتسا نأ لاقي دسج الله نإو ميرم تدلو ،الله نود أدبي ركذب حيسملا لاقيف دسجلا دسج حيسملا يذلاو وه هلإ ىلع لك 
160
 See also VANYÓ, László, Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe, p. 499. 
161
 Ibid. p. 200,3-8 
162
Ibid. p.  200,9-10 
163
 The author probably used an Arabic translation, though it is not explicitly laid down. Arabic translations of 
the New Testament are numerous and rather diverse, thought to have been made from Greek, Syriac, and Coptic 
exemplars. The earliest manuscripts seem to date from the ninth century. The oldest dated manuscript of the 
version (Sinai Arab. 151) comes from 867. The translations probably are not more than a century or two older.  
164
  al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, p. 229,14-17 
كلذك حيسملا ييحم نيملاعلا ،هتوقب ذإ ناك ببس هروهظ يف ملاعلا ذقنتسيل سانلا نم مهتللاض مهبذجيو نم ةعاط سيلبإ ىلإ ةعاط مهبر عبشيلو 
مهلوقع   انيقي امب مهرشب هب نم ةمايق مهداسجأ اهريصمو ىلإ ميعنلا يذلا هدعأ يلولأ حلاصلا هنمم 
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a higher form which is then worthy of being referred to by the same term that delineates the 
body the Messiah took. 
Concluding we may say that the body, or flesh is the object of assumption, and as 
such, must be clarified whether is or is not the body of God. The term usually refers to the 
body of the Messiah, and scarcely to an entity which is to resurrect. In this sense this is an 
organic body, which does not have a soul in itself, so it might be compared to the Latin term, 
caro. On this basis, we can already understand why it is chosen as the basis for the derived 
form, incarnatio, i.e. taÊassud. 
Patristic connotations as mentioned above on the authority of Lampe are similar to 
these ones expressed by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Êasad, so Patristic use of σῶμα may have had 
an influence on the Christian Arab understanding of Êasad, either as the Messiah’s body or 
resurrection body. But in so far the Messiah’s body is concerned; it is even more probable that 
the term σὰρξ had the primary influence on its formation. 
As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, he is not as 
consistent in the use of terminology as the Nestorian author. He sometimes refers to the 
Word’s incarnation in a body by the word Êism,165 while incarnation itself is referred to by the 
term taÊassud. In other instances he uses the same roots to give a description for the action of 
incarnation by the body, referred to as Êasad, e.g. when the Muslim opponent asks if the 
incarnation of the incarnating one is an action or a part of the incarnating one. The response 
first concentrates on the incarnating one, establishing that His essence comprises both the 
body (Êasad) and incarnation (taÊassud). As for the incarnation of the incarnating one, it is 
neither an act nor a part, but a way to the action. As for the body, two approaches are 
possible: if the divine essence is concentrated on, it cannot be taken for His part, but if the 
combined one (i.e. the Messiah that is the combination of the divine essence and the body) is 
in the centre, then the body is considered to be its part. In this, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa may be 
paralleled to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, since Êasad is the body of the Messiah, or His flesh.166 
As for Theodore AbÙ Qurra, he uses this term more frequently. In some instances, a 
differentiation between kinds of bodies can be observed: suffice us to refer to the example we 
cited above, in which we could see that corporeal entites are referred to by the term Êism in 
general, while human body is expressed by the term Êasad. In other instances Êasad denotes 
                                                          
165
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 31. 
مسجب تدسجت ...ةملكلا ... 
166
 Ibid., p. 28. 
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a physical entity, e.g. when he speaks of the earth.
167
 The unity of the human is described as 
consisting of an inner soul and a visible body, Êasad.168 In the other appearances, the term 
always refers to a body of a human being. So even if some inconsistency can be noticed, the 
average denotation of the term is that of a human body in Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s text. 
The absence of Muslim use of Êasad as a theological term until al-ÉurÊÁnÐ could be 
seen as an additional proof for its presence in Arabic language in a Christological sense as 
caro for the first time. Early Muslim authors ignore it as a theological term. As for al-
ËwÁrizmÐ, he uses it in its plural form, in his chapter on al-kÐmyÁ’,169 with the meaning of 
‘elements.’ As for al-ÉurÊÁnÐ, he has an entry on Êasad as a living body and incarnated 
being. The core of his definition is a spirit, rÙÎ, which manifests in a body (it can be of fire, 
nÁrÐ, then it is a demon, Êinn; or it can be of light, nÙrÐ, then it is an angel or a human 
being).
170
 It is to note that al-ÉurÊÁnÐ defines here the theosophical use rather than the 
theological. If we concentrate on a spirit’s appearance through a body, in this respect 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use and al-ÉurÊÁnÐ’s definition show close similarity. Thus, its later 
appearance in Muslim Sufi terminology indicates a possible Christian influence. 
 
4. Badan 171 
 
According to Afnan, even this term can be considered to be the translation of σῶμα, 
but we can think of a parallel with σὰρξ, too. As for σῶμα, the following meanings mentioned 
by Lampe
172
 will appear in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text: ‘the earthly body of man, its 
connexion with the soul;’ ‘its moral nature.’ Lampe mentions meanings in connection with 
‘resurrection,’ ‘the body of Christ: as created, hungering, suffering and dying: in 
contradistinction to the divinity, similar to all men’s bodies.’ As for σὰρξ, the senses that are 
in connection with Incarnation offer parallels: the human nature of the divine, Christ; Christ’s 
body.’ 
Our first example introduces badan as a corporeal entity, a body, and as such, it is 
composite, set up of its elements: 
                                                          
167
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm p. 181. 
168
 Ibid. p. 206. 
169
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, p. 258. 
170
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 86. 
دسجلا :رصتب لثمت حور لك ةيتاذلا مهتوق يطعت ثيح ،ةيناسنلإاو ةيكلملا حاورلأاك يرون وأ ،نجلاك ،يران مسج يف رهظو ،لصفنملا لايخلا ف
.خزاربلا سبح مهرصحي لاف ،سبللاو علخلا 
171
 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘corps;’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 86. 
172
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon,  p. 1366. 
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“Sometimes the Wise, the Preacher was harmful in His providence, when He brought forward 
heat or cold, or when He delayed them from their [ordinary] timing; this is what the intelligent 
and the learned can take as a sign for the fact that there is no benefit for their living, and the 
elements of their bodies cannot subsist without the contrariety of these times and the 
difference of these periods that befall them.”
173
 
Apart from being a composite entity, in this quote, badan is referred to as the body of human 
beings (since it belongs to the intelligent and the learned, i.e. to a group of human beings), so 
we may say that this term refers to an animate, intelligent body. This idea is more explicitly 
expressed by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ when he introduces the composite entity of badan as a 
result of divine combination enlivened by a knowing soul: “His wisdom, as it can be 
understood from the perfect execution of His composing their bodies, and His enlivening 
them with a knowing soul, is a sign that He is not miserly in His keeping them alive.”174 This 
point is emphasized elsewhwere, too, since a composite body, if looked at from the aspect of 
its being made up and combined, will be a sign for the existence of the Creator.  
“These four elements that the world is composed of are present in the structure of your body, 
your mind cannot deny it. You do not need a clearer and more evident sign for the existence of 
your Creator than the testimonies of the intellect based on the Creator’s composing your body 
out of these contrary and opposing elements, and His combining it with a knowing soul that he 
has inserted in it by His power and wisdom.”
175
 
Badan denotes a structured human body, composed of elements, and combined with a soul, 
i.e. it is described as an animate entity.  Its being set up from the four elements may remind us 
of what Theodore AbÙ Qurra referred to when describing Êism and Êasad. Though terms 
may differ, ideas expressed by them run parallel. Turning back to badan, however, it is not 
only the soul it may be combined with, but instead of being animate, if referred to as being 
combined with spirit, it will denote a spiritual entity, created by God:  
“We do not know the modality of His setting these or those in order, nor [His order] 
concerning the illnesses that befall them or their children. Likewise, if we knew necessarily 
                                                          
173
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 100,18-21 
مث دق ناك ميكحلا ظعاولا يف هريبدت   انايحأ نم ةرضم ميدقت رحلا دربلاو اهريخأتو نع ،اهتاقوأ ام لدتسي هب ووذ لوقعلا ربعلاو ىلع هنأ لا حلاص 
نأشل مهشياعم لاو ماوق عئابطل هنادبأم لاإ دداضتب هذه تاقولأا فلاتخاو هذه نامزلأا ةيراجلا مهيلع  
174
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, p. 107,15-16: 
هتمكحو اميف يلو نم ناقتإ فيلأت مهنادبأ مهشاعناو   سفنأب ، ةملاع لدت ىلع هنأ لا لخبي مهئاقبإب ىلع ةايحلا  
175 Ibid., p. 97,3-6: 
هذهف رلأاةعب ناكرلأا يتلا اهنم تفلأ راد ملاعلا ةدوجوم يف ةينب كندب لا اهركني كلقع .لاف ليلد جاتحت هيلإ ىلع دوجو كقلاخ حضوأ رهظأو نم 
.دهاوش لقعلا نم هفيلأت كندب نم هذه عابطلا ةداضتملا ةمواقتملا هئاشنإو   سفنب   ةملاع اهبكرو هيف هتردقب هتمكحو 
Another example that refers to the combination with the soul is Ibid., 107,18-20: “What He showed them of His 
generosity in their misery, and announced to them of his potency in His reviving them, and demonstrated for 
them of His wisdom when combining their souls with their bodies, may address the intellects openly.” 
لب ام مهادبأ هب نم هدوج يف مهسؤب نلعأو مهل نم هتردق يف هشاعنا مهايا رهظأو مهل نم هتمكح يف فيلأت مهسفنأ مهنادبأب، دق بطاخي لوقعلا 
  ارهج 
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that God had created the world and that which is in it, and He had created our bodies and 
combined them with spirits, we still do not know how he created the world and how he 
combined spirits with our bodies, nor do we know when death befalls any of us. But this does 
not nullify our knowledge concerning His creating us or His creating these and setting them in 
order…”
176
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ sometimes uses badan as an animate entity, combined with a soul, nafs; 
but in other instances, such as this latter one, body is combined with a spirit, rÙÎ, so it is then 
a “spiritual” entity. In every instance, badan denotes the human body. The author uses the 
same combination when declaring that badan and spirit form the unity of man; emphasis 
being laid on unity and the way this unity comes into being: 
“had it not been understood from us when we informed you on [the fact that] as the spirit of 
man has incarnated by his body; and as his body is animate by his spirit: the two of them set 
up the unity of man by their combination, by the body of man and the spirit of man. And it is 
not the body of the spirit and not the spirit of the body. Even if a man dwelt in a mansion, he 
and his mansion would never make up a single unity. The mansion would be attached to him 
forever, but the mansion would be attached to its inhabitant as a property, but not to a single 
unity, which is set up from the inhabitant and the mansion.”
177
 
This point will also be illustrative when we look at the question of the unity or duality of the 
Messiah. It is to note that when the body as “flesh” is referred to, as taken by the Messiah, it is 
usually the term Êasad which is used, but the body of a compound human being that has soul 
or spirit, i.e. which is animate or spiritual, is rather described by the term badan.   
Badan may be combined with a soul or a spirit, then they form a compact entity, and 
are even born together, but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ emphasizes that the spirit is not born of flesh.  
“If you know the truth of these things according to the verity of the states in which they 
[exist], you will be sure that your mother – even if she gave birth to you as a complete man 
with body and spirit – did not give birth to you by body and spirit. She gave birth to you as a 
man with body and spirit only by your body that is subject to birth, growth and decrease or 
increase, and not by your spirit which transcends these things, these states and disabilities.”
178
  
                                                          
176
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, p. 120,10-16 
،سيلو ذإ مل ملعن هنك هريبدت يف ءلاؤه ءلاؤهو نم نيرملأا اوتافلآ ةلاحلا مهب ،مهلافطأبو امك انأ اذإ انملع   ةرورض نأ الله قلخ ايندلا امو اهيف 
قلخو اننادبأ بكرو اهيف ، احاورأ مث لزنيس توملا لكب دحاو انم لا ةلاحم ىلإ انموي ،اذه لاو ملعن فيك قلخ ايندلا لاو فيك بكر حاورلأا يف 
اننادبأ لاو ىتم لحي توملا دحاوب انم -، سيلف كلذ امم لطبي انملع هقلخب اهيا هريبدتو اهل… 
177
 Ibid. p. 201,13-17 
ملوأ مهفي انع ام كانربخأ هب نم نأ حور ناسنلاا ذإ يه ةدسجتم ،هندبل هندبو ذإ وه سفنتم ،هحورب اماقأف امهفلاتئاب ةينادحو ناسنلاا لبق ندب 
ناسنلاا حورو ،ناسنلاا لا ندب حورلا لاو حور ندبلا .ولو نأ نإ  اناس نكس   لازنم امل ماقا وه لزنملاو ةينادحو   دحاو .هيلإ فاضي لزنملا ، ادبأ لب 
تبثت ةفاضإ لزنملا ىلإ   نلاف هنكاس ةصاخ لا ىلإ   دحاو مئاق هنم نمو لزنملا 
178
 Ibid., p. 190,15-191,2 
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This statement is already preparing the establishment of the unity of the Messiah. Human 
unity of body and soul or body and spirit offers an analogy for the Messiah’s combination of 
divine and human parts. It is also significant in establishing that the divine part is born 
together with the human, but is not originated by the human. In disputes with Muslims, such 
an establishment is of crucial importance; but at the same time, it serves to elucidate why 
Nestorians do not consider Mary Theotokos. 
 We have seen that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ pairs body sometimes with soul, in other 
instances with spirit. Though soul and spirit have differing senses in his usage, let us draw 
attention to the fact that as far as their connection to body or man is concerned, ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ does not make a strong and consistent distinction. However, the idea of body 
combined by spirit and soul comes from Greek thought, prevalent in Patristic usage, thus 
familiar to Christian authors from Patristic schools; and is to be further elaborated in Muslim 
thought later on. As an example, let us refer to the tenth-century scholar al-TawÎÐdÐ, who 
distinguishes between the roles of the two. He says that it is soul what makes a man, but it is 
spirit which makes him alive.
179
 
Human body, badan is important as an entity subject to perception, feeling, 
experiencing pain and joy as a first step of deduction or drawing conclusions:  
“As He wanted them to be the ones who take these virtues by way of acquisition through their 
deeds, so that their exultation and happiness should be perfect, he moulded them in a form that 
can receive pain and joy. He then filled the world where they were born, and in which He 
executed their creation, with useful and harmful things. If they bear the pains in their aching 
bodies for Him, they will deserve compensation from Him for this. If they get trained by what 
reaches them from this world’s joys and pains, they will get to know the quiddity of happiness 
and hardship, and will infer from it the modalities of their Lord’s reward and punishment. 
They will try hard to satisfy Him due to their wish [to acquire] His reward, and to avoid His 
discontent for fear of His punishment.”
180
  
We have seen in the chapter on intellect that in the argumentation and allegorical story of 
Theodore AbÙ Qurra experience and bodily perception may be a source for gaining 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ىتمف تفرع ةقيقح هذه روملأا ىلع ةقيقح ام يه اهيلع نم ،اهتلااح تنقيأ نأب ،كمأ نإو تناك كتدلو   اناسنإ   لاماك اذ حور ندبو، اهناف مل دلت 
كحور كندبو .امنإ كمأ كتدلو   اناسنإ تاذ  ]![حور ندبو نم لبق كندب لباقلا دلاولل ةيبرتلاو ناصقنلاو ،ةدايزلاو لا نم لبق كحور ةيلاعلا نع هذه 
روملأا نعو هذه تلاحلا تاهاعلاو 
179
 al-TAWÍÏDÏ, AbÙ ÍayyÁn, al-ImtÁÝ wa-’l- mu’Ánasa, Cairo, 1939-44. p. 114. 
نلأ ناسنلإا سفنلاب وه   ناسنإ لا ،حورلاب امنإو وه حورلاب   يح بسحف. 
180
 Ibid. pp. 108,19-109,3 
ذإ دارأ نأ اونوكي مه نيبستكملا كلت لئاضفلا مهلامعأب لمكتل كلذب مهتطبغ ،مهرورسو مهلبج ىلع ةينب ةلباق ملالآا تاذللاو   اعيمج .مث لأم راد 
،مهدلوم يتلا مدق اهيف ،مهقلخ رومأ عفانملا ،راضملاو يكل اذإ اومشجت هل دئادشلا يف مهنادبأ ةمللآا اوقحتسا اهل هنم ةافاكملا ،اهيلع يكلو اذإ اوبردت 
  اضيأ امب مهسمي نم اهتاذل ،اهعاجوأو اوفرعف كلذب ةيهام رورسلا ،هراكملاو اولدتسا ىلع ةيفيك باوث مهبر هباقعو، اودهتجاف يف هتاضرم   ةبغر 
يف هباوث اوبنتجاو هطخاسم   افوخ نم هباقع. 
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knowledge of the right or forbidden things. Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s approach was rather 
ethical, based on reciprocity, but experiencing harm or goodness could lead to an 
understanding of good and bad, reward and punishment.  In this example badan is used as a 
starting point, the approach is not ethical but rather sensory, but sensation can serve as a basis 
for an analogy which leads to a knowledge of reward and punishment as well. The two 
analogies show similarities, so we may think of rhetorical schools and Patristic tradition as a 
shared source for Christian authors in this field.  
Badan, as human body is occasionally even used metonymically: as a part it stands for 
the whole of a human being. It appears as something that God set free to take what it wants 
[!], but given that a body does not have will, it is clear that what is referred to is the whole 
human being: “He let them know, including what is possible for them to get rid of in many of 
their situations, that as He created them to be able to commit what is beneficial for them or 
what corrupts them, He also set their bodies at liberty to take things that may do harm for 
them or that which is beneficial for them.”181 It is obvious that not bodies but human beings 
are set at liberty. The parallel which we saw in the allegory of Theodore AbÙ Qurra, i.e. 
human beings are free to choose between right and wrong (ethically as well as physically), 
further confirms this interpretation, since the means of differentiation is the intellect in both 
cases. 
Badan, human body offers opportunity for Divine providence to show: “He created for 
them the food and drinks that nourish their bodies.”182 If looked at from the viewpoint of the 
outcome, then this example implicitly gives a proof for the existence of the Creator, who 
wants the benefit of His creatures. Human body and its needs can serve as signs for intellect 
to arrive at a proof for God’s creative action. At the same time, divine providence is a 
manifestation of divine goodness, which is central in Christian teaching. 
Badan is a part of the Messiah, and as such, is of great importance: “As for the 
growing body that is formed of matter, its creation and unification happened at the same time, 
after that it had not been existent in this structure and form.”183 Body is described as growing, 
i.e. subject to change. As it is formed out of matter, it is created in time, which is the time of 
its union with the divine substance as well. The Messiah’s unity is frequently paralleled to the 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, 118,18-20: 
 قلطأ كلذك ،لامعلأا نم مهدسفيو مهحلصي ام نايتلإ نيعيطتسم مهقلخ امك هنأ ،مهتلااح نم ريثك يف اهنم ررحتلا نم مهنكمأ امب ،مهملعأوأمهنادب 
روملأا نم مهعفنيو مهرضي ام لوانتلا. 
182
 Ibid. p. 121,4-5 
. قلخو مهل ام ميقي مهنادبأ نم ماعطلا بارشلاو  
183
 Ibid., p. 185:1-2 
امأو ندبلا يمانلا روصملا نم ةداملا تناكف هتلبج هداحتاو   اعيمج ، اعم دعب نأ مل نكي ىلع ةئيه هتروص   ادوجوم  
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unity of man, consisting of body and soul or spirit. Apart from being described as consisting 
of a human and a divine part, He is also described as a combination of a body and a spirit, 
which left His body at the time of death. “Had he come down from the cross alive in a form in 
which His spirit had left His body…,”184 as if the divine part is to be compared to the spirit 
and the human to the body. 
We need to investigate the Messiah’s body, badan as a means: a way for the Messiah 
to appear, in order to deliver the message to humankind and to be sacrificed. As for body as a 
means, a frame or ‘temple’ in which the divine could appear, it can make us remember what 
al-ÉurÊÁnÐ wrote in his entry on Êasad. Terms differ, but ideas are close. In ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s interpretation, body as the means for the Messiah to appear is further detailed: “He 
had even earlier known that there was no way to dismiss their doubts concerning His death 
except for His own, bodily appearance”185 Body is not only a means for manifestation and 
appearance, but also for sacrifice:  
“Till He [the Son] sacrificed His body and blood as a sacrifice for Him [the Father], according 
to the custom that the Father had imposed upon them earlier/in the time of the Old Testament, 
i.e. to sacrifice the bodies and blood of animals, in order that He should forgive their sins. By 
His incurring the viewers of His death on the cross, which was followed by the resurrection to 
life, abolishing the pleasures, he contradicts this desire which is followed by the strike of 
death.”
186
  
This quotation indicates that there is difference between badan and ºism, since the latter is 
used to denote the body of animals, while the former refers to the (human) body of the 
Messiah. Till now, ºism was seen as an inanimate, physical body. As the body of animals, it 
could be considered animate in this case, as well. Humans’ bodies are referred to by the word 
ºasad, so a hierarchy of meanings is discernible here. Remembering the previous metonymical 
use of badan, we can interpret the sacrifice of the Messiah’s body as more holistic, probably 
as a total surrender of His self, or his human part.  
If we accept that there is a hierarchy of meanings as far as different kinds of bodies are 
concerned, it is no wonder that the term badan is used when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ establishes 
that the bodies of human beings will appear in a new, spiritual form after the resurrection: 
                                                          
184
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, p. 236,16 
 هحور تقراف ام ةئيه ىلع ةبشخلا نع لزن ولفهندب  ًايح  
185
 Ibid. p. 234:11 
 هنود مهل هراهظإب لاإ هتوم يف ماوعلا بولق نع كشلا عفد ىلإ صيحم لا هنأ هملع قباسب ملعهندبب 
186
 Ibid. p. 258,15-19 
 ةنسلاك ًانابرق هل همدو هندب لذب اذإ ىتح ةعاشب همشجتب ناك ،مهاياطخ رفكيل اهئامدو ناويحلا ماسجأ بيرقت نم مهرهوج لهأ ىلع ًاميدق اهارجا يتلا
توملا ةعرص اهتبقاع تناك يتلا ةوهشلا كلت ضقانيف ،ةذلل ًلااطبإ ةايحلا ضوهن هبقعي ناك يذلا بيلصلا ىلع هتتيم 
Further examples: Ibid. pp. 261, 262, 263 (here the term ºasad is used) 
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“the bodies will be regenerated in a new, spiritual structure, which stands above and 
transcends enjoying desires and pleasures.”187 It implies that this kind of body, i.e. the 
resurrected entity is of a higher kind, probably equal to the Messiah’s human part. 
So, according to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, badan is a composite entity, a result of divine 
combination (which is a proof of the existence of a Creator and divine providence); combined 
with a soul or a spirit. It is sometimes used metonymically, referring to man. It is also a part 
of the Messiah, too. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, uses badan for human 
body only if it is contrasted to the body taken by the Messiah, which, in this case, is expressed 
by Êasad. When discussing the incarnation with the Muslim opponent, he says that the Word 
was born from Mary only by His body (expressed by Êasad), which was taken from Mary, 
and with which the Word unified; so the Word was born of her in a spiritual-bodily 
(expressed by ÊasadÁnÐ) way. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa compares this to human birth; since human 
beings are born of their mothers as embodied (expressed by mutabaddin) spirits. Without the 
unity of spirits with bodies (badan), the birth from mothers would be impossible.
188
 We need 
to remark that there is difference between the Nestorian and the Jacobite authors’ approaches. 
While Nestorians refute the idea of Mary’s being Theotokos, Jacobites, on the basis of their 
belief in the hypostatic union of the Messiah, accept Mary as Theotokos. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
uses the term badan to express one of the two “components” of the Messiah, while AbÙ 
RÁ’iÔa strictly uses it in order to refer to a human body, though, in more general terms the 
two authors agree in its use as human body. As for the use of Êasad, both of them use this 
term in order to refer to the flesh of the Messiah when contrasted to other bodies. Apart from 
the terms, another similarity is to be discerned here. Argumentation is based on the analogy of 
a human spirit embodied in the body in both cases. It shows that this argument must have 
come from a common source, probably from Patristic literature, upon which Christian authors 
relied without respect to the denomination they belonged to. I have not found representative 
examples for the use of badan in Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s works. 
                                                          
187
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-Þl-aÊwiba, p. 265,2 
 تاذللاو تاوهشلاب معنت نأ ىلع تلاعتو تعفترا ةيئامس ةيناحور ةينب ىلع نادبلأا تددج مث… 
188
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 47. 
امنإف دلو لاحل دسجلا ذوخأملا نم ةأرملا دحتملا اهب اهنلأ تدلو اهنم ةيناحور ةينادسج .سيلوأ لوقلا يف دولو نييمدلآا نم مهتاهمأ هيبش اهب يف 
ضعب هئاحنأ يف دولو ةملكلا نم ميرم .نودولوملاو نم مهتاهمأ مهأ حاورأ نم ريغ نادبأ مأ حاورأ ةندبتم .ذإو مل ندلي   احاورأ ةدرجم يفنت اهنع 
اهدولو ةندبتم .امكف نأ حاورلأا ول مل نكت حتمةد نادبلأاب مل نكي ليبس ىلإ نأ ندلوي نم تاهملأا دقو ندلوي نهنم نهداحتلا نادبلأاب عم لوأ 
نهتقلخ .اذكه لوقلا يف ةملكلا ةدسجتملا تدلو لاحل دسجلا ذوخأملا نم ميرم دسجتملا اهب لا ةدرجم نم دسجلا امك متننظ. 
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Turning to Muslim thinkers, we see that al-KindÐ does not provide a definition for 
this term, but it appears in his definition for other terms, especially in medicine,
189
 where it is 
a term that refers to human body; two times in the definition of philosophy,
190
 where it refers 
to an animate body, which has soul, nafs. In the definition of human virtues
191
 and 
chastity/righteousness
192
 it is the body of a human being. Al-KindÐ also refers to the 
definition of nature according to Hippocrates,
193
 in which he uses badan to express the human 
body. Other Muslim authors of books of definitions do not define it, since by later stages Êism 
became the standard theological term for body. However, early MuÝtazilÐs used badan as 
“the instrument and matrix of spirit”, Álat al-rÙÎ wa-qÁlibuhÁ.194 This shows similarities 
with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage, since badan both in the case of the human and the Messiah 
serves as a basis of the combination with the spirit. Christian influence on MuÝtazilÐ usage is 
thus very likely in this field. 
 
5. Terms appearing together: synonyms or terms with differing connotations? 
 
In this part, terms that appear together will be examined, in order to see how their 
denotations may be compared to each other. In the following example the terms ºism, Ìilqa,195 
and Êu××a196 appear as synonyms:  
„Then you find that the thickness of the elements of the earth that your bodily form was 
formed of is present in you. Your body accepts growth, and your corpse accepts weaning after 
[the time of] childhood and infanthood in order to be fed by the plants of the earth and the 
                                                          
189
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 171. 
بطلا - ةنهم ةدصاق ءافشلإ نادبأ سانلا ةدايزلاب صقنلاو اهظفحو ىلع ةحصلا  
190
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p.172. 
توملاو مهدنع ناتوم: ،يعيبط وهو كرت سفنلا لامعتسا ؛ندبلا يناثلاو ةتامإ تاوهشلا - اذهف وه توملا يذلا اودصق هيلإ 
Ibid, pp. 173-174. 
.ناسنلإا ةقاط ردقب ،اهللعو اهتايئامو اهتينإ ،ةيلكلا ةيدبلأا ءايشلأا ملع ةفسلفلا نأ وهف ةفسلفلا نيع هب دحي ام امأف 
ندبلا يف سفنلاك وه ؛هدنع باوجلا وه فيكف ءيش ملاعلا اذه يف ناك نإو ؛يلقعلا ملاعلا نعو ،ملاعلا اذه يف ،لجو زع ،ئرابلا نع لاؤسلا موقي لا ،
نم ءيش ت راثآ نم ىري امب ندبلاب لاإ نكمي لاو ،]هيف[ سفنلا ريبدت راثآ نم ىري امب ندبلاب لاإ ملعي نأ نكمي لاو ،سفنلا ريبدتب لاإ هريبدت هيف اهريبد
- وي امب لاإ ]ًامولعم[ نوكي نأ نكمي لا ىري لا يذلا ملاعلاو ،ىري لا ملاعب لاإ هريبدت نوكي نأ نكمي لا يئرملا ملاعلا اذكهف نم ملاعلا اذه يف دج
هيلع ةلادلا راثلآاو ريبدتلا. 
191
 Ibid., p. 177. 
نيلوأ نيمسق مسقنت يهو ؛دومحملا يناسنلإا قلخلا يه ةيناسنلإا لئاضفلا:  نع ةنئاكلا راثلآا نم ناسنلإا ندب طيحي امم رخلآاو ،سفنلا يف امهدحأ
سفنلا 
192
  Ibid., p. 177. 
 ةفعلا امأو- ا ءايشلأا لوانت يهفكلذ ريغ لوانت نع كاسملإاو اهلاثتما رامتئاو مامتلا دعب اهظفحو اهنادبأ ةيبرتل اهلوانت بجي يتل  
193
 Ibid., p. 179. 
لوق طارقب اهيف :مسا ةعيبطلا ىلع ةعبرأ   ناعم :ىلع ندب ،ناسنلإا ىلعو ةئيه نودب ،ناسنلإا ىلعو ةوقلا ةربدملا ،ندبلل ىلعو ةكرح سفنلا  
194
 al-ŠAHRASTÀNÏ, MuÎammad b. ÝAbd al-KarÐm, al-Milal wa-’l-niÎal, Eds. MUHANNÀ, AmÐr ÝAlÐ – 
FÀÝØR, ÝAlÐ Íasan, Beirut, DÁr al-MaÝrifa, 1993, Vol. I, p. 69. 
195
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term. 
196
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for this term. 
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strength of its herbs. You will infer from this that you are formed the same way [as the earth 
is] and your disposition comes from its soil. You will then know that you have subsistence and 
existence only in it, by it, and upon it.”
197
  
It can be seen that in this case the three terms all refer to the body or the bodily form of the 
human being and no great difference is discernible on the basis of the context. Bodily form, 
Ìilqa is a term that is to be introduced here. Its translation as such is taken from Afnan, and it 
can be considered to be the translation of the Aristotelian ἡ μορφή.198 Since this form – to the 
best of my knowledge – does not appear again in the text, it is hard to draw further 
implications on the basis of this sole example. It may probably be understood as the outward 
form, appearance, or as a synonym of other terms that have bodily connotations. The other 
new term is Êu××a that can be translated as body, cube.199 So it is not necessarily a living, 
organic body, but a solid body that has three dimensions. Yet, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses it to 
refer to a living body, so we may interpret it as an animate body or a corpse. The two terms 
introduced here could not be found in the Muslim authors’ books of definitions. It may imply 
that these were not crucial in Muslim philosophy and theology in the 9
th
 and the following 
centuries. 
Used together with badan and ºism, Êu××a can also mean a form that consists of a 
body, badan and soul, nafs, as in the following example:  
“Whatever is united with the soul (the share of humanity and the portion of sonship which are 
necessary for him), like other bodies of beasts and the other bodies of animals, then, 
according to the necessary truth, it is right for the body of the human to be called one of the 
two parts of the form of the human, and one of the two substances of the human’s sonship.”
200
   
Badan and ºism, as bodies of beasts and animals are used as synonyms in the first part of the 
quote. The corpse or form, i.e. Êu××a includes the meaning of badan, since the latter is just 
one of its two parts. The usage of this term attests to the initial confusion of terminology, 
since on the authority of Afnan we can see that this term comes to denote a physical entity, a 
cube in translations, while a ninth-century theologian uses it to denote a form that comprises 
human body and soul. (In this part of the quote, badan is used as the human body; referred to 
as a substance.) 
                                                          
197
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 96,19 – 97,2 
مث دجت ظلغ عابط ضرلأا يتلا اهنم تروص كتقلخ اهنأ كيف .،لدتستو نم لوبق كمسج ءامنلل كتثجو مطفلل دعب رغصلا ةيلوفطلاو امم هيدتغت نم 
اهتابن ةوقو ،اهباشعأ ىلع كنأ اهيلع تروص نمو اهتبرت تلبج .مث ملعت نأ لا ماوق كل لاو دوجو كل لاإ اهب اهيفو اهيلعو. 
198
 AFNAN, A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 92. 
199
 Ibid., p. 46. 
200
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 187,2-5  
امهمو ناك عم سفنلا  ًادحتم ةيريغك نادبأ مئاهبلا رئاسو ماسجأ ناويحلا نم مهس ةيسنلأا ظحو ةونبلا نيبجاولا هل ،امهنود لب دق قحي ىلع حلاةقيق 
ةبجاولا نأ ىمسي ندب ناسنلاا دحأ يئزج ةثج ناسنلإا دحأو يرهوج ةونب ناسنلإا 
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The following examples show a close link between the connotations of ºism and 
badan:  “And this is despite of the difference of these times: dryness of the summer and its 
heat after the humidity and cold of winter and the rigidity of the countries of daylight, which 
is for the sake of the bodies of men and the corpses of animals and their comfort, it is what 
mind cannot imagine.”201 As seen in examples that contain just one of these two terms, the 
body of human beings is referred to by the term badan. As for ºism, we have seen above in the 
examples where it was used on its own, that it meant an inanimate, physical body. Here, as 
related to badan, it gains a new meaning: an animate body, that of an animal. The second 
quote does not seem to differentiate between the two terms, since both of them express the 
idea of an animate body.  “… this would make his corpse weak and his body sick”202 We 
may consider them synonyms. When used together, the connontations of these terms is 
relativised, and may gain new meanings. 
The terms ºasad and badan as synonyms may be approached from more than an 
aspect: “If bodies remain without what is enough for them, or, I mean the least of the quantity 
upon which their bodies can subsist and their flesh may survive, they will die, if they get less 
than this as their food.”203 The two terms are used with the same meaning in this case, as 
bodies of human beings. They are also similar in connotation, as far as divine transcendence is 
concerned, which stands above them: “The divinity of our Lord is greater and higher than 
every analogy, [it] is like the place of the spirit in the human, since it stands high above the 
things that befall [their] flesh and bodies.”204 In this respect, there is no difference between 
the meanings of the two terms. Another approach where the parallel appearance of ºasad and 
badan may be examined places these terms and then nafs and rÙÎ as pairs of synonyms: “You 
subsist in your body and spirit; and your humanity can only exist in the combination of the 
two natures and the harmonisation of the two substances: the flesh and the soul. Do you claim 
that your mother gave birth to your body and soul together, at the same time?”205 This citation 
shows first that the pairs badan – rÙÎ and ºasad – nafs are synonyms, and in the third case 
                                                          
201
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 100,14-16: 
كلذ عم ام يف فلاتخا هذه نامزلأا نم ةسوبي فيصلا هرحو دعب ةبوطر ءاتشلا ،هدربو دومجو لود راهنلا نم حلاص نادبأ سنلأا ماسجأو 
.ناويحلا ،اهتحارو ام لا هليخت لقع 
202 Ibid., p. 119,18 
. لحنأ كلذ همسج مقسأو هندب  … 
203
 Ibid., p. 121,9-11 
 نإفنادبلأا  هيلع موقت يذلا ردقلا ليلق لقأ ينعأ لب ،اهفافك نم كلذ نود ىلع ىقبت دقمهنادبأ  هيلع ايحتومهداسجأ يف كلذ نود اورصق نإ كلهتو ،
مهتيدغأ 
204
 Ibid., p. 191,3-4: 
 ىلع ةثداحلا روملأا نع اهعافتراو اهولع يف ،ناسنلإا نم حورلا عضوم ،سايق لك نع تلاعتو تلج انبر توهلاداسجلأا نادبلأاو. 
205
 Ibid., p. 188,10-12: 
ذإ تنأ مئاق كندبب كحورو لاو دوجو كتيسنلأ لاإ عامتجاب نيعبطلا فلاتئاو نيرهوجلا نم دسجلا سفنلاو .لهف تمعز نلآا نأ كمأ تدلو كسفن 
كندبو يف تقو   اعيمج ، اعم 
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their use is that of a hybrid type when badan is paired with nafs. As it is demonstrated by 
Lampe under the heading of σῶμα, there existed a Patristic tradition in interpreting the unity 
of body and soul and their simultaneous creation. If we take into consideration that both terms 
may be regarded the translations of the Greek σῶμα, then we may suppose that the same idea 
survives in Arabic Christian literature.
206
 The last approach for the two terms’ parallel 
appearance shows synonymity. When used on their own, they were seen as human body and 
the body of the Messiah; used together; their similar meanings are further enhanced.  
“As He had promised people that He would vivify their flesh after the death, and He made 
them see a proof for that in the resurrection of his flesh … from death, the same way, as He 
had promised the resurrection of their bodies and their diffusion in the soil, He wanted to 
show them a proof for that in His body. So he was buried in the grave dead, and He 
resurrected from the soil alive.”
207
  
Here both terms may refer to the body of man, but also, even to the body of the Messiah. 
Again, on the authority of Lampe, it is to be remarked that σω μα is widely used in Patristic 
literature, too, in order to express Christ’s and man’s resurrection body. Given that the idea is 
broader than the term, it would be exaggerated to suspect direct influence on the basis of this 
similarity, but a parallel is undeniable. 
Finally, ºasad and ºism also appear together, but the previous differentiation between 
them recurs: “He is nothing else but the Messiah and the Son of God, and He is not like the 
other human bodies and corpses of animals which have a portion of the sonship related to 
God and its share.”208 As seen when appearing on its own, ºasad refers to human body, flesh, 
and ºism to a lower category, to the bodies of animals. 
 
6. Derived terms: ºismÁnÐ209 and ºasadÁnÐ210 i.e. bodily and corporeal 
 
An examination of derived forms (e.g. by the addition of the nisba ending) can 
contribute to our understanding of terms with bodily connotations. These terms mostly appear 
together with other simple ones already examined above, or in themselves, as synonyms, 
contrasted to concepts meaning ‘sapiential, spiritual.’ Let us first see an example for the latter 
                                                          
206
 C.f. LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 1362. 
207
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 237,3-6 
 ييحي نأ سانلا دعو هنأ امكف ًاضيأومهداسجأ  ةعرص ةماقإ يف كلذ ناهرب مهارأو توملا دعبسجهد  ميقي نأ مهدعو ذإ كلذك ،توملا نممهنادبأ 
 يف كلذ ناهرب مهيري نأ بحأ ،بارتلا يف اهرشنيوهندب  ًايح بارتلا نم ثعبنيو ًاتيم ربقلا يف نفديف 
208
 Ibid., p. 187,8-9  
 نم هاوس ام هريغك ًاضيأ الله نبا ريغ لاو حيسملا ريغ وه سيلفداسجأ  سنلأاماسجأو ظح نع ةنئابلا ناويحلا اهمهسو الله ةونب 
209
 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘corporel’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 87. 
210
 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘charnel’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 87. 
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case: “If His potency and faculty are mentioned – eulogy –, we do not imagine them as 
corporeal and bodily potencies or faculties, like the potency of the camel, the elephant, the 
lion or the bull, or whatever may resemble them; but we can be certain that they are spiritual 
and sapiential faculties and not bodily, corporeal ones.”211 In this context, it is not possible to 
differentiate between the meaning of the two adjectives. On the basis of their roots, ºismÁnÐ 
could translate as ‘connected to a physical entity’ and ºasadÁnÐ as ‘belonging to flesh.’ This 
minor difference, the relatedness to an inanimate or a living body, cannot be felt in the given 
example. But as the two adjectives stand in contrast to ‘spiritual’ and ‘sapinetial,’ they are 
probably meant to refer to living, organic (animate) bodies. 
As for ºismÁnÐ and ºasadÁnÐ when appearing with other terms: we may see them 
with the term ºism in connection with causes and faculties:  
“As for potency, faculty, and ability, they have two causes. One of them is bodily, corporeal, 
and this is the faculty that is there in the bodies of animals as a disposition. We may see a 
camel as it carries a thousand manÁ’s,212 or an elephant that can strike a camel by its strength, 
or a lion that can take a bull as its prey. [We could go on with] similar actions that are related 
to the faculties of bodies. The other [cause] is psychical, spiritual, namely the intellect, which 
is the faculty of the soul that creates these subtle things out of nothing, as we can see in the 
making of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, and 
similar things that the wisdom of the soul and the reflexion of the intellect is capable of.”
213
 
Here we could see that ºismÁnÐ and ÊasadÁnÐ, as adjectives referring to kinds of faculties, 
were contrasted to psychical, spiritual. In this context, there is no distinction between the 
meanings of the two adjectives; both express relatedness to the physical world. We also get to 
know that bodily faculty, potency and ability are present in the body, and have no connection 
with the soul. As the body to which these features are related is a living, organic one, 
ºismÁnÐ and ºasadÁnÐ are likely to refer to relatedness to living, animate beings, like the 
ones enlisted in the example. 
¹asadÁnÐ appears alone, too, as contrasted to the spiritual, rÙÎÁnÐ in the definition of 
hypostasis, qanÙm: “[everything is necessarily one of the following four things: substance, 
accident, faculty…] Or it may be a hypostasis of a substance. Like ÝAbdallÁh by his anima 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 132,17-20 
ذإو ًةردقو ًةوق امهمهوتن مل ،هللاج زع ةوقلاو ةردقلا هنم تركذ ام اةينامسج ةينادسج  ،ناويحلا نم كلذ هبشأ امو روثلاو دسلأاو ليفلاو ريعبلا ةوقك
 لا ةينامكح ةيناحور ةردق اهنأب نقون نأ انل قحي لبةينادسج ةينامسج 
212
 ManÁ’ is a weight equal to two rotls. 
213
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 157,16-19 
امأ ةردقلا ةوقلاو ةعاطتسلااو نإف اهل نيتلع ،نيتفلتخم امهدحا ةينامسج ةينادسج يهو ةوقلا ةعوبطملا يف ماسجأ ناويحلا امك دق ىرن   اريعب لمحي 
فلأ ءانم   لايفو عرصي هتوقب   اريعب   ادسأو سرتفي هتوقب ، اروث وحنو كلذ نم ليعافلأا يتلا بسنت ىلإ تاوق ،ماسجلأا ىرخلأاو ةيناسفن ةيناحور 
ينعأ لقعلا يذلا وه ةوق سفنلا عرتخملا هذه فئاطللا يتلا ىرن نم ةعنص مارجلاا ريوصتو لاكشلأا فيلأتو ناينبلا وحنو كلذ نم تاعانصلا 
رودقملا اهيلع ةمكحب سفنلا ةيورو لقعلا. 
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and body among men, or Gabriel, the angel, by the property of his hypostasis among angels, 
or any other spiritual or corporeal hypostasis that is similar to these.”214 In this definition 
corporeal and spiritual are adjectives of hypostases. It is to note that in the example which is 
to explain the meaning of the hypostasis the name ÝAbdallÁh is used. It implies that 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ addresses this elucidation to a Muslim counterpart. ÝAbdallÁh’s body, 
as a human body, consistently, is referred to by the term badan. 
The same terms (ÊasadÁnÐ and rÙÎÁnÐ) are contrasted in the following extract, but 
this time stress is laid on the lack of any relation between them. This is why there was no 
point in incarnation by an angel, it had to be a human being instead: “If He had incarnated an 
individual of the angels instead of His incarnation by a human individual, His life and dignity 
would not have included all the creation, since there is no relationship between the purely 
spiritual ones and the purely corporeal beings concerning the essence of their substance, at 
all.”215 A similar classification was seen in the previous example, Gabriel being the spiritual 
hypostasis and ÝAbdallÁh the corporeal one. In spite of the nisba-ending, the plural forms 
show that the two terms are not used as attributes here, but as nouns. What corporeality and 
spirituality refers to in this case is the substances of these beings.  (As for the question of 
incarnation, it will be investigated in the next subsection.) 
This differentiated usage of derived terms is quite unique. I could only find a parallel 
at Theodore AbÙ Qurra, who enlists the five senses and tells which body part they belong to. 
Parts of the body are referred to as aÝÃÁ’ ÊasadÁniyya, i.e. limbs belonging to the body.216 In 
this, no further special implication may be observed. 
 
7. Taºassud – incarnation 
 
Though we have seen various terms for body and corpse, when it comes to in-
carnatio, it is ºasad which forms a basis for a derived form to express it: i.e. taºassud.217 This 
term and the concept it refers to appear in various contexts. First of all, it is a cause of new 
revelation on sonship and the relationship between the persons of the Trinity:  
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 162,9-11 
 هسفنب الله دبعك وهف ،رهوجلا نم مونق امإوهندبو  ةيناحورلا ميناقلأا نم كلذ هبشأ امو ،ةكئلاملا نم همونق ةصاخب كلاملا ليئاربجكو ،سنلأا نم
ةينادسجلاو. 
215
 Ibid., p. 218,1-3 
ا صاخشأ نم ًاصخش هدسجت لدب ةكئلاملا صاخشأ نم ًاصخش دسجت ول نييناحورلا نيب ةنارق لا هنإف ،اهلك ةقيلخلا هتماركو هتايح معت مل ،سانل
 نيبو ًاضحمنيينادسجلا  ًلاصأ رهوجلا تاذ يف ًاضحم 
216
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm, p. 173. 
217
 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘s’incarner’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 86. 
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“We inform you that in the previous periods of mankind there has been no specific reason for 
notification, but when the incarnated Son appeared, His contemporaries needed to be talked 
to and be informed on His great grace, i.e. His incarnation by a human [being] of their 
substance; and thus He needed to inform them on his sonship related to His Father, and the 
fatherhood of His Father which is related to Him, and the pre-eternity of the Spirit that 
emanates from the essence of His Father for them.”
218
  
The first term in this quote is the active participle, which could be circumscribed on this basis 
as ‘taking flesh for Himself.’ The second appearance is an infinitive form, governing an 
object. Its circumscription would be ‘His taking a human for Himself as flesh.’ In this case the 
human’s body is referred to, i.e. his flesh as a means for the Messiah’s appearance. Given that 
incarnation made the Messiah perceivable for humankind, further revelation became 
necessary, in order to make the complexity of the Trinity known to people. 
Incarnation, taºassud mostly refers to a necessary step for the Messiah’s coming into 
being. It is thus a happening, or an action. “As soon as He had been conceived in a human 
being, created in time, and he grew in him, by His incarnation and by the taking of that being 
for himself, the Pre-eternal and the human became one Messiah, created in time.”219 
Incarnation is the clue to the Messiah’s unity; it is the starting point of His existence as a 
unique being. This fact is further emphasized in other instances, e.g. in the following case: 
“the pre-eternal substance – in the eternity of His pre-eternity, before His incarnation by a 
created human [being] and His unification with him – had not been Messiah, and not even 
inside the meaning of ‘the Messiah.’”220 This approach looks at incarnation and the existence 
form another point of view. It places the Pre-eternal, i.e. the Son in the centre, who, without 
incarnation, cannot be considered Messiah. 
Incarnation is not the action of the Godhead, and is not carried out by all the three 
hypostases, but is exclusively the action of the Son: “And He didn’t say anything that would 
imply that all the three hypostases had incarnated and taken Him with themselves.  He 
testified of Himself as being a unique Son by His divinity and humanity, but not as [being] a 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 167,4-7 
كربخن هنأ مل صصخي يف فلاس روهد باقعلأا ةيضاملا لبق ليجنلإا   ةلع جيتحا اهل ىلإ نلاعإ ،اهركذ ىتح رهظ نبلاا ً ادسجتم جاتحاف لهأ 
هرصع ذئنيح ىلإ نأ مهبطاخي مهربخيو ميظعب تمعنه مهيلع يف هدسجت   ارشب نم ،مهرهوج نلعيو كلذل هتونب هيبلأ ةوبأو هيبأ هل ةيلزأو حورلا 
ةضئافلا نم تاذ هيبأ مهل. 
219
 Ibid., p. 179,15-16 
 هيف امن ًاثيدح ناسنلإا يف لبح امل لبهدسجتب  ًادحاو ًاحيسم ًاثيدح يرشبلاو يلزلأا راص ،ًاثيدح هعم هذخأو  
220
 Ibid., p. 180,4-5 
لذكك مل نكي رهوجلا ،يلزلأا يف مودق هتيلزأ لبق نأ دسجتي يرشبلاب قولخملا هدحويو ،هعم   احيسم لاو   لاخاد يف ىنعم حيسملا   لاصأ  
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unique Father or a unique Spirit.”221 Later on a more detailed justification is given to show 
why the action of taºassud is impossible on the behalf of the Father:  
“Had the Father – eulogy – incarnated in the human instead of the Son, and had He taken the 
human into His Fatherhood with Himself as the Son has taken him with Himself into His 
sonship, then – similarly – he should have called the human Father, together with the Pre-
eternal. It would have been impossible to relate the sonship of the temporal human to the 
fatherhood of the Father in this statement.”
222
  
The impossibility of the Spirit’s incarnation is justified the same way: “And also, had the 
Spirit incarnated [in the human, then the human] would have deserved to be called Holy 
Spirit with Him, but this is a name that transcends being given to composite, combined 
things,
223
 and it is impossible to be described in compound bodies that were created in 
time”224 This latter case also shows that corporeal nature excludes to share spiritual features. 
Given the fact that in the Messiah a divine and a human substance form a union, it 
must be clarified that taºassud cannot affect the divine or interact with it:  
“As the Son incarnated by this human [being] and took him with himself to his sonship; the 
partial came to be called the Son of God (the Father) together with the Pre-eternal. No 
absurdity follows from it regarding the Father, and no lack can enter [the essence of] the Son 
because of this. In the previous eternal duration He had always called the ones close to Him 
and those who obey Him his Sons and beloved ones – out of grace and generosity. It did not 
enlarge his glorification and did not debase His generosity and grace. But it had never been 
possible to call any of His creatures Father or Spirit.”
225
 
This quote does not emphasize the unity of these two hypostases, but accentuates the action of 
incarnation as the starting point of the human’s taking a share of the divine sonship. 
Incarnation paves the way for the partial or relative, i.e. the human part, to be attached to the 
divine Son, but as he is the one being attached to the pre-eternal; the other one is the active 
one who takes it for Himsef as flesh, no real, substantial interaction is possible between the 
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 Ibid., p. 202,7-10 
 ةثلاثلا ميناقلأا نأ ىلع لدي ًلاوق كلذ نم ءيش يف لقي ملوتدسجت هتوسانو هتوهلاب هنأ هسفن ىلع لهسي ناك هنلأ ،هعم هتذخأو  بأ لا دحاو نبإ
دحاو حور لاو دحاو 
222
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 205,9-12 
 هؤانث لج بلأا ناك ولفدسجت  عم يرشبلا ىمسي نأ كلذ سايق ىلع بجول ًاذإ ،هتونب يف هعم نبلاا هذخأ امك هتوبأ يف هعم هذخأو نبلاا لدب يرشبلا
. تسم كلذ ناكف .ًابأ يلزلأالوقلا اذه يف بلأا ةوبأب ينمزلا ناسنلإا ةونب ىلإ بسني نأ ًلايح  
223
 In the edited text another word, names ءامسلأا can be found, but it must be a reading error and should be 
things, ءايشأ in the original one. So, I translated it in this latter sense. 
224
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 205,13-15 
 ول ًاضيأ كلذكودسجت  نأ ليحتسيو ،ةبكرملا ةفلؤملا ءامسلأا هب ىمست نأ نع ىلاعتي مسا اذهو ،سدقلا حور هعم ىمسي نأ قحتسلا حورلا فصوي
ةنوكملا ةثدحملا داسجلأا يف. 
225
 Ibid., p. 205,4-8 
 ذإدسجت  يرشبلا اذهب نبلاا دق هنإف .ةصقنم هنم نبلاا ىلع تلخد لاو ةعنش بلأا مزلت مل ،بلأا الله نبا يلزلأا عم يبسنلا يمسف هتونب يف هعم هذخأو
 ملو همركو هدوجب ناهأ لاو هميظعت كلذ دزي ملف .ًابابحأو ًءانبأ هل همركو هلضفب هتعاط لهأو هءايلوأ يمسي رهدلا فلاس يف لزي مل ناك ذنم زجتسي
مسي نأ طق ًاحور لاو ًابأ هقلخ نم ًادحأ ي 
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two. In the KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, divine transcendence is always stressed, so it 
must be made clear that incarnation is a deliberate action on the divine’s behalf, which does 
not change this transcendence. Divine transcendence is equally important for the Muslim 
opponent, so it is not surprising that this idea, as common ground between them, is 
highlighted to such a degree. 
The subject of incarnation raises several theological questions; one of them is its 
cause. As we will see it later in the chapter on creation in details, divine generosity is of 
fundamental importance in every action God carries out towards humankind; the same 
motivation is beyond incarnation. 
“Isn’t it that the Wise – eulogy – stands above doing anything in vain, without aim? His 
incarnation and union were not in vain or without an aim, either. His generosity, open-
handedness, goodness, and might were those [factors,] which enticed Him to create His 
creatures and bring them into being, and these are also what enticed Him to fulfil His grace 
and complete His beneficence by His incarnation in a human [being] of His creatures. This 
was in order to make the portion of sonship, the splendour of His lordship necessary for the 
human, too, by His incarnation in him. [And also in order that] the honour that He gave to 
that one human individual, representing all of them, should prevail over all creation.”
226
  
This description contains ideas that can be considered common ground with the Muslim 
opponent. Such is the thought that God does not do anything in vain. But it is Christian 
teaching which gives divine goodness a central role in motivation. Incarnation is seen as the 
fulfilment of beneficence, as the ultimate goodness towards creation, since this is what makes 
humankind take share in the Son’s lordship and sonship. 
Another group of theological questions deals with the outcome and results of 
incarnation, such as the fact that taºassud in one individual made it possible for all humanity 
to share the Messiah’s grace of resurrection (just as the sin of Adam resulted in consequences 
that are shared by all human beings).
227
 The reason why only one individual was chosen as a 
subject of incarnation is also investigated (in a similar way and with a similar outcome).
228
 
The question whether incarnation made humankind free from sin or not is of theological 
nature, as well, with a strongly dialectical argumentation.
229
 On the other hand it is important 
to know whether humankind deserved the Incarnation, because if so, than it is not necessary 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 215,9-15 
 نكي مل كلذك .ىنعم ريغل ًاثبع ًائيش لعفي نأ نع لاعتم هللاج زع ميكحلا نأ لاأهدسجت  هتوربجو هحلاصو همركو هدوج لب ،ىنعم لاب ًاثبع هديحأتو
 أشنأو عدبأ نأ ىلإ هتعد يتلا هناسحإ لامكتساو هتمعن ماقتنا ىلإ ًاريخأ هتعد يتلا يه ،هقلخهدسجتب  يرشبلل بجويل كلذو .هقلخ نم ًايرشبهدسجتب 
اهعيمج نم صختسملا يسنلأا دحاولا صخشلا هلانأ ام فرش اهلك ةقيلخلا معيلو هتيبوبر انسو هتونب ظح هايإ. 
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 Ibid., p. 218,1-11 
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 Ibid., pp. 217-218. 
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 Ibid., pp. 220-21. 
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to give thanks for it, but if not, then God’s gift was not properly given.230 All these questions 
may be easily answered by declaring that incarnation is a grace.
231
 Grace will play an 
important role when examining creation, as well. On the authority of Lampe, we may say that 
the same idea had been expressed by σὰρξ in Patristic literature.232 
AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, as we could see it above, uses various terms for incarnation and 
embodiment. We have seen that he used the terms taÊassum and tabaddun as embodiment, 
but when referring to the Messiah’s taking flesh, he also uses taÊassud. In the example we 
have seen above he concentrates on the quiddity of incarnation, which is neither to be 
described as an act nor as a part, but as a way to the action: i.e. manifestation, appearance, 
etc.
233
 
Theodore AbÙ Qurra scarcely uses this term. A representative example would be his 
summary for what Christians teach: i.e. that God sent His Son from Heaven to a pure woman, 
by whom He incarnated, from whom He was born as God and human, and then grew in this 
world like any of us.
234
 We cannot find further implications in this example; but it is 
undeniable that this term must have been widely used in Christian circles to express 
incarnation, without respect to denomination. 
The reason taºassud is not a term to be found in kalÁm is Muslim rejection for 
incarnation. The question of incarnation is a Christological issue, and it is not unexpected that 
approaches differ. Islam refuses the Trinitarian Christian teaching, according to which Jesus, 
the Logos, (as established in the Gospel of John,) was God; and the Word became flesh: i.e. 
Jesus was God incarnate, and the Son of God. The Qur’Án says that Jesus never claimed these 
things. In Muslim theology, the Kalima is created, and calling Jesus the Word of AllÁh 
cannot mean his deification; it is merely a confirmation of His being a prophet. As a prophet 
of God, Jesus is a manifestation of God, who transmits God’s message. The fundamental 
reason for the Muslim rejection of the Incarnation is that Jesus’ divine filiation is explicitly 
rejected in the Qur’Án, as well as it states that God neither begets nor is begotten.235 As for 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s epoch, the ninth century, Incarnation was a central theme in disputes 
between Christians and Muslims. On the authority of Beaumont we may say that Christian 
teaching relied upon the fact that Jesus did not have a human father, while Muslims, e.g. the 
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233
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 28. 
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ninth-century apologist, ÝAlÐ ibn RabbÁn al- al-ÓabarÐ (d. c. 870) appealed to Adam’s lack 
of human parents as a refutation of the Christian idea of Incarnation.
236
 Also in this epoch, 
MuÝtazilites and other theologians argued that a God limited by a body could not be 
omnipresent;
237
 and given that the same agument was present in Christian authors’ works, too, 
interaction is likely to have happened in this field. 
 
8. IttiÌÁÆ – assumption:238 the Son’s action of taking, assuming a body for Himself 
 
This term rarely occurs on its own. It is either used together with incarnation, as a term 
of a similar meaning, or together with governed nouns as objects: i.e. any of the terms of 
bodily connotations, meaning the Son’s taking, assuming a body/a form/an abode etc. for 
Himself. In the first examined example ittiÌÁÆ appears as the action of the Son: taking a 
human form in order that the Messiah should come into being: “The existence of the complex 
Messiah in His complexity was due to the assumption and unification as well.”239 We must 
underline that assuming [a form] is used together with unification, and it lets one interpret the 
two actions as complementary. 
  IttiÌÁÆ usually governs the noun Êasad. This complexity raises the question whether 
the body should be called the body of God.
240
 IttiÌÁÆ governing the noun Êasad gives the 
reader the impression that it might eventually be replaced by taºassud, as well:  
“But, as the Father – eulogy – wanted to complete His eternal generosity towards His creation 
and fulfil His previous grace upon His whole created world, and wanted to inform all the 
angels and people on the splendour of the name of His Fatherhood that He had concealed 
before: He assumed a body by His pre-eternal Son, who is born of Him. [This body is] of His 
creation. He took it with Him into His sonship, and by this he made for Him and for everyone 
of the same substance (angels and men) the share of His Fatherhood necessary. By this, they 
all deserved the heritage of His valuable and noble treasures, which he had prepared for them 
in His kingdom. His assuming the body for His Son (and not for Himself or for His Spirit) fit 
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 BEAUMONT, Mark, Christology in Dialogue with Muslims, Oxford, Regnum Books, 2005, pp. 2-3. (Later 
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237 MARTIN, R.C., Anthropomorfism, p. 106. 
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 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘assomption’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 85. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 185,3 
 ًاعم ًاعيمج داحتلااو ذاختلاا عم هلامكب عمتجملا حيسملا دوجو ناك كلذكو 
240
 Ibid., p. 196,3 
لاأ انأ دق رقن نمؤنو نأب الله ذختا هل   ادسج ريغ هنأ مل بجي ذنم طق نأ ىمسي دسج الله  
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His wisdom and greatness and is more proper for His grace and clemency than its assuming 
for Himself and for His Spirit.”
241
  
This quote demonstrates that our hypothesis concerning the possibility of replacing taºassud 
with this compound structure is verifiable. Assuming a body for the son/for Himself expresses 
the meaning of incarnation. 
The object of the action of assuming, i.e. the human [being] whose body is taken, has 
power over the others consequently: “The human [being], selected from our substance turned 
to have power over all the creatures right after that his Artificer had assumed it as a body [for 
Himself].”242 Given that the same consequence is mentioned in the case of incarnation 
elsewhere, assuming and a governed noun is seen synonymous with it. In the case of 
incarnation we have seen that it is a way of the Son’s action and manifestation, a method of 
His conveying the divine message. His assumption, being a way to similar outcomes is 
synonymous with it in this, as well. 
A last remark to make: the use of this term is significant in the debate of Christians 
and Muslims concerning Jesus as the Son of God, since this idea is not acceptable for 
Muslims. But the Qur’Án also uses the verb ittaÌaÆa, as an action of God, who took Jesus for 
Himself, which does not suggest physical generation but a relation of adoption.
243
 ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ uses this term to refer to an action of the Son of God, the object of which is a body, 
so there is a difference in denotatios. Yet, the use of this very term by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, 
i.e. expressing an idea by a terminology known to Muslims, might be an attempt to find 
common ground with them.  
 
9. taÊassud, ittiÌÁÆ and their composition or parallel with other terms 
 
TaÊassud, and ittiÌÁÆ are used together or alternately when the author cites Scriptural 
evidence in His answer to the supposed Muslim opponent’s question. Citations appear from 
the Old Testament (ÝalÁ lisÁn DÁwud; wa-yaqÙl IšÝya), and from the New Testament 
(Matthew, John).
244
 
                                                          
241
 Ibid., pp. 205,15-206,1-2 
اك ام نيعمجأ سانلاو ةكئلاملل نلعيو هتيرب ةفاك ىلع ةقباسلا هتمعن ممتيو هقلخ ىلع ميدقلا هدوج لمكي نأ هللاج زع بلأا دارأ ذإ نكلو ًاميدق هافخأ ن
لخ نم ًادسج هنم دولوملا يلزلأا هنباب ذختا ،هتوبأ مسا ءانس نم هتوبأ ظح كلذب سنلأاو ةكئلاملا نم هرهوج لهلأو هل بجوأو هتونب يف هعم هذخأو هق
عو هتمكحب لكشأ هحورو هسفن نود هنبلا دسجلا هذاختا ناكف .هتوكلم يف مهل اهدعأ يتلا ةميركلا ةسيفنلا هرئاخذ ةثارو مهعمجاب اوقحتسيل هتمظ
هحورو هل هذختإ نم هتفأرو هلضفب ىلوأو 
242
 Ibid., p. 226,9-10 
 ةعاس دعب ًاكلم هل اهلك قئلاخلا تراص انرهوج نم بختنملا انرشب كلذكذختا  ًادسج هل هعناص   
243
 BEAUMONT, Mark, Christology in Dialogue with Muslims, p. 9. 
244
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 206-9 
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As for non-scriptural appearances: our first example shows how taÊassud, ittiÌÁÆ, 
and badan are rendered side by side. 
“Due to His grace and might, He sculpted a pure and clean form of their substance, and He 
incarnated in it, and assumed it as a garment for His divinity, in order to make the right of 
pre-eternal sonship necessary for him, and to make him equal to Himself in this sonship. We 
know that the matter out of which your body was formed, is of the solidity of your father, 
then, out of the sperm were formed a body and limbs. After the creation of the body and its 
parts had been fulfilled, a living soul was created in it, but not from the solidity of your father. 
… Your soul was not begotten by your father, and it is not of the nature of the sperm, and yet, 
you became a son of your father, verily.”
245
  
This extract introduces new ideas, since incarnation happens in a form (šabaÎ), not a body this 
time. As a parallel for the Son’s incarnation in the pure form, the composition of the human 
body and soul is presented here. Human body is expressed by badan and it is combined with 
nafs, while incarnation, the Messiah’s taking flesh for Himself is still derived from Êasad, so 
this is what refers to His flesh. A hierarchy of meanings is discernible here. Another point 
which is worthy of examining here is the sequence of man’s creation and growth, as it is 
described here, since it may paralleled to the ÎadÐ× on man’s creation: “The creation of each 
of you is completed in his mother’s womb for forty days in the form of a drop, then he 
becomes a clot of blood for the same interval, then a morsel of flesh for the same period, 
…”246 Of course, the establishment of a direct relationship between the two would be far-
fetched. However, this tradition may be found in al-BuÌÁrÐ’s and Muslim’s ÒaÎÐÎs, al-
TirmiÆÐ’s Sunan, etc. which implies that this tradition had been widely known and accepted 
in the ninth century, when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ wrote the KitÁb al- MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba. 
When explaining Christian teachings, he might have used deliberately an imagery known to 
and accepted by Muslims. 
Many terms appear in the following example: e.g. incarnation and assumption are used 
together, and body, as ºasad, is governed by the verbs or verbal nouns of taºassada and 
ittaÌaÆa. The quote raises the question whether ºasad is the body of God.  
                                                          
245
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 193,12-18 
 ًارهاط ًايكز ًاحبش هتوربجو هلضفب مهرهوج نم طحنأهدسجتف هذختاو  :هلثم اهيف هعم هريصتف لزت مل يتلا ةونبلا قح كلذب هل بجويل هتوهلال ًاسابل
 نوك يتلا ةداملا نم ملعن دق امككندب  اهنمً اندب ةفطنلا نم روص مث ،كيبا بلص نم تناك امنإو ،ندب وجو ةقلخ لمك اذإ ىتح .لاصوأو حراندبلا 
 دعب نم هيف تقلخ هحراوجوسفن  قحب نضحو ًانبا كيبا عرز نم تريصف ،هتفطن عابط نم لاو كوبأ اهدلي  مل كسفنو ... ،كيبا بلص نم لا ةيح
كيبلا 
246
 C.f. al-NAWAWÏ, Forty Hadith, tanslated by IBRAHIM, E. – JOHNSON-DAVIES, D., Damascus, DÁr al-
Qur’Án al-KarÐm, 1977. , p. 37. 
 ُنوَُكي َُّمث َِكلَذ َلْثِم ًَةَقلَع ُنوَُكي َُّمث اًمَْوي َنيَِعبْرَأ ِه ُِّمأ ِنَْطب ِيف ُُهقْلَخ ُعَمُْجي ْمُكَدََحأ َِّنإ َِكلَذ َلْثِم ًةَغْضُم… 
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“We would say: we establish and believe that God assumed a body for Him, but it is not 
necessary to call it the body of God. That is, as He raised a single Messiah and a single Son 
when He incarnated by it, the body has to be attached to the Messiah, because if it’s not, [it 
will have to be called] the body of God, even if the incarnation was on the behalf of God 
originally, and not on the behalf of the Messiah, and even if God has never incarnated.”
247
  
Here ittiÌÁÆ is the action of God, as it is in the Qur’Án’s terminology. But the object, instead 
of the person of Jesus, is a body, or flesh. It is elucidated here that at the moment of 
assumption and incarnation, a single Messiah came into being, thus the body is attached to 
Him, and not to God. According to both Christian and Muslim teachings, God cannot have a 
body. 
If assumption, ittiÌÁÆ is used together with Êasad, haykal, maÎall: it raises the 
question whether this action introduces any change in the divine nature, and if there is any 
composition between the two natures. This is examined in the next example: 
“As the Word of God assumed this human [being] as a body, frame and abode for himself, 
the human [being], who was the object [of this assumption], deserved the right of sonship and 
its portion together with the other, the incarnating one; and they became equal in this sonship. 
He equalized him in everything we have mentioned: lordship, possession, power and property. 
It was impossible to make him equal to Himself in the pre-eternity of His essence and the 
spirituality of His substance. [This happened] without the Pre-eternal’s being affected by any 
contingence, composition, mingling, commixing, corruption or anything that comes from the 
created bodies, their consequences and transformation, since He transcended and stood above 
everything that the created and generated estimative faculties may perceive.”
248
  
The main idea of this example is that divinity excludes tangibility by the corporeal nature. As 
for the terms, let us remember that the Qur’Án uses the verb ittaÌaÆa, as an action of God, 
who took Jesus for Himself. In this example ittiÌÁÆ is an action of the Word of God,249 i.e. 
the Son. Replacing God with the Son, by adding the word Kalima, and then using the term 
ittiÌÁÆ, is a fruitful “manipulation” of terminology, in which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ probably 
aims at expressing a Christian idea in a way acceptable for the Muslim opponent. The objects 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, 196,3-7 
انلق :لاإ انأ دق رقن نمؤنو نأب الله ذختا هل ً ادسج ريغ هنأ مل بجي ذنم طق نأ ىمسي دسج الله .كلذو هنأ ذإ ،ماقأ يف تقو هدسجت ،هايإ هنم نمو 
يرشبلا يذلا هدسجت،   احيسم   ادحاو   انباو ، ادحاو بجو نأ فاضي دسجلا ىلإ حيسملا لاإ دسج ،الله نإو ناك دسجتلا يف لصلأا ناك لله لا سملل،حي 
ولو مل دسجتي الله   ادبأ 
248
 Ibid., p. 213,11-17 
 ذإذختا  هل يرشبلا كلذ ةملكلا اللهً ادسج ً لكيهو ً لحمو عم اهظحو ةونبلا قح كلذل لمحتملا يرشبلا قحتسا ،دسجتملا  .ًاعيمج اهيف ايوتساو رخلآا
 عيمجو هناطلس عيمجو هكلمو هتيبوبر نم انركذ ام لك يف هاواس ًاضيأ كلانهو ،كلذ رهوج ةيناحورو هتاذ ةيلزأ نم هيف هتاواسم نكمي مل ام ،هلام
 نم يرجي امم ءيش مأ داسف مأ جازتما مأ طلاتخا مأ بيكرت وأ ةسامم كلذ نم ءيش يف يلزلأا لاني نأ ريغ نمماسجلأأ  اهجئاتن نم ةقولخملا
ةنوكملا ةثدحملا ماهولأا هتكردأ ام لك نم عفرأو ىلعأ لب ،اهتلاحتساو 
249
 The phrase is „AllÁh al-Kalima” in the original text. But instead of translating it as God, the Word, I interpret 
it as the Verbum Dei, the Word of God. I followed this practice in each case.  
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of assumption are Êasad, haykal, maÎall, which, being used in the same syntactical role, are 
synonymous in the first sentence. Body means a frame, a dwelling place in this context. 
However, as we could see it on the authority of de Boer above, haykal is used in Muslim 
philosophical terminology as a term referring to the physical world as whole as well as the 
planets, because the world-soul and the spirits of the stars dwell in them like the soul of man 
in its body. Here we may find a parallel with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation as far as the 
dwelling of a spirit in a body is concerned, but the meaning of haykal is more specific. It is to 
be noted here that haykal is usually not defined in Muslim books of definitions, and may 
originally be a specific Christian (Nestorian) term. Boer interprets its Muslim usage on the 
basis of dwelling, so quite probably there is Christian influence in this field. Only al- 
ËwÁrizmÐ mentions it when classifying Christian groups, but he introduces this term with 
the meaning of a temple.
250
 The term is probably not widely used in this sense in the ninth 
century, either; at least, I could not find any occurrences in the other two Christian authors’ 
texts, which may imply that its use by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is his own invention due to a 
Nestorian tradition.  J. Pelikan emphasizes that in the Council of Ephesus in 431 an anathema 
was pronounced upon the “man-worshipper Nestorius” and his theology of the incarnation as 
the indwelling of Logos. Orthodoxy identified itself with the anathema, while Nestorians 
continued to resist it and to declare that their view of the relation between the divine and the 
human in Christ was the only correct one, and that they hold the truth of the gospel. It was the 
council of Nicea to which Nestorian theologians declared their loyalty, the first two synods 
being normative for Nestorian teaching. In disputes with the adherents of Ephesus and 
Chalcedon, the common starting point of Nestorians were “the dogmas that are in accordance 
with the faith,” namely those of Nicea and Constantinople. It was the continuity between the 
first two councils and those that followed at issue in the disputes. Nestorians denied 
continuity, so they repeated and preserved most of the emphases characteristic of the theology 
of the indwelling Logos in the fourth and fifth centuries. Many of the favourite biblical texts 
were the same. Prominent was the use of John 2:19 “Destroy this temple and in three days I 
will raise it up.” In many ways it was the key passage in Nestorian definition of the nature of 
the union between divine and human in Christ. Almost verbatim from Nestorius, the leading 
Nestorian theologian of the seventh century, Babai the Great declared: “Thus we adore God in 
the temple of his humanity, because he dwells in it as in a temple, united with it eternally.” 
The sixth-century Thomas of Edessa and the seventh-century Babai held it that the 
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 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 90. 
لكيهلا تيب روصلا هيف وصر ءايبنلأا مهيلع ملاسلا روصو كولملا دقو تركذ مهبتارم يف نيدلا ءامسأو مهئاسؤر يف باب رابخلأا 
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frankincense presented to the Christ child by the Magi had as its purpose to show that he who 
was born is the temple of God.
251
 It is then not unexpected that haykal, the word of Syriac 
origin meaning temple is employed here as “temple.” The second half of the quote introduces 
body, Êism as created, and as such, it is subject to contingence, composition, mingling, 
commixing, corruption and transformation. All these kinds of change are body-related. The 
hierarchy of meanings appears in the phenomenon that the Messiah’s body is referred to by 
the word Êasad, i.e. flesh; while human bodies, or more generally, created bodies are denoted 
by the term Êism. 
Incarnation (taÊassud) takes place together with assumption (ittiÌÁÆ), which has as its 
objects ‘temple’ (haykal) and dwelling place (maÎall):  
“We have informed you in the beginning of our treatise that He had not made him equal to 
Himself in substance, but only in what the substance might be described by: i.e. might, grace, 
majesty, and greatness. [And He did not make him equal to Himself in things] that belong to 
nature and substance. So this is what He took for Himself as a garment, and incarnated in and 
assumed for Himself as His temple and dwelling place.”
252
  
The first sentence of this quote refers to the intangibility of the divine; in a dispute with a 
Muslim opponent it is crucial to emphasize that nothing can affect the godly substance. Thus 
incarnation is compared to taking on a garment, which further accentuates that no inward or 
substantial change may reach the divine substance. Incarnation at the same time may be 
replaced by assumption and an object, which is the assumption of a frame or a dwelling place. 
Reference to the body by the name ‘temple’ is from the approach of the divine substance, 
since the divine cannot have a body. ‘Dwelling place,’ maÎall refers to the state of 
inhabitation, dwelling, i.e. ÎulÙl, in this sense the body is a sign for the existence of the 
divine, it is a means in which He can appear. 
It is established concerning both incarnation, taºassud and unification, ittiÎÁd that it is 
impossible to know their method/modality, as we can see it in the following example. 
“There is also no answer to the question of the mode of God’s incarnation and the union of 
the body with the incarnating [one] from the aspect of this sonship. What we are obliged to 
answer is the question whether He incarnated and whether He unified [with the body]. As for 
the meaning of His incarnation and union, we have already given an answer to it by the one 
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 PELIKAN, J., The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600-1700), Chicago – London, The University of Chicago 
Press, 1975. pp. 39-40. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 224,15 
،ةمظعلاو للاجلاو ةمعنلاو زعلا نم رهوجلا اهب فصوي يتلا روملأا يف هاواس امنإ لب رهوجلا يف هواسي مل هنأ انملاك ردص يف كانربخأ دق  تسيلو
 هعردت يذلا كلذو ،رهوجلاو عابطلا نعهدسجتو هذختاو هلكيه هلحمو 
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that you have heard. As for how He incarnated and how He unified [with the body]: there’s 
no way to perceive and answer it.”
253
  
This extract is of interest due to two reasons. One of them is that incarnation implies the union 
with the body. The other reason is a parallel it offers with Islamic thought, as van Ess assumes 
it: “Theologians, however, used bi-lÁ kayf rather in the sense of “without qualifying God in a 
way only to be applied to His creation; they presented it as a middle course between a literal 
acceptance of the anthropological statements in the Scripture (= takyÐf, tašbÐh) on one side 
and their metaphorical interpretation in the MuÝtazilÐ sense (ta’wÐl = taÝÔÐl) on the 
other.”254 ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s example does not refer to God’s essence when emphasizing 
the bi-lÁ kayf approach, instead, he refers to God’s creative action. However, the approach is 
the same, and we may see that Christian-Muslim parallels are offered in approach and 
methodology besides terminology. 
The difference between haykal and Êasad as well as the difference between taÊassud 
and ÎulÙl can be understood on the basis of this example:  
“If he said: why do you call it the “temple” of God and not His body? Yet, you claim that He 
dwelt in it as well as He incarnated by it. We would say: don’t we say that He incarnated in 
it and dwelt in it at the same time? This is why we called it God’s “temple” and not God’s 
body. Incarnation makes the unification of two substances necessary, while dwelling 
doesn’t. That is: incarnation by two substances in the unity of the Messiah attaches body to 
Him, whereas dwelling does not make a unity of the two, thus “temple” is attached to it, and 
it is established for the one who dwells in it, forever.”
255
  
According to this example, incarnation implies unity of the two substances, but dwelling 
doesn’t, so in this case body needs to be called the temple of God. The difference between 
haykal and Êasad is not in the very thing they refer to, since it is body in both cases. 
Difference is between the action that is examined, since incarnation implies unity, so the body 
can be referred to in the genitive construction: the body of who incarnates. Dwelling implies 
another kind of attachment, when body has to be referred to as a manifestation, a temple in 
which someone or something dwells or appears. This distinction, and calling the body the 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 214,12-20 
 ةيفيك نع ةلأسمل باوج لا كلذكدسجت  اللهداحتاو دسجلا  عمدسجتملا  له نأ لاؤسلا نم هيف باوجلا انمزلي يذلا ،ةونبلا كلت ةهج يفدسجت  لهو
دحتا ىنعم امأف .هدسجت هداحتاو  فيك امأف .تعمس يذلاب هيف انبجأ دقفدسجت  فيكودحتا و هكرد ىلإ ليبس لافهنع باوجلا  
254
 van ESS, J., TashbÐÎ wa-tanzÐÎ, p. 344. 
255
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 201,6-12 
 نومست مكلاب امف :لاق نإفلكيه  هنومست لاو اللهدسج  هنإ نومعزت دقو .اللهلح  امك هيفهدسجت  
 هنع لوقن انأ لاأ :انلق باوجلاهدسجت لحو  ،ًاعيمج هيف هانيمس كلذلولكيه  همسن ملو اللهدسج  نلأ ،اللهدسجتلا  بجوأداحتا  نيرهوجلالولحلاو  مل
 بجويداحتا  يأ ؛اذهدسجتلا  فاضي هيلإ حيسملا ةينادحوب نيرهوجلا نمدسجلا ،لولحلاو  هيلإ فاضي ،ًةدحاو ًةينادحو امهنم مقي مللكيهلا  تبثتف
 ًادبأ هنكاس ىلإ هتفاضإ  
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temple of God (i.e. the means by which He can manifest and convey His message) is 
important in a debate with Muslims, who can not accept God’s having a body. 
Another difference between taÊassud and ÎulÙl can be approached from the viewpoint 
of the incarnating divine person:  
“Had the Father and the Spirit also incarnated by him [the human] and taken him into their 
property the same way as they dwelt in Him [the Son], he [the Messiah] would have called 
himself Father and Spirit in many cases. Had the inhabitation made the same thing necessary 
as incarnation and union do, he would not have rather called himself pre-eternal Son instead 
of calling himself Father and Spirit, since the Father and the Spirit dwelt in Him, just as the 
Son dwelt in him.”
256
  
Christian teaching of Trinity implies that all three hypostases are one, thus the Father and the 
Spirit dwell in the Son. If the Son dwells in the human, then the other two hypostases dwell in 
Him as well. Dwelling does not imply a bodily attachment (as seen in the previous paragraph, 
where body could be referred to by the genitive construction as the body of God), so the 
Messiah’s body is only attached to the Son, who incarnated in it. Dwelling does not even 
imply unity, as seen above and as demonstrated in the following quote:  
“We have to know on the basis of this that it is not due to the dwelling of the divinity in 
humanity that the unity of the Messiah and the unity of His sonship came into being. It is due 
to the Son’s specification by the property of humanity by way of incarnation and their unity. 
This is why we could speak of the body of the Messiah and not the body of God. And as the 
unity of the Messiah is not due to the dwelling, this is why the “temple” is called the “temple” 
of God and not that of the Messiah.”
257
  
There is a point to remark here, namely that dwelling is on the behalf of the divinity, and not 
only the Son. This is why the body, which is the body of the Messiah, cannot be attached to 
the Messiah or to the Son only as a temple, but has to be referred to as the temple [not body!] 
of the divine, or God. Another remark we have to make here, is that incarnation is described 
here as the specification by the property of humanity. 
 Since dwelling, inhabitation has turned up in various contexts; it is time for us to 
concentrate on this term a bit more. First, we need to mention that the use of the term is 
unparalleled in the contemporary authors’ texts, but it is not unexpected if we consider the 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba,, p. 202,11-14 
 لولحلا ناك ولو .ًاحورو ًابأ عضاوملا نم ريثك يف ًاضيأ هسفن ىمس ،هيف لاح امك امهتصاخ يف هاذخأو هادسجت ًاضيأ حورلاو بلأا نأ ولف ام بجوأ
 ًابأ هسفن يمسي نأ نم ًايلزأ ًانبا هسفن يمسي تاب نكي مل داحتلااو دسجتلا بجوأ نبلاا هيف لح امك هيف حورلاو بلأا لولحل ًاحورو 
257
 Ibid., p. 202:15-18 
نكلو نم انهه بجي نأ ملعن هنأ سيل نم لبق لولح توهلالا يف توسانلا تماق ةينادحو حيسملا ةينادحوو ،هتونب لب نم لبق صاصتخا نبلاا 
ةصاخ توسانلا دسجتلاب ديحوتلابو نم امهنيب .كلذلف انلق دسج حيسملا لاب دسج الله .ذإو مل مقت ةينادحو حيسملا نم ةهج لولحلا يمس لكيهلا لكيه 
الله لا لكيه حيسملا 
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term as a Nestorian one. ÍulÙl is not widely defined by Muslim authors either, which may 
imply its being a Christian technical term, even if its use is not widely documented in the 9
th
 
century. It is not unexpected, since, as van Ess puts it, Islam rejects, under the notion of ÎulÙl 
(ἐνοίκησις), the form of anthropomorphism typical for Christianity, namely, incarnation.258 
The only exception in SunnÐ theological definitions is Ibn FÙrak, who defines it as an 
attribute of a substance, as dependence on place and firm, fixed existence in it,
259
 in which he 
shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s approach. However, pantheistic Sufis and extremist ShÐÝÐ 
theologians used extensively the term either as an infinitive noun, ÎulÙl or as a verb, Îalla. On 
the one hand, ninth century Sufism, uses ÎulÙl to express the idea of divine infusion260 while 
later Sufis meant intrusion by it.
261
 On the other hand, extremist ShÐÝÐs used the verb Îalla 
to indicate that God takes place in the persons of the ShÐÝÐ imams.262 It is obvious here that 
Muslim uses of ÎulÙl are under Christian influence. Needless to say that both pantheistic Sufis 
and extremist ShÐÝÐ theologians are condemned by Sunni and ShÐÝÐ theologians and 
accused of importing Christian ideas. As an example, let us examine how al-ÉurÊÁnÐ defines 
ÎulÙl:  
“Circulating inhabitation is the expression of the unity of two bodies in a way that one of 
them is a sign for the other, as the inhabitation of the water in the rose, the circulating one is 
the inhabiting one, while the one in which circulation is taking place is the dwelling place. 
Inhabitation in proximity expresses that one of two bodies holds the other; like the 
inhabitation of water in the jug.”
263
  
Al-ÉurÊÁnÐ uses the term Êasad when he refers to body, so it is a physical entity that we 
need to think of, but it might be a sign of Christian influence that he used the term which 
denotes ‘flesh’ in Christian usage. Especially the first definition, working with the simile of 
the water in the rose, referring to one of the two components as a sign for the other, is very 
close to the interpretation we saw in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s case. Even if the Word is not a 
body, but is present in the flesh as water in the rose, i.e. the flesh is an outward sign of it, as it 
                                                          
258
 VAN ESS, J., TashbÐÎ wa-tanzÐh, p. 342. 
259
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl, p. 24. 
دح لولحلا :وه نوكلا يف ناكملا دامتعلااو هيلع نوكسلاو ،هيف هنمو مهلوق لح املاء يف ،بجلا لحو نهدلا يف ،ةروراقلا كلذو نم تافص 
رهوجلا 
260
 MASSIGNON, Louis, Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane, Paris, Geuthner, 
1922, p. 223. 
261
 Ibid., p. 236. 
262
 al-AŠÝARÏ, AbÙ ’l-Íasan, MaqÁlÁt al-islÁmiyyÐn wa-iÌtilÁf al-muÒallÐn, Ed. RITTER, M. Hellmut, 
Wiesbaden, Steiner, 1963, p. 14. 
263
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt,  p. 104. 
:ينايرسلا لولحلا  ،ًلااح :يراسلا ىمسيف ،درولا يف درولا ءام لولحك ،رخلآا ىلإ ةراشإ امهدحأ ىلإ ةراشلإا نوكت ثيحب نيمسجلا داحتا نع ةرابع
حم :هيف يرسملاو ًلا. 
:يراوجلا لولحلا زوكلا يف ءاملا لولحك ،رخلآل ًافرظ نيمسجلا دحأ نوك نع ةرابع. 
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is the case of the rose the inhabiting water. Christian influence is very probable in this case, as 
well. 
IttiÌÁÆ is what leads to humanisation, ta’annus, but at the same time this action 
results in union between the two hypostases: “We can also say that the Word of God, who 
stands above every analogy, is the one who originated and assumed the human for Himself as 
humanity. By His humanisation (i.e. His dressing in armament) their union was necessary, 
and the unity of the Messiah originated in their combination.”264 Assuming a human for 
Himself, i.e. dressing in him, as one takes on armament, is synonymous with humanisation. 
Humanistaion implies the unity of the two hypostases, at the same time it appears in the text 
as being on the same level with combination. Thus the combination of these two parts is also 
synonymous with humanisation. 
Four terms: taÊassud, badan, ta’annus, Êasad appear in a long description. This 
example contains descriptive parts, as well as similes. 
“the soul incarnated by the body and the body by the soul, and by their combination a single 
human being originated. Thus the body was called the body of man and the soul the soul of 
man, and not the body of the soul or the soul of the body. If the soul had not combined with 
the body, the unity of man would never have come into being out of them. We can say it in 
other words and ways, too: the Word of God became human, but not in the following ways, 
as one can say e.g: the water froze, i.e. congealed in itself/its essence and became ice. Or not 
as milk became cheese, i.e. it clot in itself and thus turned cheese. Or as one can say: the 
youngster turned into a man, i.e. he grew up in himself and became a [grown] man. It is rather 
in the meaning when one says that someone armed himself, i.e. he wore armament, or 
someone equipped himself: i.e. he dressed in armour, or someone wore a turban, i.e. he put on 
a turban. It does not mean that this person became a turban or weapons or armament. It is this 
way when we say that the Word of God incarnated and became human, that is: he created a 
body and he put it on. He created a human being, and wore it as an armament, combined it 
with His hypostasis in order to appear in it, and in order to make His words and deeds appear 
through it. He also did it in order to unify this human being with Himself in His sonship. 
Beginning with the time of the assumption and unification their position is that of a single 
Messiah. It is necessary to speak of the body of the Messiah and the humanity of the 
combined Son; and it is not the humanity of God, or the humanity of the divinity,  …”
265
  
                                                          
264
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 197,9-10 
اذكه ىلعو اذه لوقن :نإ الله ةملكلا ىلاعت ىلع لك سايق وه يذلا أدب ذختاو يرشبلا هل ، اتوسان عمو هسنأت يأ هعردت بجو امهداحتا تماقو 
ةينادحو حيسملا امهفلاتئاب 
265
 Ibid., p. 196,8-197,3  
 ذإ هنأ امكتدسجت  سفنلاندبلاب ندبلاو  يمس ،دحاو ناسنا امهفلاتئاب امهنم ماقف سفنلابندبلا  لا ناسنلاا سفن سفنلاو ناسنلاا ندبندب  لاو ناسنلاا
 سفنلا فلأت مل ولو ،ناسنلاا سفنندبلاب ينادحو مقت مل.ًادبأ امهنم ناسنلاا ة 
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The first sentence sets incarnation in a new context, since it speaks of incarnation as a 
reciprocal action of body and soul: it elucidates that from the approach of the coming into 
being of the single human being, incarnation is a mutual action shared by both components. 
The second sentence obviously serves dialectical purposes. As Muslim accusation of belief in 
corporeality of the divine needs to be turned down, it has to be demonstrated that the 
Messiah’s body is not God’s body. (This part may be addressed to other Christian 
denominations, as well.) The simile of the body’s and soul’s reciprocal incarnation, which 
results in the origination of a single human being, serves as the basis for establishing that the 
body is the human’s body and not that of the soul. This analogy is necessary for 
demonstrating that Christians (especially Nestorians) do not claim God’s having a body in the 
person of the Messiah. The example of the human being is of fundamental importance, since 
in the following the Logos is introduced as having become human. Similes play an important 
role at this point in demonstrating that humanity and body did not become integral parts in the 
divine; but are taken up without changing anything inside. Examples of water turning ice, 
milk turning into cheese, youngster turning into a grown person imply an interior change, but 
the Son’s incarnation and humanisation is not so: these have to be contrasted. An interesting 
parallel is offered by A. S. Tritton, who examines what nafs, rÙÎ, and Ýaql mean for Muslims. 
As for nafs, he defines it in the following way: “It is primarily a knower (ÝallÁma) and 
knowledge is its form; it clothes itself with body which thus becomes man.”266 In this, he 
relies on the work of a tenth-century Muslim author, AbÙ ÍayyÁn al-TawÎÐdÐ (d. c. 1023), 
who uses the word badan for body, and the word labisa for clothing, as done by the soul.
267
 
Though direct connection cannot be demonstrated in this field, the similarity in the usage of 
terms is striking, so Christian influence in the formation of the idea is possible. 
Humanisation, ta’annus is only possible through a human body, Êasad: “He appeared 
[in a] humanised [form], in a body coming from the world, in order to save them all through 
it.”268 The example further accentuates that this action is not an internal change, but needs an 
outward “tool,” as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 ةملكلا الله نإ رخآ ٍوحنو ىرخأ ةظفلب ًاضيأ لوقن دقوسنأت  نبجت نبللا نإ هلوقكو .ًاحلم راصف هتاذب نادمج يأ ،حلم ءاملا :لئاقلا لوق ىنعم ىلع لا
إ :لئاقلا لوق ىنعم ىلع لب ،ًلاجر راصف هتاذب بش يأ لجرت يبصلا هلوقكو .ًانبج راصف هتاذب دقتعإ يأ نإ هلوقكو ،ًاعرد سبل يأ عردت ًانلاف ن
كلا الله نأ انلوقب كلذك .ًاعرد وأ ًاحلاس وأ ًةمامع راص هنأ لا ،ًةمامع سبل يأ ممعت ًانلاف نإ هلوقكو ،ًاحلاس سبل يأ حلست ًانلاف ةملدسجت سنأتو  يأ
 ثدحأً ادسج لوق هب رهظيلو هب رهظيل همونق ىلإ هفلأو هعردتف ًاناسنإ قلخو هسبلف تقو يف ًاعيمج امهرمأف انلق .هتونب يف هعم هدحويلو هلامعأو ه
ذاختلاا داحتلااو  ةملكلا وه الله ناك نإو ،توهلالا توسان لاو الله توسان لا ،عمتجملا نبلاا توسانو حيسملا توسان لاقي نأ بجو ،دحاو حيسم
 هدحو درفنملاهذاختلا لأا يف توسانلا عرضتم سانلا نأ لا ،ًاتوسان هايإهيلع عمتجملا حيسملا ناك لص 
266
 TRITTON, A. S., Man, nafs, rÙÎ, Ýaql, In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University 
of London, 3 (1971) 34, p. 492. 
267
 al-TAWḤÏDÏ, AbÙ ḤayyÁn, al-ImtÁÝ wa-’l-mu’Ánasa, Cairo, 1939-44. p. 202. 
ا يف سفنلا ًاناسنإ اهب ندبلا راصو ،ندبلا تسبلا امل اهنكل ؛اهتروص ملعلاو ،ةملاع لصلأ 
268
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 239,9 
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Incarnation (taÊassud) is in a complementary relation with ta’annus. A necessary 
means for these actions is a human body (Êasad) which, through the state of dwelling ( 
ÎulÙl), comes to be interpreted as the ‘temple’ (haykal) of the divine:  
“As the Word of God incarnated by the human [being] and there the Divine humanised by 
the human [being], and the human [being] divinised by the Divine, the two of them made up 
the unity of the Messiah by their union: both the human and the divine were attached to the 
one Messiah, who came into being as [a result of] their combination. Thus the body may be 
called the body of the Messiah, and the divinity is the divinity of the Messiah. They did not set 
up from this dwelling a unique Messiah to whom his dwelling place would be attached 
according to his divinity, forever. The dwelling place of God was called his “temple,” and not 
the dwelling place of the Messiah.”
269
 
Reciprocity is emphasized here: as the divine humanised, the human divinised in this action. 
The Word’s incarnation means the humanisation of the Divine as well. Dwelling, inhabitation 
does not mean an everlasting attachment, it just implies a temporary attachment of the body as 
a temple to the divine.  
 Since humanisation has appeared in several instances as related to incarnation, 
assumption or unity, it is worth looking at it in detail. We have seen that in ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s use it does not appear on its own, and it means the taking of the human as a property 
for the divine. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa also uses it in a 
similar meaning. We can mostly see his ta’annus by the side of taÊassud, incarnation, mainly 
with the meaning of humanisation, sometimes with the meaning of humanity. E.g. we may see 
a question-answer dialogue with the Muslim opponent concerning the motivation for 
Incarnation. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa first uses the structure yaÒÐr insÁnan and then the term ta’annus, 
so ‘becoming human’ and humanisation are synonyms. (The motivation, according to the 
Christian part’s answer, is grace,270 in which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s standpoint is paralleled.) 
This is a shared Christian teaching, which apparently needed to be emphasized in discussions 
with Muslims. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa also uses ta’annus in order to express the Messiah’s humanity, 
e.g. when he describes His death: “His death is a human death from the viewpoint of His 
humanity, and it is not divine, from the viewpoint of His divinity.”271 In this example 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
هيدي ىلع ًاعيمج مهصلخيل ملاعلا لهأ نم ٍدسجب ًاسنأتم رهظ 
269
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 201,18-202,3 
 ذإ كلذكدسجت  يرشبلا ةملكلا اللهسنأتف  اماقأو هللإاب يرشبلا هلأتو يرشبلاب هللإا كلانهامهداحتاب  ىلإ هللإاو يرشبلا فيضأو ،حيسملا ةينادحو
 ليقف .امهنم عمتجملا دحاولا حيسملادسجلل دسج  كلذ نم اميقي ملف .حيسملا توهلا توهلالو حيسملالولحلا  هيلإ فاضي ًادحاو ًاحيسم نكسملا تيب
حيسملا نكسم لا لكيه يأ الله نكسم ليقف ،ًادبأ الله ىلإ ةفاضلإا ىلع 
270
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, pp. 35-36. 
271
 Ibid., p. 41. 
نلأ هتوم توم يسنأ نم ةهج هسنأت لا يهلاإ نم ةهج هتوهلا. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
79 
 
ta’annusihi is contrasted to lÁhÙtihi, so it denotes the result (i.e. the human part) instead of 
the action (becoming human, humanisation). This interpretation is unparalleled at ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ. Joint appearance with taÊassud can be discerned when AbÙ RÁ’iÔa writes of the 
One God of three hypostases among which one, the Son of the Father, the Word incarnated 
and humanised by way of the pure Mary.
272
 Both in the use of ta’annus together with 
incarnation, and in the context (i.e. by way of Mary) this example can be compared to those of 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Another point of similarity is that just as ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, AbÙ 
RÁ’iÔa also emphasizes that humanisation cannot affect the divine: “Saint is the God who 
became human for us without change and He remained in His divine state.”273 So the 
transcendence of the divine is always emphasized in debates. A last example for similarities 
between them (due to the congeniality of Christian teachings) shows that incarnation and 
humanisation are a way for the divine to appear.
274
 
Taºassud and ºasad are a necessary step and a necessary part of the Son of God, as it is 
demonstrated in the following example:  
“We have informed you that there is no Son of God except the Messiah, and there is no 
existence for the Messiah except by the joining of the two hypostases. Thus it necessarily 
follows from this that the one born of Mary and taken in this union is not the Son of God on 
his own, without the other. The other is also not the Son of God on his own, without the body 
that He made his dwelling place, after His union with the body. After the time of the 
incarnation, the dwelling, the union, and the pregnancy, whenever the Son of God is 
mentioned, the one and the other which was taken in the union are mentioned together, in one 
name and meaning. If it were right to call only one of them – on his own, without the other – 
the Son of God after the time of their union, then the one who had always been the Son of God 
would be more worthy to be called the Son of God without the other, even after the time of the 
union and incarnation of the Son of God.”
275
 
First, let us remember, that according to AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, the essence of the Messiah comprises 
both the action of the incarnation and the body – as we have seen it above. In this, there is an 
undeniable parallel between the two authors. As for the rest of the quote, it introduces a new 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 70. 
273
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 89. 
سودق الله يذلا سنأت نم انلجأ ريغب رييغت يقبو ىلع لاح هتوهلا 
274
 Ibid. p. 152. 
دقو بجي انيلع تابثإ ام انيعدا نم دسجتلا سنأتلاو روهزو الله كلذب   ايجانم رشبلل مهصلاخل مهذاقناو نم ةللاضلا... 
275
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 185,13-20 
دق كانربخأ  ...هنأ لا نبإ الله لاإ ،حيسملا لاو دوجو حيسملل لاإ نارتقاب نيمونقلا .نمف رارطضلاا نذإ نأ دحتملا نم ميرم سيل ،وه ىلع هدارفنا 
نود ،رخلآا نبا ،الله لاو رخلآا ، اضيأ ىلع هدارفنا نم دعب هداحتا دسجلاب نود دسجلا يذلا هلعج هلكيه، إنب الله .لب ىتم تركذ نبا الله ذنم تقو 
دسجتلا لولحلاو داحتلااو ،لمحلاو دقف تعمج دحلأا دحتملا يف مسلاا ىنعملاو   اعمج   اعم .ولو ماقتسا نأ ىمسي امهدحا ىلع هدارفنا نود رخلآا نم 
دعب داحتلاا دسجتلاو نبا ،الله ناكل دحلأا يذلا مل لزي نبا الله ىلوأ نأب ىعدي ىلع رفناهدا نبا الله نود رخلآا نم دعب داحتلاا دسجتلاو نبا الله 
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approach as far as the denotation of the name ‘Son of God’ is concerned, i.e. what it means 
after the occurrence of Incarnation. He equates the Messiah with the Son of God; at the same 
time he differentiates between the pre-incarnation Son of God and the post-incarnation Son. 
The latter only refers to the divine substance, the Second Person of the Trinity, while the 
former, as it is equal to the Messiah, comprises the divine as well as the human substance. 
When describing the human hypostasis, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the expression ‘the one 
born of Mary and taken in this union.’ Reference to the human part of the Messiah as such 
may be a sign that the author had in mind a Muslim reader. Jesus, as a prophet is often 
referred to as the son of Mary in Muslim usage; such a reference could be a common ground. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ then goes on to emphasize that the one born of Mary, i.e. the son of 
Mary is not the Son of God (on his own, without the divine substance). In this, we may see 
again an implication that a Muslim reader is addressed; at the same time, this part may target 
fellow Christians. The one born of Mary is not the Son of God, thus Mary is not Theotokos: a 
specifically Nestorian idea is also emphasized here. Incarnation and union happen at the same 
time, and the use of ‘dwelling place’ for body refers to a union in which the divine is not 
affected by the body. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
We have seen a variety of terms in a variety of contexts in this chapter. Most of the 
terms appeared in discussions of the Messiah, His body, incarnation, and humanisation. 
Analogies, human, bestial or inanimate physical bodies were introduced as parallels. Their 
denotations are not always the same; however, the exact understanding of the concept may 
always be derived from the context. In the case of terms that refer to body, there is a hierarchy 
of meanings, and the majority of terms had a meaning in which it was most frequently used in 
spite of slight differences in different contexts. Éirm is the “lowest,” used in a philosophical 
sense and with the meaning of an atom, or a substrate that can carry accidents. However, 
Muslim authors’ interpretation of Êirm as having three dimensions is not present in Christan 
authors’ works. Éism is a corporeal, physical, inanimate and composite entity, created in time; 
and in some instances it refers to the bodies of animals. In this field, some interaction might 
be discerned, since both Christian and Muslim authors consider Êism a composite and 
compound entity, but the descriptions of Muslim philosophy that refer to dimensions can not 
be paralleled with Christian examples. Éasad expresses human body in the majority of cases, 
it can refer to the resurrection body, it has a higher rank in this hierarchy; and it is also the 
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object of assumption as the Messiah’s flesh. The term that expresses Incarnation is derived 
from this one. Badan is the composite entity, combined with soul or spirit and mostly used to 
refer to the body of the human, or the human body which is assumed by the Son of God. In a 
high portion of examples examined above we could see these last two terms appear as 
synonyms. As for the actions, assumption (and an object) and incarnation were seen as 
synonymous as well. In some contexts other terms appeared: dwelling, inhabitation, frame, 
and bodily form were introduced.  We have seen that ideas expressed by the Greek 
equivalents in Patristic literature may have influenced the use and reference of the same 
connotations in 9-th century Christian use. In some cases, Muslim terminology could be 
paralleled to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, but in many cases the same terms were missing in 
contemporary Muslim usage; thus, their later appearance in Muslim authors’ works might 
have been influenced by earlier Christian interpretations.
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Chapter III 
The Terminology of eternity (azalÐ, azaliyya – pre-eternal vs. sarmad – perpetuity vs. 
qidam, qadÐm – eternal276 vs. baqÁ’, bÁqin – permanent) 
 
 
The terms azalÐ, azaliyya; sarmad; qidam, qadÐm; baqÁ’, bÁqin are frequently used 
ones in Islamic philosophy and kalÁm, meaning eternity and permanence. In his notes to Ibn 
Rušd’s (d. 1198) TahÁfut al-TahÁfut, Van Den Bergh refers to three terms as frequently used 
by the twelfth century in Islamic philosophy: qidam as eternity in general (Greek ἀϊδιότης); 
and, as Aristotle distinguishes it: azalÐ, as eternal a parte ante, the ungenerated (ἀγένητον) 
and eternal a parte post, abadÐ (ἂφθαρτον). Van Den Bergh adds that dahr, timeless eternity 
(αἰών), which stands for aevum in scholastic philosophy, is used by Plato and Aristotle, and 
becomes especially important in Neoplatonism.
277
 In the ninth century, as attested by 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aºwiba, two of these terms (qidam and azalÐ) 
can already be found in Christian usage. Apart from these, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage 
includes sarmad and baqÁ’ as well. Two of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s terms are frequently used 
ones, appearing in various contexts, indicating that they, as well as the concepts expressed by 
them, are already well-known and widely understood ones. The other two terms are less 
frequently used, thus only minor implications concerning their 9
th
-century use and 
understanding can be recognized here. I will first examine the two terms that are not 
frequently used, later on, I will investigate those ones that are used in a variety of contexts and 
study their implications. Then I aim at drawing parallels with the Muslim counterpart’s use of 
the same ones. 
 
1. Sarmad278- perpetuity 
 
Let us start with the term sarmad – perpetuity, as ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ understands it. 
Sarmad is considered to be the translation of the Greek term ἀΐδιος,279 which, as Lampe 
                                                          
276
 In translating azalÐ, azaliyya as pre-eternal and qidam, qadÐm as eternal, I benefited from M. E. Marmura’s 
translation of the same terms as such. C.f. al-GHAZÀLÏ, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, ed. and Tr. 
MARMURA, M. E., Provo, Utah, Bringham Young University Press, 2000. 
277
 AVERROES, TahÁfut al-TahÁfut, Ed. Van Den BERGH, S., London, Gibb Memorial Trust, 1978. p. 54. 
278
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for the term. 
279
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 125. 
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demonstrates it, is used in Patristic literature in the following senses: ‘eternal, everlasting’ in 
general, referring to the Trinity, to God, to the Son, or to the Holy Ghost; or it may appear 
simply as a substance. Lampe also refers to a second meaning, i.e. ‘perpetual’. If used as a 
noun, it means eternity in general, or that of the Father, sometimes shared with the Son, 
sometimes only that of the Son. It can be a divine quality bestowed upon man.
280
  
To the best of my knowledge, there are only two loci in the KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-
aºwiba, where the author uses this term. The first locus is the following: “We would say: You 
have laid down that hyle is created, created in time, and it is the origin of elements. But what 
has the Creator of the hyle produced it of? Is it of another – earlier – matter? Or is it [made] of 
another, even earlier [matter]? [If so,] you refer to the endless perpetual.”281 The second 
appearance is in this context: “Whenever God placed them [the righteous] on a higher rank, 
He would have to make the erring ones equal to them in what [the righteous] deserved from 
Him for their righteous deeds, then He should raise [the righteous ones] a degree higher again, 
and it turns into the endless perpetual.”282 It seems that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses this term in 
the meaning of infinity, instead of lÁ-nihÁya. Interestingly enough, we may see the phrase 
“allaÆÐ lÁ nihÁyata/intihÁ’a lahu” in his text sometimes, but the abstract noun: (al-)lÁ-
nihÁya is not used. These two examples do not imply specific philosophical or theological 
connotations, so we do not have to consider this one a technical term. However, it is used in 
the sense of ‘perpetual,’ which offers a parallel to one of the senses in which its Greek 
counterpart is used in Patristic literature. 
Among the Muslim authors who are examined here, al-ÉurÊÁnÐ is the first to define 
sarmad in its adjectival form (“Perpetual is what has no beginning or end.”)283 It may imply 
that till the 14
th
 century this term may not have been used widely, in this, we clearly see 
Christian usage preceding the Muslim one. On the other hand, as we could see it in the 
introduction of this chapter, ἀϊδιότης might have been generally translated as qidam, eternity 
in general, so its translation by the term sarmad, consequently its use might have been 
secondary. 
 
                                                          
280
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 47-48. 
281
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-AÊwiba, p. 99,18-21 
انلق :دقف متررقأ نأ ىلويهلا ةثدحم ةقولخم يهو رصنع ،عيابطلا اهثداحو نم يأ ءيش لعج ؟ىلويهلا نمأ ةدام ىرخأ ؟اهتمدقت وأ تناك نم  
ةمدقتم   اضيأ ،اهلبق نوليحتف كلذ ىلإ دمرسلا يذلا لا ءاهتنا هل 
282
 Ibid., p. 123,12-14 
تسا اميف ةاصعلا مهب قحلاف ًةبترم مهلاح عفر امهموةبتر ىلإ اهنع عافترلاا ،مهتانسح مداقتو مهئلاب ةلضفل ،هنم مه اوقح  ىلإ كلذ لوحتف ،اهنم ىلعأ
دمرسلا هل ةياهن لا يدلا 
283 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 134. 
يدمرسلا ام لا لوأ هل لاو رخآ  
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2. baqÁ’, bÁqin – permanence, permanent 
 
According to Afnan, this idiom is used as the translation of the Greek philosophical 
terms ἡ μονή or τό εἶναι.284 As for the latter, Lampe enumerates its several meanings in 
Patristic literature in connection with the ‘being’ of God and His creation,285 while the former 
appears as ‘abode, lodging; dwelling place.’286 
BaqÁ’ or bÁqin is rarely used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the only locus:  
“We would say: as for the permanent structure, and the perfect world: all [the people] are 
equal in them. The difference is that while these will be happiness and joy for the righteous; 
they would be suffering and sadness for the erring ones. Since permanence in Heaven and the 
knowledge of its continuity is happiness and joy for those who stay there, while all the 
permanence in suffering and the certain knowledge of the continuity of punishment is 
suffering and sadness for those who stay there.”
287
  
We may notice that no philosophical terminology enters here; only theological influence may 
be observed, given that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term in the meaning of the hereafter, not 
as a technical term. If we now return to its Greek counterparts, we will see that these 
examples do not indicate the same connotations that τό εἶναι does, so it will be left out of 
consideration now. As for ἡ μονή, with its meanings ‘abode, lodging; dwelling place;’ it 
shows a similarity of meaning with the baqÁ’ of the example we have examined above. The 
term of the citation was translated as ‘permanence,’ in a special context referring to the 
hereafter; so in this sense it may also be interpreted as ‘dwelling, abode.’  
As for the Muslim counterparts examined here, Ibn FÙrak is the first among them to 
define al-bÁqÐ as a technical term denoting permanence: “the definition of the permanent: it 
is what exists without being generated.”288 As we will soon see it, this meaning is quite close 
to how ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term azalÐ. If we compare Ibn FÙrak’s understanding of 
al-bÁqÐ to that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, we may also notice that while the former emphasises 
its being not generated, i.e. its existence without beginning, the latter stresses its being 
endless: the aspects differ. The same can be noticed in an example by an extra Muslim author, 
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 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 32. 
285
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 417-19. 
286
 Ibid., p. 880. 
287
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-AÊwiba, p. 124,7-10 
انلق :امأ ةينبلا ةيقابلا ملاعلاو لماكلا دقف نووتسي اهيف   اعيمج ريغ امهنا نانوكي ةطبغ   ارورسو لهلأ حلاصلا   ةفآو   ةوقشو ىلع أله حلاطلا .نلأ 
ءاقبلا يف ميعنلا ملعلاو هماودب ةطبغ هلهلأ ،رورسو لوطو ءاقبلا يف باذعلا نيقيو ملعلا ماودب باقعلا ةوقش ىلع هلهأ لابوو. 
288
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl, p. 22. 
. دح يقابلا :وه نئاكلا ريغب ثودح  
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al-MÁturÐdÐ (d. 944), whose definition is as follows: “Permanence is generation in the 
beginning of time.”289 Later authors do not define the term. We may thus see that rare and not 
specific Christian usage (as it can be seen in the example of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ) and the 
scarce appearance in Muslim books of definitions show similarity; but it also needs to be 
emphasized that while the Christian author approaches it as endlessness, Muslim writers 
understand it as having no beginning. 
 
3. AzalÐ, azaliyya – pre-eternal290 
 
According to Afnan, azalÐ may be the translation of ἀΐδιος,291 which has a variety of 
meanings in Patristic literature. Among them is ‘eternal, everlasting’ in a general sense, or 
more specifically, it was also used when referring to the Trinity, to God, to the Son, or to the 
Holy Spirit. It appeared also as a substance. Lampe refers to a second meaning, i.e. 
‘perpetual’. If used as a noun, it means eternity in general, or that of the Father, sometimes 
shared with the Son, sometimes only that of the Son. According to Van Den Bergh, azalÐ, as 
eternal a parte ante corresponds to ungenerated (ἀγένητον). This term, in Lampe’s 
classification means the uncreated, unoriginated. Its general implications are ‘eternal pre-
existence, unity, and immortality.’ In Non-Christian usage, in Greek philosophy, whence it 
entered Christian terminology, it was not only applied to the divinity, but to matter and the 
soul. In Christian theology it usually refers to the divine nature of Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit, or the whole Trinity.
292
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses this term in seven main contexts.  
1. First we see it when he disputes the pre-eternity of matter: “from this approach, the 
claim of those who say that hyle is pre-eternal is refuted. [They] claim that the 
Artificer made a variety of substances out of [the pre-eternal hyle], merely outlining 
the forms of ideas [out of the already existing hyle]. But the praedicatum of what has 
always existed is pre-eternal transcendence and impossibility to receive contingence 
or to change from a state to another.”293 Another example: “What share does the 
                                                          
289 Reference in: MaÊmaÝ al-BuÎÙ× al-IslÁmiyya, ŠarÎ al-muÒÔalaÎÁt al-kalÁmiyya, Mašhad, 1415/1995, pp. 
60-61, which cites al-MÁturÐdÐ saying: 
ءاقبلا وه نوكلا يف فنأتسم ؛تقولا هعم ريغ لاوأ. 
290
 HAYEK’s translation for azaliyya is ‘éternité.’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 85.   
291
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, pp. 5-6 
292
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 15. 
293
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 98,1-3 
 نمو هذه ةهجلا لطبت ىوعد يعدملا ىلويهلا ةيلزلأا يذلا اومعز نأ اهنم عجنأ عناصلا عاونأ ارهاوجل ردقو لاكشأ روصلا .كلذو نإ مكح ام مل 
لزي   امئاق ةيلزأ ءلاتعلاا عانتملااو نم لوبق ناثدحلا ةلاحتسلااو نم لاح ىلإ لاح. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
86 
 
eternity of the hyle have in the eternity of pre-eternity if they claim that it is forced 
by and obeys to Whom differentiates it and divides it, and creates accidents in it (i.e. 
by delineating forms and changing it from a state to another)?”294 On the basis of the 
above-mentioned examples, pre-eternal is an attribute or a praedicatum; it is used in 
the meaning of ‘without beginning,’ something that ‘has always existed,’ ‘had not 
been preceded by non-existence.’ It is also important to note, that on the basis of these 
pieces of textual evidence, one may clearly discern that pre-eternal cannot be affected 
by contingence, change, and division. Though it is usually kawn (generation) 
contrasted to fasÁd (corruption) in philosophical texts, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ expresses 
this contrast by establishing that something that is not generated, can not be affected 
by change, i.e. corruption. Till now we could see that once azaliyya, pre-eternity 
appeared alone, and two times together with qidam, eternity. When used together, no 
overt difference can be recognized, qidam and azaliyya are used as synonyms. The 
joint appearance of the two terms is also remarkable, since they usually appear 
separately in philosophy and kalÁm terminologies, because qidam usually denotes 
eternity in time, while azaliyya refers to eternity out of time. On the basis of Lampe’s 
classification it is understandable why the pre-eternity of matter is discussed. It must 
be an echo of Greek philosophical ideas whence ἀγένητος was applied to matter. Since 
the discussion of the eternity of matter is not a crucial question in a debate between 
Christians and Muslims, we may think of a heritage that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
transmits here. It can be considered as a proof for his being educated in a rhetorical 
school, and being trained in Hellenistic knowledge. Another point to be made here is 
that Lampe translates ἀγένητος as ‘eternal pre-existence.’ There might have been a 
word combination also in Greek that is reflected in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s qidam 
azaliyya. 
2. We can find the term in a similar context later on, when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ disputes 
the pre-eternity of creatures:  
“If you could say: why hadn’t He created them ten thousand years before the time He 
created them? Then you could also say: and why not one hundred thousand years 
before those ten thousand years? Then you could even say: one hundred thousand 
times thousand years or even more than that. In the end of your question you could say 
that creatures are pre-eternal, they have no beginning. This is clear ignorance, and 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 98,12-14 
 يف دجوي مهس يأ وأمدق  يف ىلويهلامدق ةيلزلأا وهقم ةداقنم اهنأ مهمعز دنع لاكشلأا ريدقت نم اهيف ضارعلأا ثدحأو اهضعبو اهلصف نم ىدل ةر
؟لاح ىلإ لاح نم ةلاحلإاو 
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impossible, unattainable that something that was created in time and the making of 
which has a start should become pre-eternal that has always [pre-eternally] 
existed.”
295
 
Created beings cannot be pre-eternal, since that would mean they have no beginning. 
This is a contrast which is not acceptable. Laying down that Christians refute such 
ideas creates a common ground with Muslim opponents in disputes. Another example:  
“If we said: He has always been creating His creatures in time and He has always been 
generating them, like the elements that carry out their actions according to their nature, 
all the time; then the claim would be impossible and would contradict to itself. It is 
because when we said that He has always been creating His creatures in time, we 
made both pre-eternity and createdness-in-time necessary for His creation. And it is 
the same to say that the Creator has always created His creation in time, or to say that 
what is created in time has always existed.”
296
  
In these examples we could see that azaliyya means to have no beginning; the term is 
used as an attribute. In both cases it can be understood that azaliyya excludes being 
generated and having a beginning in time. At the same time, it is important to put 
down that Christians, as well as their Muslim opponents in disputes, do not accept the 
eternity of matter and creatures, since the only eternal substance is God. The second 
example contrasts pre-eternity, azaliyya with createdness-in-time, ÎudÙ×, which is 
remarkable, since philosophical texts usually juxtapose eternity, qidam with creation 
in time iÎdÁ×. On the basis of this pair of opposites and the one ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
used in the example of the previous point (the contrast of kawn and fasÁd expressed 
by azaliyya and contingence, change) indicates that the author is aware of the 
existence of such opposing pairs, but uses his own terminology instead of the 
canonized one. It may be due to the fact that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is an early author, 
flourishing in the period when the delineation of terminology was still in progress. 
3. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ also uses this term in order to refer to the Creator, God. It can be 
done in various ways. We will see azalÐ as an attribute, then as a divine name; then its 
abstact noun form, i.e. azaliyya, as an attribute again. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 106,20-107,4 
أو :لوقت نأ كل زاج ،ماع فلاآ ةرشعب هيف مهقلخ يذلا تقولا لبق مهقلخي مل هلاب ام لوقت نأ كل زاج ناك نإ كلذو فلأ ةيامب ماع فلاآ ةرشعلا لبق لا
 قئلاخلا نأ كتلأسم ىهتنم يف لوقت نأ ىلإ ،كلذ نم رثكأو ماع فلأ فلأ ةيامب كلذ دعب ًاضيأ لوقت مث ؛ماعةيلزأ لهجلا كلذو ،اهل ءودب لا  نيبملا
 هتعنص أدبأو هقلخ ثدحأ ام ريصي نأ عنتمملا لاحملاً ايلزأ لزي مل. 
296
 Ibid., p. 150,18-21 
نإو  انلق اذإ انلأ .اهسفن يف تضقانتو ىوعدلا تلاحتسا ،ًادبأ ًايعيبط اهلاعفأ ةلعافلا عئابطلاك ًانوكم ًاثدحم هقئلاخل لزي مل لب ،انلق هقئلاخل لزي مل
 مسا قئلاخلل انبجوأ ،ًاثدحمةيلزلأا زي مل لوقي مأ ،ًاقلخ ثدحي قلاخلا لزي مل لوقي نأ لئاقلا ىلع ءاوسو ،ًاعيمج ثودحلاو ًادوجوم ثدحملا لً ايلزأ. 
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ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ mostly uses azalÐ as an adjective, attached to a word that refers 
to God, this way the term describes a divine attribute. On the basis of its attribution to 
names that refer to God by His essence or nature (i.e. names that describe Him as He 
is, namely: God); and names that describe Him on the basis of his actions, we will see 
what other meanings pre-eternity may imply. First, let us see the use of pre-eternal as 
an attribute, attached to a divine name.  
“If you said that [the ceramist] turned [the hyle] away from its materiality by inserting 
accidents in it, this way you would affirm that contingence and corruption enters 
matter. You would attach the possibility of change and corruption to every essence 
that have always existed and have always been perfect [i.e. the hyle]. At the same time 
you blame the claim of those who say that the Pre-eternal Artificer inserted accidents 
into the essence of His substance, and he produced these elements and forms and 
figures out of it.”
297
  
The Creator (i.e. the Artificer) is the only one that can be pre-eternal, He cannot 
introduce accidents into his own essence, or substance. Pre-eternity and creation are 
related, and pre-eternity excludes the introduction of accidents to this substance. In 
another instance ‘Pre-eternal’ appears as the adjective of divinity, God, too: “It is the 
essence of one divinity, one substance, one Creator. They named what they mentioned 
of it a Pre-eternal, Creator, Worshipped God.”298 Pre-eternity, creative nature and the 
state of being worshipped are introduced as being on the same level. (As for the last 
two adjectives: Creator and Worshipped, it shows that the argumentation addresses a 
Muslim opponent, on the ground that God is to be worshipped for His creation.) 
In the next quotation it is Artificer again whom pre-eternity is attributed to at 
first, but it is the term’s second appearance what we are going to focus on this time: 
“Your question is also impossible [when you ask:] Does the Pre-eternal Artificer 
need what is substantial and natural for him? It is the same for you to ask: Does the 
Living, Rational, Pre-eternal need his Spirit and Word? Or to say: does the fire need 
its nature and essence?”299 The second appearance of the term stands here as a noun, a 
divine name. Its being a divine name would imply its theological nature. However, in 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 99,6-9 
ايغلا ناكمإ متمزلأو ،ىلويهلا ىلع داسفلاو ناثدحلا لوخد كلذب متبجوأ ،ةيلويهلا ريغ ىلإ اهيلع اهلخدأ ضارعأب اهلاحأ دق لب متلق نإو داسفلاو ر
ف ،صقتني ملو لزي مل ام لك تاذ ]ىلع[ عناصلا نأ معز نم ىوعد نم متبع امييلزلأا  عيابطلا هذه اهنم جتنأف هرهوج تاذ ىلع ضارعلأا لخدأ
روصلاو لاكشلأاو. 
298
 Ibid., p. 161,9-10 
.  ًاقلاخ ًاهلإ هومس ،اهنم اوركذ ام نإو .دحاو قلاخ دحاو ٍرهوج دحاو ٍتوهلا تاذ وهفً ايلزأ  ًادوبعم  
299
 Ibid., p. 159,13-16 
يحتسي كلذك :كلاؤس لأ عناصلا كلذ جاتحييلزلأا  جاتحي له تلأس كيلع ءاوسو ؟يعيبط يرهوج هل وه ام ىلإيلزلأا  هحور ىلإ قطانلا يحلا
اهتاذو اهعابط ىلإ رانلا جاتحت له :تلق مأ ،اهسبيو اهرح ىلإ رانلا جاتحت له :تلق مأ ،هتملكو. 
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general we need to know, that this term cannot be found in the Qur’Án, but appears 
early in translations, so it must be a philosophical term in its origin. This divine name 
describes God by His essence or nature. Another implication of this example lies in 
the context: pre-eternity excludes need. It can also be matched with the action of 
creation (since it is the attribute of ÑÁniÝ), and be paralleled with the following 
attributes: Living and Rational. (At the same time, this question serves the apologetic 
aim to defend the teaching of the Trinity: God, as a single substance has always had 
His Spirit and Word – but this question will be discussed in the chapter on Trinity and 
unity.) Pre-eternal, as a divine name may also stand alone in order to refer to God, as it 
does in the following example: “We would say the answer: there is no modality of the 
Pre-eternal and His art, and no similarity of Him or His actions.”300 This last example 
for azalÐ as a divine name shows that pre-eternity must also mean transcendence, 
since it is not perceivable. It offers an interesting parallel with the teaching of those 
Muslim theologians who stood up against takyÐf, tašbÐh, i.e. the acceptance of the 
anthropological statements in the Scripture; as we could see the parallels “bi-lÁ kayf” 
offered, in the previous chapter. 
When used as an abstract noun, i.e. with the nisba ending, azaliyya appears as 
an attribute. “In the eternity of His pre-eternity there was no-one to whom He could 
have been generous by creating His creatures.”301 Eternity, qidam and pre-eternity, 
azaliyya appear together as divine attributes, they are used as synonyms. Pre-eternity, 
as an attribute, is in close relation with another attribute, generosity.  
Finally, given that we have classified Pre-eternal as a divine name referring to 
God’s nature, we can get to know that this nature is unique: “We are sure that He is 
One in His essence, unique in His nature and pre-eternity, unparalleled in His 
substance, and there is no similarity between His acts and those of His creation.”302 
This uniqueness is closely related to pre-eternity and stands in opposition with 
anthropomorphic ideas. 
Concluding we may say that pre-eternity, when referring to God, appears as a 
divine attribute and a divine name. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 194,8 
 ةيفيك لا ناك نإو هنإ :انلق باوجلايلزلأل هلاعفب لاو هل هبش لاو هتعانصو  
301
 Ibid., p. 104,19 
مل نكي يف مدق هتيلزأ دحأ دوجي هقئلاخب هيلع  
302
 Ibid., p. 149,8-10 
. انقيأ هب   ادحاو يف هتاذ   ادرفتم هعابطب هتيلزأو، لاف ريظن هل يف هرهوج لاو هبش نيب هلاعفأ لاعفأو هقلخ  
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4. In some instances it is not God, but God’s divinity, attributes and properties that are 
referred to as pre-eternal. E.g.:  
“These are statements that refer to accidental divinities that are derived from worship 
and adoration, but it is not a substantial, pre-eternal divinity. It is not possible that the 
Wise should really mean when He says “I exist, but only for you,” especially since He 
is a pre-eternal, substantial God. It is also not possible that He say: I am [a] Living 
[God] for you, but I am not [a] Living [God] for others, since life is substantial, pre-
eternal for Him. David also did not mean by saying “Beatitude for the people whose 
God is the Lord” pre-eternal divinity, since the meaning of pre-eternal divinity has 
always been substantial – even before the creation of peoples, and he will always 
remain like this.”
303
  
This example shows us that God’s divinity and life are both substantial and pre-
eternal; as for Life, it may eventually refer to the Holy Spirit.
304
 In the case of God, 
what is substantial for Him, it is also pre-eternal; so in this special case substantial and 
pre-eternal are of equal importance. Let us mention that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
implicitly refers to the Arabic grammatical presupposition which casued problem for 
the Muslim mutakallims, according to which verbal adjectives, ÒifÁt, are derived from 
nouns, which in turn indicate entities.
305
 So if God says he is Living, he must be 
Living in all relations, hince his being living implies His having life. The next 
quotation shows the correlation of the pre-eternity of God’s life (eventually referring 
to the Holy Spirit), His Word (eventually referring to the Son) and wisdom (identified 
with the Word
306
):  
“In the first investigation, witnesses of the bodily forms of creatures made the intellect 
affirm that there is a substance that created them in time and brought them into being. 
In the second investigation, the fact that in the eternity of His pre-eternity he 
abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on he carried out their making as a 
donation, [made the intellect] render pre-eternal life necessary for him. And the third 
investigation, on the basis of his perfect government, and of what had previously 
shown of his care, guided [the intellect to accept] that he carries this out in order to be 
                                                          
303
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp.170,20-171,5 
هذهف ليواقأ لدت ىلع   ةهلآ ةيضرع يأ ةقتشم نم ةدابعلا ،ةدجسلاو لا ةهلإ ةيرهوج ةيلزأ .هنلأ ريغ زئاج نأ ينعي ميكحلا هلوقب :نوكأ مكل لاو 
نوكأ ،مكريغل اميس وه هلإ يرهوج يلزأ .امك لا زوجي نأ لوقي :نوكأ مكل   ايح لاو نوكأ مكريغل ، ايح ذإ ةايحلا هل ةيرهوج ةيلزأ .كلذك مل نعي 
دواد هلوقب "ىبوط بعشلل يذلا برلا ههلإ "توهلالا ةيلزلأا، نلأ توهلالا ةيلزلأا مل لزت هيناعم ةيرهوج لبق قلخ بوعشلا لاو لوزت امع مل لزي 
اهيلع اهنم   ادبأ. 
304
 C. f. WOLFSON, The Philosophy of the Kalam, p. 121. 
305
 C. f. GRIFFITH, S., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-BurhÁn: Christian KalÁm int he First Abbasid Century. 
In: Le Muséon, 96(1983)1-2, p. 169. 
306
 Ibid. 
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generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of his Word and the pre-eternity 
of His Wisdom, necessarily.”
307
  
This example was already introduced in our investigation of intellect, Ýaql, which 
implies that senses and intellect together can lead to an understanding and cognition of 
the pre-eternal, creating substance. The first appearance of qidam azaliyya implies 
more than ‘existence without beginning,’ it is rather a long period of pre-existence 
(compared to the world’s creation in time) which is referred to. The substantiality of 
the word and the pre-eternity of wisdom, as in the previous example, is of the same 
degree here, too. 
Let us now turn to the pre-eternity of the properties (in God): “As each of the 
pre-eternal properties deserve to be called perfect substances due to their greatness, 
because they stand above names of faculties, necessary accidents, and partition; and 
there is no distinction or difference in their substance: they will not be three perfect 
substances if counted together, just one general substance.”308 The properties already 
refer to the hypostases, as pre-eternal properties are considered substances, but the 
question of the pre-eternal Trinity and the persons will be discussed later. Suffice it to 
mention that properties stand above names of faculties, accidents, and partition, and as 
such, can be considered pre-eternal. God’s Word (Logos, eventually the Son) is also 
described as pre-eternal: “In the eternity of His pre-eternity, He (eulogy) has not 
been void of His wisdom in a way that he would gain it later for Himself by way of 
acquisition; instead, we mean [by His wisdom] His Pre-eternal Word that has always 
been a substantial property belonging to the entity of His substance and the essence of 
His nature.”309 According to this quotation, God’s Word is pre-eternal, and it indicates 
that the second hypostasis has no beginning, has always existed, and it is not 
generated. Not only is His Word pre-eternal, but also His other attributes as well. We 
may also see what attributes cannot belong to God: “As for pieces and parts, they are 
                                                          
307
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 152,5-9 
هنإف امك نع اوشلاده نم لاكشأ قئلاخلا ترطضا لوقعلا يف صحفلا لولأا ىلإ دوجو تابثإ   رهوج اهثدحأ ،اهأشنأو صحفلاو يناثلا نم هعربت 
اهتعنصب دعب هكاسمإ   اميدق نع اهقلخ ىلإ باجيإ ةايحلا هل ، ايلزأ كلذك ام لد صحفلا ثلاثلا نم ماكحإ هتسايس اهل امو مدقت نم قباس هتمه نأب 
دوجي ىلع ريغ هب،ا دهشي ىلع ةيرهوج هتملك ةيلزأو هتمكح   ارارطضإ 
308
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, 171,21-172,4 
 صاوخلا نم دحاو لك ذإ كلذكةيلزلأا  ءازجلأاو ةرطضملا ضارعلأاو ىوقلا ءامسأ نع اهولعو اهمظعل ًلاماك ًارهوج ىمست نأ ةقحتسم
ف اهنيب نكي مل مث ،ضاعبلأاوةدودعم رهاوج ةثلث ،تلمج يه اذإ ،رصت مل ،فلاتخا لاو نيابت رهوجلا ي  ًلاماش ًاماع ًادحاو ًارهوج لب ،ةلماك. 
On the question of three hypostases and one ousia see VANYÓ, László, Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor 
dogmatörténetébe, Budapest, Szent István Társulat, 2009., p. 417. 
309
 Ibid., p. 133,4-6 
 يف نكي مل هنإفمدق هتيلزأ  هتملك اهب ينعن لب ،ًاباستكا دعب نم هسفنل اهبستكا مث ًارفص هتمكح نم هؤانث لجةيلزلأا  ةيرهوج ةيصاخ هل لزت مل يتلا
هعابط تاذو هرهوج نيع نم. 
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not attributes of who is not a body and who has always existed in His pre-eternity. 
Instead, these are attributes of composite, compound bodies that were created in 
time.”310 Here God is defined as pre-eternal, and at the same time we understand that 
pre-eternity and distinction or division exclude each other.  
5. The question of the Trinity, its pre-eternity, and the pre-eternity of its hypostases is a 
crucial question for Christians. Sometimes we read Scriptural evidence for the pre-
eternity of the three hypostases, e.g in the following case: “their Gospels inform us 
about this and things like this altogether and in detail, too, when they call the Pre-
eternal, Living, Speaking [one] Father, [when they call] His eternal Word [!] and his 
Pre-eternal life Spirit.”311 We can observe the parallel appearance of qadÐm, eternal 
and azalÐ, pre-eternal, used as synonyms in this context, as well. Both terms refer to 
the persons of the Trinity, meaning that they have no beginning, and are not generated. 
Sometimes the pre-eternity of God’s fatherhood, sonship and Holy Spirit all appear 
together:  
“As He wanted to prove its truth in their hearts, He informed them on the pre-eternity 
of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, in order to warn their minds of the verity of 
the sonship, which belongs to their humanity that is unified with the pre-eternal Son, 
who declared that He had descended from Heaven and had already existed before 
Abraham.”
312
  
In other instances when pre-eternity of the hypostases is referred to, it is only 
concerning fatherhood and sonship:  
“If we set up an analogy to [grasp] what intellect cannot understand, contrasting the 
contrariety and difference between two different and contradictory things with the 
difference between the Fatherhood and Sonship of the Pre-eternal, and the created 
beings and their sonship, [we would see] that the difference between the two [kinds of] 
fatherhood and sonship is innumerable times greater and further than the farthest 
difference between two contrary and different things.”
313
  
                                                          
310
  Ibid., p. 152,17-18 
. انلق :امأ ءازجلأا ضاعبلأاو سيلف نم فصتا ام سيل مسجب لب ام مل لزي   ادوجوم هتيلزأب .لب كلذ نم تافص ماسجلأا ةثدحملا ةفلؤملا ةبكرملا  
311
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 165,17-18 
. يف مهليجنا ربخي ام اهوحنو اذهف   مهتيمست يف ليصفتلاو ليمجتلايلزلأا  هتملكو ،ًابأ قطانلا يحلاةميدقلا  هتايحوةيلزلأا  ًاحور  
Probably „Son” is missing after „Word.” 
312
 Ibid., p. 250,12-14 
 مهربخأ مهبولق يف كلذ ةحص ققحي نأ دارأ ذإ هنكلوةيلزأب  نبلاا عم ةدحتملا مهتيرشب ةونب ةحص ىلإ مهلوقع كلذب هبنيل ،سدقلا حورلاو نبلااو بلأا
يلزلأا مسلا نم لزن هنأ ربخأ ناك يذلاميهاربإ لبق ناكو ءا. 
313
 Ibid., p.166,13-17 
 ةوبأ نيب فلاخلا ىلإ ،نيدداضتم نيفلتخم نيئيش نيب فلاخلاو دداضتلا نم ،هكرد لوقعلا نكمي نوكي ام داعبأ انسق ول لبيلزلأا  نيبو هتونبو
دعبأ نم دعبأو مظعأ نيتونبلاو نيتوبلاا نيب فلاخلا ناكل ،مهتونبو نيقولخملا لاخلا نوكي ام ٍفاعضأب ،نيفلتخملا نيدداضتملا نيئيشلا نيب ف
اهددع ىصحي لا فاعضأو. 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
93 
 
The quotation informs the reader on the fatherhood and the sonship of the Pre-eternal, 
as compared to human, or more generally, worldly relations. It can be understood that 
both persons (Father and Son) and their relationships to each other (relation of Father 
to Son, relation of Son to His Father) are pre-eternal. This relation’s distance from 
worldly fatherhood-sonship is incomprehensible, as it can be read in the introduction 
of this quotation. The establishment of this distance is essential; it is to make the 
Muslim opponent understand that Christian teaching does not include a worldly father-
son relationship, i.e. begetting and generating. Pre-eternal fatherhood and sonship are 
inconceivable; this is why ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s main demonstrative tool is used here, 
which is analogy, qiyÁs.  
Another example for the pre-eternity of the hypostases according to the Scripture is the 
following: “He said: Go, and baptize the peoples in the name of the Father, the Son, 
and the Holy Spirit, and know that the pre-eternal Father has always had a pre-
eternal Son.”314 It can be seen then, that though ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ aims at disputing 
in a rational manner in order to transmit his message to the Muslim opponent, his book 
is also designed for the Christian reader, who may be enforced by examples based on 
the Scriptures.  
The next example shows the correlation of divinity, substances, hypostases, and 
properties: “As each of them[: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit (eulogy)] is a 
perfect god, i.e. a perfect, pre-eternal substance, a perfect, pre-eternal hypostasis, the 
three of them do not form three perfect gods or three perfect substances; rather, they 
are three perfect hypostases and three perfect properties together.”315 All the four 
aspects are equal in pre-eternity. 
The following quotations show the correlation of pre-eternal divine properties and 
hypostases:  
“If one says it is [true for] every substance that there is no possibility for partition and 
division in it, and there is no possibility for the existence of countable hypostases in it, 
then we answer that we have adopted for these pre-eternal properties the names of 
known hypostases, for they are perfect, stand above names of faculties and necessary 
accidents, and not because they are hypostases like the known hypostases.”
316
  
                                                          
314
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 250,3-5 
…  بلأل لزي مل هنأ اوملعأ يأ ،سدقلا حورلاو نبلااو بلأا مساب بوعشلا اودمعف اوقلطنا :لاقفيلزلأا  نبايلزأ  
315
 Ibid., p. 174,9-12 
كلذكرهوج يأ لماك هلإ ىلاعتو لج هتصاخ يف سدقلا حورلاو نبلإاو بلأا نم دحاو لك ناك ذإ ،يلزأ  يف اهثلث نكي مل ،لماك يلزأ مونقو لماك
ةلماك صاوخ ثلاثو ةلماك ميناقأ ةثلث ةلمجلا يف لب ةلماك رهاوج ةثلث لاو ةلماك ةهلآ ةثلث ةلمجلا. 
316
 Ibid., p. 174, 18-175,3 
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The persons of the Trinity are referred to as properties of the substance. Their pre-
eternity implies perfection, transcendence, so they cannot be called faculties or 
accidents. Pre-eternity makes a property equal to a hypostasis.  
The next example shows that pre-eternity, in the case of a property, excludes 
division, partition and change. “If it is possible for the properties of limited created 
beings who were generated in time to unify with one another in some bodies without 
any difference coming into being in them because of this, then it is more possible and 
necessary in the pre-eternal properties that stand above division, partition and 
limitation.”317 It is is obvious on the basis of these examples that a pre-eternal property 
is a circumscription for divine hypostasis. This second example contrasts pre-eternity, 
azaliyya with createdness-in-time, since the created beings which are generated in time 
are referred to by the term muÎda×a, so it confirms our previous remark, according to 
which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ replaces the pair of philosophical texts qidam – iÎdÁ×, by 
azaliyya – iÎdÁ×. (The latter term and its Greek equivalent will be examined in the 
next chapter.) 
There are other examples where God’s substance is called pre-eternal. Both the 
individual hypostases and the Godhead are referred to as pre-eternal substance(s). All 
the three hypostases are one in pre-eternity, they have the same substance; pre-eternity 
is the aspect of their unity, as it is in the following example: “It did not deem 
permissible for the Messiah – given that a cause appeared, due to which there emerged 
a need to explain the quiddity of the pre-eternal substance – to mention the names of 
the Father, the Son, and ignore to mention the name of the Spirit.”318 The Godhead is 
referred to by this adjectival phrase: pre-eternal and substance. The unity of the pre-
eternal is fundamental in the debate with a Muslim opponent, this is why its union is 
emphasized before speaking of the three “names,” i.e. the three hypostases. The pre-
eternal substance is one,
319
 while Trinity can be referred to by pre-eternal properties, 
as seen above, or pre-eternal essences, entities as the following example demonstrates: 
“Altogether we describe them One Lord, One God, One Creator, One Worshipped, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
إ لوقي نم لعلو صاوخلا هذه ىلع انيرجأ انأب هبيجنف ،ةدودعملا ميناقلأا دوجو هيف ناكمإ لاف ،نيابتلاو ؤزجتلا ناكمإ هيف دجوي لا رهوج لك نةيلزلأا 
ةفورعملا ميناقلأاك ميناقأ اهنلأ لا ،ةرطضملا ضارعلأاو ىوقلا ءامسأ نع اهولعو اهلامكل ،ةفورعملا ميناقلأا ءامسأ. 
317
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 204,13-15 
صاوخلا يف كلذف ،اهنم كلذل ثدحت ٍةقرف لاب ماسجلأا ضعبب ًاضعب اهضعب دحتي نأ ةدودحملا ةقولخملا ةثدحملا قئلاخلا صاوخ يف نكمأ اذإف 
ةيلزلأا بجوأو نكمأ ،ديدحتلاو ؤزجتلاو ضيعبتلاو نيابتلا نع ةيلاعتملا … 
318
 Ibid., p.p 251,20-252,2 
 رهوجلا ةيئام فصو ىلإ اهب جيتحا ةلع ترضح ذإ ،زجتسي مل حيسملا كلذكيلزلأا  مسا ركذ لفغيو نبلااو بلأا مسا ركذي نأ ،هصاوخ لامكب
حورلا. 
319
 C.f. VANYÓ, László, Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe, p. 417.  
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since you know that each of them in his property is a pre-eternal, perfect entity, and 
the three of them together are unified in one divinity, one substance that includes 
countable hypostases.”320 We have to add a remark here: i.e. entity/essence and 
property are mentioned together, on the same level. 
6. The pre-eternity of the Son, or the Messiah deserves a section of its own, since it may 
be even further differentiated, as referring to one of the Messiah’s two substances or 
His birth. The divine, pre-eternal part of the Messiah may be defined as a disposition: 
“The human unified in his sonship with the pre-eternal disposition, which is related 
to His Father, but He did not unify with the human sonship, which is related to the 
human’s mother.”321 We can see here that the divine part of the Messiah is considered 
to be a pre-eternal disposition. At the same time, it is emphasized here that the divine 
is not affected by this union. We can find pieces of scriptural evidence, too, where the 
pre-eternal “constituent” of the Messiah is referred to as a substance:  
“Can’t you see that Matthew witnesses to His humanity originating from the human 
substance, descending from David’s seed, from Abraham, and John [witnesses to] His 
pre-eternity and eternity that belong to His divinity, the Creator of everything, by 
whom it is possible for everything to subsist, and in whose hand there is the reign of 
everything. Mark and Luke witness to the unification of the Pre-eternal and the 
human in one sonship and one Messianic being, as they completed their statements on 
Him and named Him Jesus, the Messiah, Son of God.”
322
  
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the four gospels in order to support the dogma of the unity 
of the Messiah. He cites gospels that confirm either the humanity or the divinity of the 
Son, and together they attest to the truth of the unity; while separate references to the 
Messiah’s humanity and divinity confirm the Nestorian view according to which these 
never mix. He also mentions two gospels that confirm the presence of both substances 
in the Son, and in these loci, pre-eternity and eternity appear together again. In order 
not to confuse the two substances, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ makes their differences clear, 
as well: “This is clear that the Pre-eternal God who fills every place with His 
                                                          
320
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 175,13-16 
 نيع هتصاخ يف اهنم دحاو لك نأ كلذب كملعل ،ًادحاو ًادوبعمو ًادحاو ًاقلاخو ًادحاو ًاهلاإو ًادحاو ًابر ةلمجلا يف اهتعنن مثيلزأ  ةلمجلا يف اهثلثو لماك
.ةدودعم ميناقلأ لماش دحاو رهوج ةدحاو توهلا يف ةدحوتم 
321
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 183,15-16 
. كلذك دحتا يرشبلا يف هتونب ةئيهلاب ةيلزلأا ةبوسنملا ىلإ ،هيبأ مل دحتي وه هعم يف هتونب ةيرشبلا ةفاضملا ىلإ همأ  
On the Nestorian view of Christ’s “double” birth see VANYÓ, László, Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor 
dogmatörténetébe, p. 509. 
322
 Ibid., p. 208,14-17 
 رهوج نم هتوسانب ناسنإ هنأب دهشي ىتم ىرت لافأسنلإا  هنأ انحويو ،ميهاربإ لسن نم دواد عرز نميلزأ ميدق  لك ماوق هبو لك قلاخ وهو هتوهلاب
 داحتا نادهشي اقولو سوقرامو .لك توكلم هديبويلزلأا لامكأ ذإ ،ةدحاو ةيحيسمو ةدحاو ةونب يف يرشبلاو الله نبا حيسملا عوسي هايمسو هيف لوقلا 
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presence and does not change place, who raises the dead by His command through 
understanding and power, is not equal to the human who has fears, who cries, and who 
is affected by sadness.”323 This example also offers a parallel to another topic, already 
examined above, i.e. anthropomorphism. As far as the aspects of Islamic 
anthropomorphism – rejected by mainstream Islam – are concerned, we can 
differentiate between anthropomorphism proper, concerning God’s outward 
appearance, His shape (μορφή); God’s actions like speaking, sitting, etc.; His feelings 
like wrath, satisfaction, the so-called anthropopathisms; and “passive” 
anthropomorphisms inasmuch as God may be the object of human perception: when 
He is seen, heard, etc. The third category is interesting for us here, since ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ distinguishes between the Messiah’s two parts, i.e. the divine, omnipotent and 
the one who has human feelings or emotions on this basis. In a disputation with a 
Muslim opponent, it is essential to show that Christians are not to be accused of 
anthropopathism. For the importance of this issue let us see an example by al-ÉÁÎiÛ 
(d. c. 868):  
„We would not believe that a people of religious philosophers [mutakallimÙn], 
physicians, astronomers, diplomats, arithmeticians, secretaries and masters of every 
discipline could say that a man who, as they themselves have seen, ate, drank, urinated 
excreted, suffered hunger and thirst, dressed and undressed, gained and lost [weight], 
who later, as they assume, was crucified and killed, is Lord and Creator and 
providential God, eternal and not newly created, who lets the living die and brings the 
dead back to life and can create at will a great deal more for the world, …”
324
 
 On this basis we may be certain that this differentiation, which appears in ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ’s text, is an answer to such Muslim criticism of Christian belief. 
A last aspect of the Son’s and the Messiah’ pre-eternity is that of His birth. In the case 
of the Second Person of the Trinity it is essential to be laid down. As for the Messiah, 
the author’s aim is to show that His divine part is pre-eternal, which has always been 
                                                          
323
 Ibid., p. 211,10-12 
اذهو نيب نأ هللإا يلزلأا يذلا لا ولخي هنم عضوم لاو لقتني نم ناكم ىلإ ناكم ييحمو ىتوملا رمأ مهفب ،ناطلسو سيل يرشبلا يذلا عزف ىكبو 
هتضمو نازحلأا.  
324
 al-ÉÀÍIÚ, ÝAmr ibn BaÎr,  KitÁb al- AÌbÁr,  In: ROSENTHAL, Franz, The Classical Heritage in Islam. 
Transl. from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein, London, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1975, p. 45. See the Arabic text in: al-ÉÀÍIÚ, ÝAmr ibn BaÎr,  KitÁb al-AÌbÁr, In: al-
ÍIMYARÏ, AbÙ SaÝÐd NašwÁn, al-ÍÙr al-ÝÐn, Ed. MUÑÓAFÀ, KamÁl, Beirut, DÁr ÀzÁl li-’l-ÓibÁÝa wa-
’l-Našr wa-’l-TawzÐÝ, 1985,  p. 282. 
امل انقدص لاو انلبق نأ   اموق ،نيملكتم ءابطأو ،نيمجنمو ةاهدو ، اباسحو ةبتكو قاذحو لك ،ةعنص نولوقي يف ناسنإ هوأر لكأي 
،برشيو لوبيو وجنيو عوجيو ،شطعيو ستكيوي ،ىرعيو ديزيو ،صقنيو مث لتقي مهمعزب بلصيو :هنإ بر ،قلاخ هلإو ،قزار 
ميدقو ريغ ،ثدحم تيمي ءايحلأا ييحيو ،ىتوملا نإو ءاش قلخ   افاعضأ ايندلل 
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born. As for the Messiah, as the combination of the divine and the human, he is born 
in time. 
“We claim that the Messiah is born of His Father in a pre-eternal way, and we do not 
say that His Father has born Him in both of His substances. We say that both 
substances are born, [one of them] from His Father, and [the other] from His mother. 
Both parents are His parents from the aspect which is substantial and natural for them. 
His Father had eternally born Him in a divine way in His divinity, and His mother 
bore Him in His humanity, in time.”
325
  
His birth being eternal and pre-eternal is referred to together, so the two terms appear 
as synonyms in this context, as well. However, distinction is made between the eternal 
and pre-eternal birth, which takes place substantially in the divinity of the Father and 
the Son; and the birth in time, which is substantial for the Messiah’s human part and 
takes place by way of His Mother. 
As it is usual, analogies are also used in the argumentation, this is what we can see in 
the following example. “If examples and analogies fail, since they fall short to express 
the greatness of this birth, we just use the analogy of the Sun and the soul to lay down 
the pre-eternity of His birth, this is a unique state, without start, termination, change, 
and end.”326 The analogy of the Sun is a frequently used one in Christian literature; 
however, it is adapted here to the birth of the Messiah; otherwise it is more generally 
adapted to the Trinity.  
The Messiah’s two hypostases are born in different ways. The pre-eternal part, i.e. the 
Second Person of the Trinity has always been born, while the human part was born at 
a given point in time. “As the One who has always existed (eulogy) was born of His 
Father pre-eternally, he deserved the sonship due to the substantial birth from His 
Father, then, because of his grace and beneficence, he wanted to share His sonship 
with the human substance, in order to make the fatherhood related to His Father 
necessary for the human, too.”327 The example concentrates on the modality of the pre-
                                                          
325
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 191,11-14 
 ًادلايم هيبأ نم دولوم هنأ ًاضيأ حيسملا يف لوقن دقوً ايلزأ وه امنإ همأو هيبأ نم دولوم دحاو لك نإ لوقن لب .ًاعيمج هيرهوجب هدلو هابأ نأ معزن لاو ،
م ةهج نم هدلاو ًايهلاإ ًادلايم هدلو هوبأ يأ ،يعيبط يرهوج هنم وه اً اميدق ،هتوهلا ةهج نم  ًاينمز ًايرشب همأ هتدلوو. 
According to M. Hayek, in expressing this idea, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ follows the Catholicos Timothy’s practice. 
C.f. HAYEK, M., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux 
apologies du Christianisme. In: Islamochristiana, (1976) 2, p. 81. 
326
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 192,16-20 
قلا انبرض امنإف ،ةدلاولا كلت ةمظع ىلع رصقتو لطبت سيياقملاو لاثملأا تناك نإوتابث ىلع سفنلاو سمشلا نم ساي ةيلزأ  لاح ىلع كلذو ،هدلاو
عاطقنا لاو رييغت لاو ءاضقنا لاو ءادتبا لاب ةدحاو. 
327
 Ibid., p. 193,9-11 
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eternal part only, and here we can see that pre-eternal birth is substantial birth, as well. 
In such a context, when referring to the divine, pre-eternal and substantial are 
synonyms. 
7. We have already seen that the Holy Spirit appears as the pre-eternal Life of the divine. 
His pre-eternity is our last subsection in the examination of azaliyya: “Then the Son 
witnessed to whom is in Him: the Spirit and the pre-eternal Life, as he said to His 
apostles that the Holy Spirit – being the Spirit – is the Spirit of Truth that emanates 
from the essence of the Father.”328 Here we understand that Life and Spirit are 
synonyms, and further than this, we get to know that this Life or Spirit emanates from 
the Father. The Holy Spirit, as the third person is pre-eternal. The same statement on 
the emanation can be read in the next quotation: “He declares His sonship in relation 
to His Father, and the fatherhood of His Father in relation to him, and the pre-eternity 
of the Spirit that emanates from the essence of His Father.”329 The Spirit is equal to the 
two previous divine persons in His pre-eternity: “As the Holy Spirit was like the 
Father and the Son in His divinity, lordship, power, and pre-eternity,…”330 So the 
Spirit, as a divine hypostasis or a property is equal to the previously mentioned other 
two divine persons in pre-eternity. 
The meanings in which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used the term are similar to the ones 
enumerated by Lampe, so the Nestorian author can be considered a continuer of Greek 
Patristic ideas in this field. When discussing the pre-eternity of matter and creatures, he seems 
to use azalÐ with the same meaning as that of the Patristic term ἀγένητον. In other fields the 
meanings of both ἀγένητον and ἀΐδιος were carried on. 
His contemporary Melkite Theodore AbÙ Qurra does not use the term as often as the 
Nestorian author, but on the basis of a representative example we may say, that in his usage 
‘pre-eternal’ is in contrast with ‘created in time’: “From this we know that what does not 
receive change and corruption in anything is pre-eternal, and what receives change is created 
in time.”331 Such a substance (i.e. the one that does not change and cannot be corrupted) is not 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 هيبأ نم دولوم ،هؤانث لج ،لزي مل يذلا ناك ذإفً ايلزأ  رهوج كرتشي نأ هلضفو هتمعنب بحأ مث ،ًايرهوج هيبأ نم هدلاول ةونبلا قحتساسنلإا ف هتونب ي
هيبأ ةوبأ قح بجويو 
328
 Ibid., p. 165,12-13 
…  ةايحلاو حورلا يه اهنأب هيف نم نبلاا دهش مثةيلزلأا،بلأا تاذ نم ضئاف وه يذلا قحلا حور حورلا يه اهنأب سدقلا حور نإ هلسرل لاق ذإ ،  
329
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 167,7 
… هتونب كلذل نلعيو  هل هيبأ ةوبأو هيبلأةيلزأو يبأ تاذ نم ةضئافلا حورلاه  
330
 Ibid., pp. 252,19-253,1 
 …  هناطلسو هتيبوبرو هتيهلإ يف سدقلا حور ناك ذإهتيلزأو بلااو بلأاك  
331
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm, p. 191. 
ييغت لبقي لا يذلا نأ انفرع كلذ نمو وه ،ءيش يف ًاداسف لاو ًاريلزأثدحم وه ًارييغت لبقي يذلاو ، 
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generated. In this, he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s view, but the latter uses this term in a 
much wider range of contexts. Interestingly enough, the slight difference in the usage of the 
philosophical pair of opposites (kawn - fasÁd) is discernible at AbÙ Qurra, too. He, as well as 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, contrasts the receptivity of corruption (lÁ yaqbal … fasÁdan) to 
azaliyya. This confirms our hypothesis, according to which Christian authors of the 9
th
 
century flourished in a period in which the delineation of terminologies – philosophical as 
well as theological – had not been completed yet. 
As for the Muslim counterparts, we see that al-KindÐ gives a definition only for this 
term out of the four. Does it mean that in the 9
th
 century, in Islamic use concepts and terms 
concerning permanence and eternity were not further differentiated? As for al-KindÐ’s 
definition, it is as follows: “pre-eternal is what has never been non-existent and what does 
not need anything in his subsistence. What does not need anything in his subsistence does not 
have a cause, and what does not have a cause is permanent forever.”332 This definition shows 
a similar understanding of the concept with that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, since both of them 
use it as ‘having no beginning’, and al-KindÐ’s ‘having no cause’ may be paralleled to 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s ‘not having been generated.’ However, this aspect is not emphasized in 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples, who can be considered more theological in his approach, 
while al-KindÐ’s definition is philosophical. 
A century later: in al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, this term is described in the 
field of kalÁm (like qidam): the author puts it among the basic concepts of Muslim 
mutakallims.
333
 AzalÐ is given a brief definition as follows: “pre-eternal is an existent [thing] 
that has always existed and will not cease existing.”334 The meaning which is expressed in the 
first phrase of the definition is reflected in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use, too, though the 
connotations are much richer than merely ‘having no beginning.’ However, the second half of 
the definition, i.e. ‘will not cease existing’ is not implied by the Christian author. In this, he 
seems to be more exact than the Muslim writer. 
The other authors do not give definitions for this term till al-ÉurÊÁnÐ’s al-TaÝrÐfÁt. 
Before defining azalÐ, al-ÉurÊÁnÐ first defines al-azal, too: “Pre-eternity is the continuity 
of existence in periods that are estimated to have no end in the past [= beginning], as 
                                                          
332
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 169. 
. يلزلأا - يذلا مل نكي ،سيل سيلو جاتحمب يف هماوق ىلإ ؛هريغ يذلاو لا جاتحي يف هماوق ىلإ هريغ لاف ةلع ،هل امو لا ةلع هل مئادف   ادبأ  
333
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 83. 
يف تاعضاوم يملكتم ملاسلإا  
334
 Ibid., p. 83. 
. يلزلأا (وه( )نئاكلا( )يذلا )مل لزي لاو لازي  
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everlasting [perpetuity] is the continuity of existence in periods estimated as having no end in 
the future.”335 Then, he goes on to define pre-eternal:  
“Pre-eternal is what had not been preceded by non-existence. Know that the existent can be 
categorized into three groups, there is no fourth kind. One of them is pre-eternal and 
everlasting, and this is God (eulogy); the other is neither pre-eternal nor everlasting, and this is 
this world, and the third is everlasting but not pre-eternal, and this is the world of the hereafter. 
Its contrary is impossible, since what is said to be eternal is impossible to become non-
existent. Pre-eternal is what has always existed, and what has always existed has no cause for 
its existence.”
336
  
The connotations can be paralleled with those of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, even more than with 
the definition given by al-KindÐ. Al-ÉurÊÁnÐ, like ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, concentrates on the 
endlessness in the past (i.e. “beginninglessness”), and leaves “will not cease existing” out of 
consideration. The endlessness in the future is expressed by abad in his definition, which is 
contrasted to pre-eternity. Even if contrasted in this case, the two meanings are rather 
complementary, as the point which distinguishes between them is the present. As far as the 
implicit allusion can be understood, the two make up a continuum. 
No parallel appearance of qidam and azaliyya can be observed in books of definitions. 
It is not unexpected, since qidam, as we will soon see, is not defined by the majority of these 
books at all, or, if done so, only a general description is given. However, ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s usage of the term azalÐ is more differentiated than that of his contemporary, al-
KindÐ, even if he leaves the possible reference to the future out of consideration. But calling 
a substance the ‘One who has always existed’ may have the implication that He will always 
exist in the future, as well. Given that both authors worked in the ninth-century, slightly 
differing interpretations may witness to the process of the early formation of this concept. But 
it is not to be questioned that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is among the earliest ones to have used this 
term in such a wide variety of contexts, while a clear form on the Muslim side appears only 
among the definitions of the much later al-ÉurÊÁnÐ. 
 
                                                          
335
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 27. 
لزلأا رارمتسا دوجولا يف ةنمزأ ،ةردقم ريغ ةيهانتم يف بناج ،يضاملا امك نأ دبلأا رارمتسا دوجولا يف مزأةن ةردقم ريغ ةيهانتم يف بناج 
لبقتسملا. 
336
 Ibid., p. 27. 
،يلزلأا ام لا نوكي   اقوبسم مدعلاب( .و)ملعأ نأ دوجوملا ماسقأ ةثلاث لا عبار ،اهل هنإف امإ يلزأ ،يدبأو وهو الله هناحبس ؛ىلاعتو وأ لا يلزأ لاو 
،يدبأ وهو ؛ايندلا وأ يدبأ ريغ ،يلزأ وهو ةرخلآا .هسكعو ،لاحم إفن ام تبثي همدق عنتما همدع( .ليقو )يلزلأا يذلا مل نكي ،سيل يذلاو مل نكي 
سيل لا ةلع هل يف دوجولا. 
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4. qidam, qadÐm – eternity, eternal337 
 
QadÐm is the translation of the Greek term πρότερος.338 Its verbal form, προτερεύω is 
frequently used in Patristic literature with the meaning of ‘to be before time;’ sometimes 
referring to the Son, or even to the flesh of Christ.
339
  
As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, he uses al-QadÐm as a name that stands for God: “It is 
impossible [to describe] the Eternal, Omnipotent, and Wise (eulogy) by the qualities of need 
and vanity.”340 The term is also adopted as the attribute of the divine substance, i.e. the One:  
“It is impossible that the One should be three and the three should be One. The number ‘one’ 
cannot be equal to the number ‘three’. What we mean is that this Eternal One substance has 
always existed in three substantial properties, without distinction and difference between them. 
The three properties together form this eternal one substance, which is not three in a specific 
meaning, and it is not partitioned in its entity and integrity. It is not three from the aspect of its 
unity, it is just three properties.”
341
  
Eternal is an attribute of the One substance, but given that it is made up of the three 
properties, they are also eternal on the basis of this context. As we have seen above, in such 
contexts eternal and pre-eternal are synonymous; since ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses azalÐ, too, 
in such descriptions. Just as in the case of azalÐ – azaliyya, the nominal version of qadÐm, 
i.e. qidam may also be used as a divine attribute, too:  
“It is clear for reason that He had not been prevented in His eternity from creating what He 
created (in time), and then He would bring them into life by His might – [sometimes] by 
potentiality to generate them, [sometimes] restraining from their making. The fact that in His 
eternity He abstained from creating [in time] what He later created [in time] is the sign for His 
earlier deliberation in abstaining [from creation], and His intention, free will to create [in time] 
what he later created.”
342
  
                                                          
337
 HAYEK’s translation: ‘éternité, éternel.’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 89. So he considers it 
as a synonym of azaliyya. 
338
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 227. 
339
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 1189-90. 
340
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 104,13-14 
. امأ ناتلخلا نم ةجاحلا ثبعلاو امهف يرمعل نايفتنم نع ميدقلا رداقلا ميكحلا لج هللاج  
341
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 149,1-6 
 ىنعملا امأف .ةثلثلا ددعلا نوكي لا دحاولا ددعلا نأ كلذو ،هنوك نكمي لا يرمعل كاذف ،دحاو ةثلاثلاو ةثلاث دحاولا نوك نأ امأ :انلق يف دصقن هيلإ يذلا
 دحاولا رهوجلا كلذ نأ ينعن انأف ،انلوقميدقلا جوم لازي مل كلذ وه صاوخلا ثلثلا عيمجو .تاقرفم لاو تانيابتم ريغ تايرهوج صاوخ ثلثب ًادو
 دحاولا رهوجلاميدقلا  يذلا-  ةصاخ ىنعمب ةثلث وه سيل يأ-  ثلاث لب ،ةدحاو ،دحاو وه ام ىنعمب ،ةثلث وه لاو ،هلامكو هنيعب أزجتي لاو ضعبتي لا
صاوخ. 
342
 Ibid., pp. 150, 22-151,3 
لوقعلل ناب دقف  يف لزي مل ناك دق هنأ اذهبهمدق  ءاش ول عانتملااو اهنوك ىلع ٍرادتقاو ٍلوطب اهنم أشنأ مث ،ًاعنتمم ًاكسمم هقلخ نم ثدحأ ام قلخ نع
 .اهتعنص نممدقف  هكاسمإ نأ ىلع ليلدلا وه ًاثيدح اهنم ثدحأ امع انربخأ امك كاسمإً اميدق ناك معت ًاريخأ ثدحأ ام هثادحإو ،ةدارإو ةئيشمب ًاد
 ًارايتخاو 
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It is emphasized here that the Creator has not always been creating (i.e. in His eternity, 
qidam). We have just seen in the previous subsection that azaliyya can also be used to express 
the same idea. The two terms’ synonymity is thus further confirmed. At the same time, apart 
from being a technical term, in this case we may think of an ordinary meaning, such as the 
pluperfect.  
The next quotation underlines the same idea, while it emphasizes that eternity 
excludes acting because of need, or the incitement of nature:  
“Is it possible to imagine of this eternal, living substance, the Artificer of these creatures, that 
it was His nature to incite Him to create them, in order to keep Him subsistent and for the 
benefit of His own essence? [He would then be] like these animals, which have to follow their 
nature according to their disposition, and which need what keeps them subsistent. We have 
found that in His eternity He had not needed what He created from them later [in time], and 
He had stood above the need for what He brought into being of them afterwards.”
343
 
Eternity excludes need, just as we have seen above in the case of pre-eternity, azaliyya. In this 
field, the two terms are synonymous, as well. Another possible interpretation of qidam in this 
case is that it means the bygone time before creation. 
The eternity of the Father is sometimes referred to, e.g.: “He is born of the eternal 
Father…”344 A specific aspect of the Father’s eternity is His eternal generosity:  
“The Father (eulogy) wanted to fulfil His eternal generosity towards His creation and 
complete His previous beneficence for all His created beings. He wanted to inform all the 
angels and people on the splendour of the name of His fatherhood, which He had hidden 
before [in [His] eternity]. So he took a body from His creation by way of His pre-eternal Son 
who was born from Him…”
345
  
Here eternal appears as an attribute of another divine attribute. The second appearance refers 
to God’s divinity, but at the same time, may be considered an appellative, in the meaning of 
the pluperfect. Eternal fatherhood is related to pre-eternal sonship, thus we may see that the 
two terms are used as synonyms again. 
  The eternity of the Messiah (or His divine substance) appears more frequently thus 
indicating that this issue is of greater interest for the author. The idea of the Messiah’s eternity 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 151,12-18 
 يحلا رهوجلا كلذ ىلع مهوتلا زوجي له :انلقفميدقلا  حلاصإو هعابط نأش ماوقل ًاسامتلا اهايإ هقلخ ىلع هتلمح هتعيبط نوكت نأ قئلاخلا هذه عناص
لبس موزل ىلع ةلوبجملا ناويحلا هذهك ،هسفن تاذ  اندجوف .اهتايح تاذ ميقي ام مازتلا ىلع ةلومحملا ،اهعئابطمدق  ،ًاريخأ اهنم ثدحأ امع هانغ
 ًاثيدح اهنم أشنأ ام ىلإ ةجاحلا نع هءلاتعاو … 
344
 Ibid., p. 206,15-16 
.  بلأا نم دولوم هنإوميدقلا  ًلاصأ ةثدحملا ةقولخملا ةعبرلأا ناكرلأا نم ًافلؤم  
345
 Ibid., p. 205,15-18 
كلون ذإ دارأ بلأا زع هللاج نأ لمكي هدوج ميدقلا ىلع هقلخ متيو هتمعن ةقباسلا ىلع ةفاك هتيرب نلعيو ةكئلاملل سانلاو نيعمجأ ام ناك هافخأ 
…ً اميدق نم ءانس مسا ،هتوبأ ذختا هنباب يلزلأا دولوملا هنم   ادسج نم هقلخ 
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emerges first in a question of the opponent: “If he says: Inform us on this Messiah, who is one 
with us in His messianic [being]. Is He eternal or created in time?”346 The posing of the 
question itself attests to its importance in Christian-Muslim Christological dialogue. On the 
other hand, the Messiah’s pre-eternity was mentioned above, in a similar context, the two 
terms thus appear as synonyms in this field, too. In the answer to this question, we get to 
know that the divine substance of the Messiah is eternal. “This is why it must be said that the 
Messiah in the meaning of His messianic [being] is created in time. The eternal of His two 
substances had existed before the union. Just like an eternal fire and a piece of coal (which is 
created in time) become one ember (which is created in time), or as an eternal fire and a wick 
(which is created in time) become one lighted wick.”347 These analogies and similes are 
common heritage for Christians, and they come from Patristic tradition, so it is not ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ who invented them. Just as in the field of terminology, he is a continuer of Patristic 
traditions in topology, as well. If we think of the examples that were mentioned above, we 
may see that the term qadÐm, eternal is used in the same meaning with azalÐ, pre-eternal. 
This example is remarkable, since the metaphor of the fire and the lamp is widely used in 
Arab Christian literature, but especially to refer to the Trinity. Here, we find them adapted to 
the two substances of the Son. But to demonstrate how well-known and widely used these 
analogies are, let us see an example how al-ÉÁÎiÛ reflected on this:  
„Despite all this, they believe that there are three gods, two secret and one visible, just as a 
lamp requires oil, a wick and a container. The same applies [in their opinion] to the substance 
of the gods. They assume that a creature became creator, a slave became master, a newly 
created being became an originally uncreated being, but was then crucified and killed with a 
crown of thorns on the head, and then disappeared, only to bring himself back to life after 
death. …”
348
 
 The eternity or createdness of the Messiah’s two substances are further elucidated:  “Isn’t it 
true that the humanity that is created in time and comes from Abraham is firm in Him? And at 
                                                          
346
 Ibid., p. 179,4-5 
يذلا حيسملا اذه نع انوربخاف :لاق نإف  .دحاو انعم هتيحيسم يف وهميدقأ ؟ثدحم مأ وه  
347
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 179,17-180,1 
 ًاران نأ امك .عامتجلاا لبق لزي مل هيرهوج نم ميدقلا نإو .ثداح هتيحيسم ىنعم يف حيسملا نإ لاقي نأ بجو كلذلةميدق ناريصي ةثيدح ةمحفو   
.  ًةرمج ًاثيدح  ًاران نأ امكو .ةدحاوةميدق  ًادحاو ًاجارس ناريصي ةثدحم ةليتفو  
348
 al-ÉÀÍIÚ, ÝAmr ibn BaÎr, KitÁb al-AÌbÁr. In: ROSENTHAL, Franz, The Classical Heritage in Islam. 
Transl. from the German by Emile and Jenny Marmorstein, London, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of 
California Press, 1975, p. 45. See the Arabic text in: al-ÉÀÍIÚ, ÝAmr ibn BaÎr,  KitÁb al-AÌbÁr, In: al-
ÍIMYARÏ, AbÙ SaÝÐd NašwÁn, al-ÍÙr al-ÝÐn, Ed. MUÑÓAFÀ, KamÁl, Beirut, DÁr ÀzÁl li-’l-ÓibÁÝa wa-
’l-Našr wa-’l-TawzÐÝ, 1985,  p. 282. 
مث مه - عم كلذ عمجأ - :نوري نأ ةهللآا ةثلاث :نطب نانثا رهظو ،دحاو امك لا دب حابصملل نم ،نهدلا ،هليتفلاو ءاعولاو كلذكف رهوج ،ةهللآا 
اومعزف نأ   اقولخم لاحتسا ، اقلاخ نأو   ادبع لوحت ، ابر نأو   اثيدح بلقنا ، اميدق لاإ هنأ دق لتق بلصو دعب ،اذه ،دقفو لعجو ىلع أرهس ليلاكأ 
،كوشلا مث ايحأ هسفن دعب هتوم 
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the same time: the eternal divinity which is the Creator of Abraham is also present in 
Him.”349 In such a context pre-eternal was also used, as we could see it above; if they can be 
used in the same context, it implies their synonymity.  
Another similarity between the contexts of eternity and pre-eternity is the use of the 
Scriptural evidence for them. In the case of eternity examples like the following one can be 
found: “As you have heard it, John gives the euangelion of the eternal divinity of His essence 
that is of the substance of His Father and the nature of His parent.”350 In this context eternal 
refers to the divinity.  
As a last parallel to azaliyya, we may mention that eternity can also refer to the birth 
of the Son. Let us remember the example for the Son’s pre-eternal birth quoted above: in the 
same example eternal birth was also mentioned. There is Scriptural evidence to accentuate it, 
too: “From the Old Testament; the Father says it through the tongue of His prophet, David: 
“O, Lad, you have been being born from eternity.” It is clear and obvious that the Messiah is 
addressed here, who had been born of His Father in His divinity; and at the same time He is 
found to be a child born of His mother in His humanity.”351 
Among the Muslim authors who are examined here, al-ËwÁrizmÐ is the first to 
mention qidam. He puts it among kalÁm terms, just as he did when describing azaliyya, but it 
is placed among the specific terms of uÒÙl al-dÐn,352 and without being defined. If we look 
at the context it is used in,
353
 we will see that it appears in the meaning of an attribute. For 
example, he mentions the dahriyya, who believe in the eternity of endless time; while there is 
proof that the world is created in time by God. Qidam is contrasted to ‘beginning in time.’ He 
uses the term qadÐm as a divine attribute, and then uses the term when he establishes that 
God’s attributes, ÒifÁt are eternal. The way this term appears shows its importance in 
dialectics, too, i.e. we may understand that eternity is a point of crucial importance for 
different religions and denominations as far as the Creator and His creation are concerned. 
                                                          
349
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 212,18-20 
.  توهلالاو ،ةتباث هيف ميهاربإ نم ةثدحملا ةيناسنلإاو لاأةميدقلا ةدوجوم هيف ميهاربإ ةقلاخ  
350
 Ibid. p. 209,3 
 هتوهلا تاذ نع تعمس امك رشبي انحويوةميدقلا وج نمهدلاو عابط نم هيبأ ره  
351
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 206,11-13 
 ذنم" :يأ هيبن دواد ناسل ىلع بلأا لوقيف ةقيتعلا نم امأميدق دولوملا حيسملا نأ حضاو نيب اذهو ."تدلو يبصلا اهيأ كتايآ  توهلالابً اميدق  نم
 ًلافط يفلأ ذإ ،ًاضيأ لوقملا وه بلأاملأا نم هتوسانب ًادولوم. 
352
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, p. 94.  
يف فصو باوبلأا يتلا ملكتي اهيف نوملكتملا نم لوصأ نيدلا  
353
 Ibid., p. 94. 
اهلوأ لوقلا يف ثودح ماسجلأا درلاو ىلع ةيرهدلا نيذلا نولوقي مدقب ،رهدلا ةللادلاو ىلع نأ ملاعلل   اثدحم وهو الله ىلاعت .درلاو ىلع ةلطعملا إوهن 
زع لجو ميدق ملاع رداق يح هنإو دحاو .درلاو ىلع ةيونثلا نم سوجملا ةقدانزلاو ىلعو ةثلثملا نم ىراصنلا ىلعو مهريغ نمم اولاق ةرثكب 
نيعناصلا هنأو لا هبشي ءايشلأا .درلاو ىلع دوهيلا (ىلعو )مهريغ نم ،ةهبشملا هنإو سيل مسجب .دقو لاق ريثك نم ةهبشم نيملسملا هنأب ،مسج 
ىلاعت الله امع نولوقي   اولع   اريبك هنإو لج هللاج ملاع رداق (يح )هتاذب .لاقو روهمجلا ريغ ةلزتعملا هنإ ملاع ملعب (و)يح ةايحب (و)رداق ،ةردقب 
نإو هذه تافصلا ةميدق هعم ملاكلاو يف ةيؤرلا اهيفنو (اهتابثإو .)نإو هتدارإ ةثدحم وأ ةميدق 
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Ideas expressed by these two terms are similar to those of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Al-
ËwÁrizmÐ’s contemporary, Ibn FÙrak, defines al-qadÐm as follows: “eternal is what is 
extremely earlier in his existence than others.”354 Ibn FÙrak defines it on the basis of its 
existence in terms of time, but leaves the question of being generated out of consideration. 
From this point of view, we may consider it an attribute. His usage, compared to that of 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, is common usage. 
In the eleventh century, as it can be seen in Ibn SÐnÁ’s Book of Definitions, the terms 
qidam, qadÐm are defined in a more differentiated way.355 We may see a definition according 
to common usage, i.e. if something is older than another thing, thus this thing can be 
considered qadÐm, old. We then read definitions according to philosophical usage, in which 
qadÐm is defined as eternal concerning time, or eternal concerning essence. In the end, we 
get to know that only God is eternal in essence, thus we enter the field of theology, too. 
Eternal is used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in order to refer to time, and it is an attribute of the 
divine essence, as well, but his usage represents a momentum in the early formation of this 
concept. The meaning of the term is more differentiated and the definition is more exact and 
elaborated, but this is due to the fact that Ibn SÐnÁ’s work was written in a later, more 
developed stage of philosophy, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation reflects the 
formation of early kalÁm terminology. 
Al-ÀmidÐ’s al-MubÐn defines only one term among the above-mentioned ones, and 
that is qadÐm.356 He defines it on the basis of its self-sufficiency, since it does not need a 
cause for its existence, so we can understand it to be a substance. As such, this term may refer 
to God. The term may also indicate something that has no beginning in its existence. Both 
philosophical and theological approaches are discernible here. As for its reference to God, this 
definition reflects an idea that can be found at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, too. 
The last example I am going to examine is al-ÉurÊÁnÐ’s al- TaÝrÐfÁt, where we can 
find the definition of qadÐm, classified in the same way as we have seen in Ibn SÐnÁ’s 
case.
357
 He defines qadÐm as an existent (mawÊÙd), which does not need a cause for its 
                                                          
354
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl, p. 20. 
. دح ميدقلا :وه مدقتملا يف دوجولا ىلع هريغ طرشب ةغلابملا  
355
 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd,  p. 44. 
مدقلا لاقي ىلع هوجو لاقيف ميدق سايقلاب ميدقو   اقلطم ميدقلاو سايقلاب وه ءيش هنامز يف يضاملا رثكأ نم نامز ءيش رخآ وه ميدق سايقلاب هيلإ 
امأو ميدقلا اقلطمل وهف   اضيأ لاقي ىلع نيهجو لاقي بسحب نامزلا بسحبو تاذلا امأ يذلا بسحب نامزلا وهف ءيشلا يذلا دجو يف نامز   ضام 
ريغ هانتم امأو ميدقلا بسحب تاذلا وهف ءيشلا يذلا سيل دوجول هتاذ أدبم هبجوأ ميدقلاف بسحب نامزلا وه يذلا سيل هل أدبم ينامز ميدقلاو بسحب 
تاذلا وه ايذل سيل هل أدبم قلعتي هب وهو دحاولا قحلا ىلاعت امع لوقي نولهاجلا   اولع   اريبك. 
356
 al-ÀMIDÏ, S., al-MubÐn fÐ šarÎ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ÎukamÁ’ wa-’l-mutakallimÐn, pp. 118-119. 
امأو ميدقلا :دقف قلطي ىلع ام لا ةلع ؛هدوجول يرابلاك - ىلاعت .ىلعو ام لا لوأ هدوجول نإو ناك   ارقتفم ىلإ ؛ةلع ملاعلاك ىلع لصأ ميكحلا. 
357
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 198. 
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existence; i.e. it is a self-sufficient substance. QadÐm may refer to its existence as having no 
beginning, then it is to be understood as temporal eternity. Essential eternity is introduced 
indirectly, as contrasted to essential createdness-in-time. Eternal in essence is more specific 
than eternal in time. Eternal is also defined as a being whose existence has no beginning; and 
also as something that has neither starting point nor end. This last approach is not seen at 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, whose use of eternity refers to endlessness in the past only. The other 
aspects show similarities, but as al-ÉurÊÁnÐ’s work was written in a later, more developed 
stage of philosophy, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation reflects the formation of early 
kalÁm terminology, obviously, the former shows greater elaboration and a higher degree of 
exactness. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the term ‘sarmad’ is not a technical term, and is scarcely used by 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Still, he precedes Muslim authors, since the word is not found in 
Muslim books of definitions till the 14
th
 century.  
‘BaqÁ’’ is a rare term in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, and it can either be taken for an 
appellative, or as a term used in a theological sense, as the ‘hereafter.’ We can also think of 
Patristic influence if we interpret it as the translation of ‘dwelling’ [in heaven or hell]. I 
demonstrated that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text shows ‘bÁqin’ as having no end, while Muslim 
interpretation emphasizes its not being generated. I considered this difference as an indication 
which shows that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used the term in an early stage, and which attests to the 
early formation of its denotation. Muslim examples show a later understanding of the concept. 
‘Not being generated’ or rather ‘not having a beginning’ is the meaning that gives the 
core of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s understanding of azalÐ, which I introduced in its various 
contexts. We have seen it as a divine name, a divine attribute, an attribute of a substance, a 
property, or of another attribute. As a term referring to God and the divine hypostases, it can 
be paralleled to Greek Patristic terms. When compared to Greek Patristic use, we have seen 
that it appeared in a wider sense in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text. Muslim authors defined the 
term as a self-sufficient being, as something that has no beginning, and what is not generated. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ميدقلا قلطي ىلع دوجوملا يذلا لا نوكي هدوجو نم ،هريغ وهو ميدقلا تاذلاب. قلطيو ميدقلا ىلع دوجوملا يذلا سيل هدوجو   اقوبسم ،مدعلاب وهو 
ميدقلا نامزلاب .ميدقلاو تاذلاب هلباقي اثدحمل ،تاذلاب وهو يذلا نوكي هدوجو نم ؛هريغ امك نأ ميدقلا نامزلاب هلباقي ثدحملا ،نامزلاب وهو يذلا 
قبس همدع   اقبس   اينامز .لكو ميدق تاذلاب ميدق ،نامزلاب سيلو لك ميدق نامزلاب   اميدق ،تاذلاب ميدقلاف تاذلاب صخأ نم ميدقلا ،نامزلاب نوكيف 
ثداحلا تاذلاب معأ نم احلاثد ،نامزلاب نلأ لباقم صخلأا معأ نم لباقم ،معلأا ضيقنو معلأا نم ءيش قلطم صخأ نم ضيقن صخلأا .ليقو 
ميدقلا ام لا ءادتبا هدوجول ،ثداحلا ثدحملاو ام مل نكي ،كلذك ناكف دوجوملا وه نئاكلا ،تباثلا مودعملاو هدض. ليقو ميدقلا وه يذلا لا لوأ لاو 
رخآ هل. 
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These connotations could all be found at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, too. It is in fact not surprising 
that we find much overlap at such a broad conceptual level, since all of these thinkers 
presumably relied on identical sources translated from the Greek and Syriac and interacted in 
a similar intellectual and cultural milieu. 
QadÐm was used by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ as the synonym of azalÐ, in the meaning of 
‘ancient, having no beginning.’ It appeared in the same contexts as the previous one; and the 
same parallels could be drawn on the basis of a comparison with Muslim authors as in the 
previous case. We know that Muslim philosophical thought differentiated between the 
meanings of the two (i.e. qidam and azaliyya), but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ attests to the early 
formation of this term, so this differentiation is not yet reflected. 
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Chapter IV 
The Terminology of Creation 
(IbdÁ’ and ibtidÁ’ - beginning, commencement vs. ibdÁÝ – direct creation vs. ibtidÁÝ – 
instauration vs. iÌtirÁÝ – creation ex nihilo vs. Ìalq – creation vs. iÎdÁ× - creation ex 
nihilo vs. ÒinÁÝa, making vs. takwÐn – generation vs. inšÁ’ – bringing into being) 
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses a wide range of terms to express the idea of creation. These 
are ibdÁ’ and ibtidÁ’; ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ; iÌtirÁÝ; Ìalq; iÎdÁ× (and ÎudÙ×); ÒinÁÝa (and 
ÒanÝa); takwÐn; and inšÁ’. They can almost all be paired with a corresponding Greek 
philosophical term (vid. Afnan), but most of the Greek terms can be found in Christian 
theological works, too, as we can see it on the authority of Lampe. As a first step, I compare 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of these Arabic terms with the Greek ones, and then check their 
special connotations according to Church Fathers. I also check how terms and concepts 
appear in Muslim use, and try to find evidence that shows to what degree ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
(or Christian authors in general) can be considered mediators between Greek and Muslim uses 
in this field.  
 
1. IbdÁ’ and ibtidÁ’, i.e. beginning, commencement  
 
As for ibdÁ’358 (and ibtidÁ’359) i.e. beginning, commencement, in translations it 
usually stands for the Greek philosophical term ἣ ἀρχή.360 The latter appears in various 
contexts in Greek Patristic literature
361
 with denotations such as beginning (in time, or before 
time, i.e. in eternity); a starting point; origin or source; cause. If referring to Creation, it can 
be an action of the Father or the Son; and it can refer to Incarnation, too.  
The IVth stem appears scarcely in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text. Literally, it means to 
start, but it is usually used together with terms referring to creation more directly, so it 
probably has a stronger connotation beyond the meaning of giving a start to something. E.g. 
“Or do you averse from this [fleeing] to the acknowledgement that things were brought into 
being and commenced in time, [and] not of matter.”362 The context here shows that ÝAmmÁr 
                                                          
358
 HAYEK translates it as ‘inauguration’ C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 85. 
359 In HAYEK’s translation: ‘instauration’ C.f. Ibid. 
360
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, pp. 24-25. 
361
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 234-36. 
362
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 99,9-10 
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al-BaÒrÐ uses inauguration, ibdÁ’ in a theological sense, namely that God created things. 
Staying paired with inšÁ’, and appearing in a passive form, it is evident that inauguration is 
carried out by an active performer of the act, i.e. the result is caused, originated or created. 
InšÁ’ will be discussed later, but let us notice even at this point that the two terms are used as 
synonyms. We have already read above on the question of the pre-eternity of created beings, 
let us return to the end of the corresponding citation: “This is clear ignorance, and impossible, 
unattainable that something that was created in time and the making of which was 
inaugurated should become pre-eternal that has always [pre-eternally] existed.”363 All the 
words in the direct contextual environment of this term (iÎdÁ×, Ìalq, ÒanÝa) refer to the 
creative action. Though in this sentence ibdÁ’ itself is rather used in the meaning of a start, 
together with the context it gains an extra connotation of the creative action. And finally: “life 
is truly necessary for Him, who had willingly abstained from what he could have done, and 
later inaugurated what he inaugurated deliberately and by His potency.”364 The wider 
context discusses the question of creation – why God had not done it before the time He 
decided to perform it – so inauguration gains a wider meaning that comprises the connotation 
of the creative action. 
The VIIIth stem of the same root can be found in the text many times. The first 
example shows it in the meaning of ‘beginning, start:’ “The same way, the receptivity of the 
generated form that is made up of these four elements for contingence and accidents witnesses 
to their creation in time and that their existence has a beginning.”365 It is worth looking at the 
context, too, even if the other terms will be discussed only later in detail: ibtidÁ’ has a 
concrete meaning of start, inauguration, but being used together with ÎudÙ×, it gains an extra 
connotation which refers to the creative action. The object of the action is the existence of 
other beings: this further implies the creative meaning. The next examples also show a 
reference for the creative action: “We can also say that the Word of God who stands above 
every analogy, is the one who originated and assumed the human for Himself as 
humanity.”366  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 وأ تئشنأ ءايشلأا نأب رارقلإا ىلإ ًابره كلذ نم نوعجرت وأتئدبأ ىلويه نم لا ًاثيدح  
363
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 107,3-4 
 هقلخ ثدحأ ام ريصي نأ عنتمملا لاحملا نيبملا لهجلا كلذوأدبأو لزي مل ًايلزأ هتعنص  
364
 Ibid., p. 151,4 
مأ نمل ،ةايحلاف يذلا أدبأ مث ،هتئيشمو هتدارإب هلعف عاطتسا امع كسأدبأ ةلاحم لا قحب ةبجاو ،ًةردقو ًادمعت  
365
 Ibid., 97,14-16 
 اهثودح ىلع دهشي ضارعلأاو ناثدحلل عبرلأا عئابطلا نم اهنم ئشنأ ام نوكلا لوبق كلذكوءادتباو  ًارارطضا اهنوك  
366
 Ibid., 197,9-10 
اذكه ىلعو اذه لوقن :نإ الله ةملكلا ىلاعت ىلع لك سايق وه يذلا أدب ذختاو يرشبلا هل   اتوسان  
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However, in some cases the term simply means beginning, as in the case of the 
description of the Son’s birth: “The hypostasis of His divinity has always been born from the 
Father and will always be born in one way/state. It has no beginning and no termination.”367 
Here ibtidÁ’ is used as beginning, and it can refer to either the birth or the Son. Since the Son 
cannot be created, just like the birth, it must mean beginning here. The same meaning appears 
in the description of His humanity,
368
 where it is put down that human birth, as well as the 
existence of the human part, has a beginning. The term appears in other contexts, too, with the 
meaning of ‘beginning’, even if the context contains other terms that refer to the creative 
action. Let us see some examples: “There is no modality of the Pre-eternal and His attributes, 
and there is nothing similar to Him or His deeds. Just as in the case of light:  He created it as 
clear light in the beginning of creation (as He said it in the book of Genesis),”369 In this case, 
the term is used together with creation, but the meaning of the participle is ‘beginning.’  
We can notice the same meanings that could be seen in the Greek philosophical and 
Patristic usage. It was mentioned above that ἣ ἀρχή could mean simply a beginning in time, 
but also, the origin and source. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ can be considered a continuer of these 
traditions, since he used the term with the meaning of beginning, in contexts referring to 
creation, so originating was also included in the connotation. As for the inauguration of 
making and the beginning of creation, on the basis of what Gardet writes, we may even think 
of a Qur’Ánic parallel: the text frequently contrasts “the first creation” with “the second,” that 
of the resurrection of the body. In this case the expression bada’ al-Ìalq, “he originates 
creation”370 is used, so the root bd’ suggests the idea of a “beginning” which involves a 
continuation.
371
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Muslim contemporary, al-KindÐ does not define the term on its 
own. But it appears as an attribute in the definition of causes (Ýilal).372 The direct translation 
of the term as used by al-KindÐ would be inauguration, beginning, but as a cause, it implies a 
                                                          
367
 Ibid., p. 192,4-5 
ءاضقنا لاو هل ءادتبا لاف .ةدحاو لاح ىلع هنم ًادولوم لازي لاو بلأا نم ًادولوم لزي مل هتوهلا مونق نأ كلذو 
368
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, 192,7-10 
 هدلاو امأف ًةدحاو ًةرم ًاثيدح ملأا نمتدتبا  نادلاولا قفتاف ،هتوهلاب بلأا نم ًاضيأ كلانه ًادولوم هتوسانب ملأا نم هدلاو تقو يف ناك دقو ،تضقناو
 يذلا ىضقنا مث .ًاعم ًاعيمج تقولا كلذ يفأدتبا ءاضقنا لاب هيلع لزي مل ام ىلع هل ءدب لا يذلا يقبو  
369
 Ibid., 194,8-9 
نإو ناك لا يكةيف يلزلأل هتافصو لاو هبش هل لاو ،هلاعفب هنإف امك يف رونلا يذلا هقلخ   ارون   انيبم يف ىدتبم قلخلا  
370
 e.g., SÙrat YÙnus, 10,4; 10,34 and SÙrat al-Naml, 27,64, etc. C.f. The Koran Interpreted. A Translation by 
A. J. Arberry. Accessed at: http://arthursclassicnovels.com/koran/koran-arberry10.html 
ؤدبي قلخلا مث هديعي 
371
 GARDET, L., IbdÁÝ, In.: IE. Second edition, vol. III., pp. 663-65. (later on: GARDET, L., IbdÁÝ), 663. 
372
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 169. 
عبرلأا ةيعيبطلا للعلا ا ناك هنم ام :ءيشل هلجأ نم امو . هتلع يه يتلا ءيشلا ةكرح أدتبم و .وه ام وه اهب يتلا ءيشلا ةروصو .هرصنع ينعأ ،
هلوعفم لعافلا لعف 
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more direct action, an effect, and a factor in the coming into being of the caused things. No 
Muslim author dedicates an entry for this term till al-ÉurÊÁnÐ, who brings definitions for the 
term from the field of poetry and grammar, but these will be left out of consideration. He then 
introduces another concept, al-ibtidÁ’ al-ÝurfÐ373, but there is no such term in the fields of 
philosophy or kalÁm in his classification. So we may say that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of 
the term may be paralleled in his contemporary’s use, but in general, he seems to precede 
Muslim authors. At the same time, as Qur’Ánic parallels could be discerned, we may see that 
when addressing Muslim opponents, he aimed at the use of familiar terminology. 
 
2.  ibdÁÝ, ibtidÁÝ - direct creation, original creation 
 
Afnan does not offer a Greek equivalent for ibdÁÝ; even for MubdiÝ a sole 
hypothetical option is offered: γεννητής.374 Lampe only offers translations and loci for the 
noun derived from the same roots: i.e. ἡ γέννησις. In Patristic literature it means generation, 
engendering, birth; so accordingly, MubdiÝ as γεννητής is Generator or Engenderer.375 
The fourth stem – to the best of my knowledge – appears scarcely in ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s text.  The two examples I could find appear in verbal forms, as follows:  
“By my life, if you thought that by the things He wanted to create, and the creatures He 
wanted to bring into being, He only aimed at His own interest and the subsistence of the 
essence of His own substance, like the elements we have mentioned, then it would be right for 
you to say that perhaps his will had always been a will of necessity and not one of choice.”
376
 
In this example no object is explicitly named for the creative action, but as it appears parallel 
to ‘bringing into being,’ which has creatures as its object; the context unmistakably makes it 
clear that ibdÁÝ expresses creation. A common feature in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage of 
different terms denoting creation is that he emphasizes its not being a result of a need, but its 
being urged by divine grace and goodness instead. This example shows the denial of need, but 
the next one introduces the goodness, generosity as motivation: 
                                                          
373
 He then introduces another concept, customary beginning, which is a traditional formula, such as “in the 
name of God” intended to introduce the following main formula or text, etc. C.f. al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-
TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 18. 
ةلمسبلا دعب ةلدمحلا لوانتيف دوصقملا لبق عقي يذلا ءيشلا ىلع قلطي يفرعلا ءادتبلاا 
374
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, pp. 25-26. 
375 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 312. 
376
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 133,20-134,3 
 نأ ءاش يتلا روملأا نأ تننظ نئل يرمعلفاهعدبي  يتلا عئابطلاك ،هرهوج تاذ ماوقو هسفن نأش حلاص اهب دمعت امنإ ،اهئشني نأ دارأ يتلا قئلاخلاو
ت نأ ماقتسلا نذإ ،انركذرايتخا ةدارإ لا رارطضا ةدارإ لزت مل هتدارإ ىسع لوق 
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“Isn’t it that the Wise – eulogy – stands above doing anything in vain, without aim? His 
incarnation and union were not in vain or without an aim, either. His generosity, open-
handedness, goodness, and might were those [factors,] which enticed Him to create His 
creatures and bring them into being, and these are also what enticed Him to fulfil His grace 
and complete His beneficence by His incarnation in a human [being, one] of His creatures.”
377
  
The verbs translate best as ‘create,’ and we have to note that the context introduces it 
as a synonym of inšÁ’, i.e. bringing into being, in both cases. Given that MubdiÝ is a divine 
name in Islamic use; its appearance here shows that AmmÁr al-BasrÐ aimed at using familiar 
terminology for Muslims. 
The VIIIth stem also appears scarcely. In two cases the same meaning is used, in the 
case of its third appearance, ‘introducing sg. new,’ or ‘make up’ is a better translation. The 
context of the first appearance is a discussion of the question if there are two creators or just 
one.  
“Making any useless thing cannot belong to the Omnipotent, Wise, nor can it concern His 
creation. Had his intention by the creation of this been the will of creating the whole world, 
and had He then created only a part of it, and then left another part to be completed by 
someone else, it would have been ignorance and impotence, necessarily. And it cannot be an 
attribute of Who had the potency – by His Wisdom – to create a part of creatures ex 
nihilo.”
378
  
IbtidÁÝ is used in a parallel manner with Ìalq, in a synonymous sense. It is also used together 
with the phrase lÁ min šay’; so if it is to be translated ex nihilo, then creation denoted by 
ibtidÁÝ excludes pre-existent matter. This action, or the faculty, potency for this action 
implies omnipotence. The second appearance is a transition between start and creation:  
“If He – eulogy – had known that there could come a time in which their creation would be 
more adequate for them and more proper for them than the time he instaurated in order to 
carry their creation out in it, then he would have made use of this knowledge for his care for 
them to intent their creation in that time instead of the time in which he brought them into 
being, even if that would have been ten thousand years earlier, and He would have not put 
them in a disadvantage by this.”
379
 
                                                          
377
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 215,9-15 
 لاأنإ توربجو هحلاصو همركو هدوج لب ،ىنعم لاب ًاثبع هديحأتو هدسجت نكي مل كلذك .ىنعم ريغل ًاثبع ًائيش لعفي نأ نع لاعتم هللاج زع ميكحلا ه
عد يتلا نأ ىلإ هتعدبأ  ىلإ ًاريخأ هتعد يتلا يه ،هقلخ أشنأومامتإ هقلخ نم ًايرشب هدسجتب هناسحإ لامكتساو هتمعن 
378
 Ibid., pp. 102,17-103,2 
 اهنم قلخف ًلامج اهلك ملاعلا راد قلخ ةدارإ كلذ قلخب دمعت ناك نإو .هتقلخ نم لاو ميكحلا رداقلا نأش نم هيف عفن لا ام لاعتفا سيلف ًاضعب  لمهأو
ءيش نم لا قئلاخلا نم فرط عادتبا ىلع هتمكحب ردق نم تافص نم ًاضيأ تسيلو .ةلاحم لا زجع مأ لهج نم كلذف ،هريغ همتيل ضعب قلخ 
379
 Ibid., p. 106,10-14 
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Here Ìalq and inšÁ’ also appear as parallel meanings, so even if ibtidÁÝ waqt would read best 
as producing time, it has an additional connotation which refers to the creative action.  
The last occurrence of the word introduces it not as a term but as an appellative, since 
it is evidently in the sense of invention: “The first [quality] is the existence of the legislation 
of the religion of the truth, which matches the laws of the Benefactor, the Generous; not like 
the aberrant legislation which was invented by the guides of aberration, as made up in their 
scriptures and religions.”380 This usage may also be compared to Islamic terminology, since 
this term carries a connotation like that of the Islamic bidÝa. 
So far, we have seen that it is possible to find similarities between AmmÁr al-BasrÐ’s 
terminology and Greek sources. Besides Greek origins that influence the formation of these 
concepts and terms, we have to investigate their development in Muslim thought. IbdÁÝ is 
translated as absolute creation, primordial innovation by L. Gardet.
381
 He then goes on to 
assert that the term is not Qur’Ánic; even if the Qur’Án calls God BadÐÝ, Absolute Creator, 
Innovator.
382
 On this basis, the maÒdar of the IVth stem comes to express the actual act of 
God. IbdÁÝ belongs to the vocabularies of ŠÐÝism; falsafa and Ýilm al-kalÁm give it a 
further technical meaning consonant with the SunnÐ idea of “creation.”383 In ŠÐÝÐ thought, 
ibdÁÝ is thought of in connection with the divine kun, the “Be!” word that brings into 
existence.
384
 
In philosophy, al-KindÐ, in his RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’, defines ibdÁÝ as the 
displaying of the thing (the existent) from nothing, i.e. creating it ex nihilo.
385
 ÝAmmÁr al-
BasrÐ does not emphasize the ex nihilo approach in his use of the fourth stem, only in the 
case of the eighth. There is some similarity, but we cannot consider it a perfect agreement. 
 According to Gardet, for later falÁsifa, Ibn Rušd, Ibn SÐnÁ, and al-FÁrÁbÐ, ibdÁÝ 
denotes the absoluteness of the creative (emanative) act in the production of beings that have 
no reason for existing in their own essence, emanatism being of a Neoplatonic kind. But while 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
يذلا تقولا نم مهيلع دوعأو مهل حلصأ هيف مهقلخ نوكي تقو ىتأتي نأ نكمي ناك دق هنأ همسا لج هملع قباس يف ناك ولف هعدتبا  ،مهقلخ هيف ئشنيل
ضي لاو ،ماع فلاآ ةرشعب هل ًامدقتم ناك ولو ،مهأشنأ هيف يذلا تقولا كلذ نود تقولا كلذ يف هقلخل دمعتي نأ مهب هينع ملعلا ىدجأ ناكل كلذب ن
مهيلع 
380
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 129,18-19 
ا قحلا نيد عئارش دوجو ىلولأاف ام نود ،ًلامج هيف داوجلا معنملا ننسل ةمئلاملعدتبا اهنايدأو اهبتك نم تلعتفا اميف ةغئازلا اهعئارش نم ةللاضلا ةمئا  
381
 GARDET, L., IbdÁÝ, , 663. 
382
 The two verses II, 117 and VI, 101 assert that God is "Creator (BadÐÝ) of the heavens and the earth" 
383
 GARDET, L., IbdÁÝ, pp. 663-64. 
384
 "The Creator (BadÐÝ) of the heavens and the earth, when He decrees a thing, He says to it only "Be!", and it 
is" (Qur’Án, II, 117)  
385
al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 165. 
 عادبلإا- سيل نع ءيشلا راهظإ  
On this basis, GARDET says that al-KindÐ, like MuÝtazilÐs, takes ibdÁÝ in the sense of temporal creation ex 
nihilo. 
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ŠÐÝÐ thought emphasizes the divine imperative kun and its immediacy, falsafa accentuates 
an absolute production of being in the idea of ibdÁÝ.386  
As for Ibn SÐnÁ’s ÍudÙd, it defines the term as a name that can refer to two concepts. 
The first concept means the establishment of an existent out of nothing, without any 
mediation; and the second concept is that an existent thing should have an absolute existence 
coming from a cause, without a mediator; this thing could not exist [in itself], and it had lost 
completely what it had in itself [after coming into being].”387 As for his first definition, he 
shares ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ’s interpretation, even if the addition of ‘without intermediary’ 
seems to be a later development. The second definition, which approaches existence on the 
basis of causes, is clearly philosophical and more specific than ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ’s usage. It 
is not unexpected, since Ibn SÐnÁ’s ÍudÙd represents a later stage of philosophical thinking. 
In Ýilm al-kalÁm, ibdÁÝ was fully accepted into the vocabulary of the mutakallimÙn. 
It bears the same fundamental meaning, but its connotations are certainly closer to those it has 
in al-KindÐ than to those it has in Avicenna or the ŠÐÝÐs. The TaÝrÐfÁt of al-ÉurÊÁnÐ 
summarizes with precision the usage of Muslim theologians in this matter; he prepared a 
rather detailed entry on ibdÁÝ. For him, the primary sense of the term is creation ex nihilo. 
His distinction between ibdÁÝ, takwÐn and iÎdÁ× is particularly interesting.  
“In the terminology of philosophers, ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ mean the creation of a thing not preceded by 
matter or time, such as the intellects.”
388
  
So far this definition can be paralleled to what ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ said and how al-
KindÐ defined the term. The previous authors mostly emphasized the ex nihilo background; 
the lack of anteriority as such is a new element in the definition. 
“…IbdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ oppose takwÐn, i.e. generation, which means creation preceded by matter. Also, 
ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ oppose iÎdÁ×, creation in time which is preceded by time. The opposition between 
them is contrariety, even if they [both] are [kinds of] existence, given that direct creation is 
an expression of the absence of any anteriority of matter, and generation is the expression of 
the anteriority of matter. The opposition between them is compulsory opposition, since one of 
them is existential, while the other one is non-existential. This is known on the basis of the 
definition of two opposing things. …”
389
 
                                                          
386
 GARDET, L., IbdÁÝ, p. 664. 
387
 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, pp. 42-43. 
 يناثلا موهفملاو ءيش ةطساوب لاو ءيش نع لا ءيشلا سيسأت امهدحأ نيموهفمل كرتشم مسا عادبلإا لاب ببس نع قلطم دوجو ءيشلل نوكي نأ
 ًامات ًاداقفإ هتاذ نم هل يذلا دقفأ دقو ًادوجوم نوكي لا نأ هتاذ يف هلو طسوتم 
388
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt,  p. 18. 
389
 Ibid., p. 18. 
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ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ also uses these terms in a differentiated way, or we can say at least 
that he uses different terms for the creative action, and does not use only one of them to 
express this action. However, he never contrasts these terms and their meanings in such a 
way, he rather uses them as synonyms. 
“… ‘Direct creation’ is the bringing into being of an existent [thing] ex nihilo. …”390  
This portion of the definition is in perfect agreement with the way ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ uses 
the term. 
“… ‘Direct creation’ is said to [be] the foundation of an existent [thing] without another/out 
of no-thing, while creation is the foundation of an existent [thing] from another. …”391 
This opposition cannot be found in ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ’s usage, he uses the two terms as 
synonyms instead. 
“… God (eulogy) said: “the (‘direct’) Creator of the heavens and the earth” (Cow, 117). And 
also: “the creation of man” (Palm, 4). So ‘direct creation’ is more general than creation, this 
is why He said “the (‘direct’) Creator of the heavens and the earth” and “the creation of 
man,” and he didn’t say the ‘direct creation’ of man.”
392
  
Al-ÉurÊÁnÐ’s examples demonstrate the differences between the two kinds of 
creative action: the heavens and earth are created ex nihilo, while Adam was created from 
dust. The former is expressed by ibdÁÝ, while the latter by Ìalq. ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ also 
refers to Scriptural evidence in some cases, but instead of the Qur’Án, he cites Old and New 
Testament loci. E.g. in the case of bada’ the Book of Genesis is referred to, as we could see it 
above. When using this term, no scriptural quotations are used. He usually uses scriptural 
evidence to underpin something, but not in order to contrast meanings, so his approach differs 
somewhat from that of al-ÉurÊÁnÐ. 
Concluding we may say that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of the terms can be paralleled 
to those appearing in Muslim thought. However, one has to admit that these terms came to be 
much more sophisticated in later stages of kalÁm as the latter’s terminology became 
increasingly philosophical. 
 
                                                          
390
 Ibid., p. 18. 
391
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 18. 
392
 Ibid. p. 18. 
عادبلإا عادتبلااو (  اضيأ)، (يف حلاطصا ءامكحلا )وه داجيإ ءيش ريغ قوبسم ةدامب لاو ،نامز ،لوقعلاك وهو لباقي ،نيوكتلا هنوكل   اقوبسم 
،ةداملاب لباقيو ثادحلإا هنوكل   اقوبسم ،نامزلاب لباقتلاو امهنيب لباقت داضتلا نإ اناك ،نيدوجو نأب نوكي عادبلإا ةرابع نع ولخلا عن ةيقوبسملا 
،ةدامب نيوكتلاو ةرابع نع ةيقوبسملا ؛ةدامب نوكيو امهنيب لباقت باجيلإا بلسلاو نإ ناك امهدحأ   ايدوجو رخلآاو ، ايمدع فرعيو اذه نم فيرعت 
نيلباقتملا. 
عادبلإاو (وه )داجيإ ءيشلا نم لا ءيش .ليقو عادبلإا سيسأت ءيشلا نع ،ءيش قلخلاو داجيإ ءيش نم ءيش .لاق الله ىلاعت" :عيدب تاومسلا 
ضرلأاو( "ةرقبلا/117 )لاقو" :قلخ ناسنلإا( "لحنلا/4)، عادبلإاو معأ نم ،قلخلا اذلو لاق" :عيدب تاومسلا ضرلأاو"، لاقو" :قلخ ناسنلإا "
ملو لقي عيدب ناسنلإا 
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3. IÎdÁ×, production, creation and ÎudÙ×, creation in time393 
 
IÎdÁ×, production, creation and ÎudÙ×, creation in time can be paired with different 
Greek terms. As for iÎdÁ×, it may stand for the Greek ποῖεσθαι; ÎudÙ× is ποίησις or 
γίγνεσθαι. As for the derived form, muÎdi×, it corresponds to εἰδοποιός, ποιητικόν.394 In 
Greek Patristic literature ποίησις is used in general to refer to making; to creating, the act of 
creation, and to that which is created.
395
 Γίγνεσθαι appears as ‘being made/created, become’ 
in the Church Fathers’ texts,396 while εἰδοποιός is the Creator, the Giver of forms,397 and 
ποιητικόν is creative, productive.398 
As for the Muslim counterparts, as it is asserted by Anawati,
399
 “the beginning of the 
world,” ÎudÙ× comes from the maÒdar of Îada×a, which signifies: ‘to appear, to arise, to 
have come into being recently;’ ‘to take place, to happen.’ Muslim thinkers use the term with 
two meanings: one denotes the existence of a thing after its nonexistence, in a temporal 
extension: this is al-ÎudÙ× al-zamÁnÐ, to which temporal eternity (al-qidam al-zamÁnÐ) 
corresponds. For the mutakallims, ÎudÙ× al-ÝÁlam bears only the sense of a beginning in 
time. They take this “beginning” of the world as their basis for proving the existence of God. 
The other meaning is that of the hellenizing philosophers, in particular Avicenna: ÎudÙ× 
denotes contingency: the fact of a being’s existing after not having existed, but in an 
ontological or essential extension, which does not necessarily involve time. This is al-ÎudÙ× 
al-ÆÁtÐ. From this point of view the falÁsifa affirm the ÎudÙ× al-ÝÁlam and its eternity.400 
Let us now see if ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ can be seen a mediator between Greek and 
Muslim uses of the terms under consideration in this subsection. Before examining his 
examples, let us remember that an early (Christian) use of the term iÎdÁ× with the meaning of 
creation has already been established by M. Maróth, though he points at its not being widely 
used before the eleventh century.
401
  
First we will examine examples for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of the first stem, for 
which examples include the following: “The same way, the receptivity of the generated form 
                                                          
393
 HAYEK translates iÎdÁ× as ‘production, création,’ ÎudÙ× as ‘création,’ and Îada×Án as ‘contingence.’ C.F. 
Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, pp. 85, 87. 
394
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, pp. 67-68. 
395
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 1108. 
396
 Ibid., p. 315. 
397
 Ibid., p. 407. 
398
 Ibid., p. 1109. 
399
 ANAWATI, G. C., ÍudÙ× al-ÝÁlam, In: EI, Second Edition. III., p. 548 
400
 Ibid., p. 548. 
401
 MARÓTH, M., The Correspondence between Aristotle and Alexander the Great, pp. 77-78. 
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(of what was made up of these four elements) for contingence and accidents witnesses to their 
coming into being and that their existence has a beginning.”402 Here the term means ‘to 
appear, to arise, to have come into being (recently); ‘the existence of a thing, after its 
nonexistence,’ but it is hard to judge whether this coming into being refers to time, or is meant 
in an ontological, essential extension. It is not only the connotation of the term which has to 
be observed here, but the argumentation, too: the beginning of the world could be a basis for 
proving the existence of God. It is an argument accepted by both Muslims and Christians, so 
in this case ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses an idea that is familiar for his opponents, too.  
In the next quotation, the meaning of the term is the same: “If the praedicatum of what 
has always existed is natural transcendence and abstention from receiving accidents, then the 
same way, the praedicatum of what is found to receive the contingence of accidents is that its 
existence came into being and was created, necessarily”403 However, it is to be noted here 
that the term is used parallel to Ìalq, suggesting that they have a synonymous meaning.While 
philosophy usually contrasts iÎdÁ× with qidam, here its opposite is mÁ lam yazal, so it is 
closer to azaliyya. 
The next example is of particular interest, since the root Îd× appears in different stems in it. 
“If we said: He has always been creating His creatures in time and He has always been 
generating them, like the elements that carry out their actions according to their nature, all the 
time; then the claim would be impossible and would contradict to itself. It is because when we 
said that He has always been creating His creatures in time, we made both pre-eternity and 
coming into being necessary for His creation. And it is the same to say that the Creator has 
always created His creation in time, or to say that what is created in time has always 
existed.”
404
  
We find the active participle of the IVth stem, meaning ‘Creator (in time), or originator,’ 
accordingly, the IVth stem verb means ‘to create in time, originate,’ and the passive participle 
‘created in time, originated.’ Given that all the other forms have transitive meanings, i.e. there 
is an actor carrying the action out, apart from ‘coming into being,’ ÎudÙ× also gains an extra 
meaning of being created, originated. No opposition to qidam is discernible; instead, it is 
azaliyya which appears as a contrasting term. 
                                                          
402
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 97,14-16 
 ًارارطضا اهنوك ءادتباو اهثودح ىلع دهشي ضارعلأاو ناثدحلل عبرلأا عئابطلا نم اهنم ئشنأ ام نوكلا لوبق كلذكو 
403
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 98,10-12 
ناثدحل يفلأ ام مكح كلذك ،ًايعيبط ضارعلأا لوبق نم عانتملااو ءلاتعلاا لزي مل ام مكح ناك نإف  ًارارطضا قلخلاو نوكلا ثودح ًلاباق ضارعلأا 
404
 Ibid., p. 150,18-21 
انلق نإو  هقئلاخل لزي مل لبً اثدحم  هقئلاخل لزي مل انلق اذإ انلأ .اهسفن يف تضقانتو ىوعدلا تلاحتسا ،ًادبأ ًايعيبط اهلاعفأ ةلعافلا عئابطلاك ًانوكم
ً اثدحم مسا قئلاخلل انبجوأ ،ةيلزلأا  ًاعيمج ثودحلاو قلاخلا لزي مل لوقي نأ لئاقلا ىلع ءاوسو ،ثدحي  ًادوجوم ثدحملا لزي مل لوقي مأ ،ًاقلخ ًايلزأ 
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 The first stem appears in two different forms in the following quote: “The Messiah – 
as far as His being the Messiah is concerned – is nascent, he came into being after he had not 
been existent.”405 It is hard to judge whether merely coming into being in time is meant here, 
or contingency in an ontological, essential extension without respect to time. As far as the 
Messiah’s birth is concerned, coming into being is a proper translation, but coming into being 
after not having existed may carry connotations of essential extension. 
If the divine is concentrated on, essential extension may be the main meaning:  “As for 
what occurs because of this unity as an arising [thing] between them, it will be attached to the 
human, who was brought to these privileges, who was granted these gifts uniquely, and 
nothing can affect the Pre-eternal in this [unity], nor can anything come into being in 
Him.”406 It is probably not only ‘coming into being in time’ what is meant here, but 
contingence, too. “From that time on, the Son of God is not more related to his pre-eternal 
substance than to his temporal one, and He is not more related to the name of divinity and 
eternity than to the name of contingency.”407 In this last example, the extension of time has 
no importance; it is rather His existence after not having existed which is stressed here. 
After having examined the infinitive of the Ist stem, ÎudÙ×, let us turn to the IVth 
stem, aÎda×a. Let us first see an example where aÎda×a appears among other terms referring 
to the creative action: “This is clear ignorance, and it is impossible and unattainable that 
something that was created in time and the making of which was inaugurated should become 
pre-eternal that has always [pre-eternally] existed.”408 In this case, aÎda×a can also mean ‘to 
start in time, make happen in time’, as uÎdi×a Ìalquhu implies it. (UÎdi×at also appears 
elsewhere as a synonym of being disposed; so this kind of creation my also mean a fashioning 
of the created one’s disposition.)409 UÎdi×a, as usual in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage, is 
contrasted to azaliyya. In another instance we may read an example in which corruption 
                                                          
405
 Ibid., ,p. 179,11 
 ًاحيسم نكي مل نأ دعب ثدح ثداح هتيحيسم ةهج نم حيسملا لب 
406
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 183,9-11 
 داحتلاا اذه نم ضرع ام امأف نأ ريغ نم ،ًةصاخ بهاوملا هذهب هيلع معنملا ،لئاضفلا هذه ىلإ بذتجملا يرشبلا ىلإ فاضي هنإف ،امهنيب ثداحب
ثداح هب ثدح لاو ضراع كلذ يف يلزلأا ضرع نوكي 
407
 Ibid., p. 187,12-13 
 مدقلاو توهلالا مساب لاو ،ينمزلا هرهوج يف يلزلأا هرهوجب ىلوأ سيل تقولا كلذ ذنم الله نباوثودحلا مساب هنم ىلوأ 
408
 Ibid., p. 107,3-4 
لزي مل ًايلزأ هتعنص أدبأو هقلخ ثدحأ ام ريصي نأ عنتمملا لاحملا نيبملا لهجلا كلذو 
409
 Ibid., p. 125,7-11 
ت نم هيلع لابج ام فلاخ ىلإ نادجي لاو نوكسلاو نيللا ىلع فورخلا ةعيبطو ركنلاو ةدارملا ىلع بئذلا ةعيبط لبج ذإ هنأ امك مل ،ًاصيحم امهبلق
 امب ناقحتسي ًاضيأ لاو .ًاروجف هل بئذلا حرم لاو ًارب هل فورخلا نيل بسحيتثدحأ  ًاباقع لاو ًابوث امهزئارغ هيلع  
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appears as created in time in the earth, or this corruption may simply be understood as being 
introduced, caused in the element.
410
 
Terms referring to the creative action usually appear in contexts that introduce signs 
for the existence of the Creator. Our next example offers an interesting parallel with genesis, 
generating and creation:  
“then [if] he [i.e. the opponent] said: what can prove that the faculties of these elements (heat, 
cool, humidity, dryness) are generated and created? We would say: the proof for this is their 
subservience and subjugation for the combination, sequence, and commixion, which are 
created in time in them, and their receptivity for the change and transfer from one condition 
to another, to which they are exposed in this.”
411
 
IÎdÁ× can even be a sign or a proof for genesis and creation (takwÐn, Ìalq), at the same time, 
in this context, another possible interpretation of the passive form is just “happen.” If iÎdÁ× is 
a proof for the other two actions, it implies that there is some distinction between their 
meanings in this case. If we approach the form on the basis of the first stem, which means 
coming into being, then the fourth stem may be understood as ‘to cause to come into being,’ 
and its passive form may mean ‘be caused’ or ‘created in time’, or it may just be interpreted 
as happen. IÎdÁ× is a sign for creation, which later becomes a proof for the existence of the 
Creator. Apart from parallel meanings that show generation and creation are synonymously 
used, we can see that a circumscription of corruption (subservience and subjugation for the 
combination, sequence, and commixion, which are created in time in them, and their 
receptivity for the change and transfer from one condition to another) appears as a juxtaposed 
meaning. Kawn is usually contrasted to corruption in philosophical texts; but here, its derived 
form, takwÐn and the synonymously used iÎdÁ× appear together with the changes that may 
stand for corruption. 
Terms referring to the creative action usually introduce objects of creation. Let us 
mention such an example, as the term appears when incarnation is described, as well: “It is 
this way when we say that the Word of God incarnated and became human, that is: he created 
a body and he put it on. He created a human being, and wore it as an armament, combined it 
with His hypostasis in order to appear in it, and in order to make His words and deeds appear 
                                                          
410
 Ibid., p. 97, 16-17 
 اهنم ضعبلاو ضعبلا نيب قرفتو اهقرحتو اهيقنتف ضرلأا ىلإ دمعت كنأ امكثدحتو ريغو ةدابإو قرخ نم اهرهوج يف داسفلا كلذ  
411
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p.  97,9-11 
 ؟ةقولخم ةنوكم ةسوبيلاو ةبوطرلاو ةدوربلاو ةرارحلا نم ناكرلأا هذه ىوق نأ ىلع ليلدلا امو :لاق مث 
 امل اهدايقناو اهللذت كلذ ىلع ليلدلا :انلقثدحأ  اهلوبق مث ،جازتملااو لسلستلاو فيلأتلا نم اهيف ىلإ لاح نم لقنتلاو رايغلا نم كلذ يف اهل ضرع امل
لاح 
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through it.”412 In this case the object of creation is a human body or flesh, which became a 
part of the Messiah. The quote also demonstrates that one of the Messiah’s two parts is not 
pre-eternal. 
Another field terms referring to creation usually appear in is the discussion of the 
cause or motivation of creation. As for iÎdÁ×, it is an action of God, which he carried out 
deliberately, not because of need or constraint.  
“It is clear for reason that He had not been prevented in His eternity from creating what He 
created (in time), and then He would bring them into life by His might – [sometimes] by 
potentiality to generate them, [sometimes] restraining from their making. The fact that in His 
eternity He abstained from creating [in time] what He later created [in time] is the sign for 
His earlier deliberation in abstaining [from creation], and His intention, free will to create [in 
time] what he later created.”
413
  
We may also see that iÎdÁ× appears together with qidam in this paragraph. But while 
philosophical texts usually juxtapose the two (something is either created in time or eternal), 
they are both referring to the same substance in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage: in his eternity 
(qidam), God had refrained from creating in time (iÎdÁ×), which he carried out later. 
The same idea, abstention from creation, and then carrying it out later is a proof for 
His deliberation and omnipotence (as we could see it in the case of qidam).
414
  
Terms referring to creation also appear in argumentation concerning the means of 
creation. In the following example aÎda×a (as a synonym of kawwana) appears to 
demonstrate that this action is volitional:  
“we truly know, as we found His essence standing above these attributes, and we have found 
that He has a creation that comes into being in time, and which had been created in time and 
generated by Him, that He had created it in time by way of command and determination, 
without movement and process, [He carried it out by His] will and intention, without effort 
and support (by anyone else).”
415
 
                                                          
412
 Ibid., pp. 196,8-197,3  
 ةملكلا الله نأ انلوقب كلذكدسجت سنأتو  يأثدحأ  ًادسج  هعم هدحويلو هلامعأو هلوق هب رهظيلو هب رهظيل همونق ىلإ هفلأو هعردتف ًاناسنإ قلخو هسبلف
.هتونب يف 
413
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 150, 22-151,3 
 ام قلخ نع همدق يف لزي مل ناك دق هنأ اذهب لوقعلل ناب دقفثدحأ  ءاش ول عانتملااو اهنوك ىلع ٍرادتقاو ٍلوطب اهنم أشنأ مث ،ًاعنتمم ًاكسمم هقلخ نم
 امع انربخأ امك كاسمإ مدقف .اهتعنص نمثدحأ  هكاسمإ نأ ىلع ليلدلا وه ًاثيدح اهنمناك ًاميدق  ،ةدارإو ةئيشمبهثادحإو  امثدحأ  ًادمعت ًاريخأ
 ًارايتخاو 
414
 Ibid., p. 151, 15-18 
 امع هانغ مدق اندجوفثدحأ  ةيلاع نيعب اهأشنأ مث ةعيفر ةمهب اهردق هنأب ًانيقي بولقلا عبشي ،ًاثيدح اهنم أشنأ ام ىلإ ةجاحلا نع هءلاتعاو ،ًاريخأ اهنم
عنيو هريغ ىلع اهب دوجيلهعابط نأش اهب ميقي وأ هسفن ةجاح اهب دسيل لا ،هقلخ أشنأ هلجأ نم نم ىلع اهب م 
415
 Ibid., p. 149,16-18 
 ًاثداح ًاقلخ هل اندجو مث تافصلا هذه نع ةيلاعتم هتاذ اندجو ذإ ،ملعن قحب لبهثدحأ  امنا هنأ ،هنوكوثدحأ  وأ جلاعو ةكرح نود ًامكحو ًارمأ كلذ
فلك نود ةدارإ وأ ةئيشمةنوؤمو ة  
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In the case of the most important terms for creation, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ emphasizes that the 
means of the creative action is not bodily. In order to avoid accuses of anthropomorphism, he 
emphasizes the volitional nature of the divine action. (As for iÎdÁ× and takwÐn, they are used 
as synonyms even in passive participial forms elsewhere.
416
) 
Finally, let us mention that the terms which express creation, often appear as 
synonyms. As for Ìalq, it is a synonym of iÎdÁ× when the two terms are used as passive 
participles.
417
 The Creator, when moulding and forming hyle, introduces accidents in it, i.e. 
He creates them in time in it.
418
 The verb is synonymously used with anša’, too: 
“Vision/contemplation brought us [to establish] a source/entity, which is prior to them, and 
who created them in time and brought them into being.”419 A similar example was cited in 
the chapter on Ýaql, but it was a substance (and not a source/entity) that carried the creation in 
time out there.
420
 When appearing in an infinitive form, the term is used synonymously with 
ÒanÝa: “that which is said in this respect has come to an end, and intellects are forced by this 
analogy [to accept] that the Maker of these creatures is one, omnipotent; He has no helper in 
His making them and no supporter in His creating them [in time].”421 IÎdÁ× and ÒanÝa are 
                                                          
416
 Ibid., p. 97,19-21 
مث نأ ءاملا رانلاو   اعيمج نيداقنم امهلمعتستل ىنأ تئش فيكو ،تدرأ اهرخستو كل امدنع ثدحت اهيف اهلمعتستو كلذب ىلع اهنأ ةثدحم ةنوكم  
417
 e.g. al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p.  99,11 
 ةقولخم ةثدحم ىلويهلا نأ معزن لب 
Ibid., p. 99, 12 
   ةقولخملا ةثدحملا ىلويهلا نأب نونعت متنك نإ 
etc., as in Ibid., p. 179,7; p. 179, 12, … 
I bid., p. 99, 18:  
ةقولخم ةثدحم ىلويهلا نأ متررقأ دقف 
These two can even be paired with ’perceivable’ and ’imaginable’: Ibid., p. 100,1: 
أ متبجوأ نإفةثدحم ةقولخم ةموهوملاو ةسوسحملا اهلك ءايشلأا ن  
418
 “What share does the eternity of the hyle have in the eternity of pre-eternity if they claim that it is forced by 
and obeys to Whom differentiates it and divides it, and creates accidents in it (i.e. by delineating forms and 
changing it from a state to another)?” Ibid. p. 98,12-14 
 اهضعبو اهلصف نم ىدل ةروهقم ةداقنم اهنأ مهمعز دنع ةيلزلأا مدق يف ىلويهلا مدق يف دجوي مهس يأ وأثدحأو  لاكشلأا ريدقت نم اهيف ضارعلأا
؟لاح ىلإ لاح نم ةلاحلإاو 
419
 Ibid. p. 150,2-3 
ب تهتنا وه اهل مدقتم نيع دوجو ىلإ ةيورلا اندحأاهث اهأشنأو  
420
 “In the first investigation, witnesses of the bodily forms of creatures necessitated for the intellect to affirm 
that there is a substance that created them in time and brought them into being. In the second investigation, the 
fact, that in his infinite pre-existence he had abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on he carried out 
their making as a donation, [forced the intellect] to render pre-eternal life necessary for him. And the third 
investigation, on the basis of his perfect government, and of what had previously shown of his care, guided [the 
intellect to accept] that he carries this out in order to be generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of 
his Word and the pre-eternity of his wisdom, necessarily.” Ibid., p. 152,5-9 
هنإف امك نع دهاوشلا نم لاكشأ قئلاخلا ترطضا لوقعلا يف صحفلا لولأا ىلإ دوجو تابثإ   رهوج اهثدحأ ،اهأشنأو صحفلاو يناثلا نم هعربت 
اهتعنصب دعب هكاسمإ   اميدق نع اهقلخ ىلإ باجيإ ةايحلا هل ، ايلزأ كلذك ام لد صحفلا لاثلاث نم ماكحإ هتسايس اهل امو مدقت نم قباس هتمه نأب 
دوجي ىلع ريغ ،اهب دهشي ىلع ةيرهوج هتملك ةيلزأو هتمكح   ارارطضإ 
421
 Ibid., pp. 103,21-104,1 
لاو اهتعنص يف هل ًانوع لا ميكح رداق دحاو قئلاخلا هذه عناص نأ ىلإ سايقلا اذه دنع لوقعلا ترطضاو هجولا اذه يف لوقلا ىهتنا يف هل ًارزاؤم 
اهثادحإ 
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synonyms in passive participial forms, too.
422
 Another parallel is offered either by passive or 
active participial forms of iÎdÁ× and ta’lÐf: if something is created in time, it is also 
composite, and it must have a Creator (in time) or a Composer.
423
 Even the action or the fact 
of being generated can be a proof of the existence of a Creator. IÎdÁ× and ta’lÐf can be 
accompanied by tarkÐb: so all three actions may be considered synonymous.424 When used in 
a passive participial form, muÎda× is contrasted with eternal, qadÐm.425 
Concluding we may say that iÎdÁ× may sometimes be understood as an appellative, 
not a term, in the meaning of giving a start, make happen; otherwise it is used together with 
other terms that refer to the creative action, such as takwÐn, Ìalq, inšÁ’, ÒanÝa, ta’lÐf, and 
tarkÐb. This meaning is somewhere in the middle between philosophical and theological 
uses. When a source or entity, Ýayn, or when a substance, Êawhar is mentioned as the One 
who carries this action out, it is closer to philosophical terminology and interpretation. When 
it is God, or God, the Logos (especially in the case of incarnation), theological aspects are 
stronger. We need to mention that even disposition appears as a related meaning among these 
examples. 
Remaining still at the same root, we need to examine another form, Îada×Án, i.e. 
contingence. When examining the term that refers to coming into being, ÎudÙ× we saw above 
the following citation: “If the praedicatum of what has always existed is natural 
transcendence and abstention from receiving accidents, then the same way, the praedicatum 
of what is found to receive the contingence of accidents is that its existence came into being 
and was created, necessarily.”426 So the same root can express contingence. The same idea is 
expressed when pre-eternity is contrasted with the receptivity for contingence, as we have 
seen above in the case of ‘coming into being.’427 The reverse idea is also given: something 
                                                          
422
 Ibid., p. 97,13 
ةعونصم ةثدحم يهو لاإ اهنايعأ يف رايغلاو نايرجلا عجنأ نكي ملو 
Ibid., p. 154,1 
 ًاعونصم ًاثدحم لاإ ،ًلاعاف ًاعناص كردت لا مهساوح 
423
 Ibid., p. 103,10 
كلذ ةفص نم ناك   افلؤم   اثدحم هلو فلؤم ثدحم  
424
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 152,18 
لب كلذ نم تافص ماسجلأا ةثدحملا ةفلؤملا ةبكرملا  
425
 Ibid., p.179,4-5 
انوربخأف نع اذه حيسملا يذلا وه يف هتيحيسم انعم دحاو .ميدقأ وه مأ ؟ثدحم  
Ibid., p.180,1 
 ًادحاو ًاجارس ًاريسي ةثدحم ةليتفو ةميدق ًاران نأ امك 
426
 Ibid., p. 98,10-12 
 يفلأ ام مكح كلذك ،ًايعيبط ضارعلأا لوبق نم عانتملااو ءلاتعلاا لزي مل ام مكح ناك نإفناثدحل  ًارارطضا قلخلاو نوكلا ثودح ًلاباق ضارعلأا  
427
  “If the praedicatum of what has always existed is natural transcendence and abstention from receiving 
accidents, then the same way, the praedicatum of what is found to receive the contingence of accidents is that its 
existence came into being and was created, necessarily” Ibid. p. 98,10-12 
فلأ ام مكح كلذك ،ًايعيبط ضارعلأا لوبق نم عانتملااو ءلاتعلاا لزي مل ام مكح ناك نإف ًارارطضا قلخلاو نوكلا ثودح ًلاباق ضارعلأا ناثدحل ي  
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that cannot receive contingence must be pre-eternal.
428
 This term has a scarce appearance and 
the remaining examples
429
 express the same idea. 
There is one form left that has the same roots, the active participle, ÎÁdi×, i.e. 
contingent, created (in time), coming into being. For the sake of brevity, only those examples 
are mentioned that can add any new implications to what was said above. E. g. there is an 
instance when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses ÎÁdi× instead of muÎdi×: “We would say: You have 
laid down that hyle is created, created in time, and it is the origin of elements. But what has 
the Creator of the hyle produced it of? Is it of another – earlier – matter? Or is it [made] of 
another, even earlier [matter]? [If so,] you can go on like this perpetually, without end.”430 We 
could see it in the meaning of ‘coming into being,’ paired with the creative action,431 or, in the 
case of the Messiah, as we could see it above, it is also ‘coming into being,’ or ‘nascent.’432 
This unique appearance can not be a characteristic of a different Christian interpretation and 
usage, but it is really interesting, since ÎÁdi× in Muslim kalÁm and philosophy can only mean 
‘created in time.’ This example offers a remarkable contrast, but further examples would be 
necessary to underpin it with a greater certainty. We have seen the following citation above 
when examining Îada×a, as ‘happen, come into being;’ accordingly, a participle in such a 
context does not stand for an attribute, but rather an appellative: something that happens, 
comes into being: “As for what occurs because of this unity as an arising [thing] between 
them, it will be related to the human, who was brought to these privileges, who was granted 
these gifts uniquely, and nothing can affect the Pre-eternal in this [unity], nor can anything 
come into being in Him.”433 
There is no definition given for these terms by al-KindÐ, but the term ÎÁdi× appears 
in his definition for the perceiving faculty, in the meaning of occurring, created in time.
434
 Al-
ËwÁrizmÐ gives more definitions for different forms and stems, but none of them is defined 
                                                          
428
 Ibid., p. 98,1-2 
لاح ىلإ لاح نم ةلاحتسلااو ناثدحلا لوبق نم عانتملااو ءلاتعلاا ةيلزأ ًامئاق لظي مل ام مكح نإ كلذو 
429
 Ibid., p. 99,7; 183,4 
430
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 99,18-21 
نلقا :دقف متررقأ نأ ىلويهلا ةثدحم ةقولخم يهو رصنع ،عيابطلا اهثداحو نم يأ ءيش لعج ؟ىلويهلا نمأ ةدام ىرخأ ؟اهتمدقت وأ تناك نم  
ةمدقتم   اضيأ ،اهلبق نوليحتف كلذ ىلإ دمرسلا يذلا لا ءاهتنا هل. 
431
 “and we have found that He has a creation that comes into being in time,” Ibid. p. 149,16-17 
 ًاقلخ هل اندجو مثً اثداح هثدحأ هنوكو  
432
 “The Messiah – as far as His being the Messiah is concerned – is nascent, he came into being after he had not 
been existant.” Ibid., p. 179,11 
يسم نكي مل نأ دعب ثدح ثداح هتيحيسم ةهج نم حيسملا لب ًاح  
See also Ibid., p. 179,17. 
433
 Ibid., p. 183,9-11 
ريغ نم ،ًةصاخ بهاوملا هذهب هيلع معنملا ،لئاضفلا هذه ىلإ بذتجملا يرشبلا ىلإ فاضي هنإف ،امهنيب ثداحب داحتلاا اذه نم ضرع ام امأف  نأ
ثداح هب ثدح لاو ضراع كلذ يف يلزلأا ضرع نوكي 
434
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 167. 
 ةساسحلا ةوقلا-  ريغتلاب رعشت يتلا يهثداحلا ندبلا نع ًاجراخ ناك اممو ندبلا ءاضعأ نم هب رعشت نأ اهلاثم ،ءايشلأا نم دحاو لك يف  
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as a philosophical term; instead, they are introduced as kalÁm terms. The first one to be 
mentioned is al-muÎda×: “Created in time is what exists after not having existed.”435 Then, 
he introduces ÎudÙ× and muÎdi× together: “the seventh section in uÒÙl al-dÐn of which 
mutakallims speak: the first of them is the establishment that bodies are created in time, and 
the response to the dahriyya, who claim that the world is eternal; and the indication that the 
world has a Creator in time, and it is God (eulogy).”436 It is remarkable that even the 
subsection in which the author introduces these terms shows that the terminology is that of 
theology, and the concepts expressed by them belong to the field of theology, too. The 
meanings of the terms are the same that we could see at ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. However, a 
difference can be discerned: al-ËwÁrizmÐ refers to the classical pair of oppositions, i.e. 
iÎdÁ× v.s. qidam, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ mostly contrasted the former with azaliyya. This 
difference may be due to the fact that al-ËwÁrizmÐ is a later author, by whose era 
terminology had already been more elaborated. 
The Muslim theologian, Ibn FÙrak, defines two of these stems: al-ÎÁdi× and al-
muÎda×: “The definition of what is/was created (in time): [it is] what exists (i.e. comes from) 
a preceding [thing, cause]. That which comes into being and that which is created in time are 
the same.
437
 Even though ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not refer explicitly to causality, his 
approach is similar, since everything that is created in time needs a Creator, i.e. a cause. Ibn 
FÙrak’s definition is rather philosophical, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s one is theological. Ibn 
FÙrak also refers to ÎÁdi× in the definition of action, in a plural form. The context shows that 
it is used in the meaning of beings created in time.
438
 In this, he may also be compared to 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. The same term appears in the definition of acquisition, in the meaning 
of ‘coming into being.’439 ÍudÙ×, as the action of coming into being, is present in his 
definitions for two different things,
440
 two contrary things,
441
 repetition,
442
 and 
                                                          
435
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 83. 
نكي مل نأ دعب نئاكلا وه ثدحملا 
436
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 94. 
 نوملكتملا اهيف ملكتي يتلا نيدلا لوصأ يف عباسلا لصفلا 
 ىلع درلاو ماسجلأا ثودح يف لوقلا اهلوأةيرهدلا ىلاعت الله وهو ًاثدحم ملاعلل نأ ىلع ةللادلاو ،رهدلا مدقب نولوقي نيذلا  
437
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fi ’l-uÒÙl, pp. 5-41., p. 20 
أ نع دجو ام :ثدحملا دحءاوس ثدحملاو ثداحلا .لو  
438
 Ibid., p. 20 
دح لعفلا :عرتخملا ،تاذلا هنوكو كلذل لا قلعتي لاإ برلاب ،هناحبس عدتبملا رئاسل ثداوحلا نايعلأاو  
439
 Ibid., p. 20. 
هب رودقملاب ةثداحلا هتردق قلعت دنع انم رداقلا هب فرصتي مكحو لاح وه :بسكلا دح 
440
 Ibid. p. 22. 
 ام :نيريغلا دحمهدحأ دوجو وأ مدقت وأ ثودحب وأ نيناكم وأ نينامزب امإ رخلآل نيئيشلا دحأ ةرياغم زاجا رخلآا دوجو مدع عم  
441
 Ibid. p. 22. 
نيفلتخم وأ نيلثم نانوكي دقو ،ثودحلا ةهج نم دحاولا نمزلا يف دحاولا لحملا يف نايفانتي ام :نيدضلا دح 
442
 Ibid. p. 22. 
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(Ever)lasting.
443
 He also refers to it as contrasted to existence and non-existence, as it can be 
understood from the context, as coming into being.
444
 In all these, the interpretation of 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is paralleled. 
Ibn SÐnÁ dedicates a definition on its own for iÎdÁ×; but differentiates between a 
kind that happens in time and another kind which has no relation to time. The kind related to 
time is making one exist after not having existed in time; the other is rather concentrating on 
the emanation of existence without respect to time.
445
 It is the first meaning that is usually 
represented in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s book. But if we think of what he in particular, and all 
Christian authors in general write on the emanation of existence out of time (either in the case 
of the Son who has always been born; or the Spirit), it shows some similarity. It is even 
possible that Christian understanding of the emanation of existence might have influenced 
Muslim thought in this field. 
As for al-ÀmidÐ’s al-MubÐn, the terms examined above do not appear among his 
definitions, except for the active participial form of the first stem. On the basis of this, we can 
understand what an infinitive or a IVth stem form could mean for him. “As for what is 
created in time/comes into being: this [name] is given to express what needs a cause, even if 
it has not been preceded by non-existence, like the world. This name is also given to what is 
preceded in its existence and preceded by non-existence. Thus if the world is called eternal by 
them, it is an expression for its not having been preceded by non-existence, and if it is called 
coming into being/created in time, it is an expression for its need for a cause for its 
existence.”446 On the basis of al-ÀmidÐ’s defining ÎÁdi× as needing a cause for its existence, 
iÎdÁ× could probably be understood as the action of that cause: i.e. causing something to 
come into being, bringing into being. In this respect, al-ÀmidÐ’s conception is consenting 
with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s approach. However, al-ÀmidÐ contrasts eternal to created in 
time, which indicates either that he relies on a different tradition from that of ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ, or that by his time the delineation of terminologies had reached a more developed 
stage. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
و دعب ثودحلا وه :ةداعلإا دحامهنيب مدع هللختو مدقت دق ناك دوج  
443
 Ibid. p. 22. 
دح يقابلا :وه نئاكلا ريغب ثودح  
444
 Ibid. p. 35. 
445
 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, pp. 43-44. 
مو قباس نامز يف دوجو هل نكي مل نأ دعب ءيش داجيإ ينامزلا ثادحلإا ىنعمو ينامز ريغ رخلآاو ينامز امهدحأ نيهجو ىلع لاقي ثادحلإا ىنع
نيرملأا لاك نامز لك يف لب نامز نود نامز بسحب لا دوجولا كلذ هتاذ يف ... سيلو ًادوجو ءيشلا ةدافإ وه ينامزلا ريغلا ثادحلإا 
446
 al-ÀMIDÏ, S., al-MubÐn fÐ šarÎ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ÎukamÁ’ wa-’l-mutakallimÐn, p. 118. 
 امأوثداحلاعلا ىلإ رقتفي ام هب داريو قلطي دقف : ملاعلا :اذه ىلعف .مدعلاب قوبسم وهو لوأ هدوجول ام ىلعو .ملاعلاك ؛مدعلاب قوبسم ريغ ناك نإو ةل
.  ىمس نإو ،مدعلاب قوبسم ريغ هنأ رابتعاف ًاميدق مهدنع ىمس نإً اثداح هدوجو يف ةلعلا ىلإ رقتفم هنأ رابتعاف  
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
126 
 
Al-ÉurºÁnÐ’s al-TaÝrÐfÁt follows the alphabetical order in introducing terms and 
definitions, so we will follow this order, too, in his case. The first one to appear is the 
infinitive of the IVth stem, iÎdÁ×, i.e. the production of something that has the anteriority in 
time.
447
 Let us also remember that the same concept was introduced (in a contrasting way) in 
his definition for ibdÁÝ, too: while ibdÁÝ had no anteriority of time and matter, iÎdÁ× was 
introduced as having the anteriority of time.
448
 As for ÎÁdi×, its definition is as follows: 
“What comes into being is preceded by non-existence, and it is called a coming into being in 
time. [The term may also] express a coming into being that needs another [i.e. a cause], and it 
is called an existential coming into being.”449 A really similar interpretation is expressed in 
al-ÉurºÁnÐ’s definition for coming into being:  
“Coming into being is an expression for the existence of an existent [thing] after its 
nonexistence. The existential coming into being means that the existent needs another [thing, 
cause] for its existence. Coming into being in time means that a thing is preceded by 
nonexistence in a temporal sense. The first one is absolutely more general than the second 
one.”
450
 
We can see that later Muslim use is more specific than early Greek usage as it appears 
at Church Fathers. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation already includes those two meanings 
that can be discerned at later Muslim thinkers: the existence of a thing after its nonexistence, 
in a temporal extension, i.e. al-ÎudÙ× al-zamÁnÐ; and contingency: a being's existence after 
not having existed, in an ontological or essential extension, which does not necessarily 
involve time, i.e. al-ÎudÙ× al-ÆÁtÐ. His usage also shows parallels with mutakallims’ usage 
of ‘beginning in time’ as a basis for proving the existence of God. So in this case it is quite 
probable that Christian authors in general, and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, influenced 
later Muslim interpretations; or at least, they represent a transition between the two. 
 
4. IÌtirÁÝ – creation, invention 
 
There is no Greek equivalent for iÌtirÁÝ (creation, invention) to the best of my 
knowledge. It is a scarcely used term even by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. We have seen it among 
                                                          
447
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 22. 
جيإ ثادحلإانامزلاب قوبسم ءيش دا  
448
 Ibid. p. 18. 
449
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 93. 
 ًايتاذ ًاثودح ىمسيو ،ريغلا ىلإ ةجاحلاب ثودحلا نع ربعي دقو ،ًاينامز ًاثودح ىمسيو ،مدعلاب ًاقوبسم نوكي ام ثداحلا 
450
 Ibid., p. 95. 
حلا)و( .همدع دعب ءيشلا دوجو نع ةرابع ثودحلا ءيشلا نوك وه ينامزلا ثودحلا)و( .ريغلا ىلإ هدوجو يف ًارقتفم ءيشلا نوك وه يتاذلا ثود
يناثلا نم ًاقلطم معأ لولأاو ،ًاينامز ًاقبس مدعلاب ًاقوبسم 
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the definitions of intellect, Ýaql, in a participial form: “[the other cause] is psychical, spiritual, 
namely the intellect, which is the faculty of the anima/soul that creates these subtle things, 
which we can see in the making of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of 
(bodily) structures, and similar making actions that can be carried out by the wisdom of the 
anima and the reflexion of the intellect.”451 It is to be noted, that the root is used together with 
ÒanÝa, taÒwÐr, ta’lÐf, i.e. with a term referring to the creative action and with others that 
express its modality. As a verb, we may see it as follows: “And also, if you investigated the 
names and attributes by which the servants named and described their Lord, you would find 
that all of them are produced and inspired by the Books of God that had been sent down, and 
in which He had informed them on His names and attributes He had chosen for Himself; and 
it was not the people who had invented them on their own.”452 As it can be seen, ‘creation ex 
nihilo’ is somewhat modified in this context. ‘Ex nihilo’ can be accepted, but instead of 
creation, it is rather invention, making up. 
Among the Muslim authors examined here, it is only Ibn FÙrak who mentions the 
term. His definition for action was already referred to above. The same definition contains the 
current term in participial form, and the context shows that it means ‘invented/started ex 
nihilo.’ So Ibn FÙrak seems to share ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation in this case.453 As a 
conclusion we may say, that apparently ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used this word as a term before 
its having been defined as an idiom of a special connotation by Muslim authors. 
  
5. Ëalq454 - creation 
 
Origination, creation, i.e. Ìalq corresponds to the ποιεῖν of Greek philosophical 
texts.
455
 The same term is widely used in Greek Patristic literature, too. Lampe enumerates 
several meanings, but the most important ones are referring to God’s creation. As for Islamic 
use, we know that God is called ËÁliq by virtue of His creation (Ìalq) of man, made of clay.456 
                                                          
451
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 157,16-19 
ىرخلأا ةيناسفن ةيناحور ينعأ لقعلا يذلا وه ةوق سفنلا عرتخملا هذه فئاطللا يتلا ىرن نم ةعنص مارجلاا ريوصتو لاكشلأا فيلأتو ناينبلا 
وحنو كلذ نم تاعانصلا رودقملا اهيلع ةمكحب سفنلا ةيورو لقعلا 
452
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 167,10-13. 
علا اهب فصوو ىمس يتلا تافصلاو ءامسلأا نع تصحف ول كنأ امك اهيف يتلا ةلزنملا الله بتك نم اهعيمج تيحوتساو تجتنأ امنإ اهتدجول ،مهبر داب
مهسفنأ ءاقلت نم هل اهوعرتخا سانلا نأ لا هسفنل هتافصو هئامسأ نم راتخا امب مهربخأ 
453
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fi ’l-uÒÙl, p. 20. 
دح لعفلا :عرتخملا ،تاذلا هنوكو كلذل لا قلعتي لاإ برلاب ،هناحبس عدتبملا رئاسل ثداوحلا نايعلأاو  
454
 HAYEK does not provide a translation for the term. 
455
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, p. 92. 
456
 C.f. SÙrat al-RaÎmÁn, 55,14: 
 ََقلَخ  َناَس إِن إلإا  إنِم   لاَصإلَص  ِرا َّخَفإلاَك 
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One of the central themes in the Qur’Án is that reflection upon creation (Ìalq) ratifies God’s 
peerless authority to command and his unique prerogative to be worshipped. This indicates 
that the proper response to him is submission to his will.
457
 Let us see, what position Christian 
usage takes between the two. 
1. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term Ìalq in various contexts in the meaning of creation, 
but whether it is to be understood ex nihilo or creation out of pre-existing matter is not 
clear. The first appearance would leave the question open: “We would say: what is 
your argument against who denies that the Creator had matter out of which he formed 
something? And if he said: if He had no possibility to create the substances ex nihilo 
in His potency and in the eternity of His pre-eternity, then He could only bring them 
into being from His own nature and produce them from the essence of His own 
substance.”458 It is remarkable that creation ex nihilo is referred to by adding the 
expression lÁ min šay’; and it is contrasted with the word iftaÝala. The explicit 
appearance of lÁ min šay’ shows that the lack of some kind of anteriority (i.e. pre-
existing material) is not necessarily included in the connotation of the term. The 
second appearance would indicate the ex nihilo interpretation: “we would negate this, 
since we are sure that the One who had the potency to create His creations ex nihilo, 
can not be ignorant or impotent to create His creatures completely, entirely – for 
intelligible and useful reasons.”459 In this sentence no anteriority of matter can be 
presumed. Another example introduces the creation of human anima, soul, i.e. nafs; 
which is referred to by the same term, Ìalq, but it is explicitly expressed that soul is 
not created of something else (e.g. pre-existing matter):  
“As we know of the matter, out of which your body was generated as a body, it came 
from the solidity of your father; then, out of the blister a body, limbs and members 
were formed. When the creation of the body and its limbs had been complete, a living 
soul was created in it, not of the solidity of your father, … and your soul was not bred 
by your father and not of the elements of the blister.”
460
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
and: GARDET, L., IbdÁÝ, In.: IE, Second edition, Vol. III., p. 663. 
457
 PETERSON, D. C., Creation, In: EQ, Leiden, Brill, 2005. Vol. I., pp. 472-80, p. 472. 
458
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 98,5-8 
 ةدام قلاخلا يدل نوكي نأ ركنأ نم ىلع مكتجح امف :انلقف ناكمإ هتيلزأ مدقو هتردق يف نكي مل اذإ لب :لاقف ً؟ائيش اهنم لعتفاقلخل  نم لا رهاوجلا
هرهوج تاذ نم اهجتنأو هسفن عابط نم اهأشنأ امنإف ،ءيش 
459
 Ibid., 102,10-12 
انلق :انركنأ كلذ نم ثيح انقيأ نأب يذلا ردق هتردقب نأ قلخي قئلاخلا لا نم ءيش ريدق نأ لا نوكي لهج مأ جعز نع نأ قلخي هقئلاخ ةمات ةلماك 
بابسلأ ةلوقعم ةعفان 
460
 Ibid., p. 193,13-16 
امك دق ملعن نم ةداملا يتلا نوك كندب اهنم ، اندب امنإو تناك نم بلص ،كيبأ مث روص نم ةفطنلا اندب حراوجو لاصوأو .ىتح اذإ تلمك ةقلخ ندبلا 
هحراوجو تقلخ هيف نم دعب كلذ سفن ةيح لا نم بلص كيبأ،  ...كسفنو مل اهدلي كوبأ لاو نم عابط هتفطن 
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For the first instance in this example, the creation of the body is introduced as the 
action of its generation and formation of pre-existing matter, and at the same time, 
Ìalq is used in a parallel way with takwÐn and taÒwÐr. When Ìalq is used for the 
second time, it refers to the creation of the soul, which is carried out of no pre-existing 
matter. So we may see that Ìalq can refer to a creative action, no matter what is created 
(a “thing”, i.e. an existent being whatsoever, a human body or a soul). Let us 
remember a parallel we’ve seen in the chapter on terms of bodily connotations. Our 
example of the ÎadÐ× on the sequence of man’s creation can be cited here again.461 
We can not say that there is a direct relationship between the ÎadÐ× and ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s example, but we need to remember that the tradition referred to may be 
found in al-BuÌÁrÐ’s and Muslim’s ÒaÎÐÎs, al-TirmiÆÐ’s Sunan, etc., which implies 
that this tradition had been widely known and accepted by the time of ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ. He might have intended to use an imagery known and accepted by Muslims. 
The sequence of creation is referred to by the same term: Ìalq, in both instances. 
Another example for Ìalq referring to production out of pre-existing matter – though 
producing a large amount out of a small quantity – is a reference to an action 
mentioned in the New Testament: “It is clear that the one whose nature was overcome 
by the power of hunger, is not the essence which out of four loaves of bread created 
[a quantity] that satisfied the hungry stomachs of thousands. Both things are related of 
the One Messiah.”462 This example is somewhere in the middle: since there is pre-
existent matter (four loaves of bread), but the outcome is much more than that, there is 
addition and multiplication in the action of Ìalq. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not seem to 
have used the term in a firm, strictly limited sense, as far as ex nihilo is concerned, just 
only as a term that refers to a kind of creative action.   
2. Another group of examples show the term Ìalq in a context where the number of 
creators is discussed. E.g. the alleged opponent may ask: “What do you negate to be 
the creation of two who are in agreement and cooperate, and not of two contraries that 
are in opposition. Both could have created kinds of creatures that are beneficent for 
                                                          
461
 al-NAWAWÏ, Forty Hadith, tanslated by IBRAHIM, E. – JOHNSON-DAVIES, D., Damascus, DÁr al-
Qur’Án al-KarÐm, 1977 , p. 37. “The creation of each of you is completed in his mother’s womb for forty days 
in the form of a drop, then he becomes a clot of blood for the same interval, then a morsel of flesh for the same 
period, then there is sent to him the angel who blows his soul into him.” C.f. 
 ُث اًمَْوي َنيَِعبْرَأ ِه ُِّمأ ِنَْطب ِيف ُُهقْلَخ ُعَمُْجي ْمُكَدََحأ َِّنإ َِعبَْرِأب ُرَمُْؤَيف اًَكلَم ُ
َّالله ُثَعَْبي َُّمث َِكلَذ َلْثِم ًةَغْضُم ُنوَُكي َُّمث َِكلَذ َلْثِم ًَةَقلَع ُنوَُكي َّم ُْبتْكا َُهل ُلَاُقيَو ٍتاَِملَك
 ُحو ُّرلا ِهِيف َُخفُْني َُّمث  ديِعَس َْوأ ٌِّيقَشَو َُهلََجأَو َُهقْزِرَو َُهلَمَع … 
462
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 210,5-7 
 لايق نيرملأا لاكو :ةعئاج فولأ نوطب هب عبشأ ام ةفغرأ عبرأ نم تقلخ يتلا تاذلاب سيل هعابط ىلع عوجلا ناطلس بلغ يذلا نأ حضاو اذهو يف
دحاولا حيسملا 
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the world and those who live in it, and this way they [could have] cooperated in a 
single, harmonizing management/arrangement.”463 In this approach, creation would 
not be a unique, absolute action; it could belong to more than one actor. According to 
this idea creation would be followed by arrangement or management, i.e. tadbÐr, 
which is also an important divine action, in close relation to creation. This is refuted, 
e.g. by the following argument: “Or how could the agreement of this creation and the 
perfection of this government have come [into being] by the will of two impotent, 
weak endeavourers?”464 The word Ìalq may refer to the created beings and the action 
of the creation itself, too. We get to know that creation is in close connection with its 
outcome: i.e. harmony; it is a starting point of a perfect government; and there is also a 
reference made to its actor: the will of (one or more – as it is under discussion in this 
example –) endeavourers. The demonstration of the unity of the One who carries 
creation out is essential, since later on all the persons of the Trinity are referred to as 
Creators. It is thus a point of fundamental importance that needs to be proven before 
moving forward to the discussion of the number of hypostases.  
There are examples e.g. on the basis of the New Testament: “John says: the 
Word has always been existent, and the Word has always been with God, and God has 
always been the Word, and it has always been with God. And everything was created 
by Him, and without Him nothing that later existed could have been generated.”465 
Here the Word is an actor or a means in creation, but at the same time He is in unity 
with God, the creator. Another point which is worthy of attention is that Ìalq and 
takwÐn are used as synonyms. The Son’s participation in creation seems more active 
on the basis of the next example: “He says I am the Son of God, and I only do the acts 
of my Father and I create as my Father does.”466 Basically the same saying is repeated 
a bit later in the text,
467
 which indicates that this teaching is of great importance. The 
unity of the creative action serves to underline the unity of the creative hypostases, as 
well.  
                                                          
463
 Ibid., p. 102,6-8 
 نم نوكي نأ متركنأ يذلا امفقلخ قفاوتم نينثإ اهنم دحاو لكو ،نيمواقتم نيدداضتم لا نينواعتم نيقلخ  ملاعلا حلاص هيف ام قئلاخلا عاونأ نم
قفتم دحاو ريبدت يف انواعت كلذكو ؛هلهأو 
464
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 103,19-21 
 اذه قافتا ىتأت فيك وأقلخلا يزجاع نيفلكتم ةئيشمب ةسايس هذه ماكحإونيفيعض ن  
465
 Ibid. p.  208,11-12 
ناك امم ءيش نوكي مل هنودو قلخ هب لكو .الله ىدل لزي مل اذه ةملكلا وه اللهو الله دنع ناك ةملكلاو ،ةملكلا ناك لزي مل :انحوي لاقو 
466
 Ibid. p. 212,16-17 
يبأ قلخي امك قلخأ ،يبأ لامعأ لمعأ امنإو الله نبا ينإ لوقيو  
467
 Ibid. p. 252,18-19 
لاقف ينإ لعفأ امك لعفي يبأ قلخأو امك قلخي يبأ  
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Finally, let us see examples that indicate that all the three persons are one in 
their creation. In the first, lengthy case the author demonstrates that the three 
hypostases are all creators, but they should not be counted as three, since their will for 
creation is one.
468
 Again, unity in the action of creation proves the unity of persons 
and vice versa. In this case, the author uses active participial forms for Creator: ËÁliq, 
ÑÁniÝ, and BÁri’. Accordingly, just as the verbal nouns, the corresponding verbs that 
refer to the creative action are to be concerned synonymous. We need to notice that  
BÁri’ also offers Biblical parallels, given that this term is also used in the Old 
Testament to denote Creator.
469
 The other example is really similar in form and 
content,
470
 the three participles appear as synonyms, and two of the forms appear as 
synonymous verbs, too (Ìalq, ÒanÝa). What makes the persons unified in the creative 
action is the one will (irÁda and mašÐ’a); out of which and out of the one power 
(sulÔÁn) the whole creation was generated. Creation, Ìalq and generation, takwÐn are 
used as synonyms. Ëalq and takwÐn are then closely related to tadbÐr, too, and in the 
end of this demonstration the connection between Ìalq and irÁda is accentuated. 
3. A third group of examples can show that the created world is a sign of the existence of 
the Creator, e.g.: “he will be told: yes, you can find that the created world is created, 
and [from this] you will know, that it has a sole Creator who created it without 
process, effort, tiredness, and movement.”471 The way of gaining such knowledge is 
not specified here, but we have seen elsewhere (e.g. in the discussion of Ýaql) that the 
author uses sign-inference in such cases. It is to note that all forms: the created world, 
its attribute: ‘created,’ the Creator, and the verb create are all derived from the same 
stems. 
4. A fourth group of examples shows God’s creation to have a given outcome: e.g. He 
created humankind in a structure that necessarily needs food and drink for 
                                                          
468
 Ibid. p. 253,6-12 
خ ةثلث ةلاحم لا تناكل ًاقلاخو ًاقلاخو ًاقلاخ تفصو امك اهانددع ول نإ يرمعلف ،نيقلخ ةثلاث قلاخو قلاخو قلاخ نوكي فيكف :كلوق امأف نإ امأف .نيقلا
د لا ًايراب ًاعناص ًاقلاخ اهنم دحاو لك يمسن انك ريصت ًاقلخو ًاقلخو ًاقلاخ اهيمسن نأ انمزلي سيلف ،ةدحاو ةدارإو دحاو ىوهب قلخت اهنلأ ،هيبحاص نو
م دحاو لك نإ انلق ول ،نيقلاخ ةثلث ةلمجلا يف ريصت ًاقلخو ًاقلخو ًاقلخ اهدعن نأ انمزلي ناك امنإ .نيقلاخ ةثلث ةلاحم لا ةلمجلا يف هنم ةدارإو ةوقب اهن
حاص نود ًةصاخ هلوهيب 
469
 C.f. e.g. FREYTAG, G. Lexicon arabico-latinum, I., Beirut, Librairie du Liban, 1975, pp.101-102., and 
GESENIUS, W., Handwörterbuch über das Alte Testament, Berlin, Göttingen, Heidelberg, Springer-Verlag, 
1962., pp. 113-114. 
470
 Ibid. p. 253,20-254,4 
قن نيعناص ةثلثو ةثلث ةلمجلا يف اهتثلث تسيلو ،ئراب عناص قلاخ سدقلا حورو ئراب عناص قلاخ نبلااو ئراب عناص قلاخ هؤانث لج بلأا نإ لو
اهعيمج نأ كلذو .ًاعناص ًايراب ًاقلاخ هتيمس هتصاخب هتدرفأ تنأ اذإ اهنم دحاو لك ناك نإو ،قلاخو قلاخو قلاخ ًاضيأ ددعلا يف يه لاو  قلخي
م دحاو لك نأ لا ،ةقيلخلا ةلمج تنوكت دحاولا ناطلسلاو ةدحاولا ةئيشملاو ةدحاولا ةدارلإا كلت نعو .ةدحاو ةئيشمو ةدحاو ةدارإب عنصيو قلخي ةثلث ن
هقلخو حورلا ةدارإو هقلخو نبلاا ةدارإ يه هقلخو بلأا ةدارإ لب .هبحاص نود هلو هنم هتئيشمو هتدارإب ربديو عنصيو 
471
 Ibid. p. 214,10-11 
 ًادحاو ًاقلاخ هل نأ ملعتو ًاقولخم ًاقلخ دجت دق معن هل لاقي لبهقلخ ةكرح لاو بعت لاو ةفلك لاو جلاع لا نم   
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subsistence;
472
 He created them to feel pain,
473
 or in a bodily form that can be 
affected,
474
 etc. It is not specified how creation was carried out: its being ex nihilo or 
not is not emphasized in such cases. 
5. In the fifth group we can mention the objects of creation. Obviously, everything that 
exists is the object, the outcome of creation, but there are some instances where the 
objects are more explicitly named. It can be the (physical) bodies of existents,
475
 the 
world and what is in it, and human bodies combined with spirits,
476
 etc. 
6. As a sixth group, we could mention contexts where the cause or the motivation for 
creation is discussed. We get to know that it is grace, generosity and beneficence;
477
 
sometimes only generosity is mentioned.
478
 It is many times emphasized that creation 
is a good deed and is not due to a need of the Creator,
479
 (c.f. the example cited at 
ibtidÁÝ too, where deliberate creation is contrasted to force). A uniquely important 
point for Christian teaching is to be added here: even the creation of the Messiah is a 
grace.
480
 It is not the nature of God that forced Him to create.
481
 
7. A seventh group deals with the means of creation, which is specified as his potency, 
more specifically the potency of Wisdom.
482
 From another approach, it can be said 
that He created by His Word and Spirit.
483
 Yet from another approach, creation by 
God’s hands is to be discussed, and the result is that it has to be understood 
                                                          
472
 Ibid. p. 101,6-7 
… مهقلخ ىلع هذه ةينب ةرطضملا ىلإ ام اهميقي نم ماعطلا بارشلاو  
473
 Ibid. p. 107,6-8 
ملو ... نيفووأم نيرورضم نيعجوتم نيملآ مهقلخ ؟نيتئام لاو نيفووأم نيملآ ريغ نيلماك مهقلخي  
474
 Ibid. p. 107,10 
مهقلخ ىلع هذه ةئيهلا ةلباقلا راثيلإل  
475
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 103,13 
قلخ ماسجلأا  
476
 Ibid. p. 120,11-12 
ادبأ قلخو اهيف امو ايندلا قلخ الله نأ ًةرورض انملع اذإ انأ امك ًاحاورأ اهيف بكرو انن  
477
 e.g. 104,14 
 ًاماعنإو ًادوجو ًلاضفت قئلاخلا هذه قلخ 
478
 e.g. Ibid., p.  105,6 
مهيلع اهب داجو اهيف مهقلخ مث 
479
 e.g. Ibid., p. 106,7-8 
مهقلخ هتمعنب هدوجو لا ةجاحل تناك هب مهيلإ  
480
 Ibid., p. 255,7-8 
ا ةمعن يهو ،همعن لئاضف ىلإ مهبذتجاو مهقلخحيسملاب قلخل  
481
 e.g. Ibid., p. 151,18 
هعابط نأش اهب ميقي وأ هسفن ةجاح اهب دسيل لا 
482
 Ibid., p. 132,20-133,2 
ب لا ةردق يه يتلا هتمكحب روملأا هذه ريبدتو لاكشلأا هذه ريدقتو رهاوجلا هذه فيلأتو عئابطلا هذه قلخب فطل امنإ هؤانث لج هنأ ملعنو ىوس ةردق
هتمكح 
483
 Ibid., p. 153,1 
قلخ قلخلا هتملكب هحورو  
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metaphorically.
484
 It is an issue of importance in Muslim theological discourses as 
well, and with such argumentation, the author expresses that he shares the rejection of 
anthropomorphism. We may also mention in this group of examples the modality of 
creation: as we have seen, it was carried out without effort, movement, etc.
485
 
8. A rare example, but parallel to Muslim usage: Ìalq is used to express the “first” and 
the “second” creation, which is resurrection.486 
9. Finally, let us remember that Ìalq is frequently used together with other words 
referring to the creative action, e.g., inšÁ’, ÎudÙ×, ibtidÁ’ and ÒanÝa.487 And scarcely 
though, but bara’ is also used.488 Parallels can also be mentioned when the past 
participle, maÌlÙq is used.489 And the passive participle, as an adjective, appears 
frequently following words like created beings (ÌalÁ’iq),490 animals,491 substances,492 
the human part of the Messiah,
493
 bodies,
494
 etc. It can also be used as an appellative, 
meaning ‘created being(s),’495 created beings with the meaning of humanity,496 the 
human part of the Messiah.
497
 
We could see that the meanings seen in Greek Patristic usage are recurring in 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage, and in a more differentiated way. As for the Muslim 
counterparts, al-KindÐ does not give a definition for this term. He uses its passive participle 
though, as an appellative two times: once in the definition of istiÝmÁl, use, and once in the 
definition of the will of a created being, irÁdat al-maÌlÙq. As for the first one: “Use has its 
cause in will, and it can be the cause of other suggestions. It is the change, and it follows of all 
these causes that are the Creator’s action. This is why we say that the Creator (eulogy) turned 
His created beings favourable for one another, reproducing one another, and moving by one 
                                                          
484
 Ibid., p. 161,14-16 
بو هعارذب ينعي هتدجوف هلوق تنيبت اذإ كنإف ،هعارذب مأ هديب ًلاعف لعف وأ ًاقلخ قلخ هنأ هبتك ضعب يف ركذ دق هللاج زع الله ناك نإو هيهنو هرمأ هدي
هحورو هتملك نع نيدلوتملا هتدارإو  
485
 C.f. Ibid., p. 214,12-14. 
486
 E.g. Ibid., p. 109,10-11 
سيل وأ ةلماك ةينب ىلع اهدعب مهقلخ نم هب عمزأ امب اهب مهرورس لامك ةميقسلا ةينبلا هذه ىلع مهقلخ ىخوت لج ناك ذإ  
487
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 106,9-10 
ف ئشنيف ًاتقو قلخي نأ ًاعمزم هدوجب لزي مل ناك دق نأ كش لاوةعنص أدتباو لعف ثودحب لاإ كلذ نكميل نكي ملو ،مهقلخ هي  
488
 Ibid., p. 159,18 
وأ ىلإ يأ ءيش امم قلخ أربو  
489
 E.g. Ibid., p. 95,7: maÌlÙq + ÒanÝa; Ibid., p. 97,10: maÌlÙq + mukawwan; Ibid., p. 99,11, 12, 18: maÌlÙq + 
muÎda×; Ibid., p. 153,20: maÌlÙq + maÒnÙÝ; 
490
 E.g. Ibid. p. 121,1 
491
 E.g. Ibid. p. 166,11 
492
 E.g. Ibid. p. 170,11 
493
 E.g. Ibid. p.  180,5 
494
 E.g. Ibid. p. 213,16 
495
 E.g. Ibid. p. 166,1, 9 
496
 E.g. Ibid. p. 166,15 
497
 E.g. Ibid. p. 192,13 
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another.”498 As for the second one: “The will of a created being: is a faculty of the soul, 
which leans towards use by a motivation which made it lean to it.”499 The meaning cannot be 
further distinguished, we cannot decide whether this production is in time or with/out the 
anteriority of matter, but it is clear that the creator, BÁri’ produced these beings. On the basis 
of these examples, Ìalq is the creative action of the Creator.  
Among the Muslim books of definitions, Ibn SÐnÁ’s is the first to give a definition 
for the term: “Creation is a common name. It is used to refer to the emanation of existence in 
whatever way it may happen/as it is. It is also used to refer to the emanation of existence that 
comes into being from matter and form – in whatever way it is. It is used to refer to the 
second meaning if there is no preceding existence of any kind in potentia, like the correlation 
of matter and form in existence.”500 His approach is clearly philosophical, but the contents of 
the definitions are reflected in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use, too. 
The Muslim theologian al-ÉurºÁnÐ does not dedicate an entry on its own for the 
definition of this term and concept. This is remarkable, since the philosopher (Ibn SÐnÁ) 
dedicates a definition for it while the theologian does not. But as we have seen above, he 
introduces Ìalq by contrasting it to ibdÁÝ. 
“In the terminology of philosophers, ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ mean the creation of a thing not 
preceded by matter nor time, such as the intellects. IbdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ oppose takwÐn, i.e. 
generation, which means creation preceded by matter. Also, ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ oppose iÎdÁ×, 
creation in time which is preceded by time.” … ‘Direct creation’ is said to [be] the foundation 
of an existent [thing] out of nothing, while creation is the foundation of an existent [thing] 
from another. God (eulogy) said: “the (‘direct’) Creator of the heavens and the earth” (Cow, 
117). And also: “the creation of man” (Palm, 4). So ‘direct creation’ is more general than 
creation, this is why He said “the (‘direct’) Creator of the heavens and the earth” and “the 
creation of man,” and he didn’t say the ‘direct creation’ of man.”
501
  
                                                          
498
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 175. 
 لامعتسلاا-  هتلع زع يرابلا نإ لوقن كلذلو ،يرابلا لعف يه يتلا للعلا هذه عيمج مزلي ،رودلا وهو ،رخأ تارطخل ًةلع نوكي نأ نكمي دقو ،ةدارلإا
ضعبب ةكرحتم اهضعبو ،ضعبل ةجرختسم اهضعبو ،ضعبل حناوس اهضعب هتاقولخم ريص لجو 
499
  Ibid. p. 175. 
 قولخملا ةدارإ- عتسلاا وحن ليمت ةيناسفن ةوق يهكلذ ىلإ تلامأ ،ةحناس نع لام  
500
 Ibn SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, p. 43. 
ب يناثلا ىنعملا اذهل قلخ لاقيو ناك فيك ةروصو ةدام نع لصاح دوجو ةدافلإ قلخ لاقيو ناك فيك دوجو ةدافلإ قلخ لاقيف كرتشم مسا قلخلا دع
دوجولا يف ةروصلاو ةداملا مزلاتك ةوقلاب ام دوجو همدقتي مل نوكي نأ 
501
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 18. 
عادبلإا عادتبلااو (  اضيأ)، (يف حلاطصا ءامكحلا )وه داجيإ ءيش ريغ قوبسم ةدامب لاو ،نامز ،لوقعلاك وهو لباقي ،نيوكتلا هنوكل   اقوبسم 
،ةداملاب لباقيو ثادحلإا هنوكل   اقوبسم ،نامزلاب… 
عادبلإاو (وه )داجيإ ءيشلا نم لا ءيش .يقول عادبلإا سيسأت ءيشلا نع ،ءيش قلخلاو داجيإ ءيش نم ءيش .لاق الله ىلاعت" :عيدب تاومسلا 
ضرلأاو( "ةرقبلا/117 )لاقو" :قلخ ناسنلإا( "لحنلا/4)، عادبلإاو معأ نم ،قلخلا اذلو لاق" :عيدب تاومسلا ضرلأاو"، لاقو" :قلخ ناسنلإا "
ملو لقي عيدب ناسنلإا 
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We could see that Ìalq can be carried out of another existent [thing], so, according to al-
ÉurºÁnÐ, this in not the ex nihilo kind of creation. This interpretation can be found at 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, but as we saw, he is not as consistent in its usage as the Muslim author. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ represents the early formation of terminology, while by al-ÉurºÁnÐ’s 
time terms had already been more delineated. 
Concluding we may say that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage of this term is more 
differentiated than the meaning of its hypothetical Greek correspondent, ποιεῖν. However, he 
is not consistent in his use of it, since sometimes ex nihilo creation may be understood under 
it, sometimes a kind of creation that has an anteriority of matter. Given that his age is a period 
when the terminologies of theology and philosophy were on their way to separation, this kind 
of inconsistency is not surprising. What is more unexpected is that though Ìalq is a Qur’Ánic 
term, it appears relatively late in Muslim usage if compared with Christian one. ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s usage could be classified into nine main subdivisions on the basis of co-occurrences 
with other terms, themes, and meanings. As for the themes mentioned on the basis of 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples, we may see that Muslim usage can be paralleled to his 
interpretation where Ìalq is not considered to be ex nihilo. The question of the number of 
creators is not raised in the Muslim works examined here, but it is not startling: if tawÎÐd is 
endorsed it is not acceptable to discuss the number of creators. As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, 
his work is an apology that is to answer objections on the basis of the same tawÎÐd. He needs 
to establish the unity of the Creator, since he needs to establish the unity of the Trinity, as 
well. The third theme around which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples could be grouped is the 
idea that the created world is a reflection, a sign, or a proof of the existence of the Creator. 
Even if not in the books of definitions, but we have seen that it is an important idea in Muslim 
thought – as it was referred to above, in the preliminary lines of this subsection, on the basis 
of Gardet. In this case, we may think of a common and parallel line of the development of 
thought. As for the objects of creation and the given outcome that could be discerned on them, 
these details are not given in Muslim definitions, but it is reasonable, since a definition needs 
to say that Ìalq is production and the outcome is an existent (thing), which is actually always 
included in definitions.  
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s argumentation that creation is iÎsÁn, niÝma, tafaÃÃul, ÊÙd: i.e. 
beneficence, grace, divine gift, and generosity is remarkable. Creation as goodness cannot be 
found in Muslim books of definition, and it is rather a marginal matter in the manuals of 
Muslim theology. Although the Qur’Án itself enumerates creation as goodness in the Chapter 
al-RaÎmÁn for instance, Muslim theologians were interested more in Ìalq as ÒunÝ, i.e. 
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creation as making. It may rather be contrasted with what was referred to above, on the basis 
of Gardet, that creation ratifies God’s authority to command and his prerogative to be 
worshipped. As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples mentioning the means of creation, this 
idea is not reflected among definitions by Muslim authors either. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s idea 
of “first” and “second” creation may rather be paralleled to Muslim usage of ibtidÁ’ and 
ibdÁÝ; it is not the word Ìalq which is used by Muslim thinkers to refer to this contrast. As for 
the synonyms in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text that appear alongside the term Ìalq, we have seen 
instances where they appear in Muslim definitions, too, though, given that definition needs to 
clarify the accurate use of a term, these terms are used in order to contrast them with Ìalq, not 
as synonyms. We need to remark, finally, that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s differentiated use of the 
term already in the 9
th
 century is not paralleled in contemporary Muslim usage, so we may 
think of his (or more generally of Christian) influence in the formation of its interpretation in 
later Muslim usage. 
 
6. ÑinÁÝa, ÒunÝ – making 
 
And the active participle of the same root stands for τεχνίτης or δημιουργός.502 The 
terms ἡ τέχνη and ἡ πραγματεία are not listed by Lampe, so probably the two terms are not 
frequent in Greek Patristic literature in these forms. As for πρᾶξις, it is used as conduct, or act 
in general (either good or evil).
503
 Τεχνίτης means artificer, craftsman, and artist. This term 
refers to skilled workers in general, including makers of perfumes, cooks, hairdressers, etc. 
The same term refers to God as an architect of the universe, a supreme artist, a designer of the 
human body, the moulder of man, and the maker of the moral and spiritual order. Lampe also 
mentions that the term is used in contexts where distinction is made between God as Creator 
ex nihilo and the τεχνίτης who employs pre-existent matter. Τεχνίτης is used for the Logos, 
too, or to the Father in relation to Son, and finally, for νοῦς as an architectonic principle of 
universe.
504
 The term δημιουργός mostly means craftsman, author.505 
As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, he uses this term in a variety of contexts, with – 
accordingly – a range of (slightly) varying denotations. 
1. First of all, we can find the term referring to the creative action, but it is not always 
clear, whether it is meant to be ex nihilo or not. To the best of my knowledge, there are 
                                                          
502
AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, pp. 151-52.  
503
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 1127. 
504
 Ibid., p. 1392. 
505
 Ibid., p. 342. 
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two instances where ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term together with the expression 
ex nihilo: “[it] is proper [for Him] to be able to make something out of nothing.”506 In 
this respect, the term is synonymous with ibdÁÝ or Ìalq, when used together with the 
expression lÁ min šay’. Another example: “Isn’t it ignorance if someone claims that 
wills and determinations cooperate in the ex nihilo making of existent [thing]s?”507 So 
ex nihilo creation or making is in exclusive correlation with the existence of several 
Makers; if the ex nihilo act is accepted, it is to be considered a sign of the divine unity. 
2. Another approach that shows a synonymous relation between ÒanÝa and Ìalq is that 
the number of makers is discussed by using this term, as well. E.g.: on the behalf of 
the hypothetical opponent: “What denies that there should be two co-operators in the 
making of all creatures?”508 And as an answer: “How could there be two wills in the 
precision of the making of the creatures we see?”509 The perfection of making should 
be considered a sign, and a proof of divine unity, even according to the supposed 
opponent: “… we may see a proof in the precise making of these creatures and the 
precision of this order altogether [showing that the] Maker, Creator, Handler is One, 
Living, Wise.”510 And this last thought is expressed again but referring to the unity of 
the Trinity, as follows: “All of them creates and makes by one will and one 
determination. Out of this one will, one determination and one power has the totality 
of creation been generated. It is not the case that each one of the three would create, 
make and set up [an] order by his own will and own determination that belong to Him 
only and not to His partner[s].”511 
3. As a third similarity, ÒanÝa also has objects. Obviously, everything that exists as a 
result of divine making is the object, the outcome of the creative action, but there are 
some instances where the objects are more explicitly named. As a typical one, let us 
mention bodies (aÊrÁm), on the basis of an example we have already seen in several 
differing cases. “[the other cause] is psychical, spiritual, namely the intellect, which is 
                                                          
506
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 104,8-9 
 …ءيش نم لا ءيش ةعنص ىلع ىوقي نأ يرحب … 
507
 Ibid., p. 103,21-22 
؟يلوأ ءيش نم لا ءايشلأا ةعنص يف تائيشملاو تادارلإا نواعت ىعدا نمب لهجلا سيل وأ 
508
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 103,4 
 يف نينواعتم نوكي نأ ركنأ امفةعنص ؟قئلاخلا عيمج  
509
 Ibid., p. 103,17  
 ماكحإ يف ناتدارإ نوكت نأ نكمي فيكوةعنص م؟قئلاخلا هذه يف ىرن ا  
510
 Ibid., p. 152,13-14: 
 ناقتإ نم ىرن اميف انل امفعنص ميكح يح دحاو اهسئاسو اهيرابو اهعناص نأ ىلع ةلمجلا يف ًلايلد ماظنلا اذه ماكحإو قئلاخلا هذه  
511
 Ibid., pp. 253,23-254,3 
 قلخي اهعيمج نأ كلذوعنصيو رلإا كلت نعو .ةدحاو ةئيشمو ةدحاو ةدارإب نأ لا ،ةقيلخلا ةلمج تنوكت دحاولا ناطلسلاو ةدحاولا ةئيشملاو ةدحاولا ةدا
 قلخي ةثلث نم دحاو لكعنصيو هبحاص نود هلو هنم هتئيشمو هتدارإب ربديو 
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the faculty of the anima/soul that creates these subtle things, which we can see in the 
making of the bodies, the moulding of forms, the composition of (bodily) structures, 
and similar making actions that can be carried out by the wisdom of the anima and the 
reflexion of the intellect.”512 Here we see that the action of ÒanÝa is related to 
moulding, taÒwÐr and combination, ta’lÐf. (The usage of the latter, i.e. ta’lÐf might 
go back to Greek roots, and may be paralleled with atomism, like that of Democritus. 
As Gardet asserts it, the atomism of Islamic kalÁm derives from Greek sources, as 
well, e.g. Democritus and Epicurus. It indicates then, that Christian apologetics and 
Islamic theories of atomism rely on the same tradition.)
513
 This idea is in agreement 
with the Neo-Platonic differentiation mentioned in the chapter on body, i.e. the 
differentiation which divides existent things to incorporeal and corporeal entities, the 
former being the cause of the latter. 
4. As it was seen in the case of Ìalq, here also a group of examples may be collected 
according to the discussion of the cause or the motivation for creation. We get to know 
that it is a determination of the divine, not a necessity, and it is a gift. “It is clear for 
the intellect that in His eternity, He had always abstained from and withheld of 
creating His creatures, which He later created in time. And then He brought into being 
from them [what he pleased], by grace and potency over their generation, or by the 
abstaining from their making, if He pleased.”514 Again, it is to be noted, that Ìalq, 
iÎdÁ× and ÒanÝa are used parallel, as synonyms. The other example has been cited 
above, let us now concentrate on its first part:  
“In the first investigation, witnesses of the bodily forms of creatures forced the 
intellect to affirm that there is a substance that created them in time and brought them 
into being. In the second investigation, the fact that in his infinite pre-existence he had 
abstained from creating [his creatures], but later on he carried out their making as a 
donation, [forced the intellect] to render pre-eternal life necessary for him. And the 
third investigation, on the basis of his perfect government, and of what had previously 
shown of his care, guided [the intellect to accept] that he carries this out in order to be 
                                                          
512
 Ibid., p. 157,16-19 
ىرخلأا ةيناسفن ةيناحور ينعأ لقعلا يذلا وه ةوق سفنلا عرتخملا هذه فئاطللا يتلا ىرن نم ةعنص مارجلاا ريوصتو لاكشلأا فيلأتو ناينبلا 
وحنو كلذ نم تاعانصلا رودقملا اهيلع ةمكحب سفنلا ةيورو لقعلا 
513
 C.f. GARDET, L., Djuz’. In: IE, Second edition, Vol. II., Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1965. pp. 607-8. and GARDET, 
L., Dharra. In: IE, Second edition, Vol. II., Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1965. pp. 219-20. 
514
al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 150,22-151,2 
لااو اهنوك ىلع رادتقاو لوطب اهنم أشنأ مث ،ًاعنتمم ًاكسمم هقلخ نم ثدحأ ام قلخ نع همدق يف لزي مل ناك دق هنأ اذهب لوقعلل ناب دقف ءاش ول عانتم
اهتعنص نم 
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generous to others. It witnesses to the substantiality of his Word and the pre-eternity of 
his wisdom, necessarily.”
515
  
The wider context absolutely emphasizes that the creative action is a gift of the divine, 
but if we look at the direct context, we can see that making is carried out as a 
donation. This approach makes it synonymous with Ìalq. The action is volitional, since 
the Maker had abstained from carrying it out before he eventually did so. 
5. As in the case of Ìalq, a group of examples could be cited around the theme of the 
means of creation, or, in this case, the modality of making. E.g. the question of using 
“limbs” while making in general is raised, when the possibility of the existence of two 
co-operating Makers is discussed.  
“Cooperation in act(ion)s is of various kinds. There can be a doer of something using 
his limbs, like someone who elevates a heavy thing from the earth, but his limbs are 
not able to carry it, so he asks help from someone else to carry it. Or, e.g. a builder of 
an edifice needs a helper who cooperates in its building. [Such are] other similar 
actions, [too,] the actors of which need their limbs in their making.”
516
  
This making might as well be interpreted as a simple action, but given that the whole 
simile is introduced in order to elucidate the impossibility of the existence of two 
Makers, it must be referring to a creative action. As for the modality of making, there 
are other examples to unfold it, even if the first one just indicates: there’s no modality 
(or at least we cannot understand or know it) of the Creator and His making: “The Pre-
eternal has no modality, nor do His makings do, and there is nothing similar to Him or 
to his actions”517 The wider context brings many verbs and infinitives which put 
ÒanÝa in a framework where its meaning is best understood as referring to the 
creative action. But it can also be interpreted as an appellative, as ‘act.’ The exact 
modality of the creative action cannot be known, but a negative description is given: 
“As for how He created and how He made without movement and procedure, there is 
no way to know it and give information on it.”518 The bi-lÁ kayf approach of Muslim 
                                                          
515
 Ibid., p. 152,5-9 
هنإف امك نع دهاوشلا نم لاكشأ قئلاخلا ترطضا لوقعلا يف صحفلا لولأا ىلإ دوجو تابثإ   رهوج اهثدحأ ،اهأشنأو صحفلاو يناثلا نم هعربت 
اهتعنصب دعب هكاسمإ   اميدق نع اهقلخ ىلإ باجيإ ةايحلا هل ، ايلزأ كلذك ام لد صحفلا ثلاثلا نم ماكحإ هتسايس اهل امو مدقت نم قباس مههت نأب 
دوجي ىلع ريغ ،اهب دهشي ىلع ةيرهوج هتملك ةيلزأو هتمكح   ارارطضإ 
516
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 103,4-7 
هريغب نيعتسيف هلمح نع هحراوج زجعت ًلايقث ًائيش ضرلأا نم لقتسملاك ،هحراوجب ًائيش لعاف امإ :ىتش بورض ىلع ليعافلأا يف نواعتلا نإ  يف
اهتعنص يف حراوجلا لامعتسا ىلإ اهلعاف جاتحي يتلا ليعافلأا نم كلذ وحنو ،هئانب يف هنواعي نوع ىلإ جاتحي ءانب ينابك وأ ،كلذ لمح 
517
 Ibid., p. 194,8 
لا ةيفيك يلزلأل هعئانصو لاو هبش هل لاو هلاعفب  
518
 Ibid., p. 214,14-15 
 ،جلاع لاو ةكرح لا نم عنص فيكو قلخ فيك امأوهنع رابخلإاو هتفرعم ىلإ ليبس لاف  
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authors is employed here, which shows that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, when addressing 
Muslim opponents, aimed at using shared views, in order to make his point acceptable 
for the reader. 
6. As a last similarity with Ìalq, it may be mentioned that the passive and active 
participles of the form are used to express that this action is a sign, a proof for the 
existence of the Actor: “The world is composed of opposing, disagreeing elements, I 
mean the earth, the water, the fire and the air. Our first proof for their being made and 
for the essence of a Maker is the combination of these elements that we see and the 
moderation of their faculties despite of the differences of their natures and the 
opposition of their substances…”519 This making may be a synonym of creation, as the 
wider context suggests it, or it may be interpreted as, composition or combination. It is 
the phrase ta’lÐf arkÁn which expresses the combination of elements. The use of the 
vocabulary can be compared to that of Islamic atomism. 
It has to be mentioned that the same form may refer to action, too, without being 
specified as creative. Such is the case when the same term is used to express human 
actions and deeds and those of God. By this contrast, the unity of the Trinity is proved.  
“From this approach our claim has to be verified, according to which the distance of 
the similarity between the substance of the Creator and the substances of His 
creatures; and between his making/action and the makings/actions of His creatures is 
the proof of the trinity of His properties and the unity of His substance. That is: the 
substance of the source/the entity, to which His Life and Word are attached, i.e. His 
Wisdom; and [to which] His Life [is attached], which is the entity of His Spirit, [all 
these] are one, and have always existed.”
520
  
This example shows a transition between the two meanings. As for the Maker, ÒanÝa 
best translates as making in His case, but as far as creatures are concerned, action may 
be just as verifiable. Even if belonging to the divine, or the Messiah, ÒanÝa can still 
refer to a mere action: “We know this on the basis of witnesses of God, from His Old 
and New scriptures, and then from the witnesses of the Messiah: His actions are 
proofs coming from Him which prove this.”521 In other instances the plural form of the 
                                                          
519
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 95,7-9 
 ىرن ام عناص هل ناو ةعونصم اهنأ اهيلع انليلد لوأف .ءاوهلاو رانلاو ءاملاو ضرلأا ينعأ ،ةمواقتم ةداضتم ناكرأ نم ةفلؤم راد ملاعلا فيلأت نم
عم اهاوق لادتعاو ناكرلأا هذه اهرهاوج دداضتو اهعئابط فلاتخا 
520
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 149,20-23 
 انلوق قيقحت بجو ةهجلا هذه نمفنإ  ةينادحوو هصاوخ ثيلثت ىلع ليلدلا وه هقلخ عئانصو هتعنص نيبو هقلخ رهاوجو قلاخلا رهوج نيب هبشلا دعب
يلإ فاضملا ،نيعلا رهوج يأ ،هرهوجلزي مل دحاو ،هحور نيع يه يتلا هتايحو ،هتمكح نيع يه يتلا هتملكو هتايح ه 
521
 Ibid. p. 206,8-9 
هنم كلذ ىلع لدت لئلاد هعئانص يف دعب نم حيسملا تاداهش مث ،ةثيدحلاو ةميدقلا هبتك يف الله تاداهش نم كلذ ملعن  
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Messiah’s ÒanÝa is used together with afÁÝÐl, which further stresses its 
interpretation as action.
522
 In the case of the Messiah, the same root is used to refer to 
His conduct: ÒanÝa bi-nafsih.523 In the case of God, it may refer to His treatment of 
someone (e.g. enemies, ÒanÝat AllÁh bi-aÝdÁ’ikum), and His management.524 And on 
the other side, it can be man’s behaviour towards God (e.g. sÙ’ ÒanÐÝihim ilayh),525 
and the Messiah (e.g. when the Messiah asks God’s pardon for the crucifiers, since 
man does not know what he does),
526
 or to other men.
527
 
7. Finally, we can find the term as a synonym of Ìalq, used parallel to its passive 
participle: “What is the proof of the world’s being created as a making of God?”528 
The word is not an appellative referring to a simple action, instead, it is used as a term, 
and denotes divine making. This interpretation is further enhanced by its being used 
together with Ìalq. The next example contains a variety of terms: “The account of this 
approach has come to an end, and intellects are forced [to accept] on the basis of this 
analogy that the Maker of these creatures is One, Omnipotent, he has no help in their 
making and no supporter in creating them in time. Instead, He is the One: their 
Creator, Elaborator, and the Arbitrator of their management.”529 Here we could see 
that ÑÁniÝ appeared also as a divine name, so ÒanÝa, as the action of God, must be 
making in this context. By taking other divine names that refer to God on the basis of 
His actions into consideration, we may understand that these actions are also in 
relation with making in this context. Such are creation (given that God is BÁri’, 
Creator), elaboration (on the basis of Mutqin) and management (on the basis of God’s 
being MuÎkim siyÁsatahÁ). ÑanÝa at the same time is used parallel to iÎdÁ×, creation 
in time. This parallel is further emphasized, if we return to an example already seen in 
the case of ibtidÁ’: “It is doubtless that He had always been planning generously that 
He would create time, in which He would perform their creation, and it was not 
possible without creating action in time and the inauguration of making.”530 Creating 
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 Vid. Ibid. p. 209,9 and 213,2 
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 Ibid. p. 230,9-12 
524
 Ibid. p. 231,4 
525
 Ibid. p. 238,2 
526
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 244,13, 14; and p. 246,3, 6 
527
 Ibid. p. 256,18-19 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 95,6-7 
؟هتعنص نم قولخم ملاعلا نأ ىلع ...ليلدلا ام 
529
 Ibid. pp. 103,23-104,2 
 لا ميكح رداق دحاو قئلاخلا هذه عناص نأ ىلإ سايقلا اذه دنع لوقعلا ترطضاو هجولا اذه يف لوقلا ىهتنا ًانوع يف هل ًارزاؤم لاو اهتعنص يف هل
اهتسايس مكحمو اهنقتمو اهيراب دحلاا وه لب ،اهثادحإ 
530
 Ibid. p. 106,9-10 
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(action) in time is synonymous with the inauguration of making, i.e. with making that 
has a starting point in time. In its passive participial form it is also used as a synonym 
of iÎdÁ×. “Their entities would not have been exposed to any inflow and change if 
they had not been created in time and made.”531 And: “… because their senses can not 
perceive a Maker [and/or] Actor except if he’s created in time and is made.”532 The 
same passive participial form is used as a synonym of the passive participle of Ìalq: 
“… because their senses can not perceive that there should be a living, rational 
substance, except if it’s created and made.”533 So no such opposition as the one 
mentioned by Lampe (God as Creator ex nihilo v.s. the τεχνίτης, expressed by ÑÁniÝ 
who employs pre-existent matter) could be found in these examples. 
So far, we have seen that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation and use of ÒanÝa is 
parallel to the Greek use of corresponding terms. In the framework of creations, those 
appearances that denote a creative action were mostly concentrated on, but just as πρᾶξις 
could mean ‘conduct’ in general, examples of a similar kind for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s ÒanÝa 
were also cited. As for its being an action, it is rather ποιεῖν (mentioned as the term 
corresponding to Ìalq) that could show more similarities with it. As we have seen, Lampe 
mentions that the term is used in contexts where distinction is made between God as Creator 
ex nihilo and the τεχνίτης who employs pre-existent matter. Such differentiation (i.e. using 
ÒanÝa only for employing pre-existent matter) cannot be realized in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
text.   
Not every Christian author shares this approach of the two meanings; e.g. the Melkite 
Theodore AbÙ Qurra clearly places Ìalq above ÒanÝa, as it can be seen in the following 
example. “But he brought them into being ex nihilo, and he created them [ex nihilo]. For this, 
he is not only Maker, but Creator.”534 It is noteworthy that the other terms he uses (inšÁ’, 
ibtidÁÝ) are also present in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, and the two authors are similar in their 
use of these terms as synonyms as far as the creative action in general is concerned. 
As for the Muslim counterpart, the contemporary author, al-KindÐ does not define the 
term. His usage of ÒinÁÝa appears only in the definition of philosophy, as the art of arts 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 ًاتقو قلخي نأ ًاعمزم هدوجب لزي مل ناك دق نأ كش لاو ةعنص أدتباو لعف ثودحب لاإ كلذ نكميل نكي ملو ،مهقلخ هيف ئشنيف  
531
 Ibid. p. 97,13 
ةعونصم ةثدحم يهو لاإ اهنايعأ يف رايغلاو نايرجلا عجنأ نكي ملو 
532
 Ibid. p. 154,1 
 ًاعونصم ًاثدحم لاإ ،ًلاعاف ًاعناص كردت لا مهساوح نلأ 
533
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 153,20 
 ًاعونصم ًاقولخم لاإ قطنو ةايح وذ رهوج نوكي نأ كردت مل مهساوح نلأ 
534
 ABØ QURRA, Theodore, Maymar fÐ wuÊÙd al-ËÁliq wa-’l-dÐn al-qawÐm p. 190. 
نكلو نم لا ءيش اهأشنأ اهعدتباو .نم لجأ ،كلذ سيل وه   اعناص طقف نكلو قلاخ 
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(ÒinÁÝa al-ÒinÁÝÁt).535 The next author in line, al-ËwÁrizmÐ defines it among the terms of 
logic, belonging to the syllogism, but obviously with another meaning that is examined here. 
Later authors do not define it till al-¹urºÁnÐ, whose explanation does not refer to the creative 
act (exclusively), as we can see it in the following example: “Making/art is a psychical 
property, out of which actions emanate which are committed by free will/choice, casually. 
And it is called the knowledge which is related to the mode of the action.”536 Though it is not 
the creative act which is described here, but some ideas coincide: e.g. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
emphasized that making, as referred to by ÒinÁÝa, ÒunÝ, is not an action of constraint, but 
one based on free will and choice. As it was not a physical action, when referred to as making, 
on the behalf of the Creator, al-¹urºÁnÐ’s ‘psychical property’ and ‘the knowledge of the 
mode of the action’ also run parallel to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation.  
It can be clearly seen that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used the word sometimes as a term, 
sometimes as an appellative. Some ideas expressed by him might be considered the 
continuation of Hellenistic, Patristic ones especially, but there are minor differences as well. 
Probably this kind of Christian usage runs unparalleled for a long time, as it is indicated by 
the lack of definitions on the Muslim side. 
 
7. TakwÐn – generation, genesis 
 
TakwÐn, generation or genesis is the equivalent of the Greek philosophical terms ἡ 
γένεσις, ἁι γενέσεις, and τό γίγνεσθαι; mukawwan, engendered stands for τό γενόμενον, τό 
γιγνόμενον.537 The term τό γίγνεσθαι has already been introduced above,538 and on this basis 
takwÐn could be expected to be synonymous with iÎdÁ×/ÎudÙ×. As for the remaining terms, 
only ἡ γένεσις is examined by Lampe. It can refer to origin, source, and beginning: which is 
denied in relation to the Son’s divinity, but is used to describe the Son’s generation. The term 
is also used to refer to the creation of the world ex nihilo, or to the creation of man, as an 
action of the God of the Old Testament. It may also mean the created universe, or the 
creatures; the action of procreation, generation; Christ’s birth, and the human sinful birth.539 
                                                          
535
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 173. 
مكحلا ةمكحو تاعانصلا ةعانص :اولاقف 
536
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 152. 
ةيور ريغ نم ةيرايتخلاا لاعفلأا اهنع ردصي ةيناسفن ةكلم ةعانصلا، لمعلا ةيفيكب قلعتملا ملعلا ليقو  
537
 AFNAN, M. S., A Philosophical Lexicon in Persian and Arabic, pp. 262-63. 
538
 C.f. LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 315. γίγνεσθαι appears as ‘being made/created, become’ in 
the Church Fathers’ texts. 
539
 Ibid., p. 310. 
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Given that takwÐn as generation is close to kawn with the same meaning, I will also 
investigate whether the Aristotelian pair of contraries, i.e. generation-corruption may be 
discerned in the examples. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term takwÐn less frequently than some of the previous 
ones, but on the basis of these examples a similar classification is possible.  
1. We have seen that many of the previous terms appeared in contexts where the ex 
nihilo question was dealt with. To the best of my knowledge, two such examples 
exist in the case of takwÐn, leaving the reader among doubts as far as the exact 
understanding is concerned. The first example lets one believe that takwÐn may be 
a creative act ex nihilo, while the second one unmistakably denotes the existence 
of anterior matter. As for the first one, it is as follows: “His potency over their 
existence and over the elements, out of which He generated them ex nihilo, 
witnesses to His not being unable to create them non-mortals, yet, He created them 
mortals.”540 This example is ambiguous, since elements are mentioned as the 
“material” out of which an existent may be formed, while lÁ min šay’ is also 
added. It raises the question whether ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ really uses lÁ min šay’ 
as ex nihilo, or he just refers to something that came into being after not having 
existed by this expression. In this latter case, lÁ min šay’ would mean ‘after not 
having existed’. The second example is as follows: “As we know of the material, 
out of which your body was generated as a body.”541 So takwÐn, on its own, does 
not refer to the creative action as being performed ex nihilo. 
2. As a second group, we have already examined previous terms as referring to the 
possible number of Creators. To the best of my knowledge, there is one locus 
where ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses this term in such a discussion. “By this one will, 
one determination and one power were all the creatures generated.”542 As usual, 
the number of Creators (Generators) is said to be one, so the unity of the creative 
divinity is emphasized by this action, too. TakwÐn is used to express that the 
motivation is generosity and grace, and also, that it is not a necessity, but is carried 
out due to a will or determination.  
                                                          
540
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p.107,12 
 هتردق نأ كلذو اهنم يتلا عئابطلا نوكو مهنوك ىلعمهنوك نيتئام مهقلخف ،نيتئام لا مهقلخي نأ نع زجعي لا هنأب دهشت ،ءيش نم لا  
541
 Ibid. p. 193,14 
.  يتلا ةداملا نم ملعن دق امكنوك اندب اهنم كندب  
542
 Ibid. p. 254,2 
يشملاو ةدحاولا ةدارلإا كلت نعوئ دحاولا ناطلسلاو ةدحاولا ةتنوكت  ةلمجةقيلخلا 
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3. There was a subsection in the case of Ìalq where we could see that creation has a 
given outcome: the created thing is mortal, has a given form, etc. Another usual 
recurring group of examples has dealt with the cause and motivation of creation. 
Both ideas can be discerned in the first example: “What grace is better and 
generosity greater than His generating them, especially in this noble disposition – 
consisting of life, intellect, rationality, understanding, ability, free choice – after 
that they had not existed.”543  
4. As for the second idea, the motivation, e. g. grace, it can be approached by the 
presumed question by a hypothetical opponent: “If he ignored the privilege of this 
grace and said: we do not establish for Him generosity and grace on the basis of 
His generating us, since given that we had not existed, we had not hated non-
existence.”544 The phrase ‘we had not existed’ is expressed by lam naku šay’an, 
and this further confirms our supposition, that lÁ min šay’ in ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s usage may simply mean ‘after not having existed’ in some contexts. The 
cause is not a force or a need of the Creator, but his will, as it was expressed 
already in the cases of Ìalq and ÒanÝa, as well: “It is a proof of [the existence of] a 
Creator, who is earlier than them in time, as a sign/knowing that He generated 
them intentionally and by choice, and it was not a necessity of a force.”545 
5. And then, we have seen that terms that denote the creative action are often used 
synonymously; let us examine some examples here, as well. “If we said: He has 
always created His creatures in time and He has always generated them as the 
elements which fulfil their acts naturally, forever,”546 This quotation refers to God, 
and both actions (creation in time and generation) are described in active 
participial forms. Their close relation shows that the actions denoted by them are 
similar. The same parallel appears when the two terms are used as passive 
participles, side by side. They may refer to elements,
547
 bodies,
548
 or estimative 
                                                          
543
 Ibid., p. 105,7  
يهلا هذه ىلع ةصاخ مهايإ هنيوكت نم مظعأ دوجو لضفأ ةمعن ةيأفئ مل نأ دعب رايتخلااو ةعاطتسلااو مهفلاو قطنلاو لقعلاو ةايحلا نم ةفيرشلا ة
يش اونوكيئا 
544
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 105,10  
ةمعنلا هذه ةليضف لهج نإف ةمعنو دوج عضوم ةصاخ اننيوكت يف هل ضرفن لا انإف :لاقو، انلأ، يش كن مل ذإئا، مدعلا ةهارك انيدل دجوت مل  
545
 Ibid., p. 150,10 
اهل مدقتم ئراب ىلع لدتو، ارارطضا ازيرغ لا ارايتخاو ادمعت اهنوك هنأب املع  
546
 Ibid., p. 150,18 
  لاخل لزي مل انلق نإوئبطلاك انوكم اثدحم هقادبأ ايعيبط اهلاعفا ةلعافلا عئا  
547
 Ibid., p. 97,21 
548
 Ibid., p. 205,15 
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faculties.
549
 On the basis of some other examples, it is not only creation in time, 
which is similar to takwÐn in meaning, but also creation, Ìalq. The following 
quotation describes the Son on the basis of a citation from the gospel of John. “The 
Word has always existed, and the Word was at God, and God was the Word, which 
has always been with God. Everything was created by Him, and nothing was 
generated without Him.”550 Its Greek original (Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος 
ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος. Οὗτος ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. πάντα δι᾽ 
αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο, καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἕν) confirms the interpretation of the 
term as ‘generation, genesis.’ Even if details are not specified (ex nihilo, 
anteriority of time or matter), the two terms can still be understood as synonyms in 
the meaning of the creative act. The same pair of synonyms appears when the two 
terms are used as passive participles when describing elements
551
 and existent 
beings.
552
 
6. Finally, let us see another example, where mukawwan is probably not ‘generated,’ 
but rather ‘happening, coming into being.’  
“Do you mean that the divine and the man combined, and out of the two of them one 
man rose, who is not the same with any of them, one human [being]? Or did they 
commix and intermingle, and did a nature come into being from them, which is 
different from what they had been? [Is it] like [the case of] these outcomes that come 
into being/occur/happen/are generated among the clashing bodies which introduce 
corruption into each other?”
553
   
As we can see, al-natÁ’iÊ al-mukawwana are not necessarily outcomes that are 
generated, but possibly results that come into being, occur, happen; so this form may 
eventually be an appellative, as well. However, this is the first time that we have come 
across an example in which corruption, fasÁd is mentioned in the proximity of the 
term denoting generation, which makes its interpretation as a term possible. 
As for the Muslim counterpart, according to R. Kruk,
554
 it is the term that denotes 
‘bringing into being,’ more specifically used for the artificial generation of minerals, plants 
                                                          
549
 Ibid., p.  213,17 
550
 Ibid., p. 208,12 
ةملكلا ناك لزي مل، ناك امم ءيش نّوكي مل هنودو قلخ هب لكو .الله ىدل لزي مل اذه ةملكلا وه اللهو الله دنع ناك ةملكلاو  
C.f.: Jn1,1-3 
551
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 97,10 
552
 Ibid. p. 153,21 and 154,2 (the latter: more specifically ’kings’) 
553 Ibid. p. 213,9 
امهريغ دحاو ناسنإ امهنم ماقف ابكرت ناسنلإاو هللإا نأ نونعتأ، دحاو يرشب، اناك نيذللا ريغ اثداح اعابط امهنم راص اجزتماو اطلتخا مأ، ك هذه
اضعب اهضعب ةدسفملا ةزامهلا ماسجلأا نيب نم ةنوكملا جئاتنلا 
554
 KRUK, R., TakwÐn, In: IE, Second Edition, vol X., pp.147-148. 
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and animals. Within the mediaeval Islamic cultural sphere, the idea that artificial generation 
was possible was widespread in less orthodox circles. In the occult sciences (alchemy and 
magic), the processes of artificial generation are discussed in various contexts.
555
 The idea 
that underlies the concept of artificial generation is that since nature can transform the four 
elements into minerals, plants and animals, it is possible for man to repeat this process by 
imitating nature's procedures.
556
 It is worth noting that Kruk relies on works of ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s contemporaries. Fields are different, since the works mentioned by Kruk belong to 
occult sciences, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s apology is theological in nature, but still, there 
are some similarities. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ mentions takwÐn with similar ideas: the making 
up of a body out of matter. 
On the basis of Kruk’s investigation, it is no wonder that the term does not appear in 
books of definitions (neither those of the theologians or of philosophers) before al-¹urºÁnÐ. 
Al-KindÐ may be considered an exception, but he does not define the term, only uses it – to 
the best of my knowledge – once in his RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ: „Substance 
is what subsists in itself, and it is what carries the accidents, without changing its essence. It 
can have attributes but cannot be an attribute. It is said not to receive generation or 
corruption…”557 It is probably coming into being with the anteriority of matter which is 
meant here, but it is not further specified. The ues of the term together with its contrary, i.e. 
corruption, indicate that the author relies more on the philosophical tradition than ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ. 
As for al-¹urºÁnÐ, he defines the term as follows: “Generating means bringing a 
thing into existence with the anteriority of matter.”558 We may also remember that generation 
was contrasted to ‘direct creation’ on the basis of the same idea.559 This interpretation is much 
more general than that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ.  
It is noteworthy that the ninth-century Nestorian author preceded Muslim authors in 
his use of the term in a stricter theological-philosophical sense. Contemporary parallel is 
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 Ibid., p. 147. 
556
 Ibid., p. 148. 
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 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 166. 
رعلأل لماح وهو ؛هسفنب مئاقلا وه رهوجلاداسفلاو نيوكتلل لباق ريغ وه :لاقيو ؛فصاو لا فوصوم ،هتيتاذ ريغت مل ضا  
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 AL-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 73. 
ةداملاب قوبسم ءيشلا داجيإ نيوكتلا 
559
 As mentioned above: “In the terminology of philosophers, ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ mean the creation of a thing 
non preceded by matter nor time, such as the intellects. ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ oppose takwÐn, i.e. generation, which 
means creation preceded by matter. Also, ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ oppose iÎdÁ×, creation in time which is preceded 
by time.” p. 18. 
عادبلإا تبلااوعاد (  اضيأ)، (يف حلاطصا ءامكحلا )وه داجيإ ءيش ريغ قوبسم ةدامب لاو ،نامز ،لوقعلاك وهو لباقي ،نيوكتلا هنوكل   اقوبسم 
،ةداملاب لباقيو ثادحلإا هنوكل   اقوبسم نامزلاب. 
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offered in this sense in the writings of early Muslim occult writings. However, takwÐn was 
used first by MÁturÐdÐ theologians extensively to the point where they believed takwÐn to 
be the eighth essential attribute of God. Even though not present among his definitions, Ibn 
SÐnÁ used it later and in his footsteps, ÑÙfÐs and AšÝarÐs used it as well especially to 
express the divine command “kun”.560 
  
8. InšÁ’ – bringing into being 
 
As for the last term in this section, inšÁ’, there is no Greek equivalent provided for it 
by Afnan, so in this case we may think of an independent development of a concept and term, 
appearing for the first time in the Arabic language. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of the term may 
be classified mostly according to the categories used above. He also uses the word nušÙ’ with 
the meaning of evolution and growth.
561
 If we take into consideration that inšÁ’ is the 
infinitive of the IVth stem of the root n-š-’, even a simple causative meaning may be 
expected. 
1. Let us now turn to the variety of contexts it appears in, in order to see whether its 
meaning may be more specifically classified. In the case of previous terms we 
have investigated if creation ex nihilo may be implied by them. Let us follow the 
same steps and look at inšÁ’ in this framework first. To the best of my knowledge, 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term once in order to describe the creative action 
without the anteriority of matter, and four times to express that a creature is set up 
of pre-existing material. As for the first group, the example is as follows:  “Or you 
refrain from this, escaping to the establishment that the existent [things] were 
brought into being and commenced in time, not out of [pre-existing] matter.”562 
Interestingly enough, though paralleled with ibdÁ’, commencement, beginning, it 
can also be understood as a creative action without the anteriority of matter, and 
also, as creation in time. As for the second group of appearances, examples 
include:  
“[Intellects then] find a proof in the coherence and harmony of [elements], despite of 
their opposition and disagreement, that these have a Composer who adjusted their 
                                                          
560
 GOICHON, A-M., La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne) Paris, Desclée, de 
Brouwer, 1937., pp. 244-259. And: PETERSON, D. C., Creation, pp. 474-475. 
561
 This term may be paired with a Greek one, i.e. αὒξησις and ἀκμη, but no specific meanings are enlisted by 
Lampe, which indicates that the term is not of special importance in Patristic literature. 
562
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 99,10 
ىلويه نم لا ًاثيدح تئدبأ وأ تئشنأ ءايشلأا نأب رارقلإا ىلإ ًابره كلذ نم نوعجرت وأ 
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opposition and balanced the difference of their quiddity and [the opposition and 
difference] of what developed out of them. He made them last like that by a perfect 
Spirit …, and made them a dwelling place for what He brought into being out of 
them.”
563
   
In this case, there is an anteriority of matter, or more specifically, there are elements 
out of which inšÁ’, bringing into existence is carried out. The second example is not as 
obvious as this was: “We would say: what is your argument against who denies that 
the Creator had matter out of which he formed something? And if he said: since He 
had no possibility to create the substances ex nihilo in His potency and in the eternity 
of His pre-eternity, then He could only bring them into being from His own nature 
and produce them from the essence of His own substance.”564 Here the lack of clarity 
is due to the use of the words ÔibÁÝ nafsih, the first of which may either refer to 
‘elements’ or ‘nature.’ Here probably it refers to nature, since the One who carries the 
creative action out is not expected to consist of elements. The other specific feature of 
this example is the opposition between Ìalq lÁ min šay’ and inšÁ’ min ÔibÁÝ nafsih: 
both terms need further specification, either ex nihilo is intended or a pre-existent 
material, it has to be mentioned explicitly. Another example refers to inšÁ’ as a 
bringing into being from elements: “If you just mean that the pre-existent, created 
matter, which is created in time is the same as these elements that we mentioned in the 
beginning when we said that creatures were brought into being out of them, we will 
support what you mean.”565 On the basis of this example, inšÁ’ definitely needs the 
anteriority of matter. The last example does not add anything to this idea, but let us 
mention that these bodies (abdÁn) are told to be brought into existence out of earth 
(arÃ), which is an interesting addition to the chapter on body and bodily form.566 On 
the other hand, the idea of bringing creatures into being out of elements, can be 
paralleled to the atomism of Islamic philosophy and kalÁm. 
                                                          
563
 Ibid., p. 96,2 
لدتست مث، اهبصانتو اهمواقت عم اهفلآتو اهكسامت نم،  ًافلؤم اهل نأ ىلع ةلماك ًاحور هب اهمادأو اهنم أشن امو اهتيهام فلاتخا لدعو اهمواقت حلصأ …
اهنم هأشنأ امل ًانكسم اهلعجو 
Dots can be found in the text, too, since, as Hayek writes it, that word is non readable in the manuscript. 
564
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 98,5-8 
 نوكي نأ ركنأ نم ىلع مكتجح امف :انلقفىدل  ناكمإ هتيلزأ مدقو هتردق يف نكي مل اذإ لب :لاقف ً؟ائيش اهنم لعتفا ةدام قلاخلاقلخل  نم لا رهاوجلا
 امنإف ،ءيشاهأشنأ هرهوج تاذ نم اهجتنأو هسفن عابط نم 
565
 Ibid., p. 99,12-13 
ا ىلويهلا نأب نونعت امنإ متنك نإ قئلاخلا نأ انتبثأف اهركذب انأدب يتلا عئابطلا هذه يه ةمدقتملا ةقولخملا ةثدحملتئشنأ اهنم، مكانعم ىلع مكاندعاس 
566
 Ibid., p. 188,15-16 
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2. We have seen many times that the creative action may be a sign for the existence of 
the Creator. InšÁ’, as an action of the Creator and together with ta’lÐf, can refer to the 
making of bodies in a way that they should be composed together with spirits.  
“These four elements that the world is composed of are present in the structure of your 
body; your mind cannot deny it. You do not need a clearer and more evident sign for 
the existence of your Creator than the testimonies of the intellect based on the 
Creator’s composing your body out of these contrary and opposing elements, and His 
bringing it into being [together] with a knowing soul that he has inserted in it by His 
power and wisdom.”
567
 
In this example, inšÁ’ does not merely refer to the bringing into being out of pre-
existing matter: here, since the action is carried out in a way that apart from elements 
which make up a body, a spirit is present in it, inšÁ’ gains an extra denotation either as 
‘creation out of nothing’ (as referring to the bringing into being of the spirit) or as 
‘combination’ (i.e. combining the body and the spirit, and thus producing a unit). 
3. We have also seen that sometimes creation has a given outcome, in examples like 
creating creatures as mortals, etc. We can find a similar example in the usage of inšÁ’, 
which describes that creatures are brought into being as males and females: “Out of 
the two he then brought children into being as males and females.”568  
4. Another recurring subdivision deals with examples which introduce the objects of the 
creative act. As an interesting example, inšÁ’ is mentioned two times together with 
sabab, cause. Their appearance together is not to be translated as ‘bringing a cause 
into existence’, but rather as ‘producing a cause,’ or simply ‘causing:’  
“Then, due to his benevolence, for the flow of love among them, he wanted to bring a 
cause into being [i.e. to set up a cause], which will turn them to love. He had not seen 
any motivation more splendid and more stimulative for that than the continuation of 
kinship. He also wanted to bring a cause in their nature into being [i.e. to set up a 
cause] for relative relations among them, which would turn them to it and make it last 
among them, and he had not found a more proper and suitable cause for that than the 
reproduction of offsprings.”
569
 
                                                          
567 Ibid., p. 97,3-6 
 ىلع هيلإ جاتحت ليلد لاف .كلقع اهركني لا كندب ةينب يف ةدوجوم ملاعلاراد تفلأ اهنم يتلا ناكرلأا ةعبرلأا هذهف نم رهظأو حضوأ كقلاخ دوجو
 ةمواقتملا ةداضتملا عابطلا هذه نم كندب هفيلأت نم لقعلا دهاوشهئاشنإو هتمكحو هتردقب هيف اهبكرو ٍةملاع ٍسفنب. 
568
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 114,11 
 ًاثانإو ًاروكذ ًادلاوأ امهنم أشنأ مث 
569
 Ibid., p. 114,5-8 
ءاش مث  نأ هفطلب ًاضيأئشني  ًاضيأ دارأ مث .ةبارقلا لصاوت نم اهيلإ ىعدأ لاو اهل ّلجأ ًةريرج كلذل ري ملف اهيلإ هب مهريجي ًاببس مهنيب ةبحملا ءارجلإ
 نأئشني  يف هب اهيرجيو مهنيب هب اهحلي ًاببس مهنيب ةبارقللمهعئابط،  لسانت نم اهيلإ ىعدأ لاو اهب ىلوأ ًاببس كلذل دجي ملفديلاوملا  
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Both times in this example the object of the term was ‘cause.’ If we accept that a cause 
is not created, generated, or brought into being, then we may consider the term an 
appellative in this instance. When used with Ìalq as its object, it is not to be 
understood as “bring their creation into being”, but rather, to commence, start their 
creation. “As, due to His generosity and grace, He wanted to bring their creation into 
being, [i.e. start/carry out their creation] and make the cause of reproduction last 
among them, …”570 And: “Had he brought the creation of every individual into being 
separately [i.e. started their creation/completed their creation], instead of this ongoing 
reproduction among them,…”571 Till now, we could see inšÁ’ with an object as an 
appellative, having no specific connotation of the creative action. But there are some 
instances when the interpretation is more specific, e.g. in the following case: “By my 
life, if you thought that by the things He wanted to create, and the creatures He wanted 
to bring into being, He only aimed at His own interest and the subsistence of the 
essence of His own substance, like the elements we have mentioned, then it would be 
right for you to say that perhaps his will had always been a will of necessity/constraint 
and not one of choice/deliberation.”572 Here it must refer to the creative action, since 
its object is ÌalÁ’iq, creatures; and it is also used in parallel to – as a synonym of 
ibdÁÝ – direct creation, so no superficial connotation can be supposed in this case.  
5. As a fifth frequently seen subdivision, we may examine examples where the term is 
paired with a cause or motivation for carrying out the creative action. The last example 
introduced in the previous paragraph can also be cited here: it implicitly says that God 
has in mind the benefit of others when creating the world and His creatures. All the 
other examples have one thing in common: i.e. bringing creatures into being is a grace, 
niÝma, or is due to generosity, ºÙd. E.g.: “That which brought creatures into being 
by His grace, as beneficence for them, and by generosity.”573 
6. The sixth recurring subdivision deals with the mode and means of creation. In the case 
of inšÁ’ it is the means which can be elucidated. “Isn’t it evident for every wise 
                                                          
570
 Ibid., p. 114,9 
… مهنيب لسانتلا ببس يرجيو مهقلخ ئشني نأ هلضفو هدوجب دارأ ذإ ناكو، 
571
 Ibid., p. 114,20 
 … مهنيب يراجلا لسانتلا اذه لدب ناك ولو، دلاولأا نم هلاح ىلع مهنم صخش لك قلخ أشنأ 
572
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 133,20-134,3 
 نأ ءاش يتلا روملأا نأ تننظ نئل يرمعلفاهعدبي  نأ دارأ يتلا قئلاخلاواهئشني يتلا عئابطلاك ،هرهوج تاذ ماوقو هسفن نأش حلاص اهب دمعت امنإ ،
رايتخا ةدارإ لا رارطضا ةدارإ لزت مل هتدارإ ىسع لوقت نأ ماقتسلا نذإ ،انركذ 
573
 Ibid., p. 130,19 
 هتمعنب قلخلا أشنأ يذلا ًادوجو مهيلع ًلاضفت  
Other examples include: Ibid., p. 151,17 (ºÙd); Ibid., p. 216,1 (niÝma); Ibid., p. 249,15 (niÝma); etc. 
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[person] that the Divinity, to whom demons of spiritual nature obeyed for His word is 
the One who brought them into being and created them by His potency and 
faculty?”574 The means of the creative act is thus potency and faculty. The example is 
of further interest, given that here inšÁ’ and Ìalq are explicitly used as synonyms. 
7. A last subdivision is to be dedicated to synonyms of the term (we have already seen 
Ìalq,575 ibdÁ’ and ibdÁÝ576 above, in the previous subsections). It can appear parallel 
to iÎdÁ×,577 ÒanÝa,578 and ta’lÐf.579 This list further confirms that there is a problem 
of inconsistency: as for ibdÁÝ, it would suggest that the term may be an ex nihilo 
action. On the basis of what was said above on Ìalq, it could be interpreted either with 
or without the anteriority of matter. IÎdÁ× would suggest that the term is referring to a 
creative action in time. (Let us then mention that inšÁ’ is sometimes used with the 
word waqt, in order to express that the creative action happens in time: “No doubt, He 
had always been intent to create time and then bring their creation into being in it.”580 
And: “to intent their creation in that time instead of the time in which He brought 
them into being.”581) Both ÒanÝa and ta’lÐf would enhance that this kind of creative 
action uses pre-existing matter. Finally, it may appear sometimes with a meaning that 
does not refer to the creative action. It may stand for (re)production and invention, as 
well. As for the first idea: “As He (re)produced the many out of the few, and the few 
out of the less, …”582 And: “as He created them in a way that He should (re)produce 
them from each other.”583 As for the second one: “These six causes are present in all 
the tricks of the false ones, when they try to let people down in order to accept the 
books they made up and religions they invented.”584 Examples that show the word as 
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 Ibid., p. 209,18 
هتوقو هتردقب اهقلخو اهأشنأ يذلا وه هتملكل نويناحورلا نيطايشلا هل تعضخ يذلا هللإا نأ بل يذ لكل نيب اذه سيلوأ 
575
 Other examples include: Ibid., p. 151,1 
576
 Other examples include: Ibid., p. 215,11 
577
 Ibid., pp. 150,3; 151,15-16; 152,6. 
578
 Ibid., p. 151,2 
579
 Ibid., p. 188,16 
580
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 106,9 
ي نأ ًاعمزم  هدوجب لزي مل ناك دق نأ كش لامهقلخ هيف ئشنيف ًاتقو قلخ  
581
 Ibid., p. 106,13 
 نأهقلخل دمعتي مهأشنأ هيف يذلا تقولا كلذ نود تقولا كلذ يف  
 
582
 Ibid., p. 115,7 
كلذ نم لقأ نم ليلقلاو ليلقلا نم مهنم ريثكلا أشنأ اميفو 
583
 Ibid., p. 117,22 
ضعب نم مهضعب ئشني نأ ىلع مهقلخ ذإ 
584
 Ibid., p. 137,10 
لا هذهفمهنايدأ نم اوأشنأو مهبتك نم اولعتفا ام لوبق ىلإ سانلا رارتجا يف نيلطبملا ليح عيمج يف تسلا لاصخ  
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an appellative by the side of others where it appears as a term, show that in this case a 
word of everyday used is turned into a term of specific connotation. 
Till al-¹urºÁnÐ, we do not find definitions for this term in the Muslim authors’ books 
of definitions. Al-¹urºÁnÐ’s definition is the following: “Bringing into being is the 
production of the existent [thing] which is preceded by matter and time.”585 His general 
definition has a lot in common with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation, as we could see 
above.  
Seemingly Christian usage, or that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, preceded the 
term’s appearance at Muslim authors with a clearly delineated meaning – as far as it is 
possible to judge on the basis of books of definitions. For this reason we need to refer to the 
Qur’Ánic terminology. For example: “Indeed, We have produced the women of Paradise in a 
[new] creation”586 and: “And it is He who produced you from one soul.”587 Probably, 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used this term as it is a part of Muslim religious terminology, thus 
acceptable and intelligible for his opponents. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This topic is particularly important since creation is the basis of kalÁm. It is also a 
major point of difference between Muslim theology and philosophy. If that is the case, it is an 
important question to answer how Muslim theologians worked their terminology out; who 
influenced them, and what kind of interaction is probable with any other groups. Certainly it 
could not be those adversaries who denied creation (in time) who played a role in the 
formation of Muslim terminology. The probable answer is that influence on the formation of 
these ideas came from Christian theologians, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ being among the earliest. 
As we could see, in most cases ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation of the given terms 
could be paralleled with corresponding Greek terms, indicating that he continued this 
tradition. Most of his terms are used in different contexts with multiple possible denotations. 
So his usage can be considered a more detailed and elaborate one.  At the same time, it is to 
be remarked, that in the Muslim uses, whether theological or philosophical, there is a 
                                                          
585
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, A. i. M., KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 48. 
ةدمو ةدامب ًاقوبسم نوكي يذلا ءيشلا داجيإ ًاضيأ ءاشنلإاو 
586
 Q 56:35 (Translation taken from here: http://quran.com/56/35) 
 انإ نهانأشنأ ءاشنإ 
587
 Q 6:98 (Translation provided by: http://quran.com/6/98) 
وهو يذلا مكأشنأ نم سفن ةدحاو. 
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hierarchy of meanings, where takwÐn is the last in value, as it means the bringing into 
existence of something preceded by matter. As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, setting up such a 
hierarchy is not possible, as we have seen terms appearing in similar contexts, with close 
meanings and also used together as synonyms. This could be explained by the fact that he was 
an early theologian; terminology was not yet precise, and distictions were not elaborated. We 
can only say that his most important (since most frequently used) terms are Ìalq, then 
iÎdÁ×/ÎudÙ×, and then ÒanÝa. InšÁ’, takwÐn, and ibdÁ’/ ibtidÁ’ are less frequently used 
terms; and ibdÁÝ/ibtidÁÝ and iÌtirÁÝ are the most scarcely used ones. Probably the frequence 
of appaerance is an indicator of the importance of these terms for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. 
However, an important difference that is to be remarked is that in Muslim theology the 
different terms are treated as attributes, ÒifÁt. In the case of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ these are to 
be understood as divine actions. 
Chapter V 
The Terminology of Fatherhood-Sonship (Ubuwwa – Bunuwwa) 
 
In this chapter, I will concentrate on Greek predecessors, and examine how Patristic 
ideas are kept, continued and developed by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. In addition, I will compare 
briefly his terminology to other Arab Christian theologians. My purpose is to demonstrate the 
significance of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ within Christian kalÁm. 
 
1. Fatherhood 
 
As a first step I examine how the idea of Father appears in Patristic literature. On the 
authority of Lampe, we may say that ὁ πατήρ can refer to men, but in Patristic literature 
Father is mostly mentioned in a theological sense, denoting God, the Father, God, as universal 
Father of all creation, but fatherhood is not dependant on creation. God is also referred to as 
the Father of Christians. An important and typical example is the following: “αὐτός [sc. 
Christ] υἱοποίησεν ἡμᾶς τῷ π.” (Christ made us sons of the Father) (Athanasius Alexandrinus, 
Orationes tres adversus arianos, I. 38 (M.8.245A)). There are references to the fatherhood of 
the God of the Old Testament, as well. In the Trinity, Father denotes the first person in 
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relation to the second, and there is a distinction made between Father and Creator. God’s 
fatherhood of men is distinct from his natural fatherhood of Son.
588
 
As for fatherhood, it is expressed by the term ἡ πατριά. According to Lampe, this term 
can mean fatherhood in general, kinship, lineage, family, and group.
589
 Another term referring 
to fatherhood (alongside with paternity) is ἡ πατριαρχία. Apart from the meanings just 
mentioned (i.e. paternity, fatherhood), it can denote divine fatherhood, lineage, descent from 
father to son, generation.
590
 
These examples show that though Father as ὁ πατήρ has a specific notion that can 
refer to God as Father, most of the connotations enlisted by Lampe are common usage. As for 
the terms denoting ‘fatherhood,’ they are more widely used. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples of ‘fatherhood’ appear together with ‘sonship,’ which 
shows that these ideas are related ones in the understanding of the author. He mainly deals 
with the fatherhood and sonship of divine persons, but uses these terms also in order to draw 
parallels with human fatherhood and sonship (the two being correlative in this case, as well). 
A typical example would be the following: 
“Even if the attributes of live created beings [or animals] are in accordance with the properties 
of the substance of the Creator [eulogy] in the name of fatherhood and sonship, yet there’s no 
accordance between them in the essence of these meanings in any way. If we set up an 
analogy to [grasp] what intellect cannot understand, contrasting the contrariety and difference 
between two different and contradictory things with the difference between the Fatherhood 
and Sonship of the Pre-eternal, and the created beings and their sonship, [we would see] that 
the difference between the two [kinds of] fatherhood and sonship is innumerable times 
greater and further than the farthest difference between two contrary and different things.”
591
  
On the basis of this citation we can see that fatherhood and sonship in the case of created 
beings are understood as attributes, while in the case of the divine they are properties. We 
have seen (on the basis of Lampe’s work) that in Trinity, Father denotes the first person in 
relation to the second, but there is a distinction made between Father and Creator, here 
fatherhood appears as a property of the substance of the Creator. Obviously, we cannot say 
that the two terms are synonyms, and in the chapter on creation we have seen that all three 
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 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 1050-1051. 
589
 Ibid., p. 1051. 
590
 Ibid., p. 1052. 
591
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 166,11-17 
تاذ يف مهنيب قافتا لا هنإف ،ةونبلاو ةوبلأا مسا يف ىلاعتو لج قلاخلا رهوج صاوخ تقفاو ةقولخملا ناويحلا تافص تناك نإو ،ًاضيأ كلذك  يناعملا
 ًاعيمج روملأا ءاحنأ نم ٍوحن .خم نيئيش نيب فلاخلاو دداضتلا نم ،هكرد لوقعلا نكمي نوكي ام داعبأ انسق ول لب نيب فلاخلا ىلإ ،نيدداضتم نيفلت
 نيئيشلا نيب فلاخلا نوكي ام  دعبأ نم دعبأو مظعأ نيتونبلاو نيتوبلاا نيب فلاخلا ناكل ،مهتونبو نيقولخملا نيبو هتونبو يلزلأا ةوبأ نيدداضتملا
اهددع ىصحي لا فاعضأو. ٍفاعضأب ،نيفلتخملا 
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hypostases are creators: i.e. both Father and Son, yet, the distinction mentioned in the field of 
Patristic writings does not seem to be present in an emphasized way. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
does not give definitions for his terms, but by contrasting ideas (divine and human sonship 
and fatherhood) he shows that the same terms may be used to denote differentiated meanings. 
It is in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s other surviving work, the KitÁb al-burhÁn that he explains that 
Muslims wrongly assume that Christians attribute corporeality to God with the doctrine of the 
Incarnation. In ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s view, it is on the contrary: there is a transcendent 
fatherhood and sonship, which belongs to the substantial being of God, without any action, as 
among humans. The misconception comes from the erroneous Muslim interpretation, which 
does not consider that the essential names belong to God primarily, and that the same names 
may denote humans only because of God’s having graced man with them. Just because these 
names denote something created in humans, it does not mean that they are also created in 
God. Predicates belong to God in the strict sense, while to humans only metaphorically.
592
 
The following example shows it more explicitly: “How can an intelligent [person] imagine of 
God’s Book that when mentioning the names “Father” and “Son” it should mean by these 
[words] fatherhood and sonship like the fatherhood and sonship they know on the basis of the 
fatherhood and sonship of created beings?”593 It is clear then that these terms are derived from 
the appellatives or “proper names” of F/father and S/son. There is a specific kind of 
fatherhood and sonship, which belongs to the divine, there is another one belonging to 
humankind, and a general kind which includes them both. 
If we turn to the specific kind of fatherhood and sonship which belongs to the divine, 
we will see that the Patristic idea, according to which the Father in the Trinity denotes the first 
person in relation to the second, recurs in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text. Let us cite an example, 
on the basis of which we have seen that incarnation was the cause of a new revelation; but 
now we are going to concentrate on the Father-Son relation in it:  
“We inform you that in the previous periods of mankind there has been no specific reason for 
notification, but when the Son appeared through His incarnation, His contemporaries needed 
to be talked to and be informed on His great grace, i.e. His incarnation by a human [being] of 
their substance; and thus He needed to inform them on his sonship related to His Father, and 
                                                          
592
 GRIFFITH, S., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-BurhÁn: Christian KalÁm in the First Abbasid Century. In: Le 
Muséon,  96(1983)1-2, p. 173.; and HAYEK, p. 59. 
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 Ibid., p. 166,18-20 
فيكو زوجي يذل لقع نأ مهوتي ىلع اتكب الله ذإ ركذي مسا بلأا نبلااو هنأ ىنع امهب   ةوبأ   ةونبو ةوبلأاك ةونبلاو ةفورعملا نم ةوبأ نم لانيقولخم 
مهتونبو 
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the fatherhood of His Father which is related to Him, and the pre-eternity of the Spirit that 
emanates from the essence of His Father for them.”
594
  
The Father appears here as the first person of the Trinity, and relatedness of the first and 
second persons in the form of sonship and fatherhood is explicitly laid down. 
In the chapter on creation, we saw that created beings are related to each other by way 
of reproduction. This is what defines their relationship, which is correlated, as far as 
fatherhood and sonship is concerned: “It should not terrify you, Listener, if you hear His 
Scriptures call these meanings Father, Son and Holy Spirit, to think that these are like the 
fatherhood and sonship which is between creatures due to their reproduction.”595 So the 
specific fatherhood (and sonship) which belongs to creation is a caused, correlated one, which 
has reproduction as its direct cause. It is clear that he is addressing Muslims, who refute 
fatherhood and sonship in the Godhead, since, according to them, it would imply a plurality of 
divinities; and they also reject the idea of God’s having a son, as it is laid down in the 
Qur’Án: “He neither begets nor is born.”596 
As for the specific kind which belongs to the divine, it is also a correlative one, but 
when it comes to the person of the Messiah, it needs to be made clearer: since in his case, 
fatherhood or sonship could be physical and ontological as well: “They are actually unified in 
the sonship and in the relation to the Father who is described by the essence of 
fatherhood.”597 Fatherhood is thus seen here as an attribute of the first person of the Trinity, 
at the same time, fatherhood is an essence, too. 
Fatherhood as a correlative counterpart for the sonship of the Messiah’s divine part 
may raise the question of merit or gain. The opponent may ask: “… you claim that the pre-
eternal of the Messiah’s two substances merited sonship to the Father, and the Father’s 
fatherhood suited him, because He is born of Him eternally, in a substantial way.”598 It is the 
nature of the relationship, which is clarified here. We have seen above that the correlative 
relationship of fatherhood and sonship, in the case of created beings is due to reproduction. In 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 167,4-7 
كربخن هنأ مل صصخي يف فلاس باقعلأاروهد ةيضاملا لبق ليجنلإا   ةلع جيتحا اهل ىلإ نلاعإ ،اهركذ ىتح رهظ نبلاا   ادسجتم جاتحاف لهأ 
هرصع ذئنيح ىلإ نأ مهبطاخي مهربخيو ميظعب هتمعن مهيلع يف هدسجت   ارشب نم ،مهرهوج نلعيو كلذل هتونب هيبلأا ةوبأو هيبأ هل ةيلزأو حورلا 
ةضئافلا نم تاذ هيبأ مهل. 
595
 Ibid., p. 168,14-15 
لاف كنرعذي اهيأ عماسلا اذإ تعمس هبتك ىمست هذه ىناعملا   ابأ   انباو حورو سدق نظتف اهنأ ةوبلأاك ةونبلاو نيتلا نيب نيقولخملا نم لبق مهلسانت 
596
 Q. 112,3 
مل دلي ملو دلوي 
597 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 178,7-8 
لب ادحتا يف ةهج ةونبلا ةبسنلاو ىلإ بلأا فوصوملا تاذب ةوبلأا. 
598
 Ibid., p. 193,2-3 
مكبهو نومعزت نأ يلزلأا نم يرهوج حيسملا قحتسا ةونب بلأا تحصو هل هتوبأ هنلأ دولوم هنم جيرهو ميدق 
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the case of the divine, it is not the reproduction, but ontological, substantial birth, which can 
be a “cause” of this relation, rendering one of the two substances a substantial-ontological 
Father, and the other a Son in the same sense. It is essential though to note that this kind of 
birth is not to be understood in time: since the pre-eternal hypostasis of the Messiah has 
eternally been born of the Father. The hypothetical Muslim opponent may go on to ask how 
the sonship and fatherhood is to be understood in the case of the human part of the Messiah: 
“As for the created human, who was created in time, and who is not of the substance of the 
Creator: how [does he merit] the sonship to his eternal Creator, Whose substance he does not 
belong to, and how could His Fatherhood suit him?”599 There is an apparent antagonism 
between the eternal fatherhood-sonship relation, which is natural for the divine part by way of 
eternal birth, and the meriting it on the behalf of a being that is created in time. 
An important Christian answer is given for these questions: sonship and fatherhood 
can be gained by way of unity with the pre-eternal substance: “Fatherhood suited him, and he 
merited the sonship by way of the unity, which was given to him as a grace (and through him, 
this grace was given to everyone belonging to the same substance). Since true sonship can be 
proper in two cases only: either by way of birth, or by way of unity – according to which we 
intend its interpretation.”600 The problem is elucidated from the approach of sonship, but it is 
due to the correlative nature of the two. Interestingly enough, in nature fatherhood can be 
concerned to be the cause of sonship, but in the case of this ontological relation, sonship is the 
key to meriting God’s fatherhood for humankind. The same conclusion may be drawn on the 
basis of the next example: “As the One who has always existed (eulogy) was born of His 
Father pre-eternally, he deserved the sonship due to the substantial birth from His Father, 
then, because of His grace and beneficence, He wanted to share His sonship with the human 
substance, in order to make the fatherhood related to His Father necessary for the human, 
too.”601 Fatherhood and sonship still appear together. It is said explicitly here that sonship 
may be a means in gaining the fatherhood of God for the human.  
The relations of sonship and fatherhood are further detailed in connection with 
incarnation:  
                                                          
599
 Ibid., p. 193,3-5 
امأف ناسنلإا ثدحملا قولخملا يذلا لا نم رهوج قلاخلا فيكف ةونب هقلاخ ميدقلا يذلا سيل نم هرهوج فيكو تحص هل هتوبأ 
600
 Ibid., p. 193,6-8 
تحص هل ةوبلأا قحتساو ةونبلا نم لبق داحتلاا يذلا معنأ هب هيلع ىلعو لهأ هرهوج هب .نلا ةونبلا داصلاةق امنإ حصت نم دحأ نيتهج :امإ نم لبق 
دلاولا امإو نم لبق داحتلاا ىلع ام نحن نوعمزم هريسفت 
601
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 193,9-11 
 هيبأ نم دولوم ،هؤانث لج ،لزي مل يذلا ناك ذإفً ايلزأ قحتسا   هتمعنب بحأ مث ،ًايرهوج هيبأ نم هدلاول ةونبلا يف سنلأا رهوج كرتشي نأ هلضفو
هيبأ ةوبأ قح بجويو هتونب 
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“Had the Father – eulogy – incarnated in the human instead of the Son, and had He taken the 
human into His Fatherhood with Himself as the Son has taken him with Himself into His 
sonship, then – similarly – he should have called the human Father, together with the Pre-
eternal. It would have been impossible to attach the sonship of the temporal human to the 
fatherhood of the Father in this statement.”
602
  
This is the first instance to show us that fatherhood and sonship are not only correlated but in 
some respects they stand in contrast, as well. While humanity can take a share in the divine 
sonship, it is impossible for them to join fatherhood. Even if the equality of the three divine 
persons is emphasized elsewhere, this example can be interpreted as implying a hierarchy of 
Father and Son. 
A last approach we have to mention is the question how these persons and their 
relations (fatherhood-sonship) may be known.  
“But, as the Father – eulogy – wanted to complete His eternal generosity towards His creation 
and fulfil His previous grace upon His whole created world, and wanted to inform all the 
angels and people on the splendour of the name of His Fatherhood that He had concealed 
before: He assumed a body by His pre-eternal Son, who is born of Him. [This body is] of His 
creation. He took it with Him into His sonship, and by this, he made for Him and for everyone 
of the same substance (angels and men) the share of His Fatherhood necessary. By this, they 
all deserved the heritage of His valuable and noble treasures, which he had prepared for them 
in His kingdom.”
603
  
This quotation shows that fatherhood and sonship in the divine are not necessarily 
understandable and cognizable in an intellectual way. The author cannot be considered 
philosophical in this respect, since he even rejects the use of qiyÁs to compare human and 
divine fatherhoods. Humankind has to be informed on this question (i.e. on the trinity of 
hypostases in the Godhead), the method of which is revelation, i.e. it is not Ýaql, but naql in 
this case. 
 For the better understanding of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, it is essential that we examine 
some contemporary examples, as well, e.g. the Jacobite AbÙ RÁ’iÔa. The latter is less 
consistent in his usage of terms when referring to fatherhood. We can see the following 
                                                          
602
 Ibid., p. 205,9-12 
 هؤانث لج بلأا ناك ولفدسجت  عم يرشبلا ىمسي نأ كلذ سايق ىلع بجول ًاذإ ،هتونب يف هعم نبلاا هذخأ امك هتوبأ يف هعم هذخأو نبلاا لدب يرشبلا
 ةونب ىلإ بسني نأ ًلايحتسم كلذ ناكف .ًابأ يلزلأالوقلا اذه يف بلأا ةوبأب ينمزلا ناسنلإا. 
603
 Ibid. pp. 205,15-206,1-2: 
اك ام نيعمجأ سانلاو ةكئلاملل نلعيو هتيرب ةفاك ىلع ةقباسلا هتمعن ممتيو هقلخ ىلع ميدقلا هدوج لمكي نأ هللاج زع بلأا دارأ ذإ نكلو ًاميدق هافخأ ن
هنم دولوملا يلزلأا هنباب ذختا ،هتوبأ مسا ءانس نم  هتوبأ ظح كلذب سنلأاو ةكئلاملا نم هرهوج لهلأو هل بجوأو هتونب يف هعم هذخأو هقلخ نم ًادسج
 .هتوكلم يف مهل اهدعأ يتلا ةميركلا ةسيفنلا هرئاخذ ةثارو مهعمجاب اوقحتسيل 
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forms: ubuwwa, abawiyya, and abiyya, all of them in the same sense. Le tus first see an 
example for ubuwwa: 
“It is only by the Son that He was enjoined the name of the fatherhood. Or is anyone without 
a son described as father? [Or is ] anyone without a father described as Son? These are names 
of the attributes of one of them [in relation] to the other. One of them would not exist without 
the other, and one exists by the existence of the other. Then the Father and the Son are equal 
together, and neither of them precedes the other, nor is he later [than the other].”
604
 
AbÙ RÁ’iÔa also interprets fatherhood as correlative with sonship. He even emphasizes that 
Father and Son do not precede or follow each other in time. This argumentation is important 
in the discussion with the Muslim opponent, since pre-existence in time would mean a 
differentiation or division in the Godhead, and this needs to be rebutted. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
teaches the same, but AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s argumentation is much more explicit on this matter. 
Fatherhood may be a name, or an attribute on this basis. 
 In another instance AbÙ RÁ’iÔa connects fatherhood-sonship with emanation, and the 
question becomes related to the question of unity and trinity. He also compares the unity of 
substance and the trinity of hypostases to that of Adam, Abel, and Eve. In this comparison 
both triads can be described by properties, such as fatherhood, sonship and emanation.
605
 In 
this, he does not emphasize the difference between human and divine fatherhood and sonship, 
but uses the analogy to demonstarte what it means in the case of divine persons. If compared 
to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, we may remember that the latter emphasizes that no analogy can 
arrive at divine fatherhood and sonship, the two being extremely different in nature. However, 
when AbÙ RÁ’iÔa refers to these relations as correlative, he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
interpretation, but he emphasizes that the three hypostases and their relations are said to be 
one in substance and differ in properties only.
606
 
 As for AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s use of abawiyya, it is referred to as a property which 
differentiates the first hypostasis from the second and the third, even though their substance is 
one.
607
 And finally, as for abiyya, it is mentioned together with ibniyya, as properties, which 
never change. 
                                                          
604
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 50. 
امنإ بجوأ هل مسا ةوبلأا نبلااب .لهف فصوي نم لا نبا هل   ابأ نمو لا بأ هل   انبا .هذهف ءامسأ تافص اهضعب ىلإ ضعب لا دجوي اهضعب نادقفب 
ضعب دجويو اهضعب دوجوب ضعب .بلأاف   اذإ نبلااو   اعم اوس مل مدقتي امهدحأ رخلآا ملو رخأتي. 
605
 Idem, FÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa- i×bÁt al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas, pp. 145-146. 
606
 C.f. VANYÓ, László, Bevezetés az ókeresztény kor dogmatörténetébe, p. 417. 
607
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, al-RisÁla al-ÙlÁ fÐ al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas. In: Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn 
Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, Ed. Georg GRAF,<<Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium>> vol. 130.; << 
Scriptores Arabici>> tom. 14., Louvain, 1951. pp. 1-26.; p. 13. 
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 AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s interpretation is basically the same as that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, 
since both of them use the term together with sonship, as a property or an attribute. ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ is consistent in his use of the form ubuwwa, while AbÙ RÁ’iÔa uses three forms 
with the same meaning. Given that in the first half of the ninth century terminology was in its 
formative period, it is not surprising. No Muslim parallels can be drawn on the basis of books 
of definitions, so suffice us to mention that most of the ideas of Patristic literature recur here. 
Reflections may only be found in Early Muslim polemical works, but these only show us how 
Muslims understood Christian teachings. 
 
2. Sonship – Bunuwwa 
 
In Patristic literature ὁ υἱός, son can refer to a spiritual son, or to υἱός θεοῦ (the Son of 
God), or to υἱός ἀνθρώπου (the Son of Man). The second and the third meanings can be 
further differentiated. As for υἱός θεοῦ (the Son of God), it can refer to Israel, to Christian 
believers, heavenly beings, man, and the Second person of the Trinity. The Second person of 
the Trinity can have this name in relation to the Godhead in general, or it can be his title 
applied in virtue of eternal sonship, but not of Incarnation. This name is inapplicable for the 
Holy Spirit, sonship being a peculiar relationship (and not generic).  Υἱός ἀνθρώπου is used 
when referring to Christ; or as Son of man coming in judgement; of Christ as man or Christ’s 
humanity (in general or said to be son by grace).
608
 Sonship is expressed by ἡ υἱότης. This is 
mainly used for the sonship of the Son in general; and the Sonship of the Son in both natures. 
The same term can express the relationship of man to God: through Christ, or by baptism, or 
in general; or sometimes it is simply a human relationship.
609
 On the basis of those examples 
that were cited in the case of fatherhood, we could see that the Son of God, as the second 
person of the Trinity, appears as such in virtue of eternal birth and not by way of Incarnation. 
Sonship was applied to human relations, for human (or more exactly created beings’) 
relationships. The Son of God, the second person of the Trinity, by way of unity, made the 
human being the son of God.  The sonship of the Son in both natures is also a common theme 
in Patristic literature and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation. Sonship as the relationship of 
man to God (either through Christ or in a general sense) is a recurring idea; but there is no 
reference to sonship by way of baptism. We could also see that sonship can express simply a 
human relationship, as well. 
                                                          
608
 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 1426-28. 
609
 Ibid., pp. 1428-29. 
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Let us examine some of the loci that have not been cited yet (since only sonship is 
mentioned in them, without any reference made to fatherhood). When ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
writes on the close relationship of Sonship and the meaning of the word ‘Messiah,’ it is the 
sonship (without its correlation to fatherhood) which is concentrated on, as we can see it in 
the following quote: “As for our applying the name of duality for them, it is not in that respect 
in which they united, since they united in the meaning of the one messianity, and in the one 
sonship, so that there arose a One Messiah and a One Son due to their combination and 
composition, without their changing away from their essences.”610 Sonship is then a 
connection, in which a unity of two different hypostases may come into being. It is used 
parallel to “messianity,” so even if the former is more general (since that may be applied for 
the second person of the Trinity, for man and for the Messiah), in the case of the Messiah, 
these two terms are almost to be considered as synonyms. As for sonship in the case of the 
Messiah, it can be further differentiated: there is an eternal one that is attached to the Eternal 
Father, and another one that came into being in time and which is attached to the earthly 
mother: “The human unified with the pre-eternal divinity in His sonship, which is attached to 
His Father, but He didn’t unite with him in his human sonship that is attached to his 
mother.”611 Yet, it is not contrary to what has been established before, since the frame of unity 
and combination is the One sonship, that of the divine. This frame and the modality of 
unification are further detailed as follows: “The Pre-eternal made the human take all his 
graces, and unified with him in all the sonship and judgement He had, but he did not take a 
share in anything the human had.”612 Thus the sonship in which the two substances united is 
related to the Heavenly Father and not to the earthly mother. 
Sonship also appears as an essence, a name, and a kind of attachment or relation: 
“(Due to His generosity and grace,) He didn’t want to possess the essence, name, and relation 
of sonship alone after that He had taken the human, which He incarnated in, with Himself 
…”613 At the same time it is underlined here that the sonship of the Messiah belongs to the 
divine, and it is a grace that human can have a share of it. The term aÌaÆa is used to express 
that the divine Second Person has taken a human into His sonship. It is the same term which is 
                                                          
610
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 181,1-3 
 امأو انؤارجإ مسا ةينثلإا اهيلع، سيلف نم ةهج يتلا اهيف ادحتا امهنلأ ادحتا يف ىنعم ةيحيسملا ةدحاولا ةهجو ةونبلا ةدحاولا ىلإ نأ راص 
امهعامتجلا امهفلاتئاو لاب لاقتنا نع امهيتاذ   احيسم   ادحاو   انباو   ادحاو 
611
 Ibid., p. 183,15-16 
كلذك دحتا يرشبلا يف هتونب ةيهلإب ةيلزلأا ةبوسنملا ىلإ هيبأ مل دحتي وه هعم يف هتونب ةيرشبلا ةفاضملا ىلإ همأ 
612
 Ibid., p. 183,19-20 
كلذك يلزلأا لانأ يرشبلا هلئاضف   اعيمج دحتاو هب يف لك ام هل نم ةونبلا ،ةنونيدلاو ملو كرتشي عم يرشبلا يف ءيش امم ناك هل   لاصأ. 
613
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 186,1-2 
هنكلو ىبأ همركل هلضفو نأ دبتسي وأ سيرثأت تاذب ةونبلا اهمساو اهتبسنو دعب نأ ذخأ يرشبلا يذلا دسجت هب هعم …  
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used (in this form, or more frequently in the VIIIth stem) to mean the taking of the divine a 
body, a bodily form or a human disposition for himself, as we could see it in the chapter on 
terms with bodily connotations. The main idea of the citation is expressed elsewhere, too, e.g. 
in the next example, where another approach shows that sonship is a portion and a share (i.e. 
something that is probably not to be gained or merited, but can be received as a gift, or a 
grace.) “[the human] does not deserve to be called Son without the One who made him take 
the share and portion of sonship.”614 It is then a gift that was given to a particular human by 
way of the Incarnation, and through him, to all humankind. In the chapter on creation, the 
creative action was considered to be goodness, something that was carried out in order to be a 
gift, a grace for humankind. In this, it resembles what was established concerning the 
intellect, which also appeared as a grace, a gift for humankind. This idea of divine goodness is 
further emphasized through the action of Incarnation, and the action of making human take a 
share from divine sonship. This last example mentions the word Ibn, as well, out of which the 
abstract noun, bunuwwa is derived. We can see that if the human part of the Messiah cannot 
be referred to as ‘Son’ without the divine, then it also means that sonship as a meaning must 
comprise both “components” in the case of the Messiah. 
An analogy is introduced at this point, which compares the two parts of the Messiah in 
one sonship to the sonship of man, who consists of body and soul. We could see the same idea 
concerning the Messiah’s unity, in the chapter on bodily terms:  
“As the formed body of man is the offspring of his father, even if it does not deserve to be 
called a human being on its own, without the soul, nor [can it be called] a son of the father 
who bred him. It is because they both share a companionship that cannot be divided in the one 
humanity and the one sonship, equally. And he is not the son of anything but the man, or he is 
nothing but the son of the man, as long as he is alive.”
615
  
On the basis of this example we can see that two different substances are united in the 
framework of sonship. The Messiah’s human part is compared to the body, while His divinity 
to the soul. In general, sonship is the unifying factor that can keep two substances together: 
“Instead, according to the compelling truth, it is right to call the body of man one of the two 
parts of the person of man, and one of the two substances of the sonship of man.”616 It is not 
                                                          
614
 Ibid., p. 186,10-11 
… لا قحتسي نود دحلأا يذلا هلانأ ظح ةونبلا اهمهسو نأ ىعدي ىلع هدارفنا   انبا 
615
 Ibid., p. 186,13-187,2 
كام نأ ندب ناسنلإا لوبجملا عرز هيبأ نإو ناك لا قحتسي نأ ىمسي ىلع هدارفنا نود سفنلا ةدحتملا هعم اناسنإ، لاو بلأل يذلا هدلو   انبا 
امهكارتشلا ةكرش لا مسقت يف ةيسنأ ةدحاو ةونبو ةدحاو   اعيمج ءاوس سيلف ونب ريغ ناسنإ لاو ريغ نبا ناسنلإا ام ماد   ايح 
616
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 187,4-5 
لب دق قحي ىلع ةقيقحلا ةبجاولا نأ ىمسي ندب ناسنلإا دحأ يئزج ةثج ناسنلإا دحأو يرهوج ةونب ناسنلإا 
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just the unifying factor of two substances, but of two hypostases, as well. “When you call 
[Him] Messiah or mention the Son of God from that time on [i.e. the Incarnation], then you 
take the two hypostases together by the unity which is the meaning of their equality in this 
sonship …”617 Sonship apparently also means the equality of the parts. At the same time, 
sometimes sonship also appears as a substance: “By this incarnation in that one person among 
them all, He wanted to draw the substance of rational beings close to Himself, and He wanted 
to make the substance of His sonship necessary for him, too.”618 These meanings are hard to 
be treated in a separated way, so we can sum it up that sonship is an essence or a substance, at 
the same time it is a portion and share, which is due to divine grace, as a gift, goodness, and it 
is also related to another counterpart. The sonship of both parts of the Messiah is also 
justified: “The sonship of the Messiah, our Vivifier is true and right [in relation] to His Father 
from both aspects: as for His divine hypostasis, He is born from Him pre-eternally, eternally; 
as for the human hypostasis, it is unified with the One who is born from Him in His sonship, 
which stands above attributes and similarities.”619 We may see that the sonship of the second 
person of the Trinity is related to the First Person by way of birth and not incarnation, so this 
Patristic idea is recurrent in this context, as well. As for incarnation, it is only the way of 
unifying with another hypostasis, which gains sonship this way, as a gift. 
In the next example this unity in sonship is preceded by an action, which may be 
described as combining the human part with the divine hypostasis: “He combined it with His 
hypostasis, … in order to unify it with Himself in His sonship.”620 As if a combination had 
been a prerequisite of unity in sonship. As for the unity of sonship, it stands parallel to the 
unity of the Messiah, and their basis is elucidated as follows: “We need to know on this basis 
that it is not due to the dwelling of the divine in the human that the unity of the Messiah and 
the unity of His sonship came into being, but it is due to the Messiah’s taking the property of 
humanity for himself by way of incarnation and the unification between them.”621 Dwelling 
plays an important part in the terminology ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses when referring to bodily 
                                                          
617
 Ibid., p. 187,13-15 
لب ىتم تيمس حيسملا مأ تركذ نبا الله ذنم كلذ تقولا دقف تممع نيمونقلا داحتلااب يتلآا وه ىنعم اامهئاوتس يف كلذ ةونبلا 
618
 Ibid., p. 217,3-4 
دارأ اذهب دسجتلا نم بيرقت رهوج نيقطانلا يذلا دسجت صخشلا دحاولا نم هلهأ ىلإ هسفن باجيإو رهوج هتونب هل كلذب 
619
 Ibid., p. 194,2-4 
 ًايلزأ هنم هدلاول هتيهلإ مونق نم هنأ :نيهجولا لاك نم هيبلأ تقدصو تحص انييحم حيسملا ةونب  ًاميدق،  هنم دولوملا عم اهداحتلا هتوسان مونق لبق نمو
لاثملأاو تافصلا نع يلاعتملا هتونب ةهج يف 
620
 Ibid., p. 196,17-18 
 همونق ىلإ هفلأ …هتونب يف هعم هدحويل 
621
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 202,15-17 
لبق نم سيل هنأ ملعن نأ بجي انهه نم نكلو هتونب ةينادحوو حيسملا ةينادحو تماق توسانلا يف توهلالا لولح،  ةصاخ نبلاا صاصتخا لبق نم لب
اهنيب نم ديحوتلاو دسجتلاب توسانلا 
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concepts, as we could see above. We have also seen that dwelling does not imply unity, but 
provides opportunity for a substance to appear in/through another. Incarnation, which implies 
unity, as well, on the basis of what we could see above, is the clue to the unity of the Messiah 
and His sonship. So sonship is in close relation with the unity of the Messiah, since it is the 
“frame” in which the two substances could unify. 
Among the several examples of scriptural evidence for the one messianity and one 
sonship (Mk, Lk),
622
 let us mention only one: “… the Gospel informs on His change, states, 
and actions, which refer to the difference of his two substances and the unity of his 
sonship.”623 The unity of the sonship does not exclude the difference of substances, nor is it 
contrary to it. 
We could see that Patristic ideas frequently recurred in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, so 
he can be considered a continuer of Greek Patristic literature. There are some minor 
differences in approach: e.g. Christ’s making humankind God’s sons is presented from the 
viewpoint of fatherhood in Patristic literature, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ introduces it 
through sonship. 
His Jacobite contemporary, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa introduces sonship as a property, just as we 
could see it in the subsection on fatherhood. “All of them became a perfect hypostasis 
regarding their properties by which they differ from one another; none of them is 
characterised by the attribute of the other in his property, but all of them is recognizable by 
his own property: the Father by His fatherhood, the Son by His sonship, the Spirit by His 
emanation from the Father.”624 This example accentuates the correlation of sonship and 
fatherhood. Hypostasis is defined by a property, and both fatherhhod and sonship are 
properties. The relation of the Persons of the Trinity, and their difference as that of the 
property is an idea shared by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, too. Since it is Christian teaching, it is not 
surprising, but their use of the same terms, especially ÌÁÒÒa, property in this case shows that 
Christian terminology is on its way for homogeneity in this period, as far as terms of 
fundamental importance are concerned. 
Muslim anti-Christian refutations understand ubuwwa and bunuwwa in a literal sense. 
Even the Qur’Án does so in the sÙrat al-IÌlÁÒ, for example. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is trying to 
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 Ibid., p. 208,16-17; p. 212,3-6; p. 212,5, 19; pp. 212,21-213,1 
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 Ibid., p. 211,14 
ربخي ليجنلإا نم هبلقت هتلااحو هعئانصو هليعافأو اةلادل ىلع فلاتخا هيرهوج ةينادحوو هتونب 
624
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas, p. 13. 
 ًلاماك ًامونق اهنم دحاو لك راص دق ذإ امأف  اهنم دحاو لك لب ةصاخلا يف رخلآا ةفصب اهنم دحاو لك مزلي مل رخلآا فلاخي اهب يتلا هتيصاخب ًاقلعتم
بلأا نم هجورخب حورلاو هتونبب نبلااو هتوبأب بلأا هتيصاخب فرعي 
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explain the meaning of fatherhood and sonship to his Muslim counterparts as they seem to 
misunderstand their meanings.  
 
Conclusion 
  
Concluding we may say that Patristic ideas are elaborated on in Christian authors’ 
works. Key concepts and corresponding terms seem homogeneous. The correlative use of 
fatherhood and sonship is a characteristic feature of the Christian works. However, it is 
remarkable that they either emphasize that the nature of this relation is not biological, in order 
to explain to Muslims what they mean by this, or they implicitly do so, when referring to 
fatherhood and sonship as properties, which differentiate between the hypostases but do not 
affect the unity of the divine substance. 
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Chapter VI 
Terms that refer to the divine Trinity or Unity 
(Ta×lÐ× - trinity, „making three” vs.  waÎdÁniyya, tawÎÐd, ittiÎÁd – unity, “making 
one,” union; and the question of duality.) 
 
Ta×lÐ×, Trinity is a teaching of crucial importance for Christians that deals with the 
unity and trinity of God. In this chapter, first I am going to examine a term that refers to the 
Trinity, even if this term does not exactly mean „Trinity,” since the Arabic form, ta×lÐ× is 
the verbal noun of ×alla×a, ‘to make or call three.’ It would then best translate as ‘making 
three’, which, according to Thomas, as a form, expresses the Muslim understanding that the 
Christian doctrine entails plurality within the Godhead, and indicates that it has never been 
accepted in Muslim religious thought.
625
 But, this term is also a name for the doctrine of the 
divine Trinity for Christians, too. In their case we cannot speak of “making three,” but this 
form’s appearance in Christian use in general, and in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use in particular, 
demonstrates the presence of interaction, an endeavour to use common terminology with 
Muslims. It is to be observed that not all Christians aimed at the usage of shared terms with 
Muslims, e.g. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s contemporary, the Jacobite ÍabÐb ibn Ëidma AbÙ 
RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ used various forms. In addition to ta×lÐ×, he also used ×ÁlÙ×626 and 
×ulÁ×iyya.627All three terms refer to the same meaning, but when he speaks of what the 
Muslim opponent asked or told, only the first form is used. However, he does not necessarily 
use terms when writing on the Trinity. In most cases, he only talks of the three hypostases, it 
is just the minority of occurences where any of the above mentioned terms appear. 
This term can be contrasted to unity, tawÎÐd, the verbal noun of waÎÎada, ‘to make or 
call one,’ but also designating the divine Unity, which I am going to examine as third. Since 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ disputed those who accused Christian teachings of dualism in his book, 
it is worth considering his terminology of duality and dualism, which I am going to do as 
second. 
In the following, I will inspect the corresponding Greek terms, then examine to what 
extent ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ can be considered to be a continuer of Greek, especially Patristic 
                                                          
625
 THOMAS, D., TathlÐth, IE. Second Edition, vol. X. p. 373. 
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 E.g. ABØ RÀ’IÓA, Die Schriften des Jacobiten ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, p. 54,16; p. 81,10; 90,18. 
627
 E.g. Ibid., p. 74,15; p. 82,10; 88,10; etc. 
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tradition, and then contrast his (and more generally: Christian) understanding of Trinity, Unity 
(and duality) to Muslim authors’ interpretations and definitions. 
 
1. Ta×lÐ× - T/trinity, „making three” 
 
This term is not present in Afnan’s philosophical lexicon, which suggests that in those 
works of Muslim mainstream philosophy that he examined, this question was not dealt with. 
A simple reason for this is the fact that Muslim philosophers commented on Aristotle and 
Aristotelian tradition, which is pre-Christian. Trinity is a Christian notion, and as such could 
not be reflected upon by ancient Greek philosophers. On the other hand, Muslim belief does 
not accept the teaching of Trinity, so Muslim philosophy is not expected to deal with the 
question. Due to the theological nature of this question, it is normal that it belong to the field 
of Christian and Muslim theologies. For being a major subject of debate between the two 
religions, it should be a primary interest of our analysis. In particular, I will show how 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ elaborates on Trinity in Arabic at an early age of Christian kalÁm. 
Further, I will examine the terminological difference of understanding terms’ connotations in 
a Christian-Muslim polemic context. 
Lampe brings several terms that can be examined as bases for further development. 
The term that could be paired with ta×lÐ× is τριάζω, ‘make into a trinity.’ But Lampe shows 
that it is a scarcely used term, with few examples. The one that is worthy of citing introduces 
it in the same meaning as Muslims use ta×lÐ×: referring to Christians as ones who make God 
three: “Χριστιανοὶ ~οντες τὴν θεότητα” (Gregentius Tapharensis, disp. cum Hebrano Judaeo, 
M.86.628C) (i.e.: Christians make the divinity three.) This is probably a phrase of the Jewish 
counterpart with whom the disputation, which is referred to in the title of the cited opus, is 
carried out.
628
  If we want to examine terms that refer to the Trinity then the following terms 
turn up. We may find e.g. the term τριαδικός, which means threefold, with a special respect to 
Trinity, but it may simply refer to something ternary, i.e. something that consists of three. As 
for the reference to Trinity: ἕνα θεὸν τὸ τ. ὁμολογοῦντες κράτος (Gregentius Tapharensis, 
disp. cum Hebrano Judaeo, M.86.1812B) (i.e. the citation is from the Jew’s saying: 
“[Christians] confess the one God in a threefold state”), τῆς ἁπλῆς καὶ μοναδικῆς 
αὐτοαληθεὶας καὶ κυριότητος καὶ θεότητος τῷ λόγῷ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τριαδικῆς καθ’ 
ὑπόσταςιν (Gregorius Nyssenus, hom. 5.60 in Jo.: homiliae in Jo., H. Hansmann Forschungen 
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zur christlichen Literatur- und Dogmen-Geschichte 16 4-5 Paderborn 1930 saec. vi-vii.) As 
for the substantive meaning, i.e. the threefold character: ὁ λόγος ἒν πρόσωπον ὅλον ὑπάρχων, 
μία τε ὑπόστασις τῆς ἁγίας τριάδος· ἐξ ὑποστάσεων γάρ, οὐ φύσεων τὸ τ. συείλεκται 
(Leontius Hierosolymitanus adversus Nestorianos 7.4 M. 86. 1768aA) Another example: εἰ 
ὑπόστασιν, τό τῆς θεότητος καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος σημαίνουσιν ὀνόματα, ὥρα σοι λέγειν 
καὶ τρεῖς θεότητας διὰ τὸ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἄπειρον (Johannes Damascenus contra Jacobitas 
14.(M.94.1444C), id. de hymno trisagio ad Jordanem 3(M.95.29B)).
629
 Looking at the titles 
of works Lampe enlisted, we may see some of polemical nature, against Nestorians and 
Jacobites, which shows that the interpretations concerning some details of the teaching on 
Trinity are different in the three denominations’ beliefs. 
Another term which brings rich reference to Trinity is ἡ τριάς, though it may refer to a 
trinity or to the number three in general, as well. If used in a special sense, it denotes the triad 
of the divine Persons, the triunity (or the essential unity), just to mention the most important 
connotations.
630
 
Even before ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s time, but already in the Islamic era, Arab Christian 
accounts of the Trinity had been written. These date from the 2nd/8th century. It can be 
clearly seen that the authors were conscious of the challenge of “plurality;” they knew that 
their belief in the trinity can be interpreted as believing in more than one God. They replied 
by explanations and arguments which they inherited from patristic sources, such as numerical 
proofs (e.g. the perfection of the figure three) and analogies from the phenomenal world (e.g. 
the sun's disc, heat and rays), which express that the hypostases are three functions of one 
reality. These arguments remained parts of the debate as it developed in the classical 
period.
631
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples for the term Trinity are few, and all of them mention 
the trinity of persons, hypostases, or properties together with the unity of substance. The fact 
that Trinity never appears alone, may be considered as a witness to the accusation of the 
Muslim opponents, according to which Christians support plurality: this has to be avoided by 
mentioning the Trinity together with the unity of the Godhead.  
The term ‘trinity’ appears first in the third part of the book, which, as a whole, aims at 
demonstrating that the Creator is one, but has three hypostases or properties. This problem 
arises as a question first, indicating that it has a great importance in disputation.  
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 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 1403-4. 
630 Ibid., pp. 1404-7. 
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 THOMAS, D., TathlÐth, IE. Second Edition, vol. X. p. 374. (Later on: THOMAS, D., TathlÐth) 
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“If any of the opponents asked this: What is the sign/proof for the truth of the trinity of the 
unity of the Creator that you claim? How can the One be Three or the Three One? At the same 
time, you have started with the establishment of His unity, and you admitted that He is One, 
and there is nothing like Him, nothing similar to Him and there is no substituent to Him.”
632
  
As we can see it on the basis of this example, there is an apparent contradiction between unity 
and trinity that has to be solved. On the basis of this question unity and trinity is to be 
understood in a numerical sense. This is even more evident on the basis of the term’s next 
appearance, where this contradiction is disputed, and the numerical interpretation is negated:  
“We would say: As for the One’s being three and the Three’s being one, this is impossible, by 
my life. It is because the number one cannot be [equal to] the number three. The meaning we 
want to express in what we state is that we mean that this one, eternal substance has always 
existed in three substantial properties without distinction and division between them."
633
 
Here, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ refutes numerical interpretation. He introduces the word 
substance, Êawhar, and this is the term which is described as one and eternal. As for three, 
another term is introduced, .i.e. property, ÌÁÒÒa, and it is described by the number three, 
with a careful addition, according to which there is no distinction and division between them. 
In order to return to the terms in their forms appearing in the title, let us examine what 
follows:  
“The three properties together equal to this one eternal substance, which – i.e. it is not three in 
a special meaning – is not partitioned nor divided in its entity and completion, and it is not 
three in the meaning in which he is one; [they are one,] but [consist of] three properties. This 
is what we think of the unity of His substance and the trinity of His properties [eulogy].”
634
 
Trinity is not used to express the trinity of persons at this stage, it is used to refer to 
properties, so it is not contrasted any more to unity, this latter being used to refer to the 
substance. The other appearances are also characterized by a contrast of unity and trinity, but 
further details may be understood on the basis of the following examples. 
“From this approach our claim has to be verified, according to which the distance of the 
similarity between the substance of the Creator and the substances of His creatures; between 
his action and the actions of His creatures is the proof of the trinity of His properties and the 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 148,14-17. 
ص ىلع ليلدلا ام :لاقف نيفلاخملا نم لئاس لأس نإا وأ ةثلث دحاولا نوكي نأ نكمي فيكو .قلاخلا ةينادحو ثيلثت نم نوعدت ام قد امعم ،ًادحاو ةثلثل
ريظن لاو هبش لاو لثم هل سيل دحاو هنأب مكرارقإو هتينادحو مكتيبثت نم ًاضيأ هب متأدتبا. 
633
 Ibid., p.149,1-4 
 ىنعملا امأف .ةثلثلا ددعلا نوكي لا دحاولا ددعلا نأ كلذو ،هنوك نكمي لا يرمعل كاذف ،دحاو ةثلاثلاو ةثلاث دحاولا نوك نأ امأ :انلقيلإ يذلا يف دصقن ه
تاقرفم لاو تانيابتم ريغ تايرهوج صاوخ ثلثب ًادوجوم لزي مل ميدقلا دحاولا رهوجلا كلذ نأ ينعن انإف ،انلوق 
634
 Ibid., p.149,4-7 
 يذلا ميدقلا دحاولا رهوجلا كلذ وه صاوخلا ثلثلا عيمجو–  ةصاخ ىنعمب ةثلث وه سيل يأ– ثلث وه لاو ،هلامكو هنيعب أزجتي لاو ضعبتي لا ،ة
 ،دحاو وه ام ىنعمب- لاعو لج هصاوخ ثيلثتبو هرهوج ةينادحو يف انبهذم وه اذهف .صاوخ ثلاث لب ،ةدحاو 
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unity of His substance. That is the substance of the source/the entity, to which His Life and 
Word are attached. Word is the source/entity of His Wisdom; and His Life is the entity/source 
of His Spirit. [All these] are one, and have always existed.”
635
 
As for the unity of the substance and the trinity of the properties, it is a repetition if we 
take into consideration the previous examples. The interesting notion that makes this one 
worthy of citing is that it shows that the properties are attached to the unity of the substance. 
These properties are His Life (i.e. the Spirit) and His Word (i.e. His Wisdom). We can 
understand that Life (as the source of the Spirit) may refer to the third Person of the Trinity, 
whereas Word, the source of Wisdom, to the Second Person.
636
 It implies that the substance to 
which these properties are attached is the Father. The next appearance comes after a lengthy 
analogy, according to which the Muslim opponent asks whether the Pre-eternal needs His 
Word and Spirit. In the answer, he is warned to examine intelligent beings, which have 
intellect and spirit as substantial things in the substance: the Pre-eternal has His Word and 
Spirit as substantial things in His substance the same way. Further similes are introduced: heat 
and dryness substantially belong to fire, cool and humidity substantially belong to water. On 
the bases of these examples the question (whether the Pre-eternal needs His Word and Spirit) 
has no sense. It is possible to ask whether fire needs wood in order to appear, or water a place 
and dry land in order to get firm, since these things are not in their essences and not in their 
natures. Then he says: “This is the furthest point we could get to in elucidating the verity of 
the unity of the Creator’s substance and the trinity of his properties by the way of an 
intelligible analogy.”637 What is emphasized here again is that it is the Creator which is one, 
then it means that all three hypostases are creators. The trinity of the properties is only 
partially intelligible, and it is by the way of analogy that we can gain any knowledge on them. 
Another remark we need to make here is that the examples ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ enumerates 
are all triads (the fire: its heat and dryness; water: its cool and humidity, etc.) As we could see 
it on the authority of Thomas, these classical triads originate in Patristic literature, and these 
are a primary basis for early Arab Christian polemists. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is seen to be 
aware of this tradition and is a continuer of it. 
 If analogy can only lead to a partial result, then it is Scripture one needs to turn to: 
“Understand, oh Listener, what God’s prophet, Moses recites in his book: when God wanted 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 149,20-23 
 هقلخ عئانصو هتعنص نيبو هقلخ رهاوجو قلاخلا رهوج نيب هبشلا دعب نأ انلوق قيقحت بجو ةهجلا هذه نمف ىلع ليلدلا وهثيلثت  ةينادحوو هصاوخ
لزي مل دحاو ،هحور نيع يه يتلا هتايحو ،هتمكح نيع يه يتلا هتملكو هتايح هيلإ فاضملا ،نيعلا رهوج يأ ،هرهوج 
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 WOLFSON, The Philosophy of the Kalam, p. 121. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 159,20-21 
  اذهفلوقعملا سايقلاب هصاوخ ثيلثتو قلاخلا رهوج ةينادحو قح حاضيإ يف انتنكم ىهتنم 
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
172 
 
to create Adam, He said: we create human in our form and similarity. And He didn’t say in 
my form or similarity, nor did he say our forms and similarities. He just said our form and 
similarity. He indicates by this His unity and trinity in a single statement”638 This citation is 
followed by other examples which all demonstrate that in scripture plural forms are used 
(literally: numbers that exceed one and two); at the same time, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ refers to 
the same scriptures in other languages: Syriac, Hebrew, Greek. After these examples he 
contrasts these loci with the following quotation: “He also says in the beginning of His 
Testament: Listen, oh Israel, the Lord is your God, the Lord is One. By this, He warns them 
that He who is triple in His properties is One in His substance.”639 Trinity in the unity is 
further emphasized; which is a careful attempt to demonstrate that Christians do not believe in 
the plurality of divinities. All these examples are taken from the Old Testament, probably due 
to its being considered a common ground with Muslims, at least, more than any New 
Testament text would be. New Testament texts are not cited here, as these pieces of evidence 
could be easily turned down by the Muslim opponents, since the New Testament is labelled to 
be subject to taÎrÐf. In citing Old Testament as a basis of demostration, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
continues a tradition. Most Christians of his as well as later ages relied on their own 
Scriptures, even if they could not be accepted as proofs by opponents with different religions. 
He thus fits in this traditional method, however, he may be compared to more “modern” 
fellow Christians, who aimed at detecting hints of the Trinity even in the Qur’Án. Thomas 
enumerates the following examples: in the mid-second⁄eighth century the anonymous treatise 
entitled FÐ ta×lÐ× AllÁh al-WÁÎid points at the plural forms of self-address in sÙras 90,4, 
54,11 and 6,94 as indications of a triune godhead. The Nestorian patriarch Timothy I in his 
dialogue with the caliph al-MaÎdÐ (781), refers to the following sÙras: 19,17 and 21,91, for 
the same purpose, and to the groups of three letters at the start of some sÙras. And ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ’s contemporary, the Jacobite ÍabÐb b. Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa also refers to the 
evidence of the plural forms of address.
640
 
After examining the Trinity of the Godhead, I will turn now to the Trinity as dwelling 
in the Messiah, which is not a trinity in a universal sense, but a particular one. It can be seen 
on the basis of the following example: “We do not say on the basis of this anything except 
what the Messiah taught us and informed us concerning His secret, i.e. the whole Trinity 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p.160,3-6  
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 يف ًاضيأ لوقيوئدتبم هرهوج يف دحاو هصاوخ يف ثلثملا نأ ىلإ كلذب مههبني ،دحاو وه برلا ،كهلإ برلا نأ ليئارسا اي عمسا :اياصولا  
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dwelt in Him, and it [can be known on the basis of] His statement: my Father, who dwells in 
me, He makes these actions.”641 This is now not a universal issue, concerning the whole 
Godhead, it simply deals with the specific question of the Incarnation (why the Son incarnated 
and not the other ones), so this one may be solved by a citation of the New Testament. From 
another approach, if the dwelling of all three hypostases in the Messiah is proven, then it is 
further underlining the unity of these three divine persons. 
Concluding we may say that ideas of Patristic literature are continued by ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ, since he uses numerical proofs (or more exactly: explains that unity and trinity are 
not to be interpreted in a numerical sense); and employs examples of the phenomenal world, 
referring to classical triads. 
It was mentioned above that the Jacobite ÍabÐb b. Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa used three 
terms to refer to the Trinity, now let us see some examples that demonstate their synonymity. 
E.g. ta×lÐ× is used in the following:  
“This is a part of the verification of what we say on the unity of God (eulogy) and His Trinity 
as far as it is possible on the basis of the analogy [on what is] created and visible: i.e. [analogy 
of] the light; and Adam, Aaron, and Eve; and the Sun for whom it can be an analogy. [It is 
also] as far as the intellect can prospect, which is created and not capable to comprehend the 
attribute of His property, since it is distant from comprehending some of God’s (eulogy) 
attributes.”
642
  
The context shows that ta×lÐ× is used in the meaning of trinity, triad. As for the second term, 
×ÁlÙ×, it is what appears in the next example:  
“Because the early ones were assigned to worship God as One, as a whole, as He is one. His 
Word and Spirit were not exlpained for them in a revelation. It was so, in order that they 
should not think that the One [whose worship] they were invited to is similar to the many gods 
they used to believe in and worship; since the age of their paganism, believing in many gods 
was still close. That time they were weak to believe in the unity of God’s substance, [with His] 
Word and Spirit, even if the secret of the Trinity had been clearly explained to them in its 
property. So they were assigned to worship God as One, as a whole, till they reached a higher 
state in knowledge and left the plurality of gods behind.”
643
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 202,4-6 
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 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma, FÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa-i×bÁt al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas p. 
146,12-16 
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643
 Idem, FÐ al-taÊassud p. 54,12-18  
DOI: 10.15774/PPKE.BTK.2013.009 
174 
 
In this example, instead of ×ÁlÙ×, ta×lÐ× could also be used, and the meaning would not 
change. This is a clear reference for the two terms’ relatedness in meaning, since God’s 
substance, word and Spirit cannot be referred to by any other meaning, but Trinity. The last 
one, ×ulÁ×iyya is used in the third example. “The angels [also] praise the Trinity, although 
they do not need to mention the Cross; while we praise one of the three hypostases, who was 
crucified instead of us.”644 No difference in the meaning can be seen on the basis of the 
context. The variety of these terms may be due to the fact that it is the age when Christian 
writings in Arabic are first written: it is not unexpected then, that the same concept could be 
expressed in various forms. However, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s consistency in his use of the 
form Muslims used too, may be deliberate, which would imply that he intended to use a 
terminology shared by and known to Muslims, too. 
As for the Muslim counterpart, though it would seem useless to search for such an 
item in Muslim books of definitions, we may find unexpected results. As a preliminary, we 
may say, that condemnations of Christian beliefs about God start with the Qur’Án.645 
(However, early commentators noted that for Christians three was an internal characteristic of 
the godhead in the form of the persons, and not a series of external beings placed together 
with God.
646
) Early Muslim attacks appeared at the beginning of the 9th century, 
contemporary to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ. Christian explanation was known to Muslims, and, 
since the ideas employed were presented in a shared Arabic vocabulary, with terms 
emphasising the differentiations within the Godhead, it focused the debate even more upon 
the question of plurality, and made it easy for Muslim polemicists to argue that there must be 
more than one eternal.
647
   
As for al-KindÐ, his definitions include ‘one’, but it will be examined later. Other 
numbers (such as three, or making three) are not defined. The next author, al-ËwÁrizmÐ, 
deals with the question of the Trinity in his MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm. The term al-mu×alli×a can 
be found in the kalÁm chapter, in the subsection dealing with uÒÙl al-dÐn, referring to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
قلا كلذو .هحورو هتملك ريسفتب مهل حصفي نأ ريغ نم دحاو هنأب ةلمج الله اودبعي نأ اوفلك نيلولأا نلأريثك ةهللآ مهنايغط دهع برة  نأ اونظي لايل
 مهتدابعو ةهللآا ةرثك نم هيف اوناك امل هيبش هيلإ اوعد يذلااهايإ ثولاثلا رس ناك نإو هحورو هتملكو هرهوج يف الله ديحوت نع اوفعض مهنلأ .
ملا يف اولتعا مه ام اذإ ىتح ةلمج ًادحاو الله اودبعي نأ اوفلكف حضاو حرشنم مهيف ةصاخبمهروهظ فلخ ةريثكلا ةهللآا اوذبنو ةفرع ... 
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 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma, al-MaqÁla li-ÍabÐb Ibn Ëidma al-maÝrÙf bi AbÐ RÁ’iÔa al-TakrÐtÐ al-
YaÝqÙbÐ fÐ iÎtiÊÁÊ Ýan al-×alÁ× taqdÐsÁt li-’llaÆÐ Òuliba ÝannÁ, p. 93,12-14 
حبست ةكئلاملاف لإ ةجاح مهب امو ةيثلاثللاننود بلص يذلا ةثلثلا ميناقلأا دحأ حبسن نحنو بلصلا ركذ ى. 
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 In addition to denying that Jesus is identical with God (e.g. V, 17, 72), or taken by God as his son (e.g. IX, 
30-1, XIX, 35), it warns Christians against saying God is three (IV, 171) or one of three (V, 73), and clears Jesus 
of claiming divinity for his mother and himself besides God (V, 116). – References found in THOMAS, D., 
TathlÐth, p. 373. 
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Christian teaching. Al-ËwÁrizmÐ entitles the chapter as follows: “The response to the 
dualists, like the Magicians and atheists, and to the Trinitarians, i.e. Christians, and others, 
who establish the plurality of Makers: He is not like other existents”648 As we can see, he does 
not provide a definition for the term, but mentions the question as an issue in uÒÙl al-dÐn. 
However, according to his encyclopaedia, Christians were also called, in kalÁm terminology, 
Trinitarians, i.e. those who make God three. In the Muslim theological understanding this 
became the standard view: Trinity implies the plurality of divinities, although Muslim 
theologians, as pinpointed by al-ËwÁrizmÐ, admit that this plurality of divinities does not 
resemble plurality of things. Among the ones we are studying, later authors do not deal with 
this term.  
After examining several accounts of Trinity in Muslim theology, Thomas asserts that 
three main surviving works exemplify the differences of Muslim approaches of Trinity. The 
ZaydÐ ImÁm al-QÁsim b. IbrahÐm al-RassÐ's (d. 246 AH/AD 860) in his al-Radd ÝalÁ al-
NasÁrÁ identifies hypostases with ašÌÁÒ "separate individuals" (an identification supported 
by Christian authors, e.g. Theodore AbÙ Qurra and ÍabÐb b. Ëidma AbÙ RÁ’iÔa) who are 
distinct and equal and are one in ÔabÐÝa, nature. The titles “Father” and “Son” are derived 
from the act of begetting, so their relationship would be of a contingent kind, and it would not 
express the eternal actuality of God.
649
 On the basis of what we saw above, we can establish 
that ideas expressed by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ (and also by other Christian authors) only 
partially reappear in this work written by a Muslim author. First of all, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
does not use the term šaÌÒ; he rather uses qanÙm (hypostasis) to refer to the divine persons – 
as we have ssen it above. The teaching according to which divine persons are equal and one in 
nature, as described by al-RassÐ, is a correctly understood statement, either taken from 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ or any of his Christian contemporaries. As for these persons’ being 
distinct, it cannot be based on ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s work, since, as we have seen, he always 
establishes that there is no division and distinction between these three hypostases. ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ emphasizes that the relationship of Father and Son is not like the begetting of 
created beings, but rather it is a substantial birth that has always been going on, so in this case 
what al-RassÐ writes cannot be based on his ideas. This idea is never exactly reflected by 
Muslim authors.  
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 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 94. 
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According to Thomas, the second important author, al-KindÐ employs the Aristotelian 
categories enumerated in Porphyry's Isagoge. He describes the hypostases as ašÌÁÒ, 
individuals, each with its own ÌÁÒÒa, individuating property. He also shows that they cannot 
be eternal, since they are composite; they can be treated as Aristotelian predicables, so they 
must each include a number of categories within themselves; and, according to Aristotle, the 
proposition that they are both one and three, if not absurd, entails them being part of a species 
or genus. As for their eternity: what is composite must derive from an anterior cause and so is 
not eternal.
650
  
As for al-KindÐ’s describing the hypostases as individuals having a ÌÁÒÒa, in this, 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s statement might be reflected. As we could see, the same term was used 
by him when referring to the three hypostases as three properties. But their standpoints 
concerning the question of eternity show great disagreement, since according to ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ in particular, and Christian authors in general, all three divine persons are eternal. 
None of the Christian authors would describe the Godhead or the persons as composite, the 
difference of understanding might be due to terminological reasons as well as general 
teachings. 
Thomas then mentions the ŠÐÝÐ theologian AbÙ ÝÏsÁ MuÎammad b. HÁrÙn al-
WarrÁq (d. 816?), who, in his Radd ÝalÁ al-×alÁ× firaq min al-NaÒÁrÁ, subjects all aspects 
of the explanations of the main Christian denominations to an enquiry, and concludes that 
they are either incoherent or inconsistent with reason. He treats the constituents of the 
Godhead as a series of separate entities, and so can repeatedly demonstrate that the doctrine is 
in actuality ta×lÐ×, making God three.651 The argument according to which the dogma of 
Trinity is inconsistent with reason cannot be a reflection of Christian writings; this approach 
looks at it from the outside. As for the separate entities, it can partly be considered a reflection 
of what Christian writers establish, but due to a different dogmatic background, the unity is 
not reflected.  
Ta×lÐ× thus means ‘making God three’ for Muslims, but Trinity for Christians. Even 
if the term is the same, its denotation is completely different. As Thomas says, the problem 
with the doctrine for Arabic speakers was that, in the form in which it was expressed, it 
represented a plurality of real existences within the Godhead.
652
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Arab Christian theologians could not dismiss these charges till the innovation of the 
3rd/9th century: i.e. formulating the doctrine according to the logic of the kalÁm, the common 
ground of theological discourse for Muslim and Christian Arabic speakers. The hypostases 
were presented as ÒifÁt, attributes of the divine essence, or something similar.653 The Son and 
Holy Spirit were called the Ýilm or nuÔq, reason, and ÎayÁt, life, of the Father, attributes by 
which he is ÝÁlim or nÁÔiq, i.e. knowing, reasonable, and Îayy, living. The three realities can 
be distinguished from one another, but are identical, since divine attributes were not distinct 
from the being of God.
654
 This is what we could see in the example above, where ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ introduced Life and Wisdom as substantial (elements) in the divine substance. We 
have already seen that he also introduced the term uqnÙm/qanÙm as an alternative for 
attribute. Another term introduced for the same idea is Êiha, as it follows: “We open our 
speech on it by the explanation of what the opponents [i.e. Muslims] find hideous, i.e. our 
description of the Creator’s unity [eulogy] and essence in three modes.”655 Depending on the 
context, Êiha could be translated as direction, approach, too, but in this case mode is the 
closest to what we have seen insofar, suiting the denotations of previous examples of qanÙm, 
hypostasis and Òifa, attribute. In all this, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ perfectly fits in the 9th century 
interaction, and is a part of the Christian movement which aims at justifying the verity of 
Christian dogma by the means of kalÁm. 
  
2. Duality 
 
If we examine unity and trinity, we should also deal with duality: what ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ means by that, and how accusations of dualism are rejected. But first, let us remember 
how this concept appears in Greek thought. Afnan mentions the following terms: ta×niyya, 
doubling, but this form is not used as such by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, so we will leave this one 
out of consideration. Then Afnan Goes on with i×nayniyya, duality, dyad, and gives δυάς, as 
the Greek term translated by i×nayniyya in the translation movement. And finally, he 
mentions ×anawiyya, dualism, without indicating a Greek original counterpart.656 
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Lampe brings the following: ἡ δυάς, as duality in a Pythagorean, then Marcosian, 
Valentinian and Manichean sense In Patristic literature, the term also appears in connection 
with the Trinity: it can refer to the relationship of the Father and the Son. In Christology, it 
refers to the duality of natures. More generally, the term’s references include the duality of 
matter and form, and body and mind.
657
 Another term brought by Lampe is δυοϋπόστατος, 
meaning ‘of two persons.’658 
As for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text, this concept appears when the two hypostases of 
the Messiah is discussed, so in this case, there is definitely a common concern which is shared 
by ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ and Patristic literature. As it was the case concerning Trinity, the 
problem of duality arises due to a question by the (Muslim) opponent. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
accepts this name but differentiates its denotation in order to defend Christian teaching, and 
he accepts applying it only in a restricted sense, as it follows: 
“As for our applying the name duality upon the two of them [i.e. the pre-eternal Son of God 
and the human by whom He incarnated], it is not in that sense in which they unified, since 
they unified in the meaning of the one “messiah-ness” and the one sonship. So that they 
became – due to their combination and composition, without any change from their essences – 
one Messiah and one Son. We only employ the name duality on two things that are distinct 
and which do not turn to be something else, i.e. to the two hypostases, which maintain [the 
distinction] which exists between them.”
659
 
We can see that duality appears in a numerical sense, too, and it cannot be applied to express 
two hypostases if they are united. A necessary prerequisite for talking about duality is a 
division, or a distinction between two things.  
Another important citation – which we have seen in the chapter dealing with body – 
introduces two terms that refer to duality. In the first two cases the already seen i×niyya 
appears, then, with the same meaning, a different form, ×anÁ’iyya can be seen. 
“It is astonishing that some people may claim that what made them call him one substance, 
one hypostasis, is the will to make the verity of unification between the divine and the human 
necessary. [By this, they also wanted to make] the rules of duality [necessary] in every respect 
concerning the unity of the one Messiah, who consists of these two. Then they called the body 
of the Messiah the body of God, and thus, though they wanted to escape from establishing two 
hypostases, and setting up two substances and denying the unity of the Messiah, they fell into 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 181,1-4 
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امهنيب ام ىلع نيتباثلا نيمونقلا ينعي ،امهريغ 
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something even more severe. It is because in their calling the body the body of God, there is 
an establishment of the duality of the two substances in the one Messiah, necessarily: i.e. 
God, and His body. And this would mean the establishing of their duality together with the 
negation of the unity of the Messiah who consists of them, and to whom the substance of both 
is attached.”
660
 
It is again the Messiah and his two parts that makes the question arise. Duality is seen 
to appear in an exclusive contradiction with unity. It can refer to two hypostases or two 
substances on the basis of this example, and in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation the 
duality of two [distinct] substances can justify the use of this name. This passage is addressed 
to Orthodox Christians, who negate the two substances in Christ, but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
argumentation aims at demonstrating that what they actually confess to is another kind of 
duality. 
 Our last example is dealing with the duality of the Messiah, too, but the new context 
introduces the duality of two natures:  
“they unified from the viewpoint of sonship and in the relation to the Father who is described 
by the essence of Fatherhood. They are firm in the duality of their natures and in the unity of 
their persistence, without changing away from their substances and not leaving their 
hypostases. The One, Omnipotent did not become a third [one] for them; the unity of the 
Messiah came into being by the [two hypostases’] combination.”
661
 
The unity of the Messiah has to be explained as existing in a special, restricted sense only. As 
it was the case in examples for trinity, the multiplicity has an important prerequisite: a 
distinction or division between two things. This duality, which refers to the two natures 
present in the Messiah, is important to be mentioned: this way ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ cannot be 
accused of commixing the divine with the human. 
 It could be seen on the basis of these examples that duality is not mentioned on its own 
(as it was the case in his usage of trinity), but it always appears together with unity; be it the 
Godhead in the centre of his discussion or the Messiah. 
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As for the Muslim counterpart, this term is not defined. As we could just see, al-
ËwÁrizmÐ’s MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm mentions duality,662 but instead of i×niyya used by 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, he uses the term ×anawiyya. His reference probably denotes dualism as 
a religious belief, while ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s term refers to duality. Al-ËwÁrizmÐ’s 
example shows that Muslim authors did not make a connection between the problem of 
dualism and the creed of Christians. This chapter of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ may be directed 
against fellow Christians (though belonging to other denominations), not Muslims. Places like 
Qur’Án 16,51: “Allah has said: “Do not take two gods (for worship): for He is just One Allah: 
fear Me alone.”” do not seem to refer to Christians. Even G. Monnot describes that 
×anawiyya was traditionally used to refer to Manichaeans, Bardesanites and Marcionites, not 
Christians. What might be interesting to note here is that the custom of mentioning these three 
groups together as dualists comes from Christians. The three doctrines grouped together as 
connected with each other was already done by Ephrem of Edessa and the bishop Maruta of 
Maipherkat; it was traditional in Syriac writings, and was then introduced into Arabic by 
authors like Theodore AbÙ Qurra.663 
On the basis of what we could see in the case of this term, we can conclude that the Christian 
tradition is continued here and ideas are introduced in Arabic, with the translation of terms in 
different ways from later Muslim usage. In this respect, the duality dealt with by Christians 
(i.e. the two hypostases of the Messiah) is distant from the duality dealt with by Muslims 
(dualist groups), so interference is not detected. 
 
3. Unity 
 
Unity will be examined from different approaches, given that its terminology contains 
various items (waÎdÁniyya, tawÎÐd, ittiÎÁd – unity, “making one,” union).  
 
a, WaÎdÁniyya 
 
 Let us start our examination with the form waÎdÁniyya, which can also be translated 
as “oneness”. According to Afnan, this is the translation of the Greek philosophical terms 
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 MONNOT, G., Thanawiyya, EI. Second Edition, vol. X. pp. 439-441. 
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ἐνότης, μονάς, and ἓν.664 As for ἡ ἐνότης, it also played an important role in Patristic 
literature. It was used in various meanings, of which suffice it to mention ‘unity of any being;’ 
‘union (e.g. moral);’ ‘divine unity in Trinity, the unity of the Word with the Father, or the 
unity of the Holy Spirit with Son and Father;’ and ‘unity in Christology.’665 The second term, 
ἡ μονάς can refer to ‘unit’ in general; or to ‘unity: of the Church, of God, of the Trinity;’ and 
it denotes unity in Christology, too.
666
 The last term, ἓν, is not presented by Lampe. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ uses the term waÎdÁniyya in various contexts. It can refer to the 
unity of God, the unity of the Messiah, that of sonship, that of a human being, and the unity of 
meanings. As for the unity of God, we could enlist a lot of examples, since His unity is proven 
in many ways; but only two examples will be mentioned. The first one is: 
“As the leaders who demonstrated in early times on the basis of these divine things that these 
creatures, which were created in time, have a Maker, and they wanted to establish His 
existence and the unity of His essence for [those] who may not be aware of His unity and 
existence, they did not find among the perceivable things anything more complete in its 
essence and higher in its quiddity, more self-sufficient [not subject to] necessity for something 
else in its subsistence than the substance, so they called Him substance.”
667
 
What makes this example worthy of mentioning is that unity can refer to God as a whole (His 
unity), or to His essence (the unity of His essence). This unity and existence is expressed by 
God’s being a substance, a Êawhar. However, later Muslim theologians’ reflections are 
denying it e.g. AbÙ Bakr MuÎammad ibn al-Óayyib al-BÁqillÁnÐ (d. 1013), the AšÝarÐ 
mutakallim refutes that God can be a Êawhar, since according to kalÁm classifications a 
Êawhar is a substrate for accidents.668 So even if we cite this example with a demonstrative 
purpose, showing that unity can refer to God’s existence and essence, terms that appear with 
this idea had an impact on later Muslim thinkers, and provided ground for reflection and 
interaction. 
 The next example is a problem-raising of the opponent, which is remarkable since he 
refers to a passage of the Gospels. It is not probable that an actual opponent would cite the 
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 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, p. 478. 
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 LAMPE, G. W., A Patristic Greek Lexicon, pp. 877-878. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, pp. 162,18-163,2; 
دحوو هدوجو تابثإ اودارأف ًادحاو ًاعناص ةثدحملا قئلاخلا هذهل نأ ًاميدق تايهللإا روملأا هذه نع اونابأ نيذلا ةمئلأا ترظن ذإ ناكف نم دنع هتاذ ةينا
 ءايشلأا يف اودجي ملو ،هدوجوو هتينادحو لهج ماوق يف هريغ ىلإ ةرورضلا نع هسفنب ىنغأ لاو هتيهام يف ىلعأ لاو هتاذ يف لمكأ ًائيش ةكوردملا
 ًارهوج ةلعلا هذهل هومسف ،رهوجلا نم هتاذ 
668
 al-BÀQILLÀNÏ, AbÙ Bakr, KitÁb al-TamhÐd, ed. RJ. McCarthy, Beirut, al-Maktaba al-Šarqiyya, 1957, p. 
75. 
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Gospel, since it was thought to be affected by taÎrÐf; it is more likely that such a question is 
worded by a hypothetical opponent, giving occasion to discuss an important question: 
“What motivated the Messiah, after all these things you described, to say to His messengers: 
“Go, and attract all the peoples, and baptize them in the name of the Father, the Son, and the 
Holy Spirit.” He installed in them and in their offsprings the doubt in the unity of their 
Creator, and a cause for schism and quarrel between them concerning this. (As) He was 
compassionate and empathetic to them, isn’t [it the case that] He [should have] left them with 
a lasting establishment of the unity of their Maker, without assigning them with the faith in 
something that worries their mind
”669 
If we concentrate on waÎdÁniyya, we’ll see that the close context it appears in refers to God 
and the unity of the Creator or the Maker. The three persons introduced by the Messiah stand 
in opposition with this unity: the introduction of Trinity results in doubts concerning oneness. 
Introducing an innovation, such as the teaching of the existence of the Trinity causes 
disagreement and schism.
670
 The teaching of the Trinity appears as contrary to rational 
thinking, since intellect can only accept the unity of the Creator. How this idea is refuted or 
justified was already discussed above. Till now, we can see that the same questions (unity and 
trinity, unity of God) were discussed by the corresponding terms in Greek Patristic literature. 
 The second most important field where unity is discussed is the unity of the Messiah. 
In the section of duality, we saw an example relating that the unity of the Messiah comes into 
being in a special respect: in the sonship related to the Father. It was also demonstrated that 
unity came into being due to a combination.
671
 Now we will see that in addition to the unity of 
the Messiah, the unity of the meaning “one” will also be introduced. The quote is a problem-
raising by the Muslim opponent: 
“If you claim that He is eternal and created in time, as well, you will annul the unity of the 
one meaning that you described, and you will return to establishing what you negated; as you 
claimed that it is impossible to say for the one “the two of them”, and for the two “he,” and yet 
you describe Him as eternal and created in time, i.e. two substances: an eternal one and 
another one created in time.”
672
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, 249,1- 3 
امف يذلا اعد حيسملا نم دعب هذه روملأا يتلا متفصو ىلإ نأ لوقي هلسرل: "اوقلطنا اوبذتجاف عيمج بوعشلا مهودمعأو مساب بلأا نبلااو حورو 
سدقلا"، بصنف مهل مهباقعلأو ةرثع كشلا يف ةينادحو مهقلاخ ةلعو قاقشلا ءارملاو هيف مهنيب .و،لاأ ذإ ناك  ًاميحر مهب  ًاقيفش ،مهيلع مهكرت ىلع ام مل 
اولازي هيلع نم رارقلإا ةينادحوب ،مهعناص نود نأ مهفلك ناميلإا امب وبني هنع مهلقع 
670
 The same polemical argument goes on in later Byzantine apology, then in the “Antiturcica” literature, and it is 
even used by Catholic and Protestant polemics in the 16
th
-17
th
 centuries. 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, 178,8-179,2 
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 Ibid., 179,7-10 
نإو متمعز هنأ ميدق ثيدحو ،ًاعيمج متلطبأ ةينادحو ىنعملا دحاولا يذلا هومتفصو متعجرو ىلإ لوقلا يذلا ،هومتركنأ ذإ متمعز هنأ لاحم نأ لاقي 
دحاولل امه نينثلإلو ،وه عم ام نوفصت هنأ ميدق ثيدحو يأ نارهوج ميدق ثيدحو 
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This quotation shows that the Messiah’s unity needs a strong verification. Given that the two 
parts have mutually exclusive attributes: eternity and createdness-in-time, their unity is not 
possible in a single unit. This is what the “unity of meanings” refers to, so a unit cannot 
comprise two different (especially exclusive) meanings. This is what was also emphasized by 
later kalÁm: the simultaneous presence of two opposites (Ãiddayn) is impossible. This 
apparent contradiction needed to be resolved, and thus the answer for this is as follows:  
“The Messiah, so far as he is Messiah, is coming into being. He came into being after that he 
had not been Messiah. We mean by this that the pre-eternal Word and the human, who is 
created in time and created, became one [being] that came into being; and one Messiah, as the 
meaning of the unity of the Messiah is only defined by the combination of the two substances 
and by their unification.”
673
 
The solution for such a problem is that the Messiah, as one, can only be called Messiah after 
the combination and attachment of His two parts. Instead of the “unity of meanings” that the 
opponent referred to, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ concentrates on the “meaning of the unity.” On the 
other hand, he also gives a basis for the unity of meanings, since the Messiah, as consisting of 
the divine and the human, is coming into being. His unity is then based on the unity of 
meanings, as well. 
 The unity of the Messiah as the result of the combination of the two parts is often 
referred to; while sometimes it is also emphasized that His divine part stands above being 
intelligible on the basis of analogies. The same divine part is the creator of the other: “The 
Word of God stands above every analogy. He is the one who commenced and assumed the 
human for Himself as humanity. By his humanisation, i.e. His taking it up as a garment, their 
unification became necessary, and thus, by way of their combination, the Messiah’s unity 
occurred.”674 Unity and unification are not distant in meaning. What serves as a basis for 
distinction between them is the active or passive aspect. When it is an active participation, in 
which both take part, it is unification, while the result, in which the two are included, is 
referred to by the term unity.
675
 The same “outcome” is expressed in the next quote: “In His 
incarnation by [the human], His goal was a will to make the share of sonship necessary by this 
for him, and to erect the unity of the Messiah, to which the attachment of body was 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 179,11-13 
حملا ناسنلإاو ةيلزلأا ةملكلا نأ كلذب ينعن .ًاحيسم نكي مل نأ دعب ثدح ثداح هتيحيسم ةهج نم حيسملا لب ،ًادحاو ًاحيسم ًاثيدح اراص قولخملا ثد
امهداحتاو نيرهوجلا عامتجاب لاإ دحاولا حيسملا ىنعم ةينادحو دحت مل ذإ 
674
 Ibid., p. 197,9-11,  
تئاب حيسملا ةينادحو تماقو مهداحتا بجو هعردت يأ هسنأت عم ،ًاتوسان هل يرشبلا ذختاو أدب يذلا وه سايق لك ىلع ىلاعت ةملكلا الله نإلا،امهف 
675
 It can also be noted in the following: Ibid., pp. 201,18-202,1 
و يرشبلا فيضأو ،حيسملا ةينادحو امهداحتاب اماقأو هللإاب يرشبلا هلأتو يرشبلاب هللإا كلانه سنأتف يرشبلا ةملكلا الله دسجت ذإ كلذك ىلإ هللإا
امهنم عمتجملا دحاولا حيسملا 
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necessary.”676 We have seen above that the difference between inhabitation/dwelling and 
incarnation is in the result: i.e. inhabitation does not result in unity, while incarnation does. 
This example further confirms the latter statement. The third field lays emphasis on the unity 
of meanings in a unique thing/person. We have already seen an example above in the 
discussion of the Messiah’s unity; let us see, in what contexts it may also emerge. The 
following example refers to it in connection with the unity-trinity of the Godhead: 
“It is strange that some intellects should object to calling him a substance which includes 
specific hypostases, as they saw it; but they didn’t object to describing Him by the singularity 
of meaning in every aspect; while they consider that which has a singularity of meaning the 
lowest in state. Such as the simple forces and the attributes which depend on something else, 
and cannot exist in themselves, without physical bodies which are different from them. In 
these, there are no meanings except for a unity of meanings. E.g. Heat, known by the unity of 
heat; humidity specified by the unity of humidity; whiteness, which is united in the unity of 
whiteness; and blackness, which is single in the unity of blackness.”
677
 
In this example, probably the Muslim opponent is addressed. On the basis of the similes, it 
can be demonstrated that unity, or singularity, does not necessarily imply a noble connotation. 
On this basis, singularity with a unity of meanings is lower in dergree than a unity which is of 
a general kind and includes more hypostases. 
 A third typical field in which unity plays an important role deals with the human 
being. Obviously, the unity of the human being, who consists of body and soul, is only 
important as an analogy for the unity of the Messiah, who is combined of a divine or spiritual, 
and a human or corporeal part. Our first example demonstrates what ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ 
means by the unity of man:  “Had the soul and body not combined, the unity of human would 
not have ever come into being out of them.”678 It is the problem of unity-duality that shows in 
this example. Even if two components set up a human being (or the Messiah), by way of 
combination, it is just one existent that comes into being as a result, and who can not be 
defined or described without both components. The second example shows it explicitly that 
the unity of the human serves as an analogy for the unity of the Messiah: “Where is the unity 
of the one human, who has the body and the soul, if the Messiah’s body is called the Pre-
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 Ibid., p. 201,2- 3 
كهيلإ دسجلا ةفاضإ بجو يتلا حيسملا ةينادحو هب ميقيو ةونبلا ظح كلذب هل بجوي نأ دارأ هايإ هدسجت يف هضرغ نا 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 163,12-18 
و نم اوفكنتسي ملو ،اوأر امك ًاصاوخ ميناقأ معي ًارهوج هومسي نأ نم هل اوفكنتسا لوقعل بجعلاو اوار ذإ ،هئاحنأ لك يف ىنعملا يدحاوب هايإ مهفص
م اهيف دجوي لاو اهل ةفلتخملا ماسجلأا نع اهسفنأب ينغتست لا يتلا ةرطضملا ضارعلأاو ةطيسبلا ىوقلاك ،ىنعملا يدحاو ناك ام ٍلاح ىندأ يناع
نادحوب ةصوصخملا ةبوطرلاكو ةرارحلا ةينادحوب ةفورعملا ةرارحلاك اهيناعم ةينادحو ىوس ضايبلا ةينادحوب دحوتملا ضايبلاكو ةبوطرلا ةي
داوسلا ةينادحوب درفنملا داوسلاكو 
678
 Ibid., p. 196,10 
 ًادبأ امهنم ناسنلاا ةينادحو مقت مل ندبلاب سفنلا فلأت مل ولو  
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eternal God’s body, and if the Pre-eternal is called the body’s divinty?”679 The human being’s 
unity is explicitly paralleled with the Messiah’s unity. At the same time, the impossibility of 
speaking of God’s body (since it is the Messiah’s body, combined with a spirit, or a soul), and 
the body’s divinity (since this is the Messiah’s divinity, who has a human counterpart, which 
consists of a body and a soul) is demonstrated. The last example elucidates that unity happens 
on a higher level than just adding one constituent to the other. Body cannot be attached to the 
soul or the soul to the body: both components can belong to a unit of a higher degree, the 
unity of the human: “Isn’t it understood from us what we informed you upon? I.e. the spirit of 
the human, as it is incarnated in his body, and his body, as it is animated by his spirit, made 
up the unity of the human by their combination through the body of the human and the spirit 
of the human. And it is not [made up] by the body of the spirit and the spirit of the body.”680 
The example serves as an analogy for the unity of the Messiah. It demonstrates that unity 
implies something more than the result of adding two things to each other. 
 The fourth field deals with the unity of sonship.  In the following example, the unity of 
sonship appears parallel to the unity of the Messiah. It is not unexpected, since we have seen 
elsewhere that sonship is the aspect in which this unity occurs. “But from here we need to 
know that the unity of the Messiah and the unity of the sonship did not come into being 
through the inhabitation of the divine in the human, but due to the Son’s taking the humanity 
as a property for Himself in the incarnation and their union.”681 The example shows that the 
way for this unity to occur is the incarnation, but the aspect in which the unity of the Messiah 
takes place is the unity of the sonship. It is then a question of interpretation, too: to make up a 
frame in which humanity and divinity can be considered as one. The one sonship, which 
originally belongs to the Second Person of the Trinity and is given to the human at the time of 
the incarnation, is this frame. 
 I have not found this term among the definitions of the books investigated on the 
Muslim side. The only appearance I came across could be found in another definition by al-
ÉurÊÁnÐ, i.e. that of tawÎÐd, which we will soon see. It may imply that this one is primarily 
a Christian term that was later incorporated in Muslim terminology. 
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 Ibid., p. 198,7-8 
الله دسج حيسملا دسجل ليق اذإ ،ندبلاو سفنلا هل يذلا دحاولا ناسنلإا ةينادحو دجوت نيأدسجلا توهلا يلزلألو ،يلزلأا  
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 201,13-16 
ناسنلإا ةينادحو امهفلاتئاب اماقأف ،هحورب سفنتم وه ذإ هندبو ،هندبل ةدسجتم يه ذإ ناسنلإا حور نأ نم هب كانربخأ ام انع مهفي مل وأ  ندب لبق
ب لا ،ناسنلإا حورو ناسنلإا.ندبلا حور لاو حورلا ند 
681
 Ibid., p. 202,16 
 تماق توسانلا يف توهلالا لولح لبق نم سيل هنأ ملعن نأ بجي انهه نم نكلوةينادحو  حيسملاةينادحوو  ةصاخ نبلاا صاصتخا لبق نم لب ،هتونب
امهنيب نم ديحوتلاو دسجتلاب توسانلا. 
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b, TawÎÐd - unification 
 
 Another prevalent term in the field of unity is tawÎÐd, unification, Unitarianism, or 
‘making one.’ This term does not appear in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text frequently, which 
implies that the term is not of primary importance for him as far as the question of the unity is 
concerned. In the following examples we will see three contexts where the term is used with 
the following meanings: man makes something/God one; God declares of Himself that He is 
one, the Messiah makes the human one with Himself: so in each case a causative or 
declarative meaning is discernible. A representative example for the first context can be found 
when ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ enlists the reasons that can incite one to follow a “made-up”, 
invented religion. One of the reasons may be “the approval of the decorated speech of 
claimants who establish polytheism or unification or something else.”682 It then refers to a 
human act or belief, by which human considers the divine as one. 
As for the second context, when God declares His unity, it appears parallel to trinity, 
as we have seen above: “when God wanted to create Adam, He said: we create human in our 
form and similarity. And He didn’t say in my form or similarity, nor did he say our forms and 
similarities. He just said our form and similarity. He indicates by this His unity and trinity in 
a single statement”683 As a simple meaning, we may think of ‘unity’ in this case, but since 
God speaks of Himself as one and three, it can be understood as His making/declaring 
Himself one and three. 
A third context shows the Messiah’s making the human one with Himself. “He created 
a human being, and wore it as an armament, combined it with His hypostasis in order to 
appear in it, and in order to make His words and deeds appear through it. He also did it in 
order to unite this human being with Himself in His sonship.”684 ‘Making one’, unite is the 
only meaning by which the term may be translated.  
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 136,8-9 
امإ ناسحتسلاا امب عمج هيف نم ةفرخز ملاك نيعدملا يف تابثإ   كرش وأ ديحوت وأ ريغ كلذ 
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 Ibid., p.160,3-6  
وصب لقي ملو ،انلاثمو انتروصب ًارشب قلخن :لاق مدآ قلخ دارأ امل الله نإ :لوقيو هباتك يف ىسوم الله يبن ولتي ام عماسلا اهيأ مهفاف لاو يلاثمو يتر
ب ىلإ كلذب يموي :انلاثمو انتروصب لب ،انلاثمو انروصهديحوت دحاو هلوق يف هثيلثتو 
684
 Ibid., p. 196,8-197,3  
 ذإ هنأ امكتدسجت  سفنلاندبلاب ندبلاو  يمس ،دحاو ناسنا امهفلاتئاب امهنم ماقف سفنلابندبلا  لا ناسنلاا سفن سفنلاو ناسنلاا ندبندب  لاو ناسنلاا
ولو ،ناسنلاا سفن  سفنلا فلأت ملندبلاب .ًادبأ امهنم ناسنلاا ةينادحو مقت مل 
 ةملكلا الله نإ رخآ ٍوحنو ىرخأ ةظفلب ًاضيأ لوقن دقوسنأت  نبجت نبللا نإ هلوقكو .ًاحلم راصف هتاذب نادمج يأ ،حلم ءاملا :لئاقلا لوق ىنعم ىلع لا
صف هتاذب بش يأ لجرت يبصلا هلوقكو .ًانبج راصف هتاذب دقتعإ يأ نإ هلوقكو ،ًاعرد سبل يأ عردت ًانلاف نإ :لئاقلا لوق ىنعم ىلع لب ،ًلاجر را
كلا الله نأ انلوقب كلذك .ًاعرد وأ ًاحلاس وأ ًةمامع راص هنأ لا ،ًةمامع سبل يأ ممعت ًانلاف نإ هلوقكو ،ًاحلاس سبل يأ حلست ًانلاف ةملدسجت سنأتو  يأ
 ثدحأً ادسج لأو هعردتف ًاناسنإ قلخو هسبلف تقو يف ًاعيمج امهرمأف انلق .هتونب يف هعم هدحويلو هلامعأو هلوق هب رهظيلو هب رهظيل همونق ىلإ هف
ذاختلاا داحتلااو  ةملكلا وه الله ناك نإو ،توهلالا توسان لاو الله توسن لا ،عمتجملا نبلاا توسانو حيسملا توسان لاقي نأ بجو ،دحاو حيسم
 هدحو درفنملاهذاختلا  ًاتوسان هايإهيلع عمتجملا حيسملا ناك لصلأا يف توسانلا عرضتم سانلا نأ لا ، 
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ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s contemporary Jacobite AbÙ RÁ’iÔa uses this term more 
frequently. He usually puts Trinity and unity side by side, in order to refer to the unity of the 
Godhead with its three hypostases. E.g.: “We only took the light as a convincing analogy in 
some approaches: concerning His unity and Trinity, as we described God, who, according to 
us, is one substance and three hypostases.”685 In this, his use of Unity may rather be paralleled 
to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s waÎdÁniyya. AbÙ RÁ’iÔa’s examples from the Old Testament that 
concentrate on the singular-plural forms (ÒÙratunÁ, šibhunÁ; Àdam qad ÒÁra ka-aÎadinÁ, 
etc.)
686
 are closer to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage, as we have just seen. Themes and forms are 
similar, due to a congenial Christian heritage. The similarity of examples shows that the same 
patterns were used in dialogue with Muslims, without respect to denominations. 
Among Muslim authors of books of definition Ibn FÙrak is the first to describe the 
term, as follows: “The definition of unification is the knowledge that God (eulogy) is one; He 
is described by His attributes that He has; He is the Maker of the world, and has no 
companion or a second one with Himself. If someone knows it, his knowledge of this is called 
unification”687 His interpreting tawÎÐd as ‘making one’ makes him resemble ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ. The second part of the definition shows that unification also means that one accepts 
God as the Creator of the world, in which there is no contrast between ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ or 
other Christian authors and him. Only the question of companions may be a problematic 
issue, since even if Christians believe in the unity of God, their establishment of hypostases is 
understood by Muslims as establishment of companions. The other author who deals with the 
term is al-ÉurÊÁnÐ, who differentiates between the linguistic implication;688 and the 
theological one. The second is as follows: “unification … in the terminology of Sufism is the 
abstraction of the essence of the divinity of everything that can be imagined in conception, or 
be visualised in fantasy and mind. It implies three things: the knowledge of God’s Lordship; 
the establishment of His unity, and the refutation that He should have partners.”689 TawÎÐd is 
then a human action of accepting and establishing divine unity, referred to by the term 
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 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ i×bÁt dÐn al-naÒrÁniyya wa- i×bÁt al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas, p. 143. 
امنإف انذختا ءوضلا   اسايق   اعنقم يف دعب هئاحنأ يف هديحوت هثيلثتو   اعيمج   اعم امك انفصو نم الله هناحبس اندنع   ارهوج   ادحاو ميناقأ ةثلث   اعيمج   اعم 
686
 Ibid. p. 147. 
687
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ 'l-uÒÙl, p. 24. 
فصو كلذ ملع نمف هعم كيرش لاو هل يناث لا ملاعلل لعاف هنأو ،اهيلع وه يتلا هتافصب فوصوم دحاو ىلاعت الله نأب ملعلا وه :ديحوتلا دح  هملع
ديحوت هنأب هربخو 
688
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 77. 
ديحوتلا دحاو هنأب ملعلاو ،دحاو ءيشلا نأب مكحلا :ةغللا يف 
689
al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, p. 77. 
ديحوتلا... ةفرعم :ءايشأ ةثلاث وهو ،ناهذلأاو ماهولأا يف ليختيو ،ماهفلأا يف روصتي ام لك نع ةيهللإا تاذلا ديرجت :ةقيقحلا لهأ حلاطصا يفو  الله
ةلمج هنع دادنلأا يفنو ،ةينادحولاب رارقلإاو ،ةيبوبرلاب ىلاعت 
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waÎdÁniyya, the latter is then a basis of the former. In general terms, these later Muslim 
authors share ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation. 
 
c, IttiÎÁd 
 
Our last term is ittiÎÁd,690 union, unification. This one is exclusively used for the 
hypostatical union, i.e. that of the Messiah. As an exception, only the human body and soul is 
described by this term in an analogy for the Messiah’s unity. It is not a Qur’Ánic form, but 
can be considered the translation of the Greek philosophical term ἕνωσις.691 In Patristic 
literature ἡ ἕνωσις has various connotations. It can denote unity in general: in a material 
sense; in philosophy, when it refers to simplicity, unity in essence; unity of body and soul in 
man; concord, agreement. The same term may denote in theology the unity of divine persons. 
In Christology, it is both the act of union in incarnation and the state of being in union of the 
two natures of Christ, etc.
692
  
Let us remember that ittiÎÁd was often mentioned together with incarnation when 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ described how the Messiah came into being. His other examples include 
a variety of contexts. E.g., he clarifies that this unity is not substantial but is to be understood 
through sonship:  
“The unity between them is not substantial so that one of them would have been carried away 
from the essence of his substance by which he is distinguished from the substance of the other 
in such a manner that they would have become one, inclusive substance, other than the two 
they had been before. They unified in the aspect of sonship and the relation to the Father who 
is described by the essence of fatherhood.”
693
 
Union refers to hypostatical union, but it is made clear that it does not mean a unity in 
substance. In a dispute with a Muslim opponent, in order to present an explanation acceptable 
for the adversary, it is essential to make clear that the human can not affect the divine. A great 
majority of occurrences present ittiÎÁd in the unity of sonship and messianity,694 and it is also 
emphasized elsewhere that no substantial change took place in the unity.
695
 In other instances, 
the unity is told to be that of a body and an incarnating one (al-Êasad wa-’l-mutaÊassid), but 
                                                          
690
 HAYEK’s translation is ‘union’. C.f. Ed. HAYEK, Apologie et controverses, p. 85. 
691
 AFNAN, p. 312. 
692
 LAMPE, pp. 486-89. 
693
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 178,5-8 
نلأ لااداحت يذلا ناك امهنيب مل نكي   اداحتا   ايرهوج لقن   دحاو امهنم نع تاذ هرهوج زيمملا هب نم رهوج هبحاص امهريصف   اعيمج   ارهوج   ادحاو 
  ابذاج ريغ نيذلا اناك .لب ادحتا يف ةهج ةونبلا ةبسنلاو ىلإ بلأا فوصوملا تاذب ةوبلأا. 
694
 E.g. Ibid., p. 181,1-2 
695
 E.g. Ibid., p. 183,15-16 
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the way or the method is said to be unknown (as referred to above in the bi-lÁ kayf approach 
of incarnation); however, the framework is always sonship.
696
 
As an analogy, sometimes the union of man’s body and soul is offered. E.g.: “The 
body of man which is set up from the seed of his father cannot be called man on its own, 
without the soul which unified with him.”697 The union of two substances is introduced here 
with the same term. The framework of this union is also implied by the context: given that the 
body unified with the soul is the son of the father, this framework is sonship, just as in the 
case of the Messiah. 
  We may also find scriptural evidence for unity. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ first refers to the 
Old Testament prophecies, and explains ‘Emmanuel’ as the Pre-eternal dwelling among us in 
a human form.
698
 He then goes on with examples from the New Testament, citing loci from 
every gospel, and interprets each citation in a way to demonstrate that both hypostases are 
present in the Messiah.
699
  
Another approach of our investigation can be the examination of ittiÎÁd when it 
appears with other terms, it can add to our understanding of its connotation. We may see the 
difference between two terms that are derived from the same stems: i.e. the difference of  
waÎdÁniyya and ittiÎÁd: “as the meaning of the unity of the Messiah is only defined by the 
combination of the two substances and by their unification.”700 On this basis, waÎdÁniyya can 
be interpreted as the result, the state of unity, and ittiÎÁd as the action which results in this 
unity. IttiÎÁd appears parallel to i’tilÁf, as it can be seen in the following example: “The 
meaning of the name ‘One Messiah’ is structured of two substances, or hypostases, i.e. god 
and man, by way of unification and combination, as the meaning of the one necklace is made 
up of different substances: pearl, sapphire, and others, by the combination of orders.”701 Such 
a simile is supposed to make the Muslim opponent understand that Christian teaching does 
not include contingence for the divine or any change and commixion. The image is probably 
of Patristic literature. Unification and combination both denote the act that results in unity; but 
they are not synonyms. While unification implies here the “frame” for the gathering of 
                                                          
696
 E.g. Ibid. p. 214,17; and 215,6-7 
697
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 186,13-14 
امك نأ ندب ناسنلإا لوبجملا عرز ،هيبأ نإو ناك لا قحتسي نأ ىمسي ىلع هدارفنا نود سفنلا ةدحتملا هعم   اناسنإ... 
698
 Ibid., p. 207. 
699
 Ibid., p. 208. 
700
 Ibid., p. 179,11-13 
 ًاحيسم ًاثيدح اراص قولخملا ثدحملا ناسنلإاو ةيلزلأا ةملكلا نأ كلذب ينعن .ًاحيسم نكي مل نأ دعب ثدح ثداح هتيحيسم ةهج نم حيسملا لب ،ًادحاو 
امهداحتاو نيرهوجلا عامتجاب لاإ دحاولا حيسملا ىنعم ةينادحو دحت مل ذإ 
701
 Ibid., p. 182,11-13 
ىنعم مسا حيسملا لادحاو مظتني نم نيرهوج يأ ،نيمونق هلإ ،ناسنإو داحتاب ،فلاتئاو امك مظتني ىنعم دقعلا دحاولا رهاوج ةفلتخم نم ؤلؤل 
توقايو ريغو كلذ فيلأتب مظنلا. 
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individual entities, as the necklace and the one Messiah, combination refers to the individual 
entities which are rendered side by side. Here, we then witness a usage of i’tilÁf that diverges 
from atomistic implications. Let us now turn to ittiÎÁd and ittifÁq: “the same way it was not 
possible to call the divine or the human hypostasis by the name of the Messiah on their own 
without their coordination and unification in what they unified.”702 Coordination is 
synonymous to the combination of the previous example. The acts of coordination and 
unification are parallel; they result in the Messiah’s unity. The end of the sentence “in what 
they unified” implies that this unification is not absolute, i.e. not substantial, but there is an 
aspect in which the two are one. We may see ittiÎÁd as synonymous with ittiÌÁÆ, too: “at the 
time of unification and assumption…”703 The wider context is about the One Messiah, so 
assumption and unification may be understood as acts resulting in the unity. The term may 
appear in the proximity of ta’annus (and tadarruÝ), as well: “By His humanisation, i.e. taking 
the humanity up as a garment, the unification of the two became necessary, and the unity of 
the Messiah was set up by their combination.”704 Humanisation and incarnation were the first 
steps which brought forward the act of unification that resulted in the unity of the Messiah. 
This example puts the combination in parallel with unification, as well; and the result, i.e. 
unity, described by the term waÎdÁniyya can clearly be distinguished from the act, ittiÎÁd. We 
have seen above that incarnation makes this unification necessary, while dwelling does not,
705
 
so we will leave the examination of the locus in which the terms taÊassud and ÎulÙl appear in 
the proximity of unification out of consideration now. As for the accompanying term, 
tadarruÝ, it is a proof for ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Syrian origin, since this term is the 
arabization of a specifically Syriac (and Nestorian) term, lbéš.706 
Concluding we may say that ittiÎÁd in the usage of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is the 
hypostatical union of the Messiah’s two substances, or, as a parallel, it can denote the union of 
man’s body and soul. The term denotes an action, which results in the unity of the Messiah. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s Jacobite contemporary, AbÙ RÁ’iÔa uses this term in the sense 
of hypostatical union. As an example, let us see how he describes the unity of man, as a 
parallel for the unity of the Messiah: “the soul is soul forever, and the flesh is flesh forever. 
                                                          
702
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 183,7-8. 
كلذك مل نكي زوجي نأ لاقي ىلع مونق هللإا مونقو ناسنلإا ىلع امهدارفنا مسا حيسملا نود امهقافتا امهداحتاو اميف هيف ادحتا 
703
 Ibid. p. 196,18 
يف تقو ذاختلاا داحتلااو 
704
 Ibid. p. 197,10-11 
عمو هسنأت يأ هعردت بجو امهداحتا تماقو ةينادحو حيسملا امهفلاتئاب 
705
  C.f. Ibid., p. 201. 
706
 HAYEK, M., ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, La première somme de théologie chrétienne en langue arabe, ou deux 
apologies du Christianisme. In: Islamochristiana, (1976) 2, p. 93. 
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The complexity of these two different [hypostases] will not be two, but one, by way of 
unification.”707 It is the action that results in the unity of two hypostases. Let us see another 
one describing the unification of the Word with the flesh: “[the Word] and the flesh are one 
by real, permanent unification, without division concerning number and being called two; 
even if a substantial difference is attached to it, which is firm in it, as the firm presence of 
difference between the two-two substances: the Sun, the fire, the soul and those things by 
which they embodied.”708 Unification is thus the act, the way for union between a bodily and 
corporeal entity. It does not exclude the presence of two different substances in the unified 
outcome, but the two different entities are not to be counted as two, since there is always an 
aspect in which they form a union. His approach is similar to ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s one, even 
if his Monophysite approach shows in the “without division” aspect of this union. 
Among the Muslim authors, al-ËwÁrizmÐ is the first to define the term. He does so in 
the chapter on kalÁm, in a subdivision introducing the three denominations of Christians. His 
definition of union: “Union is a word derived from ‘one,’”709 comes right after the definition 
of uqnÙm, and is placed before nÁsÙt. With the exception of the first one in this line, i.e. 
uqnÙm, these terms are explained only in an etymological way, but no exact description is 
given. It shows that Muslim authors knew about Christian teachings, have read Christian 
theological or polemical works and recognized specific terms used by Christian authors. But 
their understanding might have been limited, since the definitions are not concentrating on the 
meaning of these terms, but only on their forms. 
Ibn SÐnÁ also defines ittiÎÁd. He does it in a differentiated way, saying that the same 
term is used for various concepts. First, ittiÎÁd refers to different things that have a feature in 
common, e.g. the bull and the man are both living entities.
710IttiÎÁd may also refer to different 
features that are unified in a single substrate, e.g. a single apple may have both smell and 
taste.
711
 A third reference of ittiÎÁd is when substrate and feature are unified in a single 
essence, e.g. the coming into being of man out of body (badan) and soul (nafs).
712
 In this 
description he shares ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation. Another denotation is the 
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 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 31. 
سفنلاف سفن   ادبأ دسجلاو دسج   ادبأ نم ريغ نأ نوكي بكرملا نم نيذه نيفلتخملا نينثا لب دحاو داحتلااب 
708
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-taÊassud, p. 34. 
 هل ًامزلا ًايرهوج ناقرف ناك نإو نينثا ىلإ وعديو ددعلا هيلع ىرجي ًانيابت نيابت لاب مئاد يقيقح داحتاب دحاو دسجلاو ]ةملكلا[ يهو توبثك هيف ًاتباث
مهب تمسجت نيذللاو سفنلاو رانلاو سمشلا يرهوج قرف 
709
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 90. 
دحاولا نم ةقتشم ةظفل داحتلاا 
710 IBN SÏNÀ, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd, p. 39. 
711
 Ibid. p. 40. 
712
 Ibid. 
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gathering of physical bodies (aÊsÁm) in a sequence or contiguity, or liaison.713 His definition 
is more elaborate than that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, but by his time philosophy and kalÁm 
were also more developed, so the variety of interpretations is not unexpected. As far as the 
hypostatical union is concerned, Christian authors might have played a role in its 
understanding. It is also to note that the union of body and soul, frequently used as a parallel 
either by Church Fathers or early Arab Christian authors is also recurrent here. The same fact 
may be confirmed if we take into consideration what is written by al-ÉurÊÁnÐ. He describes 
it as the unification of two essences, and then classifies it according to a unification of number 
in genus, species, property, mode, quantity; there is also a unification of sides/surfaces; 
attachment. It can also refer to a commixing of two existent beings in such a manner that they 
become one.
714
 Both authors define union in a detailed and differentiated way, it shows that 
by their time philosophy was more developed. But the basis or the core of these definitions 
may already be found in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s theological usage. 
 
d, wÁÎid – the One 
 
If we examine terms dealing with unity, then the term wÁÎid may also be of interest, 
since God’s unity is the essential teaching for both Christians and Muslims. Wolfson argues 
that kalÁm is “a system of religious philosophy based upon … scriptural presuppositions laid 
down by Philo.”715 In particular, Philo refers to the unity of God, which means the denial of 
polytheism and the denial of the dependence of God upon something else: that is the self-
sufficiency of God, the assertion that he alone is eternal, and that his unity means simplicity, 
excluding from him internal plurality. Wolfson also asserts that Christians
716
 accepted this 
conception of unity, and that the first Philonic conception of the unity of God, the denial of 
polytheism is also stressed by the Qur’Án, as well as the self-sufficiency of God.717  
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 Ibid. 
714
 al-ÉURÉÀNÏ, KitÁb al-TaÝrÐfÁt, pp. 18-19. 
داحتلاا عونلا يفو ،ةسناجم :ىمسي :سنجلا يف ،ًادعاصف نينثلاا نم ددعلا يف لاإ نوكي لاو ،ةدحاو نيتاذلا رييصت وه :ةصاخلا يفو ،ًةلثامم :
جولا دوهش وهو ،ةنزاوم :ءازجلأا عضو يفو ،ةبسانم :ةفاضلإا يفو ،ةقباطم :فارطلأا يفو ،ةاواسم :مكلا يفو ،ةهباشم :فيكلا يفو ،ةلكاشم دو
 لا ،هسفنب ًامودعم ،هب ًادوجوم ءيش لك نوك ثيح نم لكلا هب دحتيف ،قحلاب دوجوم لكلا يذلا ،قلطملا دحاولا قحلا ًاصاخ ًادوجو هل نإ ثيح نم
هو ،داحتلاا :ليقو .داحتلاا تاياهن لاصتلا ،ًادحاو ًائيش اريصي ىتح امهطلاتخاو نيئيشلا جازتما :داحتلاا :ليقو .لاحم هنإف ،هب دحتا ريغ نم لوقلا و
.ركفو ةيؤر 
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 WOLFSON, H. A.,The Philosophy of the Kalam, p. 74 
716
 ... and that only the assertion of absolute simplicity was rejected by Orthodox Christians – but it was accepted 
by heretics. C.f. Ibid., p. 75. 
717…God’s unity as meaning his being eternal alone and his absolute simplicity were partially accepted: both 
conceptions played an important role in controversy between Attributists and Antiattributists. C.f. Ibid., pp. 74-
75. 
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As for wÁÎid, the one, its establishment as a name of God in Christianity does not 
contradict the statement that there are three hypostases in the One and only God; its 
acceptance at the same time excludes polytheism. So Christianity had to solve the problem of 
the contradiction by defining what ‘one’ exactly is. Many Christian authors enlisted different 
types, categories of ‘one’ returning to what Aristotle said in his Topica,718 and established the 
types of One: as one in genus, one in species and one in number.
719
 This is exactly what AbÙ 
RÁ’iÔa does in his treatise titled FÐ al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas: “if we asked you about this, 
and you answered from how many aspects the one is described as one... we would know, you 
are right. So: do you say: one can only be established according to three aspects: genus or 
species or number?”720 This example offers a parallel that can be found at AbÙ ‘ÏsÁ al-
WarrÁq (d. 816?) a Muslim mutakallim, who lived in the same period, and who is attested to 
have engaged in polemics against Christians. In his treatise titled The Refutation of the Creed 
of the Three Christian Sects (Radd ‘ala al-×alÁ× firaq min al-NaÒÁrÁ) he made a rational 
and philosophical attempt to refute the Christian doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation of 
Jesus Christ.
721
 He also enumerates the kinds of one for defining wÁÎid: “on what foundation 
do some of them say: ‘one in substance’ or ‘one in class, type or property’ but not ‘one in 
number’”722 The example is of special interest, since al-WarrÁq aimed at the refutation not 
only of a “general Christian teaching”, but he turns to all the main denominations, to which 
the above-mentioned Christian authors belong. 
For Christianity, unity is in fundamental relation with God’s existence and his essence. 
That is: if God were not One, than He would not be God.
723
 On the subject of wÁÎid, ‘one,’ 
ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ does not define what ‘one’ means, but if we look at examples in his 
argumentation, we may find that he uses the term wÁÎid in the meaning of ‘one in his 
substance.’   
“if they said: if you made it necessary that all things are created and created in time, then what 
is the sign for their Creator’s and Producer’s being one, despite of their contrariety that we see 
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 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 170. (Reference is also made to it by KHOURY  in 
his BaÝÃ al-iÒÔilÁÎÁt al-falsafiyya wa-’l-lÁhÙtiyya, pp. 173-74.) 
719
 al-KHOURY, B., BaÝÃ al-iÒÔilÁÎÁt al-falsafiyya wa-’l-lÁhÙtiyya, ¹Ùniyya, al-Maktaba al-BÙlusiyya, 2006. 
p. 54. 
720
 ABØ RÀ’IÓA, FÐ al-×ÁlÙ× al-muqaddas  1-26. p. 5  
ول دق مكانلأس نع ،كلذ انومتبجأو ىلع مك وحن فصوي دحاولا   ادحاو  ...انملع مكنا نوقداص  ...فله نولوقت نإ دحاولا لاقي لاإ ىلع ةثلاث هجوأ :
امإ يف ،سنجلا امإو يف ،عونلا امإو يف ددعلا 
721
 al-WARRÀQ, AbÙ ÝÏsÁ, AbÙ ‘ÏsÁ al-WarrÁq's 'Against the Trinity'. Ed. and tr. THOMAS, David, 
Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1992, pp. 218. 
722
 Ibid. p. 154. (translation by Thomas, d., c.f. p. 153) 
لهو لصأ لوق سانلا وأ لوق نم لاق مهنم دحاو يف رهوجلا دحاوو يف سنجلا وأ دحاو يف عونلا وأ دحاو يف فصولا لاإ دحاولا يف ددعلا 
723
 al-KHOURY, B., al-MafÁhÐm Ýinda al-MasÐÎiyyÐn – AllÁh al-WÁÎid, ¹Ùniyya, al-Maktaba al-BÙlusiyya, 
2007. p. 39. 
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in this world? We would say the answer: what we see of the cooperation of these opposing 
things, which results in benefiting the world and those who are living in it, is the sign 
[showing] that their Creator and Organizer is One, Omnipotent, Wise, and not two opposing 
ones.”
724
  
God’s unity appears in the meaning of the opposite of multiplicity. Later on, in the 
second part of his book, he writes about the three hypostases (aqÁnÐm), too, but as the first, 
introductory part aims at demonstrating the Christian belief in the unity of God, as Creator, 
we may think of interaction from an another point of view, remembering what Wolfson said:   
“Muslims … continued assault upon the Christian doctrine of Trinity. … Christians under 
Muslim rule, … began to accommodate their doctrine of the Trinity to the Muslim doctrine of 
attributes. [And] began to argue that… there is no fundamental difference between the 
Christian persons of the Trinity and the Muslim attributes of God in their respective effects 
upon the unity of God in which both Christians and Muslims believe.”
725
  
Proving this unity is ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s aim in the above-mentioned quotation. 
Turning to Muslim books of definitions, we see that al-KindÐ gives a less detailed description 
of ‘one’ in comparison with his classification in the Refutation of the Christians.726 It may 
imply that Muslim philosophical thinking of the age is reflected in this short definition, while 
in a dispute with Christians the author is forced to deal with the question more thoroughly, 
and turn to the common source, the works of Aristotle. Al-ËwÁrizmÐ does not bring a 
definition for ‘One’, but uses it as a divine name, implying that this oneness is in close 
relation to his being the Creator, or the First cause; and everything else can be characterized 
by plurality in some respect.
727
 His description is more philosophical than ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s interpretation, since he refers to the Creator as the First cause, but in other respects, 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s ideas are paralleled here. Ibn FÙrak defines one on the basis of its 
impossibility to accept division or partition.
728
 It is again philosophical in approach, but this 
idea can also be found in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s theological description. Al-ÀmidÐ describes 
                                                          
724
 al-BAÑRÏ, ÝAmmÁr, KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, p. 100. 
نإو اولاق :نإف متبجوأ نأ ءايشلأا اهلك  ...ةقولخم ةثدحم ، اعيمج امف ليلدلا ىلع نأ اهقلاخ اهثدحمو دحاو لا ،نانثإ ىلع ام ىرن نم اهداضت يف 
؟ملاعلا انلق :باوجلا نأ يذلا ىرن نم نواعت ذهه قئلاخلا ةدداضتملا  ...اميف لوؤي ىلإ ةحلصم نأش ملاعلا ،هلهأو وه ليلدلا ىلع نأ اهقلاخ 
اهربدمو دحاو ،ردتقم ،ميكح لا نانثإ نامواقتم 
725
 WOLFSON, The Philosophy of the Kalam, pp. 81-82. 
726
 al-KINDÏ, RisÁla fÐ ÎudÙd al-ašyÁ’ wa-rusÙmihÁ, p. 168 
دحاولا وه يذلا لاب،لعف وهو اميف فصو هب   ةرات ضرعلاب 
727
 al-ËWÀRIZMÏ, MafÁtÐÎ al-ÝulÙm, p. 123. 
الله كرابت ىلاعتو زعو لاعو وه دجوم ملاعلا  وهو ببسلا لولأا ةلعلاو ىلولأا وهو دحاولا ،قحلاو امو هاوس لا ولخي نم ةرثك نم ةهج وأ تاهج 
728
 Ibn FØRAK, KitÁb al-ÍudÙd fÐ ’l-uÒÙl, p. 7. 
ا دحأزجتي لاو مسقني لا يذلا ءيشلا وه دحاول 
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one according to number, liasion, composition, species and genus. As it can be seen, his 
definition represents a later development, and is similarly elaborated as Ibn SÐnÁ’s ittiÎÁd.729 
 
Conclusion 
 
Concluding we may say that Christians argued for divine unity, but this differed from 
the absolute oneness of Islamic doctrine. This oneness was to be interpreted in another way, 
and in the Christian argumentations Greek philosophical triads could be seen implying 
oneness at the same time. This interpretation of divine Unity could not be agreed upon by the 
Muslim side. Christian reliance on scriptural evidence mostly included Biblical sources, but 
Muslims could not accept the same sources. We could see that Christian authors relied on 
Greek philosophical and patristic terms and interpretations; these were further developed in 
Arab Christian writings, and could be seen as preceding Muslim appearances in the majority 
of cases. In this field which is fundamental for both sides interaction can be discerned, either 
in an argumentative way, or on the level of terminology, and Christian influence is 
undeniable. 
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 al-ÀMIDÏ, al-MubÐn fÐ šarÎ maÝÁnÐ alfÁÛ al-ÎukamÁ’ wa-’l-mutakallimÐn, p. 114. 
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Conclusion 
 
 I demonstrated that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aºwiba is an 
important piece of Christian theology. It played an important role in the transmission of Greek 
wisdom and Hellenistic knowledge to the Muslim theology. I relied on various Arab Christian 
and Muslim sources, and examined their terminologies. On this basis, I demonstrated that 
these terminologies and the ideas expressed by them show similarities, and by comparing 
them I drew the conclusion that either Christian authors had influenced Muslim thought, or 
that both parties had relied on a shared tradition. I found remarkable the fact that the Christian 
authors of the ninth century had already had a ready set of terminology in Arabic.  
So the hypothesis I started with about the role of rhetorical or Christian schools in the 
transmission – which is the idea defended by M. Maróth – seems to be confirmed. He argues 
that the earliest transmission of Greek wisdom to Arabic had taken place in the milieu of the 
remnants of once rhetorical schools which turned to be the centers of education for Christians 
in the East. The examination of the KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba proves this, since I 
demonstrated that its terminology corresponds to Greek philosophical terminology, more 
specifically in the form these terms were used by Church Fathers in Patristic literature. I 
carried out a comparative terminological examination including contemporary and later 
Muslim sources, as well, in which I discovered further agreement, which may indicate direct 
influence in some cases or reliance on mutually known sources in other instances. 
 In the first chapter, I examined the concept of the intellect, referred to by the term 
Ýaql, which is the Arabic translation of the Greek philosophical terms ἡ φρόνησις, and ὁ νοῦς. 
In Patristic literature, these terms mean intellect, understanding; description of mind and its 
functions with reference to man’s distinctive nature: in relation to other faculties; particularly 
in relation to sense perception. Mind’s capacity for knowing God is often discussed; as well 
as mind between good and evil. In mind’s way to perfection divine assistance was referred to. 
I showed that in Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s analogy mind is God’s gift, a means for cognition, 
and as such, it is a faculty. It had a responsibility for choosing between right and wrong. In 
this, I showed that Patristic ideas are clearly reflected. Then I demonstrated that according to 
AbÙ RÁ’iÔa, faith goes beyond the capacity of the intellect, so man needs divine assistance. 
In this, I recognized another recurring Patristic theme. I analysed ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
usage, and found that he introduced intellect as a cause, a faculty, a disposition, an attribute, 
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and a quality. In the examples I examined, I found ideas that had already been present in 
Patristic literature, but ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s differentiated usage shows greater elaboration 
and development. In his argumentation, I pointed at the influence of rhetorical education. I 
found several examples for Christian influence on Muslims: e.g. Theodore AbÙ Qurra’s 
medical allegory shows an interaction between Christian and Muslim imageries. I realized 
that contemporary Muslim thought on Ýaql shows another approach, based on a different 
tradition. In the examination of Muslim definitions I highlighted those points that are present 
both in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s work and later Muslim definitions, as well: e.g. intellect’s 
being a faculty, a means of cognition, a distinctive feature of humankind, etc. These features 
could already be seen in Greek writings, then in Christian ones, and finally in Muslim works, 
in which I saw a proof for Christian transmission. Later Muslim authors represent a more 
elaborated stage of philosophy; but in their distinguished classifications the aspects 
emphasized by Christian authors are also included. 
In the second chapter I examined the following terms: Êirm, Êism, Êasad, badan; 
adjectival forms like ÊismÁnÐ and ÊasadÁnÐ; and derived forms like taÊassud, alongside 
with ittiÌÁÆ, ta’annus and ÎulÙl. I set up a hierarchy of meanings according to ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ, and I arrived at results as far as Christian role in transmission between Greek and 
Islamic cultures is concerned. In the case of the first term, Êirm, I demonstrated that 9th-
century Christian usage can be paralleled to Muslim usage of the same period, so a parallel 
development on the basis of Greek roots can be discerned. In the case of Êism, a differentiated 
Christian usage was introduced, which relies on Neo-Platonic and Patristic roots, but is further 
developed by this time in Christian authors’ works. A recurring range of ideas in later Muslim 
use may indicate a strong Christian influence. I found that Êasad is a Christian term: 
corresponding contemporary Muslim examples could not be found. It is the term that denotes 
the Messiah’s flesh, or sometimes human body. Since its appearance is early documented in 
Christian texts, while it cannot be found among Muslim definitions for a long time, a later 
Muslim appearance and interpretation may well be influenced by Christian usage. I found 
badan as a term denoting human body made up of elements, or sometimes as the human 
corporeal part of the Messiah. Its appearances at Christian authors, as well as at their Muslim 
contemporary, al-KindÐ, represent an early stage of terminological development; this parallel, 
and the one found at MuÝtazilÐ authors imply an analogous evolution of the term at both 
parties. I also showed that in the case of incarnation, interaction in the field of ideas had 
happened, especially in the emphasis of divine transcendence. I found that ideas and analogies 
used in the demonstration of incarnation echoed Patristic ideas in a more developed form. In 
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the case of ittiÌÁÆ, I observed a possible influence of Qur’Ánic terminology in the use of this 
term for expressing assumption. I found that ta’annus as a specifically Christian term 
developed from Patristic roots, while Christian ÎulÙl had an undeniable influence on later 
Muslim usage. 
 In the third chapter, I investigated terms referring to eternity or perpetuity, continuity. 
In every case, I demonstrated that the connotations of corresponding Greek, Patristic terms 
were recurrent in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation but his interpretation also shows a 
further development of these ideas. In case of two terms, baqÁ’ and sarmad scarce 
occurrences made a detailed analysis impossible. However, I discerned ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
being influenced by Patristic usage, as well as the fact that he preceded Muslim authors in the 
use of them; and I discovered that baqÁ’ in later Muslim authors’ usage resembles ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ’s azalÐ. I found all this as attesting to the early formation of terminology. I found 
that the only term described by a contemporary Muslim author is azalÐ, which made me 
confirm ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s pioneer role in this field. His use of qadÐm is synonymous to 
azalÐ: similar examples were observed. I showed that in his usage of qadÐm, ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ preceded Muslim authors. In the more detailed definitions of later authors, his ideas 
were recurrent, which may be a sign for Christian influence on Muslim thought. Given that 
Patristic ideas are developed by Christian authors, and that their ideas recur in later Muslim 
books, it shows that Christians are transmitters of ideas between Greek and Islamic cultures. 
 In the fourth chapter, I examined terms denoting creation. Through the examples of 
ibdÁ’ and ibtidÁ’ I showed that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ developed Patristic concepts, though a 
slight Qur’Ánic parallel can also be observed in his usage of the term. Examining Muslim 
authors’ definitions I found that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ had preceded them in this field. In the 
usage of ibdÁÝ and ibtidÁÝ I found that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ relied and carried on Greek and 
Patristic ideas as far as he used this term in the meaning of engendering. A Qur’Ánic parallel 
could be found in this case, as well. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is among the earliest authors to have 
used this term. His contemporary, al-KindÐ emphasizes the ex nihilo approach, and it is 
mentioned by later Muslim authors, too. I showed that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s ideas expressed 
by this term are shared by later Muslim authors, which implies Muslim-Christian interaction 
in its formation. I examined different forms derived from the root Î-d-×. I also demonstrated 
that the meaning of corresponding Greek terms is recurrent in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage. 
IÎdÁ×, when a source, or entity, Ýayn, or when a substance, Êawhar are mentioned as the One 
who carries this action out, it is closer to philosophical terminology and interpretation. When 
it is God, or God, the Logos (especially in the case of incarnation), theological aspects are 
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stronger. The contemporary author, al-KindÐ uses the term ÎÁdi× in the meaning of 
‘occurring, created in time,’ so some parallels could be observed. Later authors’ definitions 
show similarities with ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation: i.e. creation/createdness in time, 
though some of them, like al-ËwÁrizmÐ approach them as kalÁm terms, while others, like 
Ibn FÙrak, are rather philosophical in defining them. On the basis of Ibn SÐnÁ’s definition, 
which introduced iÎdÁ× as a kind that happens in time and another kind which has no relation 
to time, I demonstrated that the first meaning is usually represented in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s 
book, as well. On the basis of the other kind, which is concentrating on the emanation of 
existence without respect to time, I drew a parallel with what ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in 
particular, and all Christian authors in general write on the emanation of existence out of time 
(either in the case of the Son who has always been born of the Father; or the Spirit). I found it 
possible that Christian understanding of the emanation of existence might have influenced 
Muslim thought in this field. Later Muslim definitions were found to be similar to ÝAmmÁr 
al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation in general terms, but it was demonstrated that later Muslim use is 
more specific. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage already includes those two meanings that can be 
discerned at later Muslim thinkers: the existence of a thing, after its nonexistence, in a 
temporal extension, i.e. al-ÎudÙ× al-zamÁnÐ; and contingency: a being's existing after not 
having existed, in an ontological or essential extension, which does not necessarily involve 
time, i.e. al-ÎudÙ× al-ÆÁtÐ. His usage shows parallels with mutakallims’ usage of ‘a 
beginning in time’ as a basis for proving the existence of God. So in this case it is quite 
probable that Christian authors in general, and ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, influenced 
later Muslim interpretations; but at least, they represent a transition between the two. In the 
case of iÌtirÁÝ I demonstrated that apparently ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ used the term before its 
having been defined as an idiom of a special connotation by Muslim authors. In the case of 
Ìalq, ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ does not seem to have used the term in a firm, strictly limited sense, 
as far as ex nihilo is concerned, just only as a term that refers to a kind of creative action. 
Greek and Patristic ideas are carried on as far as “making” is concerned, but Islamic parallels 
could also be found in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage when he used the term to refer to the 
production of something out of something else. I found that a possible explanation for this 
may be that his age is a period when the terminologies of theology and philosophy were on 
their way to separation. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s use of the term was examined in different 
contexts: I set up a classification of eight differing subsections. I showed that he developed 
and enriched the concept he had inherited from Church Fathers. I also contrasted his use of 
the term with its appearances in Muslim books of definitions: and found that though Ìalq is a 
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Qur’Ánic term, it appears relatively late in Muslim usage if compared with Christian one. I 
found that Muslim usage can be paralleled to his interpretation where Ìalq is not considered to 
be ex nihilo. The third theme around which ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s examples could be grouped 
is the idea that the created world is a reflection, a sign, or a proof of the existence of the 
Creator, which is an important idea in Muslim thought, too, and I considered this a common 
development of thought. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s idea of “first” and “second” creation may 
rather be paralleled to Muslim usage of ibtidÁ’ and ibdÁÝ; it is not the word Ìalq which is 
used by Muslim thinkers to refer to this contrast, but the idea is present in both cases. As for 
the synonyms in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s text that appear alongside the term Ìalq, we have seen 
instances where they appear in Muslim definitions, too, though, given that definition needs to 
clarify the accurate use of a term, these terms are used in order to contrast Ìalq with, not as 
synonyms. We need to remark, finally, that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s differentiated use of the 
term already in the 9
th
 century is not paralleled in contemporary Muslim usage, so we may 
think of his or more generally of Christian influence in the formation of its interpretation in 
later Muslim usage. I showed that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s interpretation and use of ÒanÝa is 
parallel to the Greek use of corresponding terms. Appearances that denote a creative action 
were mostly concentrated on, but examples for ‘conduct’ in general were also cited.  I 
examined this term in the framework of the same classification that was used in the case of 
Ìalq, and I found that the two terms are synonymous in ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s usage. Muslim 
authors did not define it, so I demonstrated that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ is earlier to have used 
the term. In the case of takwÐn I showed that the ninth-century Nestorian author preceded 
Muslim authors in his use of the term in a stricter theological-philosophical sense. 
Contemporary parallel is offered by early Muslim occult writings. However, takwÐn was 
used first by MÁturÐdÐ theologians extensively to the point where they believed takwÐn to 
be the eighth essential attribute of God. Even though not present among his definitions, Ibn 
SÐnÁ used it later and in his footsteps, ÑÙfÐs and AšÝarÐs used it as well especially to 
express the divine command “kun.” Christian precedence in using this term may have 
influenced its interpretation on the Muslim side. In the case of inšÁ’, seemingly Christian 
usage, or that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ in particular, preceded the term’s appearance at Muslim 
authors with a clearly delineated meaning – as far as it is possible to judge it on the basis of 
books of definitions. However, I brought an example of the Qur’Án, in order to demonstrate 
that ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ might have used this term due to its being a part of Muslim religious 
terminology, acceptable and intelligible for his opponents. 
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 In the fifth chapter, I demonstrated that Patristic ideas are carried on in Christian 
authors’ works. The correlative use of fatherhood and sonship is a characteristic feature of 
both Greek and Arab Christian authors. However, it is to be noted that Arab Christian authors 
either emphasize that the nature of this relation is not biological, in order to explain to 
Muslims what they mean by this, or they implicitly do so, when referring to fatherhood and 
sonship as properties, which differentiate between the hypostases but do not affect the unity of 
the divine substance. Examples of early polemics show that vivid interaction accompanied 
this teaching, so alongside an exchange of ideas, terms used by Christians could also reach 
Muslim opponents (and vice versa). 
In the sixth chapter, I showed that Christians argued for divine unity, but this differed 
from the absolute oneness of Islamic doctrine. This oneness was to be interpreted in another 
way, and in the Christian argumentations Greek philosophical triads could be seen implying 
oneness at the same time. This interpretation of divine Unity could not be agreed upon on the 
Muslim side. Christian reliance on scriptural evidence mostly included Biblical sources. I 
showed that Christian authors relied on Greek philosophical and Patristic terms and 
interpretations; these were further developed in Arab Christian writings, and could be seen as 
preceding Muslim appearances in the majority of cases. In this field which is fundamental for 
both sides interaction can be discerned, either in an argumentative way, or on the level of 
terminology, and Christian influence is undeniable.  
It is admitted that Christian authors use more frequently the theological terminology. 
The books examined, and especially that of ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, relate more to kalÁm than to 
philosophy, although the philosophical influence on some materials is evident. In my view, 
this is the case because the adversaries in the debates were Muslim theologians. It is expected 
that Christian authors address them according to their vocabulary. Had they used a clearly 
philosophical terminology, with which they were familiar, they would have been objected. 
Furthermore, their aim is apologetic. They debate to defend the Christian belief and to 
invalidate the Muslim creed. 
Apart from the examination of the terms, I benefited from my examples in order to 
draw attention to the Christian authors’ argumentation. E.g., we could see that ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s second-figure syllogism shows perfect agreement with the one accepted in rhetorical 
argumentation. Greek and Patristic analogies, topoi, and imageries were also referred to, 
which attested to Christian authors’ reliance on rhetorical traditions. However, I also 
demonstrated, that for being a dialectician, ÝAmmÁr al-BasrÐ had to use the terms and 
reasoning of his opponents, too. 
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We may thus conclude that either as the performers of translations, or heirs to a 
tradition not known to Muslims till the end of the 10
th
 and the beginning of the eleventh 
century, or as genuine thinkers, Christian authors show characteristics of a deep conceptual 
and terminological knowledge not paralleled by Muslims in the ninth century. ÝAmmÁr al-
BaÒrÐ’s book is one of the earliest pieces of theology written in Arabic. For this reason, an 
intercession of philosophical and theological terminologies has happened in his works. 
Having borrowed philosophical and theological terms and transmitting them to later Muslim 
theologians, he makes the case of a bridge between Christianity and Islam.  
I aimed at demonstrating that Arab Christian theology plays an important role in the 
transmission and in the development of ideas and corresponding terms. The example of 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ shows that an examination of an Arab Christian corpus with numerous 
sources could contribute to a better understanding of this major state of the beginning of 
philosophy and kalÁm, and it could add to a more accurate knowledge of the history of 
beginning of Arabic and Islamic prose. 
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Epilogue 
 
The present dissertation aimed at a terminological analysis in order to confirm the thesis 
introduced in the foreword. These terms were selected from among a much wider range of 
terms, and were limited to these selected ones only for the sake of brevity. I am aware that 
other philosophical and kalÁm terms could have been investigated, offering significant 
results: they will be the theme of my future research. 
I have not dealt with theological issues: a comparative analysis of Christian denominations as 
far as their apologies and terminologies are concerned is also a topic of future elaboration.  
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Summary 
 
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aºwiba is an important piece of Christian 
theology. It played a major role in the transmission of Greek wisdom and Hellenistic 
knowledge to the Muslim theology. The terminological comparison of this piece in particular 
and Arabic Christian sources in general with Muslim ones shows that sometimes Christian 
authors had influenced Muslim thought, or that both parties had relied on a shared tradition. It 
is remarkable that the Christian authors of the ninth century had already had a ready set of 
terminology in Arabic. The hypothesis about the role of rhetorical or Christian schools in the 
transmission is confirmed by the examination of the KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba, since its 
terminology corresponds to Greek philosophical terminology, more specifically in the form 
these terms were used by Church Fathers in Patristic literature. In contemporary and later 
Muslim sources there are further examples for agreement, which may indicate influence in 
some cases, or reliance on mutually known sources in other instances. The comparative 
examination is carried out in six chapters: the term of the intellect; terms of bodily 
connotations; terms referring to eternity; terms denoting creation; correlative use of 
fatherhood and sonship; and divine unity are examined. In Christian authors’ usage, 
continuity with Greek philosophical and Patristic terms can be discerned, however, these are 
further elaborated. Several examples for Christian influence on Muslims can be found; 
features that could already be seen in Greek writings, then in Christian ones, and finally in 
Muslim works, form a proof for Christian transmission. The majority of terms used by 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ show reliance on Neo-Platonic and Patristic roots even if they are further 
developed. In some cases parallel appearance of the terms at Muslim authors can be 
discerned, so parallel development on the basis of Greek roots could be seen. In other 
instances Muslims began using terms later than Christian authors: a recurring range of ideas 
in later Muslim use may imply a strong Christian influence on Muslim thought. In a minority 
of cases specifically Christian terms can be found, while others reflect a possible influence of 
Qur’Ánic terminology on Christian usage. Examples for early Muslim-Christian polemics are 
also mentioned, which attests to a vivid interaction. It is admitted that Christian authors use 
more frequently the terminology of theologians. The books examined, and especially that of 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ, relate more to kalÁm than to philosophy although the philosophical 
influence on some materials is evident. The adversaries in the debates were Muslim 
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theologians, so it is expected that Christian authors address them according to their 
vocabulary. Had they used a clearly philosophical terminology, with which they were 
familiar, they would have been objected. Furthermore, their aim is apologetic. They debate to 
defend the Christian belief and to invalidate the Muslim creed. Apart from the examination of 
the terms, the Christian authors’ argumentation is examined, which, in some cases, shows 
perfect agreement with earlier forms of rhetorical argumentation. Greek and Patristic 
analogies, topoi, and imageries were also referred to, which attested to Christian authors’ 
reliance on rhetorical traditions. Concluding: either as the performers of translations, or heirs 
to a tradition not widely known to Muslims till a later age, or as genuine thinkers, Christian 
authors show characteristics of a deep conceptual and terminological knowledge not 
paralleled by Muslims in the ninth century. ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ’s book is one of the earliest 
pieces of theology written in Arabic, which, having borrowed philosophical and theological 
terms and transmitting them to later Muslim theologians makes the case of a bridge between 
Christianity and Islam. 
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Összefoglalás 
 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aºwiba c. műve a keresztény teológia egyik 
fontos darabja, mely jelentős szerepet játszhatott abban a folyamatban, mely a hellenisztikus 
és görög műveltséget a muszlim teológia számára elérhetővé tette. Ennek a műnek, 
átlalánosságban pedig más kortárs arab munkáknak az összehasonlítása a muszlim forrásokkal 
azt bizonyítja, hogy az arab keresztény szerzők egyes esetekben hatottak a muszlim 
gondolkodásra, máskor pedig azt látjuk, hogy a két fél terminológiája közös forrásokra 
támaszkodva, párhuzamosan fejlődött. Fontos megjegyezni, hogy a kilencedik századi arab 
keresztény írók már kész terminológiai rendszerrel dolgoztak. Az az előföltevés, mely szerint 
a retorikai (keresztény) iskolák szerepet játszottak a hagyományozásban, megerősíthető a 
KitÁb al-MasÁ’il wa-’l-aÊwiba vizsgálata alapján. Terminológiája egyezést mutat a korábbi 
görög filozófiai terminusokkal, különösen abban a formában, ahogy ezek az egyházatyák 
műveiben is megjelentek. Kortárs és későbbi muszlim forrásokban is találunk terminológiai 
egyezéseket, ami lehet annak jele, hogy a keresztény irodalom hatott a muszlimra, de azt is 
jelezheti, hogy a két fél azonos forrásokra támaszkodott. A disszertációban elvégzett 
összehasonlító terminológiai vizsgálat hat fejezetre osztható: intellektus; testi jelentéssel bíró 
terminusok; örökkévalóság; teremtés; atyaság és fiúság; egység. A keresztény szerzők 
terminushasználatában megfigyelhető, hogy a görög filozófiai, illetve az egyházatyák által 
képviselt vonulalot követik, fejlesztik tovább. Több olyan példa is felsorakoztatható, mely a 
keresztény írók muszlim teológusokra gyakorolt hatását mutatják, illetve közvetítő szerepüket 
a görög és muszlim gondolatkörök között: az először görögben, majd arab keresztény íróknál, 
később muszlimoknál megjelenő fogalmak és terminusok ezt a közvetítő szerepet igazolják. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ legtöbb terminusa a neoplatonikus és egyházatyai hagyományokra épül, 
ezeket fejleszti tovább. Egyes esetekben azt látjuk, a terminus a muszlimoknál is ugyanekkor, 
hasonló jelentéssel jelenik meg: ezek a példák a közös görög alapokon nyugvó, párhuzamos 
fejlődést mutatják. Más terminusok esetében megfigyelhető, hogy a muszlimok később kezdik 
használni őket, ami, a jelentésbeli egyezésekkel együtt, keresztény hatást enged feltételezni. 
Az esetek kisebb hányadában kifejezetten keresztény terminusokkal is találkozhatuk, míg 
mások koráni hatásra engednek következtetni. A korai muszlim-keresztény hitviták azt 
bizonyítják, hogy a vitatott kérdésekben élénk eszmecsere folyt a két fél között, melynek 
során fogalmaik ütköztek, terminológiájuk, érveléstechnikájuk pedig hatott a másikra. A 
keresztény szerzők elsősorban teológiai terminusokkal élnek, még ha a filozófiai hatások 
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nyilvánvalóak is. Az ellenfelek muszlim teológusok voltak, tehát a filozófiai helyett a 
teológiai terminológiát kellett használni. A célkitűzés apologetikus: a keresztény hit védelme, 
a muszlim tanítások cáfolata a cél. A példák lehetőséget adnak a terminusok mellett az érvelés 
vizsgálatára is, aminek eredményeképp a korábbi görög retorikai formákkal való egyezés 
mutatható ki számos esetben. Összességében elmondható, hogy akár fordítókként, akár egy 
olyan hagyomány örököseiként, mely a muszlim szerzők számára később vált általánosan 
ismertebbé, a keresztény szerzők olyan mértékű elméleti és terminológiai tudással 
rendelkeztek a kilencedik században, mely a muszlim oldalon még egy ideig nem jelenik meg. 
ÝAmmÁr al-BaÒrÐ könyve a legkorábbi arab nyelvű teológiai művek egyike, mely korábbi 
filozófiai-teológiai termiusokat továbbfejlesztve, s azokat a muszlim félnek továbbadva a 
kereszténység és az iszlám közti közvetítő szerepe miatt az egyik legjelentősebb korai arab 
prózai mű.  
 
